

Ex-Nixon Aide Is Accused Of Welcoming Violence

By Lawrence Meyer and Peter A. Jay
Washington Post Staff Writers

Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) accused former White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman of having welcomed violent demonstrations against President Nixon as part of a White House plan to blame the Democratic Party for the violence.

Weicker quoted a February, 1973, memo for which Haldeman acknowledged responsibility, asserting: "We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist money—that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972. We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to (Sen. George) McGovern (D-S.D.) and thus to the Democrats as part of the peace movement."

Bristling with anger, Weicker, a freshman Republican, told Haldeman, "This type of business, when it emanates from the highest councils in the land, I think it is a disgrace . . . I don't think there has been any change in tactics from the election campaign of '72 as to when you sit before this committee right now, Mr. Haldeman."

"I think there was, or I know that there was, some information, I don't know how good it was, that there was foreign money used to support the financing of demonstrations," said Haldeman, who had no specific information. "The point here was to develop the story that that had been the case, develop the facts on it."

Weicker refused to accept that ex-

planation, however, and asserted that Haldeman was not trying to gather facts but rather trying to launch an attack against Democrats. And under questioning, Haldeman acknowledged that the idea was to start a newspaper campaign "as a counterattack to the material that would be developed" by the Watergate committee.

Many more questions about what Weicker referred to as the "mentality in the White House" were pressed by several other members of the Watergate committee who asked Haldeman about a number of investigations that the White House encouraged the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service to conduct.

The senators also again raised the issue of the White House "enemies" list, asking Haldeman to explain the purpose of cataloguing names of those felt by the White House to be opponents of major administration policies.

Haldeman also was asked if he had any knowledge concerning secret investigations conducted for the White House by former New York policeman Anthony Ulasewicz. Haldeman, who has been described by other witnesses as being extremely interested in obtaining information on the activities of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), disclaimed any knowledge of Ulasewicz's reported attempts to use a New York apartment as part of a blackmail scheme to gather from friends of the late Mary Jo Kopechne

See HEARING, A22, Col. 1

HEARING, From A1

information on the 1969 Chappaquoick incident.

Throughout his testimony, Haldeman denied any prior knowledge of the Watergate bugging or any participation in the subsequent cover-up. He continually claimed lack of detailed knowledge about specific acts in the cover-up, asserting that former White House counsel John W. Dean III was the White House aide responsible for keeping up with developments and also, Haldeman suggested, was the man primarily responsible for the cover-up.

Haldeman acknowledged releasing \$350,000 from a secret White House fund after the election after Dean told him that the money was needed by the Nixon re-election committee to pay the legal fees and family expenses of the Watergate defendants. Haldeman said he was unaware that the money was being used to buy the silence of the Watergate defendants.

"This was a decision," Haldeman said, "whatever decision was made, for paying legal fees or reimbursements, was made by people at the (re-election) committee and people who were in charge of dealing with this situation."

"I did not weigh it in its context of legality, morality or necessity. I simply accepted what I was told, which was that these funds were being raised for the purpose of legal fees for the defendants."

Haldeman also told the committee that Dean worked under him "administratively," but "substantially, he worked under other people, depending upon the nature of the particular task he was engrossed in."

"Did he report to you regularly?" Sen. Edward J. Gurney (R-Fla.) asked Haldeman.

"No, sir," Haldeman replied.

"Would he report to you on pretty important matters, keep you advised?" Gurney asked.

"No, not on substantive matters because he would report to the person responsible for that area," Haldeman said.

In dealing with the men closest to President Nixon, the committee has encountered assertions by them that they had little to do with the Watergate affair. Ehrlichman, like Haldeman, denied criminal involvement.

Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell admitted participation in trying to "keep the lid on," but denied illegal activities. At times during Mitchell's testimony it was difficult to determine how decisions were made or who made them.

"I was a participant in the discussions, no question about it," Mitchell testified on July 12. Asked if he participated in making decisions, Mitchell replied, "I am sure that there was consensus that would come out of the discussions in the room and I would be a part of that consensus."

"I knew that something had gone on," Haldeman told the committee. "I didn't know what. I still don't know exactly what in terms of who did what, when and how."

Haldeman's position as White House chief of staff—a job he held from the first day of the first Nixon administration in 1969 until his resignation under fire on April 30, 1973—put him at the very center of the information flow to President Nixon.

Because he controlled the access of virtually every other White House aide or administration official to President Nixon, Haldeman was widely considered to be the most powerful man in the White House next to the President.

