

Excerpts From the Buchanan Testimony

Following are excerpts from a transcript of the testimony in Washington yesterday of Patrick J. Buchanan before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities:

MORNING SESSION

MR. BUCHANAN:

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

For a variety of reasons I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your select committee. But in candor I cannot speak with the same enthusiasm of the manner in which the invitation was delivered.

At the President's personal directive, his White House staff has been called upon and has cooperated, I believe, fully with the committee. Specifically, this witness has certainly done so.

Nevertheless, the surprise announcement that I was to be called as a public witness before these hearings was made over national television before even the elementary courtesy of a telephone call of notification had been extended.

Of greater concern to me, however, has been an apparent campaign, orchestrated from within the committee staff, to malign my reputation in the public press prior to my appearance. In the hours immediately following my well-publicized invitation, there appeared in *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *The Baltimore Sun*, *The Chicago Tribune* and on the national networks, separate stories all attributed to committee sources alleging that I was the architect of a campaign of political espionage or dirty tricks.

According to *The Post*, committee sources were in possession of my memoranda recommending "infiltrating the opposition." In *The Times*, the charge was that the committee had a series of Buchanan memoranda suggesting "political espionage against Edmund S. Muskie of Maine and other candidates for the Presidential nomination."

Blueprints and Plans

One wire service stated that Mr. Buchanan would be questioned about "blueprints and plans concerning the scandal." In *The Chicago Tribune* the headline read, "Nixon Speechwriter Blamed For Muskie Plot." The story read, and I quote: "Senate investigators have evidence that Patrick J. Buchanan, one of President Nixon's favorite speech writers, was the secret author of a political sabotage scheme."

In *The Baltimore Sun*, under a major front-page headline reading, "Buchanan Linked to '72 Dirty Tricks," the story ran thus: "Patrick J. Buchanan, a Presidential consultant, may emerge as yet another architect of the 1972 White House dirty tricks strategy, according to Congressional sources.



The New York Times/George James

Patrick J. Buchanan telling the Watergate committee of his activities as a Presidential speech writer.

Mr. Chairman, this covert campaign of vilification, carried on by staff members of your committee, is in direct violation of Rule 40 of the rules of procedure for the select committee. That rule strictly prohibits staff members from leaking substantive materials.

Repeatedly, I have asked of Mr. Dash and Mr. Lenzner information that they might have to justify such allegations. Repeatedly, they have denied to me that they have such documents.

When I asked Mr. Lenzner who on the committee staff was responsible, he responded: "Mr. Buchanan, you ought to know that you can't believe everything you read in the newspapers." It was his joke and my reputation.

So it seems fair to me to ask, how can this select committee set itself up as the ultimate arbiter of American political ethics if it cannot even control the character assassins within its own ranks.

Unaware of Sabotage

For the record, Mr. Chairman, let me state the following: I did not recommend or authorize, nor was I aware of, any on-going campaign of political sabotage against Senator Muskie, or any other Democratic candidate.

I did not recommend, either verbally or in memoranda, that the Re-election Committee infiltrate the campaigns of our opposition. I have never met nor spoken with, nor can I recall ever having heard the names of, Messrs. Hunt, Liddy, McCord, Ulasewicz, Reagan, Barker or Segretti until those names appeared in the public press.

Nor have I ever heard, until the terms were made public, the code names of Ruby 1, Ruby 2, Crystal, Sedanchair 1 and Sedanchair 2, or Fat Jack. Even today, I could not testify with certitude to whom these terms refer.

Now let me move quickly to the heart of the public allegations against me, but more generally against our Presidential campaign.

It is being argued that illicit Republican strategy and tactics were responsible for the defeat of the strongest Democratic candidate for President, and for the nomination of the weakest. It has been contended pub-

licly that the Democrats were denied, by our campaign and our strategy, a legitimate choice at their own convention.

It is being alleged that the campaign of 1972 was not only a rigged campaign, but an utter fraud, a "political coup by the President of the United States."

These contentions, Mr. Chairman, are altogether untrue. Republicans were not responsible for the downfall of Senator Muskie. Republicans were not responsible for the nomination of Senator McGovern.

