All They Need to Know and More

Privacy and Freedom, by Alan F. Westin (Atheneum, 487 pp. $10), concludes that the outer world is gaining in its persistent invasion of the inner man. James J. Kilpatrick, former editor of The Richmond News Leader, is now a Washington-based conservative columnist.

By JAMES J. KILPATRICK

FIVE years in the writing, Alan F. Westin's massive study of privacy in the United States—what it was meant to be, and what is happening to it—may well rank among the most important books of this decade. His theme is the continuing conflict between the outer world and the inner man; his conclusion is that the outer world is winning. The tools already exist for an Orwellian triumph of science over personal privacy. These tools cannot be obliterated, as *Saturday Review* once suggested, by tucking them into a test bomb. The imperative demand upon Congress, the courts, and the states is rather that they be brought under strict control.

Other voices have sounded these same warnings, notably Samuel Dash in *The Eavesdroppers* (1959) and Missouri's Senator Edward Long in his recent book, *The Intruders*. In two significant cases this past term the U. S. Supreme Court voiced its own deep concern at the threat to freedom posed by new devices of technology. The Senate Judiciary Committee, responding to the mounting apprehension, recently approved a bill to protect the privacy of federal employees. Manufacturers of data processing equipment, to their great credit, have themselves spoken soberly of the Frankenstein's monster now stirring in their gleaming cradles.

What Professor Westin has done in this brilliantly executed work is to tie all the threads together. He begins slowly, with a reflective look at a common need evidenced both by animals and by all mankind—the need to be left alone. Man is also, to be sure, a social being; he needs companionship as well as solitude; at times he needs the catharsis that comes with disclosure of some part of his private self. Yet it has been a characteristic of all societies, until now, to grant every man his secret pool of utter confidence. It is this unspoken contract, Professor Westin suggests, that now stands terribly endangered. With chilling effectiveness he describes the proliferating means by which the state (but not the state only) may destroy man's aloneness. The ugly art has advanced much further than most Americans probably realize.

> A technological breakthrough in techniques of physical surveillance now makes it possible for government agents and private persons to penetrate the privacy of homes, offices, and vehicles; to survey individuals moving about in public places; and to monitor the basic channels of communication by telephone, telegraph, radio, television, and data line. Most of the "hardware" for this physical surveillance is cheap, readily available to the general public, relatively easy to install, and not presently illegal to own.

Yet the devices of surveillance, marvels of fiendish invention in themselves, promise to be outstripped by the devices of data preservation and retrieval. A California precision instrument company has demonstrated a new machine that relies upon a laser memory process. Professor Westin describes its potential:

> One small unit, containing one 4,800-foot reel of one-inch plastic tape, will be able to store in digital form about twenty pages of information (250 words of typing to the page) for every person in the United States, including women and children. Specific information from a person's twenty-page dossier on this reel could be retrieved in a maximum search time of four minutes, and the entire dossier could be printed out for dispatch to an inquiring source in a matter of a few more minutes. . . . Ten such reels would make possible 200-page dossiers on every American, and a mere 100 reels would begin to offer real possibilities of a progressive life-record dossier of each American from birth to death.

There are forces in American society—and not all of them sinister—that are eager to put these glittering tools to use. Law enforcement agencies, struggling against crime rates now soaring out of sight, plead that electronic surveillance devices are vital to their work. Reputable social and political planners, promoting a "Federal Data Bank," deny that they wish to intrude upon man's privacy; they wish merely to serve society more efficiently. The scientists now tinkering with brain-wave scanners defend their research as scientists always have: their quest to know is boundless. Businessmen see only the convenience and not the perils of computerized trade and banking, in which the consumer becomes a number on magnetized tape.

Professor Westin sensibly rejects the doctrinaire view which would prohibit every action that might be described as an invasion of privacy. The right to privacy, he agrees, is not an absolute right; it is subject, as the Fourth Amendment tells us, to reasonable abridgment in the common good. He is skeptical of the need professed by police for bugs and wiretaps, but he does not propose that these devices be denied to law enforcement altogether; he asks only for the tight controls and strict accountability defined by the Supreme Court this past June in *Berger vs. New York*. Neither

Your Literary I. Q.

Conducted by John T. Winterich and David M. Glixon

ON WINGS OF SONG

It doesn't matter which was better, the play or the musical. Arthur E. Danese of Mount Morris, N.Y., just wants you to recall which play in Column Two inspired each musical in Column One. Refunds on page 50.

Column One	Column Two
The Boys from Syracuse ( )	1. *Ah, Wilderness!*
Carousel ( )	2. *Anna Christie*
The Chocolate Soldier ( )	3. *Arms and the Man*
Kiss Me Kate ( )	4. *The Comedy of Errors*
Hello, Dolly! ( )	5. *Green Grow the Lilacs*
The Most Happy Fella ( )	6. *Liliom*
New Girl in Town ( )	7. *The Man Who Came to Dinner*
Oklahoma! ( )	8. *The Matchmaker*
Sherry ( )	9. *My Sister Eileen*
Take Me Along ( )	10. *Romeo and Juliet*
West Side Story ( )	11. *The Taming of the Shrew*
Wonderful Town ( )	12. *They Knew What They Wanted*

does he reject the idea of a federal data center, though he regards it with grave misgivings; in one of the best sections of his book Professor Westin suggests specific steps that might be taken to prevent misuse of the silent, omnipotent reels.

