

Excerpts From Testimony by Dean Before

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 27—
Following are excerpts from a transcript of the testimony on the 14th day of hearings on the Watergate case today before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential campaign activity:

MORNING SESSION

John W. Dean 3d

SENATOR ERVIN: We have two very peculiar questions which have been addressed to the committee, apparently by Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President. The first question addressed to the committee by Mr. Buzhardt is this:

"Did you and your counsel develop a strategy for obtaining immunity from prosecution? What were the elements of that strategy?"

On behalf of the committee, I would reply to Mr. Buzhardt that the only strategy we developed was to pursue the course outlined by the act of Congress codified as Sections 6002 and 6005 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

The second question is this — this is to the committee — the second question is: "Didn't your strategy include deliberate leaks of information to the media on what you had told investigators? Maybe this is addressed to Mr. Dean, I do not know.

It is probably addressed to Mr. Dean. *

Well, Mr. Dean, I will ask you these questions — well, maybe I had just better let us proceed in orderly fashion. am sorry I misconstrued the question.

I might state these were just handed to me about one second before I read them and I drew the inference, since the questions were separated as they were, some of them were addressed to the committee rather than the witness. But perhaps I am mistaken in that but I would say that the only strategy this committee has followed to secure immunity for any witness has been to pursue the law strictly.

Now, on yesterday the witness was asked to produce some exhibits and I just wanted to ask him if he had provided them.

DEAN: Yes, I did. These are from a file that is entitled Opponents List and Political Enemies Project.

Back to the Beginning

SENATOR GURNEY: We have had a great deal of testimony, 245 pages of your statement as well as the testimony yesterday, and I must say it is hard to know where to begin in all this. I think probably the best place to start always is at the beginning. Would you say that it is fair to say that Gordon Liddy's plan of bugging and electronic espionage really started out the whole Watergate affair?

A. Well, there was an atmosphere that might have been several precursors source to that plan. The plan was an accident of fate where they culminated into Mr. Liddy's specific proposal that was presented in the Attorney General's office in



The New York Times

John W. Dean 3d, second from right, arriving yesterday at Old Senate Office Building. He is accompanied by his lawyers, Charles N. Shaffer, left, and Robert C. McCandless.

the two meetings which occurred in late January and early February.

Q. But as far as the Watergate break-in itself is concerned, it really stemmed from Mr. Liddy's plan of bugging and electronic espionage, did it not? Now, who recommended Mr. Liddy to the committee to re-elect the President?

A. I passed on a recommendation that I had received from Mr. Krogh to Mr. Mitchell and he in turn, endorsed that recommendation and sent him over to the re-election committee.

Q. Did you interview Mr. Liddy after Krogh recommended him to you?

A. Not to my recollection, no. I was present when he was interviewed by Mr. Mitchell and again when he was interviewed by Mr. Magruder.

Q. Did you ask any questions about his qualifications at that time or did Mr. Liddy just simply answer questions?

A. I asked Mr. Krogh about his qualifications at that time when he first mentioned him to me. And they asked questions during those interviews, yes.

Q. Did you ever ask him what he had been doing for Mr. Krogh? Or Mr. Hunt? A. No, I did not.

Liddy's Qualifications

Q. Would that not be important in finding out his qualifications, his previous employment?

A. Well, I was told, for example, when I met him — when I talked to Mr. Krogh about him, I can recall Mr. Krogh very specifically telling me that he had written some of the best legal memorandums that he had run across in a long time. He explained that Gordon had taken some rather complex subjects and analyzed them in a very precise way. One of these memoranda had gone in to the President and the President had complimented Mr. Liddy through Mr. Krogh on the quality of the document that he had prepared.

Q. Was it under that part of his duties would be in charge of security or things like that? A. That is correct.

Q. Well, did you ask any questions of him as to what

* G. 13, 14, - P. 36

he had been doing in the area of security?

A. I was told that he had an F.B.I., Treasury Department, law enforcement background. There was not a great focus on that at that time. I knew Mr. Krogh had worked in the past before I came to the White House and partially after I was still at the White House with the demonstrator problem.

