CIA

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C.I.A. Spies From 100 Miles Up; Satellites Probe Secrets of Soviet

Electronic Prying Grows

Following is the third of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other Times staff members.

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WASHINGTON, April 26 — To the men most privy to the secrets of the Central Intelligence Agency, it sometimes seems that the human spies, the James Bonds and Mata Haris, are obsolete. Like humans everywhere, they are no match for the computers, cameras, radars and other gadgets by which nations can now gather the darkest secrets of both friends and foes.

With complex machines circling the earth at 17,000 miles an hour, C.I.A. agents are able to relax in their carpeted offices beside the Potomac and count the intercontinental missiles poised in Soviet Kazakhstan, monitor the conversations between Moscow and a Soviet submarine near Tahiti, follow the countdown of a sputnik launching as easily as that of a Gemini capsule in Florida, track the electronic imprint of an adversary's bombers and watch for the heat traces of his missiles.

Only a half dozen years ago, at least one human pilot was still required to guide a black U-2 jet across the Soviet Union from Pakistan to Norway, or over Cuba or Communist China from bases in Florida and Taiwan.

His cameras and listening devices, capable of picking out a chalk line or a radar station from 15 miles up, were incredible in their day, the product of imaginative C.I.A. research and developments. But spies in the sky now orbiting the earth do almost as well from 100 miles up.

Cosmic Espionage

Already, the United States and the Soviet Union are vying with each other in cosmic spying. American Samos and Soviet Cosmos satellites gather more data in one 90-minute orbit than an army of earthbound spies.

Other gadgets of the missile age have taken over the counterspy function. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara gave a Congressional committee a strong hint about that last year when he mentioned "inspection of orbiting objects in the satellite interceptor Thor program as well as in the two large ground-based optical programs at Cloudcroft, N. M."

His testimony suggested that the United States could orbit a satellite capable of photographing and otherwise "inspecting" Soviet space spies, while other equipment could photograph them from the ground with remarkable detail.

Such electronic eyes, ears, noses and nerve ends — and similar ones aboard ships and submarines — are among the nation's most vital secrets. They are not exclusively the property or inspiration of the C.I.A.

C.I.A. cameras and other snooping equipment are riding in spacecraft that are otherwise the responsibility of the Defense Department.

No clear breakdown of responsibilities and cost is available, but, altogether, the annual cost of the United States' intelligence effort exceeds $3-billion a year — more than six times the amount specifically allocated to the C.I.A. and more than 2 per cent of the total Federal budget.

Bugging From Afar

Not all the gadgetry is cosmic. The agency is now developing a highly sensitive device that will pick up from afar indoor conversations, by recording the window vibrations caused by the speakers' voices.

This is only one of many nefarious gadgets that have made the word "privacy" an anachronism. It is possible, for instance, with equipment so tiny as to be all but invisible, to turn the whole electric wiring system of a building into a quivering transmitter of conversation taking place anywhere within.

Picking up information is one thing; getting it "home" and doing something with it is another. Some satellites, for instance, are rigged to emit capsules bearing photos and other readings; as they float to earth by parachute, old C-130 aircraft dash across the Pacific from Hawaii and snare the parachutes with long, dangling, trapeze-like cables. The planes have a 70 per cent catching average.

Sometimes the intelligence wizards get carried away by their imaginations. Several years ago they spent tens of millions of dollars on the construction of a 600-foot radio telescope designed to eavesdrop on the Kremlin. It was to pick up radio signals, such as those emitted when a Soviet Premier called his chauffeur by radio-telephone, as they bounced off the moon.

The project turned into an engineering fiasco, but technology came to the rescue by providing "ferret" satellites that can tune in on the same short-range radio signals as they move straight up to the ionosphere.

Overlooking the rights of territorial sovereignty and national and human privacy, officials throughout the United States Government praise the C.I.A.'s gadgetry as nothing short of "phenomenal." The atmosphere everywhere, they say, is full of information, and the objective of a technological intelligence service is to gather and translate it into knowledge.

At C.I.A. hedquarters in Langley, Va., other intricate machines, some unknown a decade or even a few years ago, read, translate, interpret, collate, file and store the information. Sometimes months or years later, the data can be retrieved from tens of millions of microfilmed categories.