In the tart dissenting opinion he wrote last month in the Berger case, Justice Byron White defended the use of electronic surveillance devices by law enforcement officers. He accused his colleagues of failing utterly to deal with "facts of the real world." Professor Westin has avoided this pitfall. Man is a complex being, anxious to preserve his own privacy but not above a little voyeurism when someone has left a curtain raised. The wise governance of society is equally complex; it demands that the state know its people's wants and needs, and plan effectively in terms of dealing with them—and perhaps it is part of the zealous bureaucrat's nature to want to know more than he really needs to know.

The conflicting forces have to be reconciled. It is absurd to deny the police the use of a wiretap to catch a kidnapper. It is equally absurd to permit a federal agency to inquire through personality tests into the sex dreams of a clerk-typist. Doubtless it should be made a criminal offense, as Professor Westin recommends, for an inquisitive person to bug his neighbor's bedroom; but it would be foolish to pass anti-snooping laws of such sweeping effect that protective TV cameras were banned from apartment house elevators.

The task of accommodating man's need for personal privacy with his need for public security is not impossible. It demands of our policy-makers primarily an awareness that the invading forces are so well equipped, and so far advanced along the Orwellian road.

Seeing All the Evil

***The Spy in the Corporate Structure: And the Right to Privacy**, by Edward Engberg (World. 274 pp. $5.95), reveals the ways in which private lives are being made matters of governmental record. Nicholas Samstag was for twenty years an executive of Time Incorporated.*

By NICHOLAS SAMSTAG

THERE are a great many puzzling things about this book. Why is its table of contents so uninformative? Why does it lack an index? A work so full of names, places, and facts would be expected to help its readers find what they want in it. Or is the frustration intentional? (A useful device, well known to journalists, is to "unalphabetize" any long list from which several important factors have had to be omitted so that anyone suspecting such omissions will have to check every entry to make sure.) And why is the real subject hidden behind a title that pretends to present a book for businessmen when it could more accurately have been given a name appealing to the public, thus vastly widening its audience and sale? For the real message here is not addressed to the corporation man but to you and me—and the book's subject is not corporate secrets but the way our private lives are being systematically exposed and made matters of governmental (and ultimately public) record.

Not that Edward Engberg's efforts fail to cover exhaustively (even exhaustingly) the shady, infinitely complicated business of how secrets are stolen from one firm by another. The volume is, in fact, a how-to-do-it handbook on the subject, complete with overdetailed case histories and the names, addresses, and fees of the most accomplished operators in the field. Six thousand seven hundred dollars is the current price for stealing a commercial secret, and for $125 they will check your office for bugs and wire taps. (But you'd better have it done every day because there are thousands of ways of getting what they want, not all electronic: see Chapter 31, entitled "Broads.")

Yet something bigger runs through



and behind all these pages on how corporations are like nations and must have their armies and their espionage systems; on the unforeseeable ingenuities of electronic devices and the all too predictable baseness of human turncoats; on the babblers who spill information accidentally and the agents disguised as cleaning women who seek it laboriously as they sift the contents of executive wastebaskets; on the "tails" and "ears" who shadow and eavesdrop for $25 a week plus expenses; on the "headhunting" or executive placement firms who will find for you not merely executives but corporate secrets wrapped up in executive tailoring.

That bigger something behind all this ephemera shows up in two statements quoted by the author—one by a Professor Beaney who, in testifying before the Gallagher Committee, gave the opinion that "the only people in the future who may really enjoy privacy are those who do absolutely nothing important"; the other by a New York lawyer who, with excellent reason, incessantly requests that the telephone company check his line for taps, and who proclaims to all who will listen, "I wouldn't say anything over a telephone wire that I wouldn't be willing to shout over a megaphone in Grand Central Station."

It steadily becomes apparent, as one reads on through this heavy, jumbled, spicy fruitcake of a book, that the villains of the piece are not the corporations who hire the spies, but what Mr. Justice Brandeis calls "men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding," who are steadily encroaching on our most precious liberties, those insured by the Fourth Amendment in which the people are guaranteed the right to be safe "in their persons."

These men, says the author (a former *Fortune* writer and managing editor of *Business International* whose background bristles with other evidence that he knows what he is talking about), abound in government, science, education, and corporate business life. They are, he asserts, steadily sucking the privacy out of our lives in the names of national security, science, progress, and several other almost unassailable causes, with the declared aim of fattening a huge proposed information retrieval system called a National Data Center "to contain all the information in the Federal Government's files covering every citizen." This means that there will shortly be available in the cybernetic bowels of this monster more information about you than you ought to be willing to make known to anyone (especially as you will not be able to find out what is in your file to correct errors or expunge slanders by your personal enemies or business competitors).