Q. You never did go into what he had been doing with Krogh and Hunt? A. No, I did not.

Q. The Jan. 27 meeting occurred and as I recall, you testified that the original plan—and I do not know what the word was that you used to describe it, but— A. I think I called it a "Mission Impossible" plan.

Q. Did you ever talk to Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Magruder after this horrendous plan? A. As I recall, the only conversation I had was a very brief conversation. Mr. Liddy was taking the charts off the easel and they were preparing to leave the office when I paused in front of Mr. Mitchell's desk and he told me that this was certainly out of the question.

Plan Caused Worries

Q. Well, did it worry you that this man came up with kidnaping, prostitution, mugging, and all the rest of it? A. Yes, sir, it did.

Q. But you never really discussed it with Mitchell and Magruder as to Liddy's capability of staying on at the job? A. Well, sir, you would have had to have been there to believe it and I might say that it was so far out that there was no hope in my mind that anyone was ever going to approve any plan like this. So I just assumed that it was going to die a natural death.

Q. Now we come to the second meeting that occurred on Feb. 4. My recollection also is that you testified that you were again very disturbed at what he was proposing. A. That is correct and I was injecting myself into the meeting in an effort to terminate the meeting, which I did.

Q. Well, did you have any discussion after the meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder about his continuing?

A. I had a direct discussion with Mr. Liddy at that time. I might add, after the first meeting, I had told Mr. Liddy he should destroy the charts. After the second meeting, as we were leaving the office, I told him that I would not discuss this with him any further, I indicated to him that it still was not what was necessary, and it was a rather brief discussion. I must say I felt very sorry for Gordon Liddy during much of this because of the fact that he had received no guidance from anybody that I could tell—certainly none from me—as to what was expected of him.

Q. Was what you testified that you told him that he was never to discuss this thing again with you, that if any plan was approved like this that you did not want to know about it? A. That is correct.

Reported to Haldeman

Q. Why did you not go back to the President and tell him about this hair-raising scheme? A. Well, I did go back, but I did not have access to the President, as I

think I explained. I went to Mr. Haldeman.

Q. Did you try to gain access to the President? A. Senator, I did not try. I had never been into the President or called by the President before. My reporting channel was through Mr. Haldeman and I went back and told what I thought was the proper reporting channel. I told him what I had seen, told him my reaction to it, told him that I thought it was unwise, unnecessary, and Mr. Haldeman agreed with me.

Q. Did you ever discuss after this meeting with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, whether this plan was going to be implemented or what ever happened to it?

A. I never heard about the plan again, until, as I have testified, Mr. Liddy came into my office some time in February or March—I do not know the precise date—and told me that he could not get his plan approved. I reminded him that I was not going to talk with him about it, and he said that he understood and he did not talk about it.

Q. Did you ever report that to the President?

A. No, I didn't, sir.

Q. Now, to get back to the break-in at the Watergate, as I recall your testimony, there really wasn't anything in Watergate or much of anything in the activities surrounding the committee to re-elect the President from that Feb. 4 meeting until the Watergate Break-in. And I understand you got back from the Philippine Islands on the 18th and then returned here to Washington and went in your office on the 18th.

Then, as I recall, you said that you had received phone calls that day and talked to a number of people—Caulfield, Magruder, Ehrlichman, Strachan, Colson, Sloan, and you later called Liddy and Kleindienst. Why all these calls if you weren't that closely associated with what they were doing over there in the political field?

Investigative Office

A. Well, Senator, I would say that my office was one that, one, I did have some dealings with the re-election committee, I did know all the parties involved. My office normally was asked to investigate or look into any problem that came up of that nature. When any wrongdoing was charged—an Administration office, for example, when the grain deal came up—and I think as the Senator will recall, during the I.T.T. matter, my office had some peripheral involvement in that. And I believe we had some dealings with you office on that matter.

Q. Not my office. I think we met in Senator Hruska's office, the Republican members of the committee. A. Well, Senator, I recall one time that Mr. Fielding and I came up to your office on the matter and Mr. Fielding provided some material for your staff.