This effort has paid off monumentally, according to those who know most about it.

It was aerial reconnaissanee by the U-2 spy plane — succeeded in many ways by satellites in 1961 — that enabled Washington to anticipate and measure the Soviet Union's capacity to produce missiles in the nineteen-fifties. These estimates, in turn, led to the so-called "missile gap," which became a prime political issue in the 1960 Presidential campaign. But it was also the U-2 that later produced proof that the Russians were not turning out missiles as fast as they could, thus dispelling the "missile gap" from Washington's thinking and jargon.

Still later, C.I.A. devices discovered missiles being emplaced underground in the Soviet Union. U-2's spotted the preparation of missile sites in Cuba in 1962. They also sampled the radioactive fallout of Soviet nuclear tests in 1961. Highly secret techniques, including aerial reconnaissance, allowed the C.I.A. to predict the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 with remarkable accuracy.

Purloined Messages

Countless conversations and messages the world over have been purloined; even subtler signals and indications, once detected by the marvels of science, can be read and combined into information of a kind once impossible to obtain.

The first duty of the C.I.A. is to collect, interpret and disseminate what it learns from its worldwide nerve system — weaving together, into the "intelligence" the government needs, every electronic blip, squeak, and image and the millions of other items that reach its headquarters from more conventional, often public, sources: random diplomatic contacts, press clippings, radio monitor reports, books and research projects and eyewitness evidence. (Even some of these "open" sources, such as a regional newspaper from Communist China, must be smuggled or bought at a stiff price.)

Every hour of every day, about 100 to 150 fresh items of news, gossip and research reach the C.I.A.'s busy headquarters in Virginia and are poured into the gigantic human-and-technological computer that its analysis section resembles.

Four of every five of these items, it is said, now come either from "open" sources or inanimate devices. But in many important instances it is still the human agent, alerted to make a particular arrangement or to chase a specific piece of information, who provides the link that makes all else meaningful and significant; sometimes, now as in the 18th century, it is men alone who do the job in danger and difficulty.

When it was discovered, for instance, that Premier Khrushchev had shaken the Communist world with a secret speech denouncing Stalin in 1956, it was a C.I.A. agent who finally came up with the text, somewhere in Poland, and other analysts who determined that it was genuine.

A Rebellion Hastened

This feat of human spying in an electronic age yielded vital information and, leaked to the press in Europe and elsewhere, hastened the anti-Stalin rebellions in many Communist countries and probably contributed to upheavals in Poland and Hungary that are still among the heaviest liabilities of Communist history.

It takes a sub-agent in Tibet, personally recruited by a C.I.A. man there and paid either a retainer or by the piece, to deliver a sheaf of secret army documents circulating among regimental commanders of Communist China's People's Liberation Army.

Only his counterpart in Algeria can provide some drawings of the design of the interior of Peking's embassy (although such designs can often be obtained with no more effort than asking for them at the offices of the American who constructed the building).

And beyond this large remaining value of the human being in the humming world of espionage, it is also the human brain in the C.I.A. that gives information its real importance by supplying interpretations for the President and his men.

The end product is a series of papers, handsomely printed and often illustrated with fancy maps to gain a bureaucratic advantage over rival pieces of paper from other agencies.

The agency produces intelligence reports almost hourly, and sweeping summaries every day. It provides a special news report for President Johnson's nightly bedtime reading, sometimes containing such juicy tidbits as the most recent playboy activities of the indefatigable President Sukarno of Indonesia.

A C.I.A. Press Conference

More elaborate reports and projections are prepared on such matters as the rate of Soviet economic growth.

The State Department has sometimes published these, without credit to their origin. Piqued by these announcements, the C.I.A. called its first news conference in 1964 to put out the latest readings on Soviet prosperity. The idea of the "spooks," as C.I.A. men are called, summoning reporters

C.I.A. Is Spying From 100 Miles Up as Satellites Probe Secrets of the Soviet Union

ELECTRONIC AIDS TO PRYING GROW

Two Nations Vie in Cosmic Surveillance—Earthbound Gadgetry Developed, Too

caused so much amusement in Washington—and perhaps displeasure in other agencies—that the C.I.A. has never held another news conference.

