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Dr. Franz Schurman, director for the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, and co-author of "The Politics of Escalation, speaking at the University of California, August 4, 1966, under the auspices of The ~~Community~~ ^{Community} for New Politics, on Objectives of American Policy in Southeast Asia. broadcast by KPFA, Berkeley, October 16, 1966.

..... I would like to suggest that what we are beginning to see in America is the development of something I would call the para-state -- para, which in Greek means alongside of -- the state alongside the state. It was Hans Frankel who wrote a book on Nazi Germany called The Dual State. This dual state or para-state phenomenon, you found in Nazi Germany and you found in Japan. In some strange way Japan -- imperialist, militarist Japan -- seems a better analogy to the present United States than does Nazi Germany for a variety of reasons. Japan, in contrast to what most people think, was actually, well into the 1930s, a rather liberal country. Liberal in the 19th century European sense. It had a parliamentary system, it had civil government. I've brought along this recent history of Japan, which brings out this point again, that life in Japan was not totalitarian -- in fact some people maintain ~~that life in Japan was never totalitarian, even~~ there never was any Japanese totalitarianism, even during the period of militarism. The courts continued to function, even political oppression in Japan was not that great. I have many friends who were marxists and leftists who continued to teach -- they had to be rather quiet during the war, but were not imprisoned. In other words, this was in considerable distinction to Nazi Germany. Put outside of Japan, in Manchuria and ⁱⁿ Korea, there grew up a military -- an army that was almost independent of Tokyo, fascist in tendency, militarist, violent, mad, that carried out the original invasion of China, that in fact occupied Manchuria without the Tokyo government exactly knowing what was going on -- but, it needs to be pointed out that ~~the~~ the Tokyo government always supported what the Kwantung Army did, and what the Korean Army did. But that you suddenly got a military system, in this ~~case~~ ^{of} outside Japan which finally became ^{so} powerful, so massive, which seized power through assassinations and through all kinds of

skullduggery, and finally did away with Japanese liberalism, foisted a militarist dictatorship, pushed Japan into war and of course final disaster. I would also maintain from my very limited knowledge of the political system of Nazi Germany, that a rather similar phenomenon occurred in Nazi Germany -- not right away, not in '33, but in '35 and '36, after Hitler broke with the left wing of the Nazi Party, the Stroesser ~~and Ruz~~ wing, and Rhoem. But there too you had a massive dual state growing up. Remember that in Germany during even the worst periods the civil courts continued to function. Somehow remnants of the Weimar system remained, but alongside of it you had the political courts -- the volks _____ and all these horrible phenomena, not to mention the Gestapo, the Waffen SS and all the other horrors which finally came into being.

Because what I'm bringing up here is a problem ^{of} in modern politics -- what I'd like to call the -- I've called it the para-state; perhaps ^{also} one can/call it the polity of the split personality. We have today a military establishment that is so powerful, so incredible, that it consumes about one tenth of the gross national product and perhaps even more. But even more dangerous than that, ^{this polity} this parastate, this defense department and the CIA and all the other agencies that are concerned with quote foreign policy unquote -- we still like to use the euphemism -- of rationality -- that ^{this} parastate has no real ties to society. We hardly see soldiers, we know nothing about the pentagon, we don't even know who the joint chiefs of staff are; they're faceless. And yet we know they ~~can~~ conjure up planned scenarios of escalation, as Fulbright once said. We can't even under stand their language. I heard Arthur Godfrey the other night lampooning their ~~talk~~ pentagon talk, and it was absolutely correct, what he said -- no one can understand it, and it has no ties to the polity in which we exist at the present time. And yet it consumes one -tenth of the gross national product. No one can tell me that something as massive as that is under civilian control, as it has been put traditionally -- namely that MacNamara is a civilian ~~in~~ and that President Johnson,

in his infinite wisdom, maintains civilian control. (Laughter).

A pinhead on top of a massive monster, I think, has limited capability of controlling what's below it. (Laughter, applause).