Q. What does that have to do with the Watergate? A. Well, I was explaining the type of thing that would come to my office and my office was a fire-fighting office and would get into various—

Q. Did you do other fire-fighting before June 18th? A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the committee to re-elect? A. Not to my knowledge, no. That was the only

fire I recall over there, and it was the biggest one.

Q. Now, then, you mentioned in your testimony yesterday in response to Mr. Dash that you inherited the cover-up. Would you tell how you inherited the cover-up?

A. When I came back to the office on the 18th and talked to Mr. Strachan, I realized that the cover-up was already in effect, in being, and I realized that when Mr. Strachan told me of the documents that he had destroyed and Mr. Haldeman's instruction, that there certainly wasn't going to be a revelation of the White House involvement in the matter. I didn't at that point in time know the potentials of the White House involvement.

Early Meeting Recalled

Q. Was not one of the first meetings of the cover-up held in John Mitchell's apartment on the 19th of June?

A. Senator, I would say that the day of, to my knowledge, the day of the 19th at the White House was a very busy day. That the calls I received from Mr. Ehrlichman, from Mr. Colson, the meetings I had with Mr. Ehrlichman and then again later with Mr. Colson about the safe were long before I went to the meeting at Mr. Mitchell's apartment, which I do not recall was on the 19th or 20th. I do recall a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office but I do not recall specifically which day it was.

Q. Well, what you are saying is then that these several phone calls you had with all of these people really had to do with at least the beginnings of the cover-up, is that right? Well, you were in on it from the beginning, were you not? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You really did not inherit anything. You were in on the sort of hatching of it, were you not? Who set the policy on the cover-up?

A. I do not think it was a policy set. There was just no alternative at that point in time. Q. Did you advise the President of what was going on?

A. Senator, the first time I ever talked to the President was one occasion that I recall before Sept. 15th which was in late August, to the best of my recollection, and that certainly was not an occasion to talk to the President about anything because his former law partners were in the office, Mrs. Nixon was in the office, there were several notaries or one notary there, some other members of the staff and it had to do with the signing of the President's testamentary papers and it was—just was not a very appropriate occasion to even give a whisper to the President that I would like to talk to him. So I must say that any time between June 19th and Sept. 15th I had no conversations with the President, and nor did I approach the President at any time other than through reporting to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman.

Did Not Try to See Nixon

Q. Do you not think as the President's attorney, you should have tried to go to him and warn him about what was being done? A. I probably should have but I was assuming everything I reported to Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman was also be-

Senate Panel Investigating Watergate

ing reported to the President.

Q. Let us go and discuss for a moment the F.B.I. reports of the investigation. Did you first go to Mr. Kleindienst for these reports? A. Right. I do not recall whether it was Mr. Kleindienst or Mr. Petersen that I first discussed this with.

Q. Who asked you to get the reports? A. Initially the request came from Mr. Mitchell and I believe that was a result of Mr. Mardian's desire to see the reports. Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman thought it was a good idea that I see the reports, and I had—at what point in time I actually raised this with either Petersen or Kleindienst my recollection is I did talk to Mr. Petersen about it at some time and he suggested I go directly to Mr. Gray, and I do recall discussing it with Mr. Gray.

Q. Let us get back to Mr. Kleindienst. Are you sure you cannot recall whether you ever talked to him about getting these 302 forms? A. It is very possible, as I said, Senator, it is very possible I did.

Q. Well, do you recall if you talked to Mr. Petersen? What did you recall of that conversation? A. I recall he suggested that I go directly to Mr. Gray.

Q. Did either Mr. Petersen or Mr. Kleindienst or anybody, according to your recollection, tell you that you could not get these F.B.I. reports, that the President himself would have to get them? A. I was told that the best way to deal with this situation is go directly to Mr. Gray.

Q. Then, you have no recollection that the Attorney General or Mr. Petersen told you that you could not have them unless you get them through the President? A. I do not recall it, frankly.

