## RICHARDSON ŠAYS HAIG BACKED COX

Asserts Chief of Staff Tried to Persuade Nixon Not to Order Halt to Tape Suit

> By LESLEY OELSNER Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 22-Elliot L. Richardson says that Alexander M. Haig Jr., President Nixon's chief of staff, told him he had unsuccessfully tried to dissuade the President from ordering Archibald Cox on Oct. 19 to stop all court actions to obtain White House tape recordings and related documents.

The former Attorney General said in an interview, "Haig said that he had tried, but that the President wouldn't yield on that."

Mr. Haig, in an interview last night, made it clear that he was not denying the Richardson account but declined to discuss the matter. Sitting before the fireplace in his office in the West Wing in the White House, he said, "I don't discuss what discussions I had with the

Mr. Cox's refusal to comply with the President's order led to his dismissal on Oct. 20 as the special Watergate prosecutor.

The order led as well to Mr. Richardson's resignation as Attorney General and to the dismissal of William D. Ruckelshaus as Deputy Attorney General. In the wake of Mr. Cox's refusal to comply, the President directed first Mr. Richardson and then Mr. Ruckelshaus to Continued on Page 57, Column 3

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dismiss the prosecutor, and each in turn chose to leave office rather to obey.

Mr. Richardson recounted Mr. Haig's statement in an interwiew this week at his home in McLean, Va.

Mr. Richardson said that Mr. Haig made his comment on Friday afternoon Oct. 19

It was the end of a week of negotiations involving the

It was the end of a week or negotiations involving the White House, Mr. Cox and Mr. Richardson, regarding the manner in which the President should respond to Mr. Cox's Subpoena—which had just been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals—for tape recordings of nine Watergate-related conversations.

ted conversations.

Much of the discussions had

centered on the proposal under which Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, would prepare an "authenticated" summary of the contents of the tapes, and the summary would be presented to the courts ra-ther than the tapes themselves. Mr. Richardson said that he

had become increasingly aware that the White House wanted to link the Stennis proposal to a limitation on Mr. Cox's ability to go to court in pursuit of any other presidential tapes or documents.

So, he said, he tried to devise some way to "handle the relationship between the basic Stennis proposal and the White House view that Mr. Cox should be foreclosed from pursuing other documents.

## A Rejected Thought

He thought first of writing into the proposal some reference to its status as a "precedent," he recalled, but dismissed that as unworkable.

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"So then I had the thought," he said, speaking with deliberation "that the way to do it was to try to persuade the President to drop any mention of other situations and himself, in effect, to put forward the Stennis proposal alone."

"So I called Haig to urge that, and later Buzhardt [J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., a White House lawyer] and talked to Haig a second time," Mr. Richardson said. "Haig said that he had tried; but that the President fouldn't yield on that."

That evening, the President announced both the Stennis proposal and his order to Mr. Cox, directing the prosecutor to refrain from all future court actions aimed at obtaining Presidential napers

tions aimed at obtaining Presidential papers.

The Stennis plan was subse-

The Stennis plan was subsequently dropped as a result of public and political criticism.

The question of just what was said in the negotiations that week regarding Mr. Cox's future access to other Presidential papers and tapes has been, from a different angle a material papers.

tial papers and tapes has been, from a different angle, a matter of some dispute lately. Mr. Richardson testified before the eSnate Judiciary Committee that he opposed the White House efforts to forbid Mr. Cox to go to court to seek Presidential documents beyond and in addition to the tapes of the nine disputed conversations.

## Support for Summary

In the interview, the former In the interview, the former Attorney General said that he made clear to the White House on Oct. 15, and especially on Oct. 17, that he would try to persuade Mr. Cox to accept the Stennis summary in place of the tapes of the nine specific conversations. But, that he the tapes of the nine specific conversations, but that he would not try to persuade the prosecutor to agree that access to other material should be foreclosed as well.