Things, says the often obscure and

always ominous Mr. Engberg, have already reached what can only be called an extremely ugly pass. And he proves his thesis from A through and beyond Izzard with a combination of erudition, journalism, and personal comment that is often lurid and confused but which, all in all, makes a valuable and frightening book. Between the tale of childish, tragic gallantry on page 5 describing how Henry Stimson refused to believe the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese were anything but Groton gentlemen to the horror story on page 269 about a man who bought a new car with a built-in defect and was thus, all unknowing, blackballed for a government job, reader and author wander hand in hand through a sort of hell—populated by lying parents and workers, prying agents and government agencies, timid legislators and arrogant corporation heads. Don't miss the story of how Sam Slater single-handedly smuggled the Industrial Revolution out of England into America, or the description of the Light-Signal Denial Index that helped determine what U.S. cities are most susceptible to crime, or the lunatic logic holding that a man seated or on foot need not incriminate himself with spoken testimony but must, as a motorist, yield his telltale blood on demand for an alcohol test, or the long debate on whether there is any difference between the right of property and the right of privacy.

IT all adds up to Mr. Engberg's statement near the book's end that he is inclined "to suspect that privacy, conceived as a right, may end without so much as a whimper . . . tsk-tsked to death in the course of some . . . investigation." The author's last chapter, just four pages long, made what seemed for a moment to this puzzled, wearied, and discouraged reader a sound suggestion for a way out of the dilemma. But I'll bet it wouldn't work—not in a world like *that.*

England's Secret War

***Set Europe Ablaze,** by E. H. Cookridge (Crowell. 410 pp. $7.95), recounts the work of Britain's Special Operations Executive for sabotage, espionage, and subversion in Nazi-occupied territory during World War II. Harry Howe Ransom teaches international politics at Vanderbilt University. His books include "Central Intelligence and National Security."*

By HARRY HOWE RANSOM

TODAY we risk inundation by a flood of tales about espionage and secret political warfare, most of it only remotely related to the real world of secret agents. Yet during World War II the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) were involved in countless adventures, some of which, if told as fiction, would strain credulity.

The British, who continue to operate one of the world's most secret Secret Services, have recently permitted historical accounts to be published revealing in rather full detail SOE's European record. During the war few even knew of SOE's existence, and until very recently it has received far less publicity than OSS. Yet, ironically, nothing resembling an adequate, authentic history of the OSS exists.

"E. H. Cookridge" (Edward Spiro) is a writer of popular books on espionage. In *Set Europe Ablaze* he shows how SOE grew out of the conviction held by a few British leaders that secret agents and paramilitary forces could aid greatly in the defeat of Hitler, particularly in those subjugated nations where German presence was deeply resented. Some even believed that Germany might be defeated by economic pressure, air bombardment of vital targets, and revolt in Nazi-occupied areas. In the early stages of the war Britain's ability to inflict direct military damage on Germany was severely limited; but plenty of recruits were available for underground resistance if they could be efficiently mobilized and supplied. Prime Minister Churchill in particular was enthusiastic about this method of fighting the enemy.

On July 16, 1940, Churchill appointed Hugh Dalton to take charge of SOE, a new organization independent of existing intelligence, propaganda, and political warfare units, whose mission was, in Churchill's colorful language, "to set Europe ablaze." Yet the role of SOE was initially defined in very general terms. Its basic assignment was to carry on espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare in Nazi-occupied territories. By 1943 SOE had come under the control of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, and it became closely affiliated with the American OSS, an organization with similar aims. British experience was exchanged for American supplies.

What were the results? Mr. Cookridge does not give a clear answer, although he implies throughout that the net effect of SOE's work was of great importance to the Allied victory. The book is essentially an episodic account of SOE's many efforts, including its initial organizational difficulties, its exploits on the Continent, particularly in France, and its leading personalities, as well as its tragic failures. SOE agents were initially and inevitably amateurs at secret warfare. They were recruited mainly from the armed services and had to learn quickly a new and dangerous profession. Many died in action.

In this loosely knit account we read of Francis Cammaerts, a London schoolmaster and originally a conscientious objector, who became an organizer of resistance groups in southeast France. Another SOE agent persuaded Rudolphe Peugeot to cooperate in the sabotage of his own automobile works, which were manufacturing tank parts for the Wehrmacht. There are stories of the SOE's constant difficulties with the intelligence agencies of the many governments in exile in London, as well as with various factions of the political Left and Right in Continental resistance groups, and of how German agents succeeded in impersonating SOE officers. Cookridge has obviously searched many records and interviewed many participants, Allied and German. He brings together some fascinating details of major and sometimes confusing secret operations.

MUCH of the story has previously been told. The book's main fault, however, is its failure to put the events into a coherent pattern, or to describe episodes within the context of Allied grand strategy. *Set Europe Ablaze* is little more than a series of vignettes, never approaching in quality M. R. D. Foot's outstanding history, *SOE in France,* published in 1966 in the British Government series "History of the Second World War." No attempt is made to evaluate SOE's work, to generalize about secret warfare as an instrument of policy, or to discuss any lessons that may be learned from the experiences the author depicts.