However, during his Senate testimony, which was concluded yesterday, Haldeman minimized his influence over administration policy and left the impression by his answers that he had little or no knowledge of details in several areas.

Time and again yesterday, as he did Tuesday, Haldeman professed ignorance when asked questions about White House matters. Frequently, when handed documents that had been addressed to him while in the White House, Haldeman told the committee that he could not remember seeing them previously.

Unlike his close friend and associate, former top presidential domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman, who was aggressive and combative in his testimony preceding Haldeman, the former White House chief of staff was gentle, composed and solicitous under even the hardest questioning.

As committee chairman Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.) worked to squelch Haldeman's feisty lawyer, John J. Wilson, the senators took firm control of the questioning yesterday in 10-minute turns. By the day's end, Haldeman had testified for a total of about 15 hours over three days, compared to about 24 hours of testimony over five days for Ehrlichman, who, with Wilson, had often seemed to be taking charge of the inquiry.

Haldeman's main adversary, as he has been since last spring when he first asked Haldeman to resign from

the White House, was Weicker. Weicker confronted Haldeman with two documents, one concerning plans for an October, 1971, Nixon rally in Charlotte, N.C., and the other about the February, 1973, effort to link demonstrations and "Communist money" to the Democrats and McGovern.

The Charlotte, N.C., memo, from a White House advance man, warned Haldeman that demonstrators would be present for President Nixon's scheduled visit. "They will be violent; they will have extremely obscene signs," the memo states, with the words "violent" and "obscene" underlined. A handwritten notation at that point in the margin, acknowledged by Haldeman as his, says, "Good."

The memo states the demonstration "will not only be directed toward the President, but also toward (the Rev.) Billy Graham." Next to that portion, which is underlined as well, Haldeman acknowledged writing, "Great."

The memo goes on to discuss the problem of how to exclude the demonstrators from the hall where the President was to speak.

"My question," Weicker said, "specifically relates to what mentality it is in the White House that goes ahead and indicates 'good' when the word 'violence' is mentioned, when 'obscene' is mentioned, at which violence and which obscenity is to be directed against the President of the United States. How in any way can that be good?"

"Senator," Haldeman replied, "I can explain that, I think, very easily. The problem that we had during the campaign of violence, of demonstrations, of obscene signs, of efforts to heckle and shout down the President when he was delivering a speech were very great.

"They were not recognized as being very great and there was an attempt made in the coverage of many of these events to present this as totally off-the-cuff reactions of certain people in the audience who were just there and disagreed with what the President said and were expressing their disagreement in a proper exercise of their right to do so as contrasted to planned organizations that were put together for the purpose of creating violence and creating these things in the way that the intelligence indicated this one was going to be handled.

"The reason," Haldeman continued, "for reacting to the indication that they would be violent, obscene and directed toward Billy Graham as 'good' was that if, in fact, they were going to do this in this way, it would be seen that they were doing so clearly. Sometimes they weren't that ineffective. They did a better job of disguising their true intents and their true method of operation, and the reaction of 'good' to those indications was very much in that sense."

"The whole point of the memo," Haldeman said, "strongly confirms my feeling that this sort of activity was not to our benefit in showing the extremes that steps that were planned, in order to try to avoid these people having the opportunity to carry out their violence and their obscenity and directing it toward the President and Billy Graham, at least in the hall."

Committee chairman Ervin interjected to say that he had attended the rally and "it was one of the most orderly meetings I ever attended, there was no disturbance inside the hall."

Weicker later returned to the same theme, quoting the Feb. 10, 1973, memo, which Haldeman said he accepted responsibility for although he said he had not actually dictated it himself.

October 14, 1971
9:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: RONALD H. WALKER
RE: CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA - DEMONSTRATIONS

To Walker
High Priority

1. The most recent intelligence that has been received from the Advanceman Bill Henkel and the USSS is that we will have demonstrators in Charlotte tomorrow. The number is running between 100 and 200; the Advanceman's gut reaction is between 150 and 200. They will be violent; they will have extremely obscene signs, as has been indicated by their handbills. It will not only be directed toward the President, but also toward Billy Graham. They will have smoke bombs, and have every intention of disrupting the arrival and trying to blitz the Coliseum in order to disrupt the dedication ceremony.

Good

Great!

2. According to Henkel and the USSS, and it is also indicated on the handbills being distributed by the demonstrators, the Charlotte police department is extremely tough and will probably use force to prevent any possible disruption of the motorcade or the President's movements.

