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The Summit Meeting: Support for Nixon JUN 28 1974

W. Averell Harriman

WASHINGTON—In my three-hour talk in Moscow with Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, on June 4, he underlined the importance of the agreements reached with President Nixon in 1972 and 1973 and spoke with confidence that further significant steps would result from his upcoming meeting with the President. His overriding concern was the control of the nuclear arms race. He spoke not only of the limitation but the mutual reduction of capability.

I have dealt with Soviet leaders, beginning with Leon Trotsky—regarding a manganese concession—for nearly fifty years. I had endless meetings with Stalin on military and political affairs during the war, and long negotiations with Nikita S. Khrushchev on nuclear and other matters. I have known Alekssei N. Kosygin since 1942, and now for the first time I have met Mr. Brezhnev.

Each man was quite different in character and style. Mr. Brezhnev speaks with emotion. He said to me, "You and I saw the terrible suffering of World War II," and expressed his concern "for the need for peace." He has publicly committed himself to the policy of détente.

It is historically inaccurate to assert

that President Nixon initiated a period of negotiations. This belittles the achievements of President Eisenhower in the Austrian state treaty giving Austria its independence, and of President Kennedy who broke the ice with the limited test ban treaty, and of President Johnson's further agreements.

In fact, in 1968 Lyndon B. Johnson was about to meet with Mr. Kosygin in Leningrad to initiate talks on the limitation of strategic arms. Unhappily, the invasion of Czechoslovakia intervened. Furthermore, Mr. Brezhnev's policy of détente was signaled by his agreement with Willy Brandt in Mr. Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. However, President Nixon deserves full credit for seizing the opportunity unfolded in his visit to Moscow in 1972.

Mr. Brezhnev has definite objectives and is a tough trader, but he speaks of the "irreversibility of the move toward détente." Step by step, year by year, progress must be made.

He told me he looked forward to coming to the United States again next year. But there is to be no unilateral disarmament on the part of the Soviet Union nor the acceptance of second place in nuclear "defense," as he calls it. Every time we embark on new programs, the Russians will do the same. Our military Establishment contends that we are only trying to keep up

with the Russians' moves. Regardless of who is right, aggressive statements or actions by each side tragically stimulate one to outdo the other.

This dangerous competition has been checked by the agreement limiting antiballistic missiles, but only preliminary action has been taken in limiting offensive capability. It is now more difficult to find a formula for equality as each side has a superiority in certain fields and is behind in others.

The Russians believe we outstrip them today because of our threefold greater numbers of warheads with greater accuracy, in addition to our forward-base system, whereas we are concerned that they in time could surpass us by the greater throw-weight (nuclear payload) of their missiles.

The term "essential equivalence" is now wisely being substituted for "parity," but this is exceedingly difficult to negotiate. Both sides have such fantastic second-strike capability that it makes little difference militarily just where the line is drawn to stop expansion, but it has become important that neither side can claim superiority from the standpoint of political prestige.

In place of the Pentagon's demand that we must never let the Russians

catch up to us, Mr. Nixon wisely says that we must never permit ourselves to be "second." I sincerely hope that common sense will take the place of unrealistic competition.

Mr. Brezhnev mentioned the possibility of the elimination of underground testing. However, he wants also to make progress in the limitation of offensive weapons and spoke of the need to control new weapons systems. He has in mind, too, the possibility of reducing military forces in Europe.

I found that Mr. Brezhnev has confidence in President Nixon's sincerity and objectivity, and Watergate in no way inhibits Mr. Brezhnev's readiness to negotiate in good faith.

However, President Nixon's hand will be strengthened with an atmosphere of hope coming from the United States rather than suspicion. For this reason, I have been urging since my return from the Soviet Union support for President Nixon in his endeavors to reach agreements designed to reduce the possibility of nuclear disaster—agreements that are so vital to our survival on this earth.

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union during World War II, was chief negotiator of the 1963 treaty banning nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space and under water.