Maurice des Vergiers -- again, a ~~slightly~~ somewhat slightly centrist French political scientist, de Gaullist, wrote an article on America in which he said: What you have today in America ~~today~~ is a split between le fascisme exterieur (external fascism) and la democracie interieur (domestic democracy). And he said the question is, which is going to win? Is domestic democracy, with its American ideals and values -- values that derive from the founding fathers and the rationality of the 18th century, that have created the most prosperous and most affluent nation in the world, and that have given ideals -- it's amazing even when you go to the Soviet Union and talk to people from Communist China how this sense of American ideals still is deep, even in a country like Communist China. Edgar Snow points out that Mao Tze-tung still believes in the rationality of America. The reason he believes is ~~that~~ ^{because} the Chinese foreign ministry is full of American- and English-educated people, despite the purges, and they tell him, well, American politics has Republicans and Democrats and interest groups and so on -- you know, they still reflect what is the essential rationality of liberal democracy. In fact, Mao told Edgar Snow in January of 1965: The United States is not going to attack North Viet Nam; Secretary Rusk has assured us that they wouldn't do it. And of course within a short time they did.

I think des Vergiers, in his distinction between foreign fascism and internal democracy, has hit upon this split personality, this parastate. We here in America, in the University of California, all throughout America, we live in la democracie interieur. It's a good society, police don't beat us up for the most part unless we happen to be some of the underprivileged minorities, but those of us who are here in this part of -- at least on this side of Telegraph -- we live, we get good salaries, we lead decent lives, and so on. And the polity

still, as far as the civilian society is concerned -- even though funds for poverty programs are cut back and so on -- is decent, far more decent than anything than anything in Japan and Germany was, and I think it's important to remember that. And yet what is going on abroad is genocide, militarism, pursuit ~~and~~ of mad and irrational goals. I don't understand what le fascisme exterieur is exactly, but I know it exists, and I think it's something that a lot more thought has to be given to.

I think in some strange way President Johnson hopes that these two things can be kept separate. It's what ~~Krook~~ ^{Krook} or Reston said, he gives a couple of things to the hawks, and a couple of things to the doves. I think he'd like to have a great society -- a not so great society, but still an America that's ^{affluent and} relatively decent, some civil rights, not too much unemployment and perhaps a few nice projects that he can put his name to. In other words I think he, as a New Deal Democrat, is thoroughly committed to la democracie interieur. I mean this is part of Johnson's heritage and I think he has to be given credit for this. And I would say he has done his best, and he has achieved a great deal -- the legislation of 1964 has been remarkable, and 1965, in many fields, and I think it's good that it's gone through. And yet, on the other hand, he is the militarist abroad, a totally different face -- we've all had this sort of button. The problem of course is, can the two things be kept separated. De Vergiers thinks one is going to have to win out -- either le ~~fascisme~~ ^{fascisme exterieur} wins and becomes le fascisme interieur, or we have democracy all around.

I will end here by saying that the enemy that people of the left, dissenters, protesters, liberals and radicals, face is ~~that~~ an immense power. The thought of somehow suggesting that American

militarism -- the Pentagon, the defense department, and all of its ties in the economy and the polity that they represent, something that people are opposed to, ~~a~~^{it's} a kind of staggering thought. Opposition in Japan and in Germany was not very effective. There are too many tragic stories of heroic Germans and heroic Japanese. But I don't think we're that far yet. I agree with Fulbright here, that we're only in the beginning of the process, but we are, I think, farther ahead than possibly Fulbright realized. And we have a habit, I think, of waking up and suddenly finding ourselves somewhere without having realized that we got there.

In my own opinion, my own feeling is ^{that} that, more than ever, political action in this country, grass roots political action, local community action, action among all those not just opposed to the war and opposed to poverty and opposed to racial discrimination, but opposed to what I would say is this cancerous evil that is growing with ^{incredible} ~~incredible~~ rapidity, which has deep roots in the economy, deep roots in the establishment and business, and government, and in some ways even in American history. And I think that ~~this~~ this cancer has to be fought and at some point cut out. I see it as one of the great dangers to the world. So then by saying that the problem of the Vietnamese war, if it were simply that, were just the war, then perhaps sooner or later persuasion could work. A Fulbright or a Kennedy or others might persuade Johnson that the best way is compromise, to accept less than total victory; as did happen in Korea. The United States accepted a compromise in Korea, I think that and it was as good thing that it did. It ~~kept~~ kept the world at peace for fifteen years.

If this could be done again I would have some greater hope in American liberal democracy. I would feel ~~that~~ perhaps that my estimations of the strength of the parastate were exaggerated and that perhaps I have been too pessimistic. But I don't feel that yet.

Thank you.