

# A Glimpse of the Old

By Lou Cannon

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate investigators yesterday caught glimpses of another, tougher Bob Haldeman than the soft-spoken, crew-cut witness who had cooperated with them through 2½ days of difficult testimony.

Behind the mask of the ever-smiling adman, Haldeman emerged on the final day of his testimony as the unrelenting White House chief of staff who divided the world into friends and enemies and gave scant quarter to the latter.

"We need to get our people to put out the story on the foreign or Communist money that was used in support of demonstrations against the President in 1972," this other Haldeman wrote to then-White House Counsel John W. Dean III on Feb. 10, 1973, three months after Mr. Nixon's reelection landslide. "We should tie all 1972 demonstrations to McGovern and thus to the Democrats as part of the peace movement."

This was the same Haldeman who on Oct. 14, 1971, penciled in the word "good" alongside an advance man's written prediction that President Nixon would be greeted by "violence" and "obscene signs" when he attended Billy Graham Day ceremonies at Charlotte, N.C. When the advance man forecast that Dr. Graham also would be a target, Haldeman added the notation, "great."

This also was the same Haldeman who on Jan. 21,

1970, responded succinctly to a wordy memo from Jeb Stuart Magruder, then a White House aide, on various alternatives for monitoring the press. "I'll approve whatever will work and am concerned with results—not methods," Haldeman wrote on the Magruder memo.

These reflections of Haldeman's siege mentality were in sharp contrast to the amiable, even gentle, demeanor that Haldeman presented to the Watergate committee during the first day and a half of testimony. He was genial yesterday, too, but there was more bite to his answers, and less patience by his attorney, John J. Wilson, with adversary questions from the committee.

Wilson was annoyed with Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), who the attorney said had slurred his other client, John Ehrlichman, by calling him "a liar" over an inadvertently live microphone. Yesterday, Wilson enlisted Chairman Sam Erwin's cooperation in preventing Inouye from questioning Haldeman about his combative role in Mr. Nixon's unsuccessful 1962 California gubernatorial campaign.

The witness seemed less bothered by Inouye than by Sen. Lowell Weicker, the histrionic Connecticut Republican who took the lead role in peeling off the layers from the earlier, more amiable Haldeman.

At one point Weicker attempted to invoke the "results not methods" memo notation by Haldeman as

the operating philosophy of the Haldeman White House.

"Don't you feel that might not have been the psychology that led to the excesses we've had described to this committee?" Weicker asked.

"No, I certainly don't," Haldeman replied.

Haldeman went on to say that his comment was limited to the narrow scope of the memo and that he didn't believe that a President ought to be elected on the basis of what Weicker called "Watergate-type activities."

"Do you think we ought to elect Presidents on the basis of digging up all the personal political dirt we

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## Commentary

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can on their opponents?" Weicker continued.

"... It puts it in a terminology that sounds bad," responded Haldeman, without giving ground. "I would say that it's very important to know the facts about an opponent in a political campaign, whatever they may be."

Later in the afternoon Weicker backed Haldeman up against the wall again in questioning him about a memo to Dean on Feb. 9, 1973, that told Dean to have then-Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst order the FBI to investigate purported wiretapping of Mr. Nixon in the 1968 campaign. The memo concluded with instructions to Dean to have Pepsico Chairman Donald Kendall call in Pepsico employee Cartha DeLoach, a

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former high FBI official, and fire DeLoach if he didn't provide the necessary information.

After sparring with Weicker through three questions, Haldeman finally conceded, "This was a question of applying additional pressure to attempt to get the information from Mr. DeLoach."

The Haldeman who emerged from these inquiries very much resembled the single-minded Haldeman of years past, the Haldeman who forced a transfer of the White House head of the Secret Service detail because he wouldn't let a crowd rush past protective barriers for a "spontaneous" greeting of the President, or the Haldeman who emerged briefly on public television in February, 1972, to say that critics of the administration's Vietnam policies were "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy."

Most of all, the Haldeman of the final day of testimony resembled the campaign chairman of 1962, who led Mr. Nixon's troops to glorious defeat in what was supposed to be a political cakewalk against California incumbent Democratic Gov. Edmund G. Brown.

A California court in 1964 found that Haldeman, using documents "amended and finally approved by Mr. Nixon personally," had organized a phony Democratic committee aimed at disrupting the Brown campaign. The committee cast aspersions on Democratic candidates for favoring the admission of

mainland China into the United Nations.

This week in the hearing room, Haldeman spoke with pride of the restoration of relations with "the People's Republic of China" as a major accomplishment of the Nixon administration. He called it "Red China" in 1962.

The Senate Watergate committee, however, never really ventured into the 1962 campaign. Inouye started out by reading from court transcripts, but he was blocked by the peppery Wilson, who objected that the inquiry was irrelevant. For the second time in as many days Ervin sided with a Wilson objection and halted the testimony.

The combination of Wilson's frequent objections and the committee's self-imposed rule limiting senators to 10 minutes of questioning conspired to interrupt promising lines of inquiry. Senators left the hearing room frequently. They lost their train of thought. Sen. Edward Gurney (D-Fla.) quarreled publicly with Ervin about the committee's failure to immediately call Charles Colson as a witness.

While the committee appeared to be running down, Haldeman was suffering from a lapse of memory.

The best guide to what really happened in the President's office, Haldeman cheerfully conceded to Ervin, is contained on the tapes that Mr. Nixon insists the committee will never hear.