McGovern Machine

To suggest that is, first of all, to do a grievous injustice both to Senator McGovern and to his campaign organization. Senator McGovern was nominated because his men wrote the rule book; his men were in the field earliest and worked hardest; his campaign was precisely targeted on the primaries they could win, and because he was possessed of the best political organization the Democratic party has seen in at least a dozen years.

It was not Donald Segretti who put together the organization that carried for Senator McGovern the crucial Wisconsin primary. It was not any agent of the Committee to Re-elect the President who was out winning McGovern delegates in states like Georgia, Louisiana and Florida.

It was not our personnel but theirs who worked out Senator McGovern's victorious campaign and convention strategies. The McGovern people won their own nomination. And they lost their own election.

As Theodore H. White has written in his latest and best campaign history, all of the dirty tricks of 1972, added together in the ultimate balance, had "the weight of a feather."

Now what of the suggestion I recommended that Republicans, in the spring and summer of 1971, concentrate their political resources upon Senator Muskie, rather than to dissipate them on the dozen other potential aspirants for the nomination? That statement is essentially true.

Senator Muskie was targeting his political attacks upon the President, as was every single one of the other potential nominees. No requirement exists in ethics or logic or law that we provide equal time and political response to each of our potential opponents.

Reason Called Basic

The reasons for recommending the focus upon Senator Muskie were basic. He was the frontrunner. Alone among the Democrats, he led the President in the national polls. He appeared to me to be both the strongest candidate and the candidate with the greatest opportunity of uniting the warring wings of the Democratic party.

Candidly, it was my hope, if not my expectation, that our political counterattacks, concentrated primarily but not exclusively, upon the Democratic frontrunner might contribute to opening up the Democratic primaries and preventing a closed convention.

There was nothing, and is nothing, in my judgment, illicit or unethical or improper or unprecedented in recommending or adopting such a political strategy. The resources which we recommended for employment in that summer and fall, all of them legitimate, were basically these:

National committee speakers and publications, including Republican chairmen and organizations in states Senator Muskie visited; the Committee to Re-elect, its media resources and its developing state organizations; surrogate speakers from the national Administration, including the

Vice President and the Cabinet; Congressmen and Senators from the Republican party who would use the forum of the White House or Capitol Hill either to defend the President against Senator Muskie's allegations or to put Senator Muskie himself on the defensive.

Also, use of the media, through briefings and conversations and the like by political operatives, to carry the message.

Wallace Had Role

There is no Republican individual or organization, Mr. Chairman, to credit or blame for the decline in the candidacy of Senator Muskie. The narrowness of his victory in the New Hampshire primary was a reflection of his declining standing in the national polls.

The enormous margin of his defeat in Florida was a consequence of the unanticipated appeal of the candidacy of George Wallace. His defeat in Wisconsin came at the hands of one man, Governor Wallace, who had been there but a single day; and another man, Senator Mc-

Govern, who had organized the state for 18 months.

R. DASH: Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to deplore, along with Mr. Buchanan, any newspaper stories derogatory of him that are indicated as having been leaked or come from sources in the committee. I know of no staff member who has done it. I have searched to find such staff members if there were any. We have had a problem like this before and I think we all know that the problem of leaks is one that isn't always to be solved.

Also, this has been a problem, I think, that has plagued the inquiries in this area not only for this committee, but the Department of Justice, the White House itself. It is not even known whether or not these sources did come from the Senate Committee.

But I would deplore, along with Mr. Buchanan news stories that reflect on his character or reflect on his activities and I can assure the committee that they did not come from any source that I know of in the committee and certainly not from any counsel that I know.

Mr. Buchanan, in the course of your duties at the White House did you have occasion to write a series of memoranda to the President or Mr. Haldeman or anybody else?

A. Well, being a writer, yes I did. That was the format I generally used for communication in the White House. It was memoranda. I have written numerous, scores, if not hundreds of memorandums to both the President and, I am sure, to Mr. Haldeman. That is correct.

Q. Now, Mr. Buchanan, did you bring with you or produce in accordance with the subpoena issued you on Sept. 20, 1973, copies of your memoranda dealing with political strategy for the President or Presidential primary for 1972 and the campaign?

A. No, sir, I did not. Pursuant to a directive of the President's counsel I believe this matter is in court. I have read, because of the brevity of the time I was given to prepare for this testimony I have not had an opportunity to read all political strategy memos that I sent between 1971 and '72, but I have read a number of them.

Again, I did not bring them here pursuant to the directive of the President's counsel.

Q. What counsel advised you?

A. I couldn't be certain which individual. It was Mr. — certainly it was Mr. Buzhardt and Mr. Garment and/or Mr. Parker, I think.

Q. And is it the position

of counsel at the White House that these memoranda dealing with political campaign strategy are not available to a subpoena because of executive privilege?

A. I think you would have to ask counsel what their position is, but I think that's not unreasonable in light of the fact that many of the memoranda are to the President of the United States.

Many of the memoranda deal with recommendations for Presidential action. Many of the memoranda were pre-

pared at the direction of the President. I think you would have to talk to those individuals to ascertain what the legal grounds were for withholding them.

The Plumbers' Unit

Q. Did you know that a special unit under Mr. Ehrlichman was contemplated and was, in fact, was set up to investigate Mr. Ellsberg.

A. No, sir, I did not. The first I heard of the plumbers' unit was when I believe I read it in Newsweek and my understanding of my assignment was it would not be an investigation conducted inside the White House at all, by White House personnel but it would be outside.

Q. Did you know Mr. Krogh or Mr. Young? A. Very well. Mr. Krogh is a good personal friend of mine. Mr. Young I worked with on briefing books occasionally when he worked with Dr. Kissinger. I knew him less well than I do Mr. Krogh.

Q. And did you have any working relationship at all with regard to this particular matter? A. No, I had nothing to do with the thing once we signed off.

Q. After you turned down the offer to sort of coordinate this investigation of Ellsberg, did Mr. Colson talk to you about it and indicate that you had been given first opportunity in going ahead?

A. Mr. Colson called me. He said, simply to alert me as a courtesy, that he had discussed the Ellsberg thing before some Senate committee and he said, I told the Senate committee that you had been offered the assignment of investigating the Ellsberg thing first and that you turned it down and that I had, after you turned it down, I had spoken with you by telephone to offer it to you again and that you had turned it down again by telephone. And I have no recollection of that telephone call with Mr. Colson, but I'm sure, I'm sure it's accurate.

Fielding Break-in

Q. By the way, when did you first learn of the break-in in Dr. Fielding's office? A. When Mr. Mort Allen who runs the President's news summary came walking into my office with the item off the A wire.

Q. Now, Mr. Buchanan, would you turn to your memorandum of June 8, 1972, which is tabbed 27. A. This is the known euphemistically as the assault strategy.

Q. Now, well, let me point to paragraph 25 on page 11 which has a heading Ellsberg and reads, "McGovern's personal encouragement of Ellsberg to violate Federal law is a matter which we should wait to exploit, say two months past the Democratic convention. It should serve as a centerpiece of a national speech, perhaps by the Vice President. Now."

A. Right.

Q. Was that in your memorandum — do you recall making that recommendation?

A. That, I'm sure it is, because what you do not have is, in coupled with this, if you will, the attack strategy, was what was known as a quotations or attack book.

In that book there is a public statement by Senator McGovern of four paragraphs from Parade Magazine wherein he himself states publicly, I believe, that he encouraged, he told Daniel Ellsberg, I believe, that I can't do this because I'm a Senator but why don't you go to The New York Times.

In my judgment that was a political error on his part, the quotation was a public one, the quotation was in the political quotations book and my recommendation was that having researched Senator McGovern thoroughly, having got hold of this quotation, we should hold back and use this as the— as a centerpiece for the speech later in the campaign. That's correct.

Tie-In With Ellsberg

Q. Then it would be fair to say that one of your recommendations during the campaign was to attempt to make some tie-in between the Ellsberg matter and Senator McGovern's campaign.

A. There was no need to make the tie-in. It was, we were going to use Senator McGovern's own quotations. That was a matter of public record.

