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'Scoop' Goes to Peking JUN 28 1974

By James Reston

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WASHINGTON, June 27—Senator Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson of the State of Washington is turning out to be the most vigorous Democratic candidate for the Presidency these days, the challenger of Henry Kissinger, and the darling of the Pentagon, the weapons industry, the pro-Israel lobby, and the labor leaders at the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

This is a formidable political base—sort of a military-industrial-labor complex of his own—and it's no accident that he attacked Mr. Kissinger and the Administration's strategic arms control policy on the eve of President Nixon's mission to Moscow, and then took off himself on a mission to Peking.

"Scoop" is well worth watching. He has been around here for over 33 years—12 in the House and 21 in the Senate—and at 62, he has the energy of a bull, looks no more than 50, and has strong views on most of the great issues of the age.

His main theme now is that "détente" is a trap, a tricky French word that the Russians are using to achieve the military domination they couldn't get with threats and bluster. He insists he is not against an accommodation with Moscow, but he wants it on terms Mr. Kissinger doesn't think he can get. And here lies the dilemma.

Senator Jackson does not deny that Watergate has weakened the Nixon Administration, but in spite of Watergate, he thinks the U.S.S.R. is much weaker than the United States, needs the trade and advanced technology of the West more than we need what he regards as the dubious political advantages of "détente." In short, he believes Mr. Kissinger has misjudged the world political and strategic problem, and with his usual subtlety he charges Mr. Kissinger with being too "soft" and Mr. Nixon with being too "eager" to make military and commercial concessions.

The bloody muddle and perverse difficulties of foreign affairs don't bother "Scoop." He is quite capable of debating them, and his sincerity is not at issue; but he leaves little room for the honorable perplexities of foreign affairs, or for the notion that great nations can change. In the slow philosophic approach of Mr. Kissinger, he sees nothing but the coming whirlwind of disaster.

Accordingly, while he has lately been talking privately with the Secretary of State about the issues of the Moscow summit conference, he has acted publicly to put barriers in the way of what he fears will be a phony compromise that will merely help the President over the Watergate barrier and place the nation in an awkward and even dangerous strategic position.

In fact, he has been so sold in challenging the Nixon-Kissinger mission that he summoned the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who share his fears, and charged the Administration with making "secret" deals with Moscow that would place the United States at a military disadvantage. Even the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright of

Arkansas, himself a constant critic of the Administration's foreign policy, took the floor to defend the President.

"If anyone is exploiting Watergate to the detriment of our foreign policy," Mr. Fulbright said, "it is not the Russians but some of our own military leaders and certain members of the Senate. . . . With a flawless sense of timing, the enemies of détente have chosen the moment of the President's departure for Moscow to fire a few broadsides at his policy." He went on to accuse Mr. Jackson of precisely this intent.

The Senator from Washington merely characterized this as nonsense and went off to Peking and it is probably no accident that the Chinese will welcome him there around the President's Moscow visit, and thus give him a platform in Peking to continue his campaign.

In fairness, he has always suspended judgment about the good intentions of the Soviet Union. He believes in the persuasive quality of power rather than of philosophy, and relies on it more than on the fairness of the Russians or the eloquence of Mr. Kissinger or the judgment and wisdom of President Nixon.

Mr. Kissinger sees the world as fundamentally intricate, but capable of change if a modicum of trust can be established by mutually beneficial compromises. He would, as he proposed to President Sadat of Egypt, "take chances for peace," believing that not to take chances would be the larger risk. But not "Scoop." He sees only the dark riddle of Moscow, and puts his trust in missiles.

If he is gambling his last chance for the Presidency on this assumption, it is probably an honest but a poor gamble, for he is inviting a return to the cold war, and this is not likely to be the most popular platform in 1976.

After all, the President's most successful experiment, and the thing that is holding him up without any other visible means of support, is precisely that he has worked valiantly to get away from the cold war and move, as he says, from an era of confrontation to an era of accommodation.

Still, Mr. Jackson is a blunt man, with powerful forces behind him, and if the President's efforts at dependable arms control and a genuine peace in the Middle East do not produce results, public opinion could move toward Jackson.

But whether it moves that way or not, "Scoop" is likely to keep drumming on power. In this sense, he is a man of his New Deal and cold war days—liberal at home, tough and unyielding abroad. He has a kind of naked vigor, but it is almost always in opposition. He seems to be saying that the world is wicked, and beyond persuasion or redemption, and the chances are that the Chinese will probably agree with him—especially since he is so suspicious of the Russians.