

How C.I.A. Put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo

Intervention, Invasion, Spying All in a Day's Work

Following is the *second* of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other members of The Times staff.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25—At the Ituri River, eight miles south of Nia Nia in the north-east Congo, a government column of 600 Congolese troops and 100 white mercenaries had been ambushed by a rebel force and was under heavy fire. Suddenly, three B-26's skimmed in over the rain forest and bombed and strafed a path through the rebel ranks for the forces supported by the United States.

At the controls of the American-made planes were anti-Castro Cubans, veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, three years before. They had been recruited by a purportedly private company in Florida. Servicing their planes were European mechanics solicited through advertisements in London newspapers. Guiding them into action were American "diplomats" and other officials in apparently civilian positions.

The sponsor, paymaster and director of all of them, however, was the Central Intelligence Agency, with headquarters in Langley, Va. Its rapid and effective provision of an "instant air force" in the Congo was the climax of the agency's deep involvement there.

The C.I.A.'s operation in the Congo was at all times responsible to and welcomed by the policy-makers of the United States.

It was these policy-makers who chose to make the agency the instrument of political and military intervention in another nation's affairs, for in five years of strenuous diplomatic effort it was only in Langley that the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon found the peculiar combination of talents necessary to block the creation of a pro-Communist regime, recruit the leaders for a pro-American government and supply the advice and support to enable that government to survive.

From wire-tapping to influencing elections, from bridge-blowing to armed invasions, in

the dark and in the light, the Central Intelligence Agency has become a vital instrument of American policy and a major component of American government.

It not only gathers information but also rebuts an adversary's information. It not only organizes its own far-flung operations but also resists an adversary's operation.

Against the Soviet Union alone, it performs not only certain of the services performed in Moscow by the K.G.B., the Committee for State Security, but also many of the political, intelligence and military services performed by pro-Soviet Communist parties around the world.

When the Communist and Western worlds began to wrestle for control of the vast, undeveloped Congo in 1960 after it had gained independence from Belgium, a modest little C.I.A. office in Leopoldville mushroomed overnight into a virtual embassy and miniature war department.

This was not to compete with the real United States Embassy and military attachés but to apply the secret, or at least discreet, capacities of the C.I.A. to a seething contest among many conflicting forces.

Starting almost from scratch, because the Belgians had forbidden Americans even to meet with Congolese officials, the C.I.A. dispersed its agents to learn Congolese politics from the bush on up, to recruit likely leaders and to finance their bids for power.

Capable of quickly gathering information from all sources, of buying informants and disbursing funds without the bureaucratic restraints imposed on other government agencies, the C.I.A. soon found Joseph Mobutu, Victor Nendaka and Albert Ndele. Their eventual emergence as President of the country, Minister of Transportation and head of the national bank, respectively, proved a tribute to the Americans' judgment and tactics.

So pervasive was the C.I.A. influence that the agency was widely accused of the assassination of Moscow's man, Premier Patrice Lumumba. Correspondents who were in the Congo are convinced the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the murder, though it did play a major role in establishing Cyrille Adoula

as Mr. Lumumba's successor for a time.

Money and shiny American automobiles, furnished through the logistic wizardry of Langley, are said to have been the deciding factors in the vote that brought Mr. Adoula to power. Russian, Czechoslovak, Egyptian and Ghanaian agents were simply outbid where they could not be outmaneuvered.

In one test after Mr. Adoula had been elected, rival agents of East and West almost stumbled over each other rushing in and out of parliamentary delegates' homes. On the day of the roll-call, American and Czech representatives sat one seat apart in the gallery with lists of members, winking at each other in triumph whenever a man pledged to the one turned out to have been picked off by the other. Ultimately Mr. Adoula won by four votes.

More Than Money

By the Congo period, however, the men at Langley say they had learned that their earlier instincts to try to solve nasty political problems with money alone had been overtaken by the recognition of the need for far more sophisticated and enduring forms of influence.

"Purchased?" one American commented. "You can't even rent these guys for the afternoon."

And so the C.I.A. kept growing in size and scope.

By the time Moise Tshombe had returned to power in the Congo — through American acquiescence, if not design — it became apparent that hastily supplied arms and planes, as well as dollars and cars, would be needed to protect the American-sponsored government in Leopoldville.

This, apparently, was a job for the Defense Department, but to avoid a too obvious American involvement, and in the interests of speed and efficiency, the Government again turned to the C.I.A.

The agency had the tools. It knew the Cubans in Miami and their abilities as pilots. It had the front organizations through which they could be recruited, paid and serviced.

It could engage 20 British mechanics without legal complications and furnish the tactical expertise from its own ranks or from Americans under contract.