Q. Now in the course of your duties during the Presidential campaign of '72, and also your duties at the White House, were you of the view that a number of tax-exempt foundations were unfriendly to the President or to the Republican party and indeed helpful to the Democratic party?

A. Well, it's, that has, that might have been mentioned during the '71 or '72, but

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this is an idea that, or a thought that I'd had back as far as '69 and '70 and it is my view that, for example, the tax-exempt funds of the Ford Foundation, which is the largest of all foundations, which has something like 18 per cent of all assets in foundations, that these by and large were being channeled when they were into public policy institutes, into public policy institutes and others which were in basic disagreement with our own political philosophy and that these tax-exempt multi-millions have the effect, in my personal judgement, of unbalancing the political process.

So I'd recommend and had drafted speeches, actually, to lay this out on the table much as we laid out the, what I felt was the bias of the networks on the tables, at the same time to create some of our own institutions which would be a counterpart of, say, the Brookings Institution, which would be conservative institutions. That's true.

But that, I do not think that was an issue or a matter that was, I may be wrong, I haven't read all these memos, but it was under active consideration in the campaign of '71 or '72. I know I recommended it to the President after the campaign of '72 that we ought to establish our own institutions, our own public policy things, on a competitive basis.

Figures in Senate Inquiry

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 26—Following are the names of individuals who figured in today's hearings by the Senate committee on the Watergate case:

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Sam J. Ervin Jr., North Carolina Democrat, chairman.
Herman E. Talmadge, Democrat of Georgia.
Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii.
Joseph M. Montoya, Democrat of New Mexico.
Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee.
Edward J. Gurney, Republican of Florida.
Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL

Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director.
Fred D. Thompson, chief minority counsel.
Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy counsel.
Terry F. Lenzner, assistant chief counsel.
James Hamilton, assistant chief counsel.
David M. Dorsen, assistant chief counsel.
H. William Shure, assistant minority counsel.

WITNESS

Patrick J. Buchanan, Presidential aide and speech writer.

PERSONS NAMED IN TESTIMONY

Bernard L. Barker pleaded guilty in Watergate break-in.
Bernard L. Barker, pleaded guilty in Watergate break-in.

J. Fred Buzhardt, Presidential counsel.

Charles W. Colson, former special counsel to the President.

John T. Ehrlichman, former White House domestic adviser.

Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, key figure in Pentagon papers case.

Dr. Lewis Fielding, Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Leonard Garment, counsel to the President.

E. Howard Hunt Jr., former White House aide who pleaded guilty in Watergate break-in.

Henry A. Kissinger, former White House aide who is now Secretary of State.

Egil Krogh Jr., former assistant to Mr. Ehrlichman.

G. Gordon Liddy, former White House aide convicted in Watergate break-in.

James W. McCord Jr., convicted participant in Watergate break-in.

Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, Democratic Presidential candidate in 1972.

John N. Mitchell, former Attorney General and former director of re-election committee.

Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Democrat of Maine.

Donald H. Segretti, accused of conducting sabotage campaign against the Democrats.

Anthony T. Ulasewicz, former aide to John J. Caulfield.

Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama.

David R. Young Jr., co-director of the White House intelligence unit.

Q. Did you make the recommendation that an investigation should be made concerning the Ford Foundation's activities in political affairs?

'I Did an Investigation'

A. I did an investigation, I did an investigation myself in 1970, in the summer of '70, but again this had nothing, this did not have to do with '71 or '72. I read every article that was written and the books that were written on the Ford Foundation in a 10-day vacation period and you did not need other than the material that I had at hand in the public sector as to where these funds were being channeled. It's a matter of public record where the Ford Foundation puts its funds.

Q. Now as a matter of fact in the same memorandum [March 24], which is a general memorandum on the so-called liberal foundations and the requirement for a Republican conservative founda-

tion, at the very top of the page it states "that one of my primary concerns about this is that it requires a strong fellow running the Internal Revenue Division and an especially friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the tax exempt office."

A. Exactly. Now let me give you the reasoning on this thing. After the election of 1964 when Barry Goldwater was defeated there was a conservative foundation who had some personnel who had worked in Senator Goldwater's campaign. They came within an ace of losing their tax exemption even though they had not engaged in political activities. There is no question but in my mind—there's an apprehension in my mind that if the

Democratic party came into power and this—any tax-exempt institution you had created which was not really clean as a hound's tooth in which any sort of violation had occurred would have that tax exemption jerked.


Q. Let me refer you, Mr. Buchanan, to a memorandum, April 12, '72. Let me read at least the first paragraph.

"Our primary objective to prevent Senator Muskie from sweeping the early primaries, locking up the convention in April and uniting the Democratic party behind him for the fall has been achieved. The likelihood, great three months ago, that the Democratic convention would become a dignified coronation ceremony for a centrist candidate who could lead a united party into the election is now remote."

Now, we look to page eight of that same memorandum.

"Our Next Goal. What we need now is a decision on whom we want to run against. We believe that McGovern is our candidate for dozens of reasons. He could be painted as a left radical candidate, the Goldwater of the Democratic party and at this point in time we would inundate him. The Wallace Democrats, South and North, as well as the Daley and Meany Democrats, would have to take hemlock to support a fellow whose major plank is to chop \$32-billion out of defense. Also, he is weak with the blacks and would have to cater to that vote. To his great disadvantage, Humphrey can take the blacks for granted in a contest with the President."

And so in that memoran-



The New York Times
Spectators listening yesterday to Patrick J. Buchanan, Presidential speech writer, in the Caucus Room of the Old Senate Office Building

dum, the goal was stated to have Mr. McGovern as the candidate for the Democratic party.

A. It asks for a decision, I believe, from the campaign hierarchy, in the first sentence.

Q. I thought that was your recommendation.

A. My recommendation was repeatedly that we ought not do anything to Senator McGovern in any way to impede his run to the nomination. And frankly, Mr. Dash, if anything was done against—even in the way of pranks or something like that—against Senator McGovern in that period of time, then it would certainly have been contrary to any recommendation that I made.

Q. Well, actually on page 24—on tab 24—your next memorandum, April 27, 1972, from you to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman—that's exactly your recommendation. A. Right.

Q. "With the great success of McGovern and the subsequent pull-out of Muskie, the chances of a McGovern nomination are immensely improved. Thus we must do as little as possible at this time to impede McGovern's rise."

A. I think the reason for that was that there were some self-starters on our side who had—we had done—we had, frankly, had one candidate, Senator Muskie, on whom we'd done enormous research, who had dropped out of the race.

Research on McGovern
We had done enormous research on Senator McGovern. And there were some individuals within the campaign organization who were recommending that we move now to be critical and to lay on the record Senator McGovern's positions in order to get him on the record before the convention—post-

convention criticisms being given little credence. And my recommendation was that we not do that, that we not be critical of Senator McGovern, that we stay out of his effort and—I don't mean that in the pejorative sense, that we not criticize him.

AFTERNOON SESSION

MR. THOMPSON: So when a public figure, in effect, made a speech promoting the candidacy of the President either taking a position against the leading Democratic opponent that would be an attack, is that right?
A. Right. That would be a political attack, right.

Q. What was the political climate with regard to name-calling? Was there name-calling throughout the campaign?

A. I think you will find a recognition and awareness on our part that when the campaign gets heated things are going to get out of hand; they invariably do, you have statements made that are too much, that are excessive; so we recommend that one individual, and I named the attorney general, or that he designate a deputy who would be assigned to clear all political copy—all attack, offensive copy coming out of the campaign in order we would not run into the same problem we ran into in 1970 when some of the ads were excessive and counter-productive.

But there is an awareness, I think, through a number of these memoranda that things when you get into the heat of a campaign, individuals do go too far. I recall in Senator McGovern's campaign, I am sure Senator McGovern now would not like to refer to the fact that he compared American policy in Indochina with the extermination of the Jews or that he compared the President of the United States

with Adolf Hitler. These things were excesses, I think in the campaign that occur and we were cognizant that they would occur; some things would occur on our part as they occurred on the other side.

Q. In any of your recommendations regarding the possible candidacies of the leading Democrats, did you in any way advocate defaming of anyone?

A. Well, no. In a public statement that sort of thing is not only mistaken, it is counterproductive.

The Kennedy Memorandum

Q. I refer you to tab 13, if I may, on page 5. That memorandum is dated June 9, 1971 confidential. A. This is the Kennedy memorandum.

Q. For the President from you, E.M.K. political memorandum. You discuss pros and cons, his assets, deficiencies, and on page 5, under the heading of Chappaquiddick, you state, "This, of course, will be kept in the public mind by the press—speculating on whether it is helping or hurting E.M.K. We ought to stay miles away from it—indicating even in private, it is hard to say the effect; we don't know." Was this policy followed?

A. It was. Let me add another case similar to the thing. When Senator Eagleton's problems came over the national wire the President directed—I was in the room when he did it—directed all Republican spokesmen out on the campaign trail to make no comment whatsoever about it. The Chappaquiddick thing, I think, the same policy was in effect. This would be my recommendation, that our speakers make no reference whatsoever to it in public statements. I believe it was a course that was followed.

Q. In these evaluations, did you set up the strong points of the candidates as well as their deficiencies? A. We certainly did, as a matter of fact, the memo [on] Hubert Humphrey is very laudatory, as I recall.

SENATOR ERVIN: I was very much intrigued by your testimony and I want to commend you for the frankness of your testimony that you advise the President that they should see that grants

were channeled to organizations that supported the President's philosophy.

A. If you are talking about the grants and contracts and things like that that are up bids, if there are discretionary funds at the disposal of the White House—in other words, the White House says the State Department is doing a study of a foreign policy problem, and it is within our discretion as to whom that contract should go, my recommendations would invariably be that we gave the contract to those particular public policy institutes which were supportive of our point of view and philosophy.

Q. And you favor that even in cases that the other party or applicant was better qualified as long as the matter was discretionary with the President?

A. Well, I certainly would not recommend that he grant to totally unqualified and incompetent individuals, but if it is six of one and half a dozen of the other, I would favor our side.

Q. Suppose it was seven of one and five of the other?

A. We are getting close, Senator, I think if it were eight to four, we might go the other way.

'Beyond the Pale'

Q. I think you have a sense of humor and I am glad I have one, because I do not know how you would get over the rough spots of life without one. I am like you: I do not object to some humorous things being done in a political campaign. But I infer from the testimony that you gave this morning that if it is true, as has been charged, that some persons in Florida forged, made a forgery on what purported to be the letterhead of Senator Muskie and disseminated it, broadcast it, making salacious attacks upon Senators Jackson and Humphrey for the purpose of discrediting them, that is beyond the pale.

A. That crosses the line, Senator. My own view is that there are sort of four gradations. There are things that are certainly utterly outrageous and I would put that in with the kind of demonstrations against Vice President Humphrey in 1968

which denied him an opportunity to speak for almost a month. Then, there is dirty tricks, then there is political hardball, then there is pranks. I think you will almost have to leave it to the individual and his own sense of ethics as to what is permissible. There is no question but what the line was probably breached in both campaigns in 1972 and perhaps previous ones.

Q. Sometimes, that is left to people's determination that have no ethics and we have very unethical things happen. A. Yes sir, that is very true.

SENATOR GURNEY: I wonder if you could give us any advice, Mr. Buchanan—you certainly have been the most knowledgeable witness, I believe, we have ever had before the committee on the whole area of issues in the campaign, what the candidates stood for, the various candidates, attack plans and all that sort of thing, and you are also acquainted certainly with some of the other political campaigns in recent years, either actively participating on behalf of Mr. Nixon or I guess doing research. Could you give us any idea how this campaign of 1972 stacked up against other campaigns in the sort of strategy and tactics done by all of candidates? Was it a fairly clean campaign, was it a very dirty campaign? What about it, keeping out the Watergate thing now because we are talking about supposedly dirty tricks department.



The New York Times/George James
Senator Edward J. Gurney, Florida Republican, discussing a point yesterday with Fred D. Thompson, minority counsel to the Watergate committee.