Good

3. My instructions to Henkel are to control the demonstrators outside the Coliseum as much as he can with the help of the USSS and the police department, from the city of Charlotte. He is to set up as fine a screening system as possible. There are 8000 seats in the Coliseum and we have printed up 25,000 tickets. It is a known fact that there are demonstrators who have tickets. Therefore it will be necessary for us to set up screening system to eliminate anyone that has a false or fake ticket. We will set up our normal checkpoints, using 25 Veterans of Foreign Wars and between 50 and 60 ushers that are being provided by the local Republican Party. There will also be a volunteer lawyer corps to handle any legal questions that might arise, as far as us denying entrance on the grounds of a phony ticket.

The thing that bothers me is that we are for the most part paralleling the system that we had designed for the Wright-Patterson Air Force Museum dedication in Dayton, Ohio. Realizing the attention that was drawn to the techniques used there, and the concern that has since been expressed by Ziegler, Warren, and most vehemently by Pat Buchanan, the feeling is that the Press Corps especially the liberals are very much aware of how the demonstrators are being handled, and although the White House has not been identified with these processes, we are very much suspect. Buchanan maintains that they will be the look out for demonstrators and how they are being handled, and it is his feeling that this could be extremely damaging to the President's posture, even if the White House is only indirectly involved. The Billy Graham people have been of great help but they've got their own problems with citizens' organizations sponsoring the Billy Graham Day, and have pretty well backed off from any of the arrangements with the exception of crowd building. Therefore, we have got very little support in handling demonstrators in the hall.

QUESTION

Should we continue with our plan to prevent demonstrators from entering the Coliseum?

Yes H No

As long as it is local police
of local volunteers doing it -
not our people

H. R. Haldeman's comments are written in the margins of this memo to him from Ronald H. Walker about demonstrations thought to be scheduled during a visit by President Nixon to Charlotte, N.C., in October, 1971.

"We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972," the memo states. "The investigation should be brought to include the peace movement which leads directly to McGovern and Teddy Kennedy. This is a good counter-offensive to be developed."

"Are you trying to tie the Democratic Party to Communist money or foreign money?" Weicker asked.

"I am trying to tie the demonstrations that were instigated by McGovern or McGovern campaign people to those people," Haldeman replied. "I am trying to get out the story of what the facts were in regard to the instigation of and financing of demonstrations.

"It was my understanding," Haldeman said, "that there were facts that led to these points."

"What are the facts?" Weicker asked.

"I don't know," Haldeman replied. "I have stated what my understanding was. Mr. Dean was the one I understood had the facts."

Weicker referred to the May 24 testimony of Bernard L. Barker, one of the seven convicted Watergate defendants. "It is funny how the word Communist keeps popping up," Weicker said.

In explaining why he participated in the Watergate break-in, Barker told the committee: "I have the greatest respect for Mr. McGovern as a senator and as presidential candidate. I disagree personally with the kind of philosophy I saw in a similar circum-

stance turn Cuba into a Communist state.

"If we were successful in obtaining documents that implicated a foreign government of Cuba in the operation, if this hurt Mr. McGovern, it would be the nature of the evidence, not I."

"Is there some connection," Weicker asked Haldeman, "is there something this committee has missed in its investigations whereby you feel that in fact there is a connection between Mr. McGovern's candidacy and Communist money just as apparently Mr. Barker operated on that same basis in his break-in at the Watergate?"

"The point I made in my statement was precisely that I hope the committee will investigate that possibility and determine whether there was or not," Haldeman replied. "I understand that you will."

Weicker, his voice rising with anger, asked Haldeman, "Was it not your job at that time, the job of the executive branch of government to investigate rather than to go ahead and put stories out?"

"I mean, you know Mr. Barker is in jail today because somebody sold him that story. Now, that is what I am talking about. Mr. Barker is in jail today because somebody sold him the story of the connection, if you will, between Mr. McGovern's candidacy and Communist in Cuba. That is the reason he went into the Watergate, as he explained it to this committee.

"How many more Americans were supposed to believe this if you had put out the story? This was not a memorandum to . . . investigate on the part of law enforcement agencies but to put out a story," Weicker concluded.

Ervin later picked up the same line of questioning and suggested to Haldeman that the memo reflected "a purpose to cover up the (Watergate) cover-up."

"I do not believe so," Haldeman replied.