Still more important subjects, such as Soviet nuclear capabilities or Communist Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia, are dealt with in formal national intelligence estimates. These encompass all information available on a given subject and reflect the final judgment of the Board of National Estimates, a group of 14 analysts in the C.I.A.

National estimate intelligence is intended to reach a definite conclusion to guide the President. But as other departments are consulted and the various experts express their views, their disagreements, caveats and dissents are noted and recorded by footnotes in the final document. These signs of dispute are likely to herald important uncertainties, and some officials believe the footnotes to be the best-read lines of all the millions committed to paper in the Government every month.

The C.I.A. also produces rapid analyses and predictions on request — say, about the likelihood of the Soviet Union's going to war over the Cuban missile crisis, or about the consequences of different courses of action contemplated at a particular moment by the United States in Vietnam.

How Good Are the Reports?

How effective these reports have been, and how well they are heeded by the policy-makers, are questions of lively debate in the intelligence community.

In recent years, the C.I.A. is generally believed to have been extremely good in furnishing information about Soviet military capabilities and orders of battle, about the Chinese nuclear weapons program and, after constant goading from the White House, about the progress of India, the United Arab Republic, Israel and other nations toward a capacity to build nuclear weapons.

Reports from inside Indonesia, Algeria and the Congo during recent fast-moving situations are also said to have been extremely good.

On the other hand, the C.I.A. has been criticized for not having known more in advance about the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, about the divorce of the United Arab Republic and Syria in 1961, about the political leanings of various leaders in the Dominican Republic and about such relatively public matters as party politics in Italy.

Some — including Dwight D. Eisenhower — have criticized the agency for not having recognized in time Fidel Castro's Communist leanings or the possibility that the Soviet Union would ship missiles to Cuba.

Almost everyone, however, generally concedes the necessity for gathering intelligence to guide the Government in its worldwide involvements. Criticism goes beyond the value or accuracy of C.I.A. reports. For information-gathering often spills over at the scene of action into something else — subversion, counteractivity, sabotage, political and economic intervention and other kinds of "dirty tricks." Often the intelligence gatherer, by design or force of circumstance, becomes an activist in the affairs he was set to watch.

On-the-Scene Action

C.I.A. analysts reading the punchcards of their computers in Virginia can determine that a new youth group in Bogota appears to have fallen under the control of suspected Communists, but it takes an agent on the spot to trade information with the local police, collect photographs and telephone taps of those involved, organize and finance a countermovement of, say, young Christians or democratic labor youth, and help them erect billboards and turn mimeograph machines at the next election.

Dozens — at times hundreds — of C.I.A. men have been employed on Taiwan to train men who will be smuggled into Communist China and to interview defectors and refugees who come out; to train Chinese Nationalists to fly the U-2; to identify and befriend those who will move into power after the departure of the Nationalists' President, Chiang Kai-shek; to beam propaganda broadcasts at the mainland; to organize harassing operations on the islands just off the shore of the mainland, and to provide logistic support for other C.I.A. operations in Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia.

In these and dozens of other instances, an agent who is merely ostensibly gathering intelligence is in reality an activist attempting to create or resolve a situation.

Because a great many such activists are also in the field for a variety of purposes other than open or clandestine information gathering, the involvement of fallible human beings in the most dangerous and murky areas of C.I.A. operations causes most of the agency's failures and difficulties and gives it its fearsome reputation.

Men, by and large, can control machines but not events, and not always themselves. It was not, after all, the shooting down of a U-2 inside the Soviet Union in 1960 that caused worldwide political repercussions and a Soviet-American crisis; each side could have absorbed that in some sort of "cover." It was rather the Soviet capture of a living American pilot, Francis Gary Powers, that could not be explained away and that Russians did not want explained away.

But the C.I.A. invariably develops an interest in its projects and can be a formidable advocate in the Government.

When it presented the U-2 program in 1956, fear of detection and diplomatic repercussions led the Eisenhower Administration to run some "practice" missions over Eastern Europe. The first mission to the Soviet Union, in mid-1956, over Moscow and Leningrad, was detected but not molested. It did, however, draw the first of a number of secret diplomatic protests.

After six missions the Administration halted the flights, but the C.I.A pressed for their resumption. Doubts were finally overcome, and 20 to 25 more flights were conducted, with Soviet fighter planes in vain pursuit of at least some of them.