He said that on Oct. 19 he became aware of the White House desire to link the foreclosure to the Stennis summary proposal and that he had ob-

proposal, and that he had ob

But not until that evening,

he said, when Mr. Hang called him at 7 o'clock to read him a letter the President was sending to Mr. Richardson, did he

realize that Mr. Cox was to be "instructed" not to try to obtain other presidential material.

President Nixon, however, has been variously quoted by Congressmen as having told them that Mr. Richardson "lied" or mislead the Senate in testify-ing about his role in the negoing about his role in the negotiations. The White House has denied the use of word "lie." It has said, however that the President referred to "several versions of the events" leading to Mr. Cox's dismissal.

Mr. Haig said last night that "there is nothing in dispute"

except for the meeting at the white House on the morning of Oct. 19 among Mr. Richardson, Mr. Haig and other White House aides, in which the proposal to link the Stennis plan to the foreclosure plan was

discussed.
As Mr. Haig explained it, his As Mr. Haig explained it, his "perceptions" of the meeting were different from Mr. Richardson's. Mr. Richardson's according to Mr. Haig, believed that the White House announcement would likely include "some combination" of the Stannia and forcelosure plans. Some combination" of the Stennis and foreclosure plans, while Mr. Haig believed that it was clear that the discussion had involved the plan to "instruct" Mr. Cox to refrain from further litigation.

The Senate Indicions Com-

The Senate Judiciary Committee is expected to vote next week on whether to call Mr. Haig to testify about the apparent conflict.

## More Difficulty Seen

Mr. Cox's objections to the foreclosure arrangement were that his job of prosecuting Watergate cases would be made infinitely more difficult and, in some cases, perhaps impossible without access to Watergate-

without access to watergate-related presidential papers.

Mr. Richardson has said con-sistently in his public state-ments that he could not impose such a limitation on the special prosecutor's independence because he had promised the Senate, during his own confirmation hearings, that the mation hearings, that the prosecutor would be allowed independence.

The President has consistently argued that any forced disclosure of Presidential papers or conversations would inhibit White House personnel in their

work and discussions and would thus hinder the functioning of the executive branch.

Others neve suggested, though, that the President may have been using the Watergate tappes cases almost as a decoy. tapes case almost as a decoy, that by denying access to the tapes he could also deny access to other documents that might

be more incriminating.

The President has also been reported to have said, at various times, thae he would prefer having Mr. Cox out of office.

According to Mr. Richardson's chronology of the week that culminated in Mr. Cox's dismissal, the negotiations be-gan with the White House suggesting that Mr. Cox be dismissed

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On Monday morning, three days after the appeals court ruled that Mr. Nixon must comply with the subpoena, "I was called over the White House," Mr. Richardson said.

In a meeting with Mr. Haig and Mr. Buzhardt, he said he was told the following: "The President would prepare his own edited version of the tapes, this would be offered to the court, and Cox would be fired."

"I said no, I thought it was a terrible idea and if that happened, I would resign," Mr. Richardson said.

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Richardson said.

Later that day, he went on, Mr. Haig broached the Stennis proposal. According to Mr. Richardson, he said that he would try to persuade Mr. Cox to accept the summary as a substitute for the tapes—making clear, he said, that he would not try to persuade Mr. Cox to give up the chance for

access to any other Presidential papers later.

As has been made clear through his statements and his writings, Mr. Cox did not find the Stennis idea acceptable.

Thursday night, when Mr. Richardson went to the White House once more, there was, he said, "long discussion."

"The plan that was put to me Thursday evening," he said, "was that if Cox definitively, flatly rejected the Stennis proposal, that he would be fired."

Mr. Richardson said that he went home that night and wrote out a summary of "reasons why I must resign," and that on Friday morning, he asked for, and was told he could have, an appointment with the President. He planned to tell Mr. Nixon, whom he had not seen or talked to all week, that he would resign, he said.