Sen. Joseph M. Montoya (D-N.M.), who was unusually sharp in his questioning yesterday, told Haldeman, "It is patently clear . . . that you people were trying to fabricate a situation and not develop the facts, otherwise

you would not have used the phrase 'put out the story.'"

Despite Haldeman's attempts to persuade Montoya that the memo envisioned an investigation to determine the facts, Montoya remained unpersuaded.

Referring to tape recordings of presidential conversations that the committee has tried unsuccessfully to get from President Nixon, Montoya told Haldeman, "Well, I am sorry, but I see that pattern in this memorandum and if that is true, then I fear for the authenticity of the tapes at the White House in the event that the court should order that we have them."

During his testimony, Haldeman told the committee at several points that he had been involved in decisions but could not give them "specific" details on why things had been done or how they had been done.

Under questioning by Montoya, he conceded that he had ordered the FBI to make a background report on CBS newsman Daniel Schorr.

"Why would you order a check in that context?" Montoya asked. "Was Mr. Schorr being considered for an appointment?"

"No, sir, he was not," Haldeman replied.

"Why would you check on him, then?" Montoya asked.

"The check was made," Haldeman replied. "I don't know why, but the check was made."

Montoya pressed Haldeman further, asking whether the White House had file on Schorr.

Haldeman: No sir, the FBI did, or may have . . . They have a file on most people who are known publicly . . .

Montoya then recalled to Haldeman that Haldeman's former aide, Alexander Butterfield, had told the committee that Haldeman had ordered FBI checks on eight persons, including Schorr, actress Helen Hayes and singer Frank Sinatra.

Montoya: Was Helen Hayes being considered for an appointment?

Haldeman: Quite possibly . . . Helen a file on Schorr.

Hayes had helped presidential appoint-

ments and commissions at a number of times and that is quite possible.

Montoya: Was Frank Sinatra being considered for an appointment?

Haldeman: No sir. Frank Sinatra was being considered as an entertainer at the White House . . .

Montoya: And was Daniel Schorr being considered for entertainment at the White House?

Haldeman: No sir.

Haldeman added that he had read that in the Johnson administration, the "enemies" list was referred to as "the anathema list, and I must say that is a much more delicate term for it."

Regarding the investigation of the Watergate affair, Haldeman expressed little knowledge about the probe John Dean was conducting for the White House into the affair.

"I was not an investigator," Haldeman told the committee. "I didn't investigate investigations into other things except when I was ordered to. In this case there was so much under way that anything I would have done beyond that would have been a drop in the bucket and I didn't have the capability or the time to go into that kind of thing and as I said in my opening remarks, this is an enormously important matter today. And it has become so, but it wasn't at that time."

Haldeman also professed to know little about a memo discussing A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a Defense Department employee who was dismissed from his job after revealing a \$2 billion cost overrun on the C-5A transport plane.

Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii) read Haldeman a 1970 memo addressed to him from White House aide Alexander P. Butterfield.

"Fitzgerald," Butterfield wrote, "is no doubt a topnotch cost expert but he must be given very low marks in loyalty, and after all, loyalty is the name of the game."

"Mr. Haldeman," Inouye asked, "was loyalty the name of the game at the White House and was loyalty much more important than the truth?"

"I would not say that either of those was the case," Haldeman replied. "I would say that loyalty was important. I would say that the truth is overwhelmingly important."

The memo, Inouye said, "is quite critical of someone who was attempting to expose to full public view the truth."

"Well, senator," Haldeman replied, "I do not know any of the ins and outs of Fitz—is it Fitzgerald? . . . I am not qualified to comment on the facts in the Fitzgerald case. I can only say that in answer to your question as to attitude of this witness, that loyalty did not override truth."

Haldeman was pressed by the committee several times during the day to explain the administration's use of the federal machinery for political purposes.

Echoing the earlier testimony of John Dean, he said that he knew the Internal Revenue Service, for example, had been urged to investigate Democrats more closely. It was believed at the White House, he said, that Republicans were unfairly singled out for close scrutiny.

"I don't know anything about it because first-hand I have made no investigation into this," he said, but it was believed that "the diligence with which they (the IRS) pursued cases that had been referred to them related to potential misdoings by opponents of this administration" did not match the energy expended on investigating administration supporters.

In response to a question from Sen. Herman E. Talmadge (D-Ga.), Haldeman said he did not recall whether former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, a Democrat, had been the subject of an IRS probe.

"I know that there was considerable —" Haldeman said and then interrupted himself. "Now wait a minute. Clark Clifford."

"He is a prominent Washington attorney, as you know," Talmadge said.