Moreover, some C.I.A. agents eventually felt compelled to fly some combat missions themselves in support of South African and Rhodesian mercenaries. The State Department denied this at first — then insisted the Americans be kept out of combat.

But it was pleased by the overall success of the operation, in which no planes were lost and all civilian targets were avoided.

Meanwhile, in Other Areas...

In the years of the Congo effort, the C.I.A. was also smuggling Tibetans in and out of Communist China, drawing secrets from Col. Oleg Penkovsky of Soviet military intelligence, spying on Soviet missile build-ups and withdrawals in Cuba, masterminding scores of lesser operations, analyzing the world's press and radio broadcasts, predicting the longevity of the world's major political leaders, keeping track of the world's arms traffic and of many arms manufacturing enterprises and supplying a staggering flow of information, rumor, gossip and analysis to the President and all major departments of government.

For all this, the C.I.A. employs about 15,000 persons and spends about a half billion dollars a year.

Its headquarters, the brain and nerve center, the information repository of this sprawling intelligence and operations system, is a modern, eight-story building of precast concrete and inset windows — a somewhat superior example of the faceless Federal style — set in 140 acres of lawn and woodland overlooking the south bank of the Potomac eight miles from downtown Washington.

In this sylvan setting, somewhat resembling an English deer park, about 8,000 C.I.A. employees — the top managers, the planners and the analysts — live, if not a cloistered life, at least a kind of academic one with the materials they are studying or the plans they may be hatching.

Formerly, the C.I.A. was scattered through many buildings in downtown Washington, which increased the problems and expense of security.

In the early nineteen-fifties, a \$30-million appropriation for a new, unitary headquarters was inserted without identification in the budget of another agency — and promptly knocked out by a Congressional committee so befuddled by C.I.A. secrecy that it did not know what the item was for.

When Allen W. Dulles, then director of the C.I.A., came back in 1956 with more candor, he asked for \$50-million, and Congress gave him \$46-million. He justified the bite that he proposed to take out of a 750-acre Government reservation on the Potomac by saying the site with "its isolation, topography and heavy forestation" would provide the agency with the required security.

While the whitish-gray building is undoubtedly as secure as fences, guards, safes and elaborate electronic devices can make it, the location is hardly a secret. A large sign on the George Washington Parkway pointing to "Central In-

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How C.I.A. Put an 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo to Carry Out United States Policy

INVASION, SPYING ARE AGENCY JOBS

Staff of 15,000 Is Directed From Only Partly Secret Sylvan Virginia Area

telligence Agency" has been removed, but thousands of people know you can still get to the same building by turning off on the same road, now marked by the sign "BPR"—"Bureau of Public Roads."

There, beyond the affable guard at the gate, is the large, rectangular structure with four wings, the ground-level windows barred, which stands as the visible symbol of what is supposed to be an invisible operation.

For organizational purposes, C.I.A. headquarters is divided into four divisions, each under a deputy director — plans, intelligence, science and technology, and support.

What the Divisions Do

The Division of Science and Technology is responsible for keeping current on developing techniques in science and weapons, including nuclear weapons, and for analyzing photos taken by U-2 reconnaissance planes and by space satellites.

The Division of Support is responsible for procuring equipment and for logistics, communications and security, including the C.I.A. codes.

The Division of Plans and the Division of Intelligence perform the basic functions of the agency. They represent the alpha and omega, the hand and brain, the dagger and the lamp, the melodrama and the monograph of the intelligence profession. Their presence under one roof has caused much of the controversy that has swirled about the C.I.A. since the Bay of Pigs.

It is the responsibility of the Intelligence Division to assemble, analyze and evaluate information from all sources, and to produce daily and periodical intelligence reports on any country, person or situation for the President and the National Security Council, the President's top advisory group on defense and foreign policy.

All information — military, political, economic, scientific, industrial — is grist for this division's mill. Perhaps no more than one-fifth — by volume and not necessarily importance — comes from agents overseas under varying depths of cover.

Most information is culled from foreign newspapers, scientific journals, industry publications, the reports of other Government departments and intelligence services and foreign broadcasts monitored by C.I.A. stations around the world.

All Sorts of Experts

The Intelligence Division is organized by geographical sections that are served by resident specialists from almost every profession and discipline — linguists, chemists, physicists, biologists, geographers, engineers, psychiatrists and even agronomists, geologists and foresters.

Some of the achievements of these experts are prodigious, if reports filtering through the secrecy screen are even half accurate. For instance:

¶From ordinarily available information, reliable actuarial and life-expectancy studies have been prepared on major foreign leaders.

¶In the case of one leader, from not-so-ordinarily available information, physicians gleaned important health data: They made a urinalysis from a specimen stolen from a hospital in Vienna where the great man was being treated.

