



THIEU & HUONG WITH MONTAGNARDS
Mountain dew and *déjà vu*.

Highland Reconciliation

Bamboo flutes tweedled, brass gongs thrummed, and Montagnard maidens twisted ceremonial copper bracelets round the wrists of President Nguyen Van Thieu, Premier Tran Van Huong and other South Vietnamese dignitaries. Stoically, the visitors sipped from the brimming urns of *mnam kpie*, a sour-tasting homemade rice wine. Then they moved on to lunch in the comfortable former summer residence of exiled Emperor Bao Dai, in the highland provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot. The Saigon dignitaries, together with a host of American officials, were joining in ceremonies marking what they hoped would be the end of a tribal rebellion. It was a gala occasion, albeit marked by a certain sense of *déjà vu*.

Viet Nam's Montagnards have never mixed well with the Vietnamese, who tend to scorn them as savages. French colonial authorities generally left the Montagnards alone. Few Vietnamese display much interest in or knowledge of the roughly 1,000,000 tribesmen living in the remote, heavily jungled high plateaus. The Montagnards take a lot of knowing, for they comprise an extraordinarily complex ethnolinguistic mixture numbering at least 20 tribes and many more splinter groupings. They have for centuries resisted the cultural influences of the Sinitic and Hindu peoples that have flooded into the Indo-Chinese peninsula. Saigon leaders, from President Ngo Dinh Diem through General Nguyen Khanh and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, had gone through similar ceremonies previously in attempts to rally the Montagnards to Saigon's cause—without success. Instead, Montagnard sentiments gradually coalesced around an organization known as FULRO (Front Unifié de Lutte des Races

Opprimées, or The United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races).

Determined Drive. FULRO's strength has been considerably augmented by troopers trained by U.S. Special Forces teams, which since 1963 have been turning tribesmen into skillful jungle fighters in increasing numbers. Once trained and equipped, the "yards" (short for Montagnards) displayed an unhappy tendency to join FULRO when their enlistment was up, feeling that the Saigon government posed more problems for them than the Viet Cong. Last year Saigon officials mounted another determined drive to bring FULRO over to their side, and the Ban Me Thuot ceremonies testified to the partial success of that effort.

At least 2,500 FULRO troopers agreed to end their rebellion, in return for pledges of better treatment from the Saigon government. Thieu promised that they would "be accepted with equality. You have returned in justice because your aspirations have been met." The Montagnards will be given a voice in the provincial governments and be allowed their own military units. But there was a distinct cloud over the ceremonies: FULRO Leader Y Bham Enuol, who had reportedly given full assent to the agreement, was the prisoner of a splinter group of FULRO dissidents in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. Without Y Bham, who is venerated by Montagnards, the chances of a genuine reconciliation in the highlands remained tenuous at best.

TANZANIA

Murder by the Book

Eduardo Mondlane was a revolutionary, and the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) he headed was one of black Africa's more effective independence movements. Tall, handsome Mondlane was also a scholar who loved the bookish academic world he abandoned just six years ago, and it is clear that his enemies knew their man all too well. Last week an expertly built bomb killed him as he worked at an American friend's villa in Dar es Salaam. The bomb had come to him concealed in a book.

His assassination was the culmination of some 18 months of increasing difficulties within Frelimo's leadership. Mondlane himself, educated in South Africa, Portugal and the U.S. (an Oberlin College graduate, with a Ph.D. from Northwestern University), was damned as a moderate by more radical leaders. Frelimo's military operations in Mozambique reflected these difficulties. The tempo of combat has dropped in recent months, or so the Portuguese claim, but Frelimo's estimated 8,000 well-trained guerrillas (most of them Mozambicans trained in Tanzania and supported from that country) are tying down more than 40,000 Portuguese regulars. The major centers of Frelimo activity are in northern Mozambique,



JANET & EDUARDO MONDLANE (AUGUST 1967)
Enemies in both blocs.

where the rebels fully control three districts: the area around Tete, on the Zambezi River in the northwest and on the Muêda plateau in the north.

As in any guerrilla war, the fighting can be vicious, and Mondlane, a gentle and cultivated man, seemed to some of those he met remarkably out of character as the leader of such a movement. Perhaps his single greatest talent lay in wangling aid from both the Communist and capitalist worlds: "I get weapons from the East and money from the West," he told a TIME correspondent last year.

Radical Target. But he had enemies in both ideological blocs as well. He believed that he was marked for death by Portugal's secret police (PIDE), who knew him as the most direct threat to continued Portuguese control over his native Mozambique. He was also a target for radical Mozambicans who look to Communist China for inspiration. In March 1968, angry radicals forced the temporary closing of the Mozambique Institute, headed by Mondlane's American wife Janet, and two months later a Frelimo central committee member was stabbed to death in a pitched battle for control of Frelimo's headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

One of Mondlane's enemies linked to the factional clashes was Father Mateus Gwengere, a militant Catholic priest who fled Mozambique in mid-1967 and since then had consistently opposed Mondlane. Last July, however, Mondlane seemed to have reconciled all the opposing factions within Frelimo. After persuading them that continued conflict could only harm their common cause, he went on to stage party elections in a "liberated area" of northern Mozambique. It was a dramatic propaganda victory, and Mondlane was confirmed as head of Frelimo. Nevertheless he was

forced to expand the membership of Frelimo's executive committee to pacify his rivals.