The Powers plane is thought to have been crippled by the nearby explosion of an antiaircraft missile developed with the U-2's in mind.

Risky and Often Profitable

The simplest and most modest of these risky, often profitable, sometimes disastrous human efforts are reported to be carried out in the friendly nations of Western Europe.

In Britain, for instance, C.I.A. agents are said to be little more than contact men with British intelligence, with British Kremlinologists and other scholars and experts.

With MI-6, its London counterpart, the C.I.A. compares notes and divides responsibilities on targets of mutual interest. The agency, having come a painful cropper in Singapore a few years ago, now leaves spying in Malaysia, for instance, to the old Commonwealth sleuths while probably offering in return the C.I.A.'s copious material from Indonesia.

Generally cooperative arrangements also prevail in countries such as Canada and Italy and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in France. In West Germany, a major cold-war battleground, the C.I.A. is much more active.

The C.I.A. runs an office in Bonn for general coordination. Another in Berlin conducts special activities such as the famous wiretap tunnel under East Berlin, a brilliant technical hookup that eavesdropped on Soviet Army headquarters. It was exposed in 1956 when East German workmen, digging on another project, struck a weak spot in the tunnel and caused it to collapse.

A C.I.A. office in Frankfurt supervises some of the United States' own espionage operations against the Soviet Union, interviews defectors and recruits agents for service in Communist countries.

In Munich, the C.I.A. supports a variety of research groups and such major propaganda outlets as Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to Eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, aimed at the Soviet Union.

Jobs for Refugees

Besides entertaining and informing millions of listeners in Communist nations, these nominally "private" outlets provide employment for many gifted and knowledgeable refugees from Russia, Poland, Hungary and other countries.

They also solicit the services of informers inside the Communist world, monitor Communist broadcasts, underwrite anti-Communist lectures and writings by Western intellectuals and distribute their research materials to scholars and journalists in all continents.

But there is said to be relatively little direct C.I.A. spying upon the United States' allies. Even in such undemocratic countries as Spain and Portugal, where more independent C.I.A. activity might be expected, the operation is reliably described as modest.

The American agency has a special interest, for instance, in keeping track in Spain of such refugees from Latin America as Juan Perón of Argentina. Nevertheless, it relies so heavily on the information of the Spanish police that American newspapermen are often a better source for American Embassy officials than the C.I.A. office.

In much of Africa, too, despite the formidable reputation it has among governments, the C.I.A. takes a back seat to the intelligence agencies of the former colonial nations, Britain and France, and concentrates on

gathering information about Soviet, Chinese and other Communist efforts there. (The Congo has been the major exception. The agency compiles lists of travelers to Moscow, Prague or Peking, attempts to infiltrate their embassies and checks on arms and aid shipments through African airfields.

An Eye on Potential Rebels

The agency is thought to have attempted to infiltrate the security services of some African countries but only with mixed success. It gathers special dossiers on the activities of various nationalist and liberation movements and befriends opposition leaders in such countries as Algeria and the United Arab Republic, in the hope that it can predict upheavals or at least be familiar with new rulers if their bids for power are successful.

The C.I.A., long in advance, had information on the plan by which Algerian Army officers overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella last June — but it did not know the month in which the officers would make their move, and it had nothing to do with plotting or carrying out the coup.

Thanks to contacts with Gamal Abdel Nasser before he seized power in Egypt, the C.I.A. had almost intimate dealings with the Nasser government before the United States drew his ire by reneging on its promised aid to build the Aswan Dam.

Some of these Egyptian ties lingered even through the recent years of strained relations. Through reputed informants like Mustafa Amin, a prominent Cairo editor, the C.I.A. is said in the United Arab Republic to have obtained the details of a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal in 1964 and other similar information. Thus, Amin's arrest last fall may have closed some important channels and it gave the United Arab Republic the opportunity to demand greater American aid in return for playing down its "evidence" of C.I.A. activity in Cairo.

The C.I.A.'s talent for secret warfare is known to have been tested twice in Latin America. It successfully directed a battle of "liberation" against the leftist government of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954. Seven years later, a C.I.A.-sponsored army jumped off from secret bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua for the disastrous engagement at Cuba's Bay of Pigs.

Promoter of Fronts

Not so melodramatically, the agency runs dozens of other operations throughout the hemisphere.

It provides "technical assistance" to most Latin nations by helping them establish anti-Communist police forces. It promotes anti-Communist front organizations for students, workers, professional and business men, farmers and political parties. It arranges for contact between these groups and American labor organizations, institutes and foundations.

It has poured money into Latin-American election campaigns in support of moderate candidates and against leftist leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana.



Defense Dept.

DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: This Soviet freighter was photographed after leaving Cuba on Nov. 6, 1962, carrying on deck one of the missiles the Soviet Union withdrew under intense pressure from the U.S. It was C.I.A. efforts that originally uncovered the presence of Soviet missiles on the island that led to diplomatic showdown.

It spies upon Soviet, Chinese and other Communist infiltrators and diplomats and attempts to subvert their programs. When the C.I.A. learned last year that a Brazilian youth had been killed in 1963, allegedly in an auto accident, while studying on a scholarship at the Lumumba University in Moscow, it mounted a massive publicity campaign to discourage other South American families from sending their youngsters to the Soviet Union.

In Southeast Asia over the past decade, the C.I.A. has been so active that the agency in some countries has been the principal arm of American policy.

It is said, for instance, to have been so successful at infiltrating the top of the Indonesian government and army that the United States was reluctant to disrupt C.I.A. covering operations by withdrawing aid and information programs in 1964 and 1965. What was presented officially in Washington as toleration of President Sukarno's insults and provocations was in much larger measure a desire to keep the C.I.A. fronts in business as long as possible.

Though it is not thought to have been involved in any of the maneuvering that has curbed President Sukarno's power in recent months, the agency was well poised to follow events and to predict the emergence of anti-Communist forces.

Links to Power

After helping to elect Ramón Magsaysay as president of the Philippines in 1953, buttressing the family government of Ngo Dinh iDem and Ngo Dinh Nhu in South Vietnam in 1954 and assisting in implanting the regime of the strong-man Phoumi Nosavan in Laos in 1960, the C.I.A. agents responsible obviously became for long periods much more intimate advisers and effective links to Washington than the formally designated American Ambassadors in those countries.

And when the Kennedy administration came into office in 1961, the President concluded that the C.I.A. had so mortgaged American interests to Phoumi Nosavan that there was at first no alternative to dealing with him.

Moreover, the C.I.A.'s skill at moving quickly and in reasonable secrecy drew for it many assignments in Southeast Asia that would normally be given to the Defense Department. It was able, for instance, to fly supplies to the Meo tribesmen in Laos to help them fight against the pro-Communist Pathet Lao at a time when treaty obligations forbade the assignment of American military advisers to the task.

In South Vietnam, the C.I.A.'s possession of energetic young men with political and linguistic talents proved much more successful in wresting mountain and jungle villages from Communist control than the Pentagon's special forces.

But the C.I.A. was also deeply committed to the Ngo brothers and was tricked by them into supporting their private police forces. These were eventually employed against the Buddhist political opposition, thus provoking the coup d'état by military leaders in 1963 that brought down the Ngos.

In Thailand, the C.I.A. has now begun a program of rural defense against Communist subversion. Working through foreign aid offices and certain airlines, agents are working with hill tribes along the Burmese and Laos borders and helping to build a provincial police network along the borders of Laos and Cambodia.

Furtive Operations

Few Americans realize how such operations as these may affect innocent domestic situations — the extent to which the dispatch of a planeload of rice by a subsidized carrier, Air America, in Laos causes the agency to set furtive operations in motion within the United States.

When Air America or any other false-front organization has run into financial difficulties, the agency has used its influence in Washington and throughout the United States to drum up some legitimate sources of income.

Unknown to most of the directors and stockholders of an airline, for instance, the C.I.A. may approach the leading officials of the company, explain its problem and come away with some profitable air cargo contracts.

In other domestic offshoots of the C.I.A.'s foreign dealings, American newspaper and magazine publishers, authors and universities are often the beneficiaries of direct or indirect C.I.A. subsidies.

A secret transfer of C.I.A. funds to the State Department or United States Information Agency, for example, may help finance a scholarly inquiry and publication. Or the agency may channel research and propaganda money through foundations—legitimate ones or dummy fronts.

The C.I.A. is said to be behind the efforts of several foundations that sponsor the travel

of social scientists in the Communist world. The vast majority of independent foundations have warned that this practice casts suspicion on all traveling scholars, and in the last year the C.I.A. is said to have curtailed these activities somewhat.

$400,000 for Research

Congressional investigation of tax-exempt foundations in 1964 showed that the J. M. Kaplan Fund, Inc., among others, had disbursed at least $400,000 for the C.I.A. in a single year to a research institute This institute, in turn, financed research centers in Latin America that drew other support from the Agency for International Development (the United States foreign aid agency), the Ford Foundation and such universities as Harvard and Brandeis.

Among the Kaplan Fund's other previous contributors there had been eight funds or foundations unknown to experts on tax-exempt charitable organizations. Five of them were not even listed on the Internal Revenue Service's list of foundations entitled to tax exemption.

Through similar channels, the C.I.A. has supported groups of exiles from Cuba and refugees from Communism in Europe, or anti-Communist but liberal organizations of intellectuals such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and some of their newspapers and magazines.

Encounter magazine, a well-known anti-Communist intellectual monthly with editions in Spanish and German as well as English, was for a long time — though it is not now — one of the indirect beneficiaries of C.I.A. funds. Through arrangements that have never been publicly explained, several American book publishers have also received C.I.A. subsidies.

An even greater amount of C.I.A. money apparently was spent on direct, though often secret, support of American scholars. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology opened a Center of International Studies with a grant of $300,000 from the C.I.A. in 1951 and continued to take agency funds until the link was exposed, causing great embarrassment to M.I.T.'s scholars working in India and other countries.

The agency's support for M.I.T. projects gradually dwindled, but the fear of compromising publicity led the university to decide a year ago to accept no new C.I.A. contracts.

Similar embarrassment was felt at Michigan State University after the recent disclosure that C.I.A. agents had served on its payroll in a foreign-aid project in South Vietnam from 1955 to 1959. The university contended that no secret intelligence work was done by the agents, but it feared that a dozen other overseas projects now under way would be hampered by the suspicions of other governments.

The C.I.A. was among the first Government agencies to seek the valuable services of American scholars — an idea now widely emulated. Many scholars continue to serve the agency as consultants, while others work on research projects frankly presented to their superiors as C.I.A. assignments.

At a meeting of the American Political Science Foundation here last fall, however, at least two speakers said too many scholars were still taking on full-time intelligence services. They also warned that the part-time activities of others could influence their judgments or reputations.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty provide cover for C.I.A.-financed organizations that draw upon the research talents of American scholars and also service scholars with invaluable raw material. The Free Europe Committee even advertises for public contributions without revealing its ties to the United States Government.

Radio Swan, a C.I.A. station in the Caribbean that was particularly active during the Bay of Pigs invasion, maintains unpublicized contacts with private American broadcasters.

The C.I.A. at times has addressed the American people directly through public relations men and nominally independent citizens committees. Many other C.I.A.-run fronts and offices, however, exist primarily to gather mail from and to provide credentials for its overseas agents.

Thus, the ramifications of C.I.A. activities, at home and abroad, seem almost endless. Though satellites, electronics and gadgets have taken over much of the sheer drudgery of espionage, there remains a deep involvement of human beings, who project the agency into awkward diplomatic situations, raising many issues of policy and ethics.

That is why many persons are convinced that in the C.I.A. a sort of Frankenstein's monster has been created that no one can fully control.

By its clandestine nature, the C.I.A. has few opportunities to explain, justify or defend itself. It can don the cloak of secrecy and label all its works as necessary to further some "national interest." And it can quietly lobby for support inside the Government and among influential members of Congress and with the President.

But a "national interest" that is not a persuasive defense to men who have their own ideas of the "national interest" — along with secrecy itself — has the inevitable effect of convincing critics that the agency has plenty to hide besides its codebooks.

The imaginations and consciences of such critics are certainly not set at rest when they learn, for instance, that in 1962 an outraged President Kennedy — obviously differing with the agency about the "national interest" — forced the C.I.A. to undo a particularly clumsy piece of sabotage that might have blackened the nation's name all around the world.

Tomorrow: How the C.I.A. is "controlled."