Conversations With Gray

Q. Well, then let's go to Mr. Gray and your conversations with him.

A. Mr. Gray told me that he thought that I could read them in his office, I told him I thought that was awkward, and when we discussed it, he wanted some assurance that this information was being reported to the President. As I recall, I gave him such an assurance.

To the best of my recollection Mr. Gray said to me that, after I gave him assurance it was going to be reported, that he would work something out. Now I don't recall when I first received the initial reports. I only recall that it was after a summary report was prepared on the 21st of July, as I recall the date, and I showed that report to the people at the White House and the people at the reelection committee, that the pressure began that I let others read the raw F.B.I. reports.

Q. Let me get back again now to the conversation with Mr. Gray. Wasn't he pretty specific with you that the only reason he would turn these things over to you is because the President of the United States requested them through you?

A. Well, Senator, in my dealings with Mr. Gray from the very outset was very anxious to be of any assistance he could.

When he told me, for example, he was traveling around the country a lot and I should deal with Mark Felt that to me evidenced that Mr. Gray wanted to be of assistance if he wasn't there I should talk to others. The same tenor was in the conversation that he would have to check and he wanted assurances these were going to the President, this information would go to the President. I am sure he knew very well that the President didn't want to sit down and read a stack of raw F.B.I. materials.

Q. Did you ever report to the President what was in those 302 forms? A. There was never anything in those F.B.I. reports that I read worth reporting even to Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman.

82 F.B.I. Files

Q. Did you ever show a Single one of the 82,302 files to the President? Did you ever report a single information that was in those files to the President?

A. Not to my recollection, no. I may have reported the general tenor of the investigation which was, I might say, very vigorous. I would report that to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and as my channel of reporting.

Q. Did you ever get a call from Mr. Gray about this newspaper story about one of the reports being shown to Mr. Segretti?

A. Well, I recall that when the story broke, Mr. Gray called me and asked me if that were true, and I said absolutely not, that the FBI reports have never left my office and I have never showed an FBI report to Mr. Segretti which, in fact, is true.

Q. Who did you show them to?

A. Mr. Mardian was anxious to see them, Mr. Mitchell thought that was a good idea and also that Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Parkinson also come see them. They came to my office. I recall them scanning them. The only other occasion I recall anybody else looking at the files is when

Mr. Dick Moore who was special counsel to the President was given those documents to look at.

Q. Now, as I understand it some material was turned over to the F.B.I. but certain materials were held out, is that correct? What was turned over to Gray? A. Two envelopes containing sensitive political documents.

Q. That was turned over at a meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office, is that right? A. That is correct. You will recall I had been instructed to "deep-six" and shred documents. I had to come up in my own mind with a persuasive argument for Mr. Ehrlichman as to why not to "deep-six" and destroy documents.

Q. Now then what transpired when they [the documents] were turned over?

A. As I said, I took the documents and had a very brief discussion with Ehrlichman.

It was pretty well understood what the meeting was for, so it was not necessary to have any extended discussion other than the fact that the documents were very politically sensitive, that as I recall, I called them political dynamite when I raised them with Gray, that he should take custody of them, and that would be the way to handle it as far as the White House was concerned. I do not recall any discussion of telling Mr. Gray to destroy the documents.

He at that point in time, as I recall, placed the documents in a small sort of briefcase and seemed quite willing to take them.

Spoke to Petersen

Q. Did you ever ask him again on any occasion what he had done with the documents? A. After I had disclosed this matter to Mr. Petersen, I recall that I was at luncheon at the Justice Department. This was probably in early January. At that time, Mr. Gray came up to me and sort of took me by the arm and said: "John, you have got to hang tight on not disclosing these documents." And I said nothing to him.

Q. Let us go to the August press conference, where the President referred to the Dean report. My understanding is that you indicated great surprise at this so-called Dean report? A. That is correct.

Q. Did you ever protest to the President? A. No sir, but others I did. I talked to Mr. Mitchell about it; I talked to Mr. Moore about it; I talked to my associate, Mr. Fielding.

Q. Let's turn now to the Sept. 15th meeting with the President and Mr. Haldeman and yourself. A. The President asked me to sit down and told me that Bob had told him what I had been doing and he expressed appreciation for it.

Q. Did you discuss the criminal cases that were coming on for trial, the civil suits that were filed by the Democrats, the Common Cause suit that had been filed by Common Cause, the Patman hearings? A. That is correct, we did.

Q. Did you discuss any aspects of the Watergate at that meeting with the President?

A. Well, given the fact that he told me I had done a good job I assumed he had been very pleased with what had been going on. The fact that the indictments, he was pleased that the indictments had stopped at Liddy because the only other link into the White House was Magruder.

Q. Did you discuss what Magruder knew about Watergate, the cover-up money, Strachan bringing wiretap information into Haldeman, [or] Haldeman instructing Sta-

chan to destroy all of these materials? A. No, I did not.

Q. Well now how can you say that the President knew all about these things from a simple observation by him that "Bob tells me you are doing a good job?"

A. I was aware of the fact that Mr. Haldeman had often made notes, Mr. Haldeman

has a good memory. This was the hottest issue that was going in the campaign. I can't believe that the fact that we were going to contain this matter would totally escape the President's attention and it was to me a confirmation and a compliment to me that I had done this.

Q. Did he say that "Bob has been telling me everything you have been doing." A. He said, "Bob has been reporting to me," something of this nature.

Q. I thought you said that he said that "Bob has been telling me what a good job you have been doing." A. Well, we are quibbling over words but I remember—

Gurney Denies Quibbling

Q. We are not quibbling over words. We are talking about something very important, whether the President of the United States knew on Sept. 15th about the Watergate and the cover-up.

A. I am quite aware of that and I have told you I am trying to recall. My mind is not a tape-recorder. It does recall impressions of conversations very well, and the impression I had was that he had told, he told me that, Bob had reported to him what I had been doing. That was the im-

pression that very clearly came out.

Q. Now then let's go to October, going along there in chronological fashion, and the money that was turned over to you, the \$15,200. Who brought it to you? A. Gordon Strachan and Mr. Richard Howard.

Q. Now then, I understand that you withdrew \$4,850 from it.

A. When I took it out. I took out, I was seeking to take out about \$5,000. I thought that would cover my expenses. I might put this in context: When my prospective bride came back I was working around the clock on this, I had been given a couple of assignments. I was supposed to get the minister or I was looking for a judge to do that, and also to get some wedding music because the wedding was going to be held in a home. Come Thursday I hadn't even gotten a chance to take care of these matters. I counted out what I thought was going to be roughly five and it came up to \$4,850. I put a check, wrote a check out and put it in, wrote it to cash.

Q. Do you know this is a crime, Mr. Dean? Isn't it embezzlement?

A. Well, I had very clearly made, there was no intention on my part never to account for the full amount.

CHARLES SHAFFER: Excuse me. I would like to say as counsel for Mr. Dean that, based upon the fact that have been discussed with Mr. Dean, if they are true, Mr. Gurney says that is embezzlement. I disagree with him, and I think there

Figures in Senate Inquiry

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 26 — Following are the names of individuals who figured today in hearings by the Senate select committee on the Watergate case:

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Sam J. Ervin Jr., Democrat of North Carolina, chairman.

Herma E. Talmadge, Democrat of Georgia.

Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat of Hawaii.

Joseph M. Montoya, Democrat of New Mexico.

Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee.

Edward J. Gurney, Republican of Florida.

Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut.

COMMITTEE COUNSEL

Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director.

Fred D. Thompson, chief minority counsel.

Rufus L. Edmiston, deputy counsel.

WITNESSES

John W. Dean 3d, former counsel to the President.

PERSONS NAMED IN TESTIMONY

J. Fred Buzhardt, special counsel to the President.

John J. Caulfield, former employe of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Charles W. Colson, former counsel to the President.

John D. Ehrlichman, former White House adviser.

L. Patrick Gray 3d, former acting director of the F.B.I.

H. R. Haldeman, former White House chief of staff.

E. Howard Hunt Jr., former White House consultant; pleaded guilty to spying in the Watergate case; in jail.

Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's former personal attorney.

Richard G. Kleindienst, former Attorney General.

Frederick C. LaRue, former deputy to Mr. Mitchell at the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

G. Gordon Liddy, former White House aide, convicted in the Watergate break-in; in jail.

Jeb Stuart Magruder, former deputy director of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Robert C. Mardian, official of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

John N. Mitchell, former Attorney General and former chief of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Richard A. Moore, a White House assistant.

Paul O'Brien, an attorney for the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Henry E. Petersen, an Assistant Attorney General who led the Watergate prosecution until last month.

Charles N. Shaffer, attorney for Mr. Dean.

Hugh W. Sloan Jr., former treasurer of Finance Committee to Re-elect the President.

Gordon Strachan, former assistant to Mr. Haldeman.

I did not know if he knew the full involvement of everybody, and I thought that I should report it.

I also would like to add one other thing. On a number of occasions, I asked Mr. Ehrlichman, particularly after the first of the year, if the President were being kept fully informed still. Ehrlichman assured me that the President was being kept regularly posted.

Q. Could you summarize briefly for us the points you touched upon?

A. I had tried back as early as the second meeting, I believe, to tell him that I felt that I was involved in an obstruction of justice, particularly after he had told me that I should report to him and made the comment to me that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were principals.

That stuck in my mind so very clearly that I thought maybe he did not understand everything that I was doing. When I raised this with him, I gave him a few of the facts and he began to debate with me about the fact that he did not think I had any legal problem based on what I was telling him and I said I did. He did not want to get into it at that time.

Data on Later Meeting

Q. Did you have a later meeting with the President and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman?

A. Yes sir. I went from the President's office to a subsequent meeting with Ehrlichman and Haldeman and the discussions began to focus on Mitchell coming down and having Mitchell step forward and if Mitchell stepped forward and would account for this thing, then maybe the problems that had followed for the White House after the break-in would be forgotten. And we went to a meeting in the President's office that afternoon to re-discuss that.

Q. Was there also a discussion at this meeting and later at the one on the 22d that all of you might put this down on paper as to what you viewed as your role in the Watergate? You and Haldeman and Ehrlichman?

A. Yes sir. The first time I heard about writing a report again occurred when I arrived at Camp David on the afternoon of the 23d. The telephone was ringing as I walked into the cabin my wife and I were staying in. The operator told me it was the President on the phone. It was not the President. It was Mr. Haldeman on the phone and he said, while you are up there, why don't you sit down and write a report on this thing.

AFTERNOON SESSION

SENATOR GURNEY: When you put the check in the

Q. Did you ever write this report? A. Yes, sir, and I have submitted that as a document to the committee.

Q. Did you ever tell the President about this report or give him a copy of it? A. No, sir, I used my normal reporting channels.

Clemency for McCord

Q. Turning to the offer of clemency to Mr. McCord, did you ever advise the President of the United States about that?

A. No, Sir. I was proceeding on a conversation I had with Mr. Ehrlichman after Mr. Ehrlichman indicated and Mr. Colson also had indicated that they had talked directly with the President about the matter, something which was later confirmed by the President himself in conversations with him.

Q. Let us go to the meeting now of March 21st in the White House with you and the President. That, as I understand it, is when you gave him a pretty complete run-down of the story about the Watergate, is that correct?

A. That is correct. The President had been rather nonchalant in dealing with the million dollar issue. We had discussed on the 13th the fact that he had discussed clemency with Colson and Ehrlichman. I really felt that the President did not understand the full implications of some of these activities.

envelop that contained the \$15,200, your check, I understand, of \$4,850—that account was that drawn on A. It was drawn on personal checkbook.

Q. Was there

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

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Q. Yes.

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Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Continued From Preceding Page

count to John Wesley Dean 3d. I wonder if you would look at the bank statement and tell the committee how much money you had in the checking account at that time, Mr. Dean.

\$1,625.12, is that not correct? Yet, you put in your file where you were keeping the money in trust a check for \$4,850.

A. That is correct.

Q. Mr. Dean, we were discussing the time lapse between those meetings with the President, the last meetings on the 20th and 21st and 22d and your next communication with him, which was April 15, as I recall.

All of these meetings on the 20th, 21st, 22d, as I understand it, they were the first meetings between what I would call perhaps the most principal people involved in Watergate, at least those in the White House, to where you were coming to serious discussion about what ought to be done and all of you realized that something certainly had to be done, and done rather fast, as I understand it?

A. I would not characterize the meetings as to what had to be done. In fact, the meetings were, as I believe I described them in my testimony, very similar to many, many meetings I had occurred, or I had been in earlier where we talked about, you know, how do we deal with the Senate committee, the President at one point in the meeting picked up the

phone and called the Attorney General and asked him why he had not been meeting with Senator Baker.

Q. Mr. Dean, finally, before wrapping up here, I would like to pin down the occasions this year prior to March 21st, the meeting with the President, when you and he discussed the cover-up of Watergate.

A. All right. It was the meeting on the 27th [February] that I had with the President when he told me to report directly to him. Well, also, I might add at the conclusion of that meeting, as we were walking to the door to leave the office, he again complimented me on the fact that I had done a good job during the campaign, that this had been the only issue that they had had, that they had tried to make something of it but they had been unable to make anything of it and he was very complimentary of my handling of the job.

He then told me we have got, you know, you have got to fight back on situations like this. And I can recall something I cannot express in writing, a gesture when he sort of put his fist into his hand and said, you have just got to really keeping fighting back and I have got confidence in you that you can do that and this thing will not get out of hand.

I am now at the March 13 meeting, where the matter of executive clemency and the million dollars came up. That would be the next instance in the sequence. At March 13, there was a num-

ber of unspecified demands for money that had come to me through Mr. O'Brien. I had also been having conversations with Mr. Mitchell.

So there was this general problem that was existing before the 13th of March as the support money and how it was going to get there. That is what prompted me to raise it with the President at the end of the meeting, because it was on my mind, and I told him that, you know, there were money problems, there was no money to pay these people and he said, "How much will it cost?"

I said, "My best estimate is a million dollars or more." He asked me who the demands were coming from. I told him principally from Mr. Hunt through his attorney. At that point in time, he said something to the effect that, well, Mr. Hunt has already been given an assurance of clemency.

He said, I talked to Mr. Ehrlichman about that and then Mr. Colson came and talked to me about it after he had been instructed not to talk to me about it.

Q. I am just trying to shorten it up. Did you discuss Watergate with him at all? A. Not specifically, no.

Q. March 17. You had a meeting that day? A. Yes, that was St. Patrick's Day, and I recall the President had a green tie on and sitting in the Oval Office. He was very relaxed and he had his feet up on the desk and was very — the thing that stuck in my mind from that particular conversation was that he wondered if the Sen-

ate would bite the bait that he had put out at his press conference on litigating over the question of Dean and executive privilege because he was convinced if they did you would never see any of the White House staff before the Senate.

Q. Then, I think it is also true, at least, according to my understanding, that during the rest of the year 1972 between the June 16 or was it if the 17th, the 17th, the day of the break-in, except for a meeting on Sept. 15, even you have not testified to any discussions with the President about Watergate. Isn't that correct? A. That is correct.

Q. Now, then we come to the year 1973 and from what I have been able to gather in the questioning I have just finished your testimony is that on Feb. 28 you did discuss this matter of obstruction of justice and then you also testified to what you did here on March 13, and then, of course, we come to the meeting on March 21 when you told him most of what Watergate was all about. And the summary that I can see from the testimony, the President of the United States certainly didn't know anything about all this business, to this one Senator, until this thing on Feb. 28, according to your testimony, and on March 13 but especially, of course, the meeting on March 21 where you did discuss with him at great length the Watergate and he a later press conference said that he learned about it on that date.

*Dean says first knowledge was 18 Jun
from Fielding - WXP 26 Jun 73, p.9