"I am sorry," Haldeman said. "I was thinking of a different person." (Clifford has said that he knows of no audit of his taxes.)

Asked later by Sen. Montoya about the extensive use of FBI background checks on people believed to be "enemies" of the administration, Haldeman said the practice was used to develop a sort of blacklist for White House social functions.

Many of the people on the list, he said, "were, in fact, quite vocally and publicly opposing administration positions on the (Vietnam) war."

"Why did you label them as enemies, then?" asked Montoya. "Did they not have a right to comment on the war?"

"Why certainly," Haldeman replied. "But they did not have a right to be extended the courtesy of the President's hospitality in order to express their opposition."

In again challenging Dean's testimony sharply on several points, Haldeman did not believe the former White House counsel's account of a March 13, 1973, conversation with the President in which Dean said executive clemency

for the Watergate defendants was discussed.

Dean had testified that he told the President on March 13 that the defendants wanted money—as much as \$1 million—in exchange for their silence. He also said executive clemency was discussed.

Haldeman said he believed “that those matters, clemency and money demands, were not discussed at the March 13 meeting because they were, in fact, discussed at the March 21 meeting in such a way as not to seem . . . that they had been discussed earlier.”

Haldeman was present for parts but not all of both meetings. He has testified that he has listened to a White House tape recording of the second meeting.

March 21 is the date given by White House officials—Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and Richard Moore in their testimony before the committee and the President in an April 17 announcement—as the time when Mr. Nixon first became aware the Watergate scandal extended beyond the seven convicted conspirators.

Haldeman did, however, confirm many details of Dean's testimony about his March 21 meeting with the President, including Dean's assertion that he warned Mr. Nixon that Watergate was “a cancer on the presidency” that threatened to consume the administration.

Several times during the day, members of the committee introduced various documents into evidence in an effort to depict Haldeman as a hard-bitten and demanding boss of the White House staff who had little regard for niceties but a great deal for results.

Underneath one memorandum on a routine political proposal, Haldeman had written: “I'll approve whatever will work and I'm concerned with results—not methods.”

Weicker, after reading Haldeman's handwritten comment, asked the witness if he didn't “feel that might not have been (the) psychology that led to the excesses which we have had described to this committee?”

“No,” Haldeman said, “I certainly don't.”

Like Ehrlichman, who preceded him to the committee's witness table, Haldeman spoke intensely of his belief in the importance of government service and the need for people of quality in high office.

In contrast to Gordon C. Strachan, the 30-year-old former Haldeman aide who told the committee that he would urge young people “to stay away” from careers in government, Haldeman said it is “one of the proudest things that I have in the back of my mind” that his oldest son, now a college undergraduate, hopes to enter government service.

As he ended his testimony, he said he wished to “reiterate my pride in having served President Nixon in the first four years of his term,” and said his period in the White House has been “the high point of my life.”

He said he felt “deep regret and sorrow that in a few instances there was a failure” to maintain high standards at the White House, and hoped they would not obscure the administration's accomplishments.

Haldeman was asked several times yesterday about the tapes of presidential conversations that Mr. Nixon has refused to turn over either to the committee or to federal prosecutors.

Inouye asked him at one point if in his opinion the President ever intended to release all the tapes, and Haldeman replied that in his view the President did not.

“Well,” asked Inouye, “how do you account for the historical aspect of the tapes?” (The White House has said the recordings were made for historical purposes.)

“For his (the President's) own use,” Haldeman said.

Ervin, also, repeatedly suggested that the hearings could be rapidly completed if the President would release the recordings.

Haldeman has heard two of the tapes and testified to the committee about his recollection of them, Ervin noted, “and the presidency has not been destroyed and the Constitution hasn't collapsed and the heavens haven't fallen, have they?”

Haldeman agreed.

Once again, yesterday's hearing was punctuated from time to time by laughter from the audience.

When Haldeman's lawyer, John J. Wilson, protested to Ervin, the chairman replied: “Mr. Wilson, I wish you would tell me some way I can keep people from laughing. I don't approve of it, and I wish they would restrain themselves, and I have tried to restrain them.”

Then, turning to the subject at hand—the memo concerning the 1971 rally in his native North Carolina, Ervin remarked, “I hate to hear all of this about things like this supposed to be happening in that Garden of Eden, North Carolina, but nobody must laugh at that.”

There was another burst of laughter.

The hearings resume at 9:30 a.m. today.

Richard Helms, former CIA director, is scheduled to testify.