¶C.I.A. shipping experts, through sheer expertise, spotted the first shipment of Soviet arms to Cuba before the vessels had cleared the Black Sea.

¶Some anthropologists at C.I.A. headquarters devote their time to helpful studies of such minor — but strategically crucial — societies as those of the hill tribes of Laos and Vietnam.

¶One woman has spent her professional lifetime in the agency doing nothing but collecting, studying, collating, analyzing and reporting on everything that can be learned about President Sukarno of Indonesia — "and I mean everything," one official reported.

Heavy With Ph.D.'s

It is the agency's boast that it could staff any college from its analysts, 50 per cent of whom have advanced degrees and 30 per cent of whom have doctorates.

Sixty per cent of the Intelligence Division personnel have served 10 years. Twenty-five per cent have been with the C.I.A. since 1947, when the agency was established. The heaviest recruiting occurred during the Korean War — primarily, but by no means exclusively, among Ivy League graduates.

The Division of Plans is a cover title for what is actually the division of secret operations, or "dirty tricks." It is charged with all those stratagems and wiles — some as old as those of Rahab and some as new as satellites — associated with the black and despised arts of espionage and subversion.

The operations of the C.I.A. go far beyond the hiring and training of spies who seek out informers and defectors.

It was the Plans Division that set up clandestine "black" radio stations in the Middle East to counter the propaganda and the open incitements to revolution and murder by President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Radio Cairo.

It was the Plans Division that masterminded the ouster of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 (two notable successes) and the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 (a resounding failure).

Among the triumphs of the Plans Division are the development of the U-2 high-altitude plane, which, between 1956 and May, 1960, when Francis Gary Powers was shot down by a Soviet rocket, photographed much of the Soviet Union; the digging of a tunnel into East Berlin from which C.I.A. agents tapped telephone cables leading to Soviet military headquarters in the acquisition of a copy of Premier Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th party congress in 1956 denouncing Stalin's excesses and brutalities.

Liberals in the C.I.A.

The C.I.A. analysts of the Intelligence Division, in the opinion of many experts, are aware of the embedded antagonisms and frustrations of peoples just emerging into nationhood. Thus they are likely to be more tolerant than the activists in the Plans Division of the flamboyant nationalism and socialist orientation of the leaders in former colonies and more flexible than many of the State Department's cautious and legalistic diplomats.

In discussing the Portuguese territories of Angola of Mozambique, for example, the analysts are said to take the attitude that change is inevitable, that the United States has to deal with a pluralistic world. The State Department, on the other hand, tends to be diverted by Portuguese sensitivities and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base in the Azores, also a Portuguese territory.

One State Department officer said that "there are more liberal intellectuals per square inch at C.I.A. than anywhere else in the government."

The operators and agents of the Plans Division, on the other hand, are described as more conservative in their economic outlook and more single-minded in their anti-Communism. This is particularly true of those engaged in deep-cover operations, many of whom are ex-military people or men formerly in the Office of Strategic Services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It has been said, however, that many of the agents

who are essentially information gatherers and who work under transparent cover are as sophisticated as the analysts back home, and like them are sympathetic to the "anti-Communist left" in underdeveloped countries.

The C.I.A. agents abroad fall into two groups — both under the Plans Division.

First, there are those engaged in the really dirty business — the spies and counterspies, the saboteurs, the leaders of paramilitary operations, the suborners of revolution. Such agents operate under deepest cover, and their activities become known only when they are unfortunate enough to be caught and "surfaced" for political or propaganda purposes.

While such operatives may be known to "the chief of station" — the top C.I.A. officer in any country — they are rarely known to the American Ambassador, although he may sometimes be aware of their mission. In fact, these deep agents are not known to the C.I.A.'s Intelligence Division in Washington, and their reports are not identified to it by name.

Correspondents of The New York Times say they have never, with certainty, been able to identify one of these agents, although they have on occasion run across some unaccountable American of whom they have had their suspicions. Often unknown to each other, the deep agents masquerade as businessmen, tourists, scholars, students, missionaries or charity workers.

Second, there are those agents, by far the larger number, who operate under the looser cover of the official diplomatic mission. In the mission register they are listed as political or economic officers, Treasury representatives, consular officers or employees of the Agency for International Development (the United States foreign aid agency) or United States Information Agency. The C.I.A. chief of station may be listed as a special assistant to the Ambassador or as the top political officer.


Not Very Secret

This official cover is so thin as to be meaningless except to avoid embarrassment for the host government. These agents usually are readily identifiable.

The chief of station is recognized as the man with a car as big as the Ambassador's and a house that is sometimes — as in Lagos, Nigeria — better.

In practically all the allied countries the C.I.A. agents identify themselves to host governments, and actually work in close cooperation with Cabinet officials, local intelligence and police.

In some embