

I have long done no copying because I'm almost out of paper and delivery is always slow. The new batch should have been here two weeks ago, so today, to clean the stack, I did what I had stacked. I don't recall why this was in it, so I assume it was to make a copy for you. It is from Roy Cohn's book, McCarthy. HW 10/13/73

CIA

13 Oct 73

~~McCarthy~~

Mix on grounds McCarthy probe 27  
CIA during Ike administration

62 / McCARTHY

"Suddenly," Hughes said, "the Wisconsin Senator was vulnerable to direct attack on an unclouded issue."

Hughes then recounted how he, Deputy Attorney General William Rogers, and other staff members working with colleagues in New York who were safely unconnected with the White House, "decided to encourage a telegram of protest to the President from the National Conference of Christians and Jews in New York."

"We also agreed not to speak publicly," said Hughes. "I don't know if it was possible to reach at almost any hour that month was full of other dangerous liabilities who would have to be discussed."

"Accordingly, while our mutual trust in outside government sources was good, I hastened the same day to get the agreement of Sherman Adams to our plan and to drop the President's reply to the message we still agreed." [my italics]

In other words, this potential message that rang with indignation was actually worked up by the receipt of the protest to which it was proposed to reply.

The plan was set, but the stage manager neglected to let the President know of their strategy. This omission almost wrecked the effort. When the family succeeded in procuring a protest from the church leaders, they were unable to reach Eisenhower to get his response to the prepared reply.

"By the time the signals were at last cleared," Hughes recalled, "the situation was unpropitious. The President, not yet even advised of what was about to be done, was closeted with important visitors, and the rumor was racing across Capitol Hill that McCarthy was about to dismiss Matthews and publicly invite applause for his own fair-mindedness. Soon I began to get increasingly frantic phone calls from Rogers on the Hill: 'For God's sake, we have to get our message out fast, or McCarthy will beat us to the draw.'"

Adams suggested taking the reply to the President alone, Hughes said, adding somewhat sheepishly, "since the President tended to discount the heat of my own feelings about McCarthy."

At last they got the President to affix his signature—not a moment too soon, for while the stencil for the mimeographed press release was being recut for minor changes, word came from Rogers that Senators McCarthy and Mundt had just finished conferring and were on their way to the Hill, probably with Matthews' resignation.

At this point the Vice President, according to Hughes, buttonholed



McCarthy in the Senate Office Building and kept him in conversation until Hughes could telephone the "all clear" signifying that the presidential statement was in the hands of the press.

Thus were the clergymen's protest and the presidential reply frustrated by the group of Eisenhower aides who, as Hughes freely admits had long been awaiting an opportunity to get Senator McCarthy over a barrel.

One desired investigation that never got started was that of the Central Intelligence Agency, headed by Allen W. Dulles. Our staff had been accumulating extensive data about its operations and McCarthy was convinced that an inquiry was overdue.

Our files contained allegations gathered from various sources indicating that the CIA had unwittingly hired a large number of double agents—individuals who, although working for the CIA, were actually Communist agents whose mission was to plant inaccurate data. Since the function of the CIA is to estimate the military capabilities, defensive systems, and political stability of nations, and since top-level policies and decisions are based upon these estimates, false information accepted as true could be disastrous.

We also wanted to investigate charges:

—that the CIA had granted large subsidies to pro-Communist organizations.

—that persons who were proponents of the China mistake occupied high positions in the agency—these individuals had supported the Institute of Pacific Relations position that the Chinese Communists were harmless agrarian reformers.

—that although we spent far more for intelligence than other countries, the quality of the information we were receiving was so poor that at times the CIA found out what was happening only when it read the newspapers.

These were grave questions that urgently called for answers. When the subject of an investigation was discussed at a subcommittee executive session, only Senator Stuart Symington voiced strong objection.

We wanted McCarthy to clear it with the White House. Recognizing that highly sensitive matters might be involved, McCarthy agreed.

When the news broke that McCarthy was contemplating an inquiry



into the CIA, consternation reigned at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Vice-President Nixon was assigned to the delicate job of blocking it. He arranged for a small private dinner to be held in a Washington hotel suite, to be attended by Senator McCarthy, the three Republican members of the subcommittee (Dirksen, Potter, and Mundt), and several top-level officials of the Government.

Nixon spoke at length, arguing that an open investigation would damage national security, harm our relations with our allies, and seriously affect CIA operations, which depended on total secrecy. The meeting lasted late. Finally, the three subcommittee members, not opposed to the inquiry before they went to dinner, yielded to Nixon's pressure. So, too, did McCarthy, and the investigation, which McCarthy told me interested him more than any other, was never launched.

The subject of a CIA investigation arose once again toward the close of the Army-McCarthy hearings. On June 2, 1954, during the morning session, McCarthy observed that "Communist infiltration of the CIA is a disturbing and worrisome problem." Immediately speculation arose that he was planning an investigation. Interesting developments followed.

On July 4, former President Herbert Hoover announced that his Government Commission had named General Curtis W. Clark to head a study of "the CIA's effectiveness in detecting and counteracting Communist infiltration." At about the same time, President Eisenhower secretly named a special study group, headed by General Curtis LeMay and General James H. Doolittle to conduct a separate study. The name of the Doolittle group was not revealed until its report was announced.

In its final report the Doolittle committee reported that it found little to praise, but to praise some areas "could and should be improved." In general, however, a "credible" job was being performed. In the following year, Clark's Task Force found no "valid ground" for McCarthy's assertion that Communists had infiltrated the CIA. It did note a number of administrative flaws and cited a "lack of adequate intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain." Said the report: "There is still much to be done by our intelligence community to bring its achievements up to an acceptable level." The investigators also recommended creation of a congressional watchdog committee.

Senator Mike Mansfield, Montana Democrat, sponsored a resolution in the Senate to create a committee of twelve members, six from each House, to be named the Joint Committee on Central Intell-

gence. Without it, he said, "we will have no way of knowing whether we have a first-rate intelligence service or a very poor one." It took until 1956 to bring the resolution to the floor and then it was defeated, 59 to 27.

Thus it remained in a countering magazine published by young West Coast radicals, to lay bare in satirical fashion the CIA's soiled linen to an astonished middle-class America years after Joe McCarthy had been denied access to the highest of offices.