PIDE's Death List. Now Frelimo faces another severe internal struggle to choose Mondlane's successor. The leading contenders are Rev. Uria Simango, Mondlane's bearded vice president, and Marcelino dos Santos, his external affairs minister. Simango leans toward Peking, dos Santos toward Moscow, and a prolonged struggle between them could damage Frelimo severely. Nothing, of course, would please Portugal (and PIDE) more, and some Frelimo spokesmen believe that PIDE is behind a plot to wipe out the front's leadership. Certainly, Frelimo leaders have an undisputed penchant for dying of unnatural causes. Only six weeks ago, the deputy chief of Frelimo's armed forces in Mozambique was shot dead under mysterious circumstances, and the murder two years before of a close Mondlane associate has never been solved. Simango himself is said to be on PIDE's death list.

In Lisbon, the controlled Portuguese press blamed Mondlane's murder on the "extreme left-wing faction," but skeptics doubted that version. A source close to Premier Marcello Caetano's government made no secret of his feeling that Mondlane was "a moderate, a man we could eventually talk to, and his disappearance is a loss." In black Africa, the press hailed Mondlane as an outstanding liberation leader, and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere said that "the best way of crying for him is to increase our efforts for the liberation of Africa." As far as Frelimo goes, at any rate, those efforts have been badly damaged by Mondlane's murder.

PERU

Challenging the U.S.

Peru seems headed toward a major diplomatic showdown with the U.S. that could produce serious repercussions throughout South America. It is a highly paradoxical crisis that neither side really wants—or can avoid. The dispute centers on a Standard Oil of New Jersey subsidiary, International Petroleum Co., whose Peruvian oilfields and refinery were seized last October by the country's new military regime, headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The pretext: that I.P.C. years ago had illegally acquired its oil concession in Peru.

Aware of the highly charged nationalistic feelings involved in the I.P.C. case, the U.S. asked only that the junta pay Standard Oil a fair price for I.P.C.'s properties (Peru's Supreme Court had earlier set the figure at \$142 million). If it does not, as the Peruvians well know, the U.S. would be forced under the provisions of the Hickenlooper Amendment to suspend its economic aid to Peru within six months after the seizure unless promising negotiations for equitable compensation

are under way. At present, U.S. aid amounts to \$34 million a year plus another \$45 million in preferential purchases of Peruvian sugar.

Last week, in a highly emotional television and radio address, General Velasco virtually foreclosed any possibility of a negotiated settlement. In an obvious bid to win the support of other nationalist army officers and businessmen, Velasco asserted that I.P.C. owes Peru \$690.5 million for all the oil that it has pumped from Peruvian soil. To recover at least a part of that sum, representing I.P.C.'s entire gross sales for the past 44 years, Velasco plans to auction off the company's properties within the next 40 days.

Left Face. Velasco and his colleagues appear to be committed to a collision course. They can hardly back down from such an extreme stand without to-



GENERAL VELASCO ADDRESSING NATION
Committed to a collision.

tally losing face in Peru. After all, they overthrew President Fernando Belaúnde Terry largely because he failed to execute an outright takeover of I.P.C., settling on a compromise instead. In his speech, Velasco defiantly declared that Peru was willing to accept the consequences of its actions and denounced the impending application of the Hickenlooper Amendment as "economic aggression." In addition, Velasco appealed to other Latin American countries to support Peru in its confrontation with the U.S. because "if they do not demonstrate firmness and unity, tomorrow other countries will succumb to [U.S.] economic pressure."

In a transparent maneuver, the Peruvian generals have tried to prevent the U.S. from applying the Hickenlooper Amendment by doing an abrupt left face in their foreign policy. In the past four months, Lima's military regime has established diplomatic or commercial re-

lations with Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Two weeks ago, the Peruvians agreed to exchange ambassadors with the Soviet Union, leaving only three South American countries (Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela) that do not have diplomatic ties with Russia.

Unlikely to Be Lost. Sensing an opening, the Soviets immediately dispatched a five-man economic mission to Lima with promises of economic aid and help in running Peru's oil industry. It is an open question exactly how much aid the Soviets could render, but their apparent willingness to help Peru has spurred Ecuador to invite the Soviet mission to drop by for talks and has caused Bolivia to take a more active interest in Soviet offers.

Other South Americans are closely watching the events in Peru. Five of the continent's major countries are ruled by military regimes of various types that tend to emulate one another. If the Peruvians, aided by the Soviets, are able to exert their independence of the U.S. and get away with it, their example is unlikely to be lost on the other generals who today rule more than three-quarters of South America's people.

BRAZIL

Annual Vibrations

Carnaval, as everyone knows, is the time when Brazil plunges into the world's biggest binge, a wild four-day pageant driven by the intoxicating beat of the samba. There are no politics to *carnaval*, and no Brazilian government—however tough-minded—would dare deny its people their great annual excursion into fun and fantasy (see box following page). Yet there is a slightly unreal air to Brazil this week, as *carnaval* dances toward its pre-Lent climax. Since the military crackdown last December, Brazilians have had to put up with a tough, moralistic, even prudish regime. While revelers are putting the final touches on their colorful *fantasias*, the stunning costumes that give *carnaval* its color, the dour government of President Arthur da Costa e Silva continues its purges and its arrests. Scores of Brazilians are in jail, and some will sit out *carnaval* in virtual exile, on the lonely island of Ilha Grande, 70 miles off the coast.

Stand-by Alert. On the surface, it hardly seems to matter. Along Avenida Rio Branco in Rio de Janeiro large stylized figures decorate the curbs, bird cages in their outstretched hands. Huge, brightly colored sunflowers float above the traffic amid a profusion of plastic hummingbirds, cardinals and canaries. "Mother's Heart," an outsized paddy wagon so named "because there is always room for one more," is on stand-by alert—although the cops will haul away only the rowdiest of cariocas.

There are really two festivals, one for the rich and another for the poor. For the poor, *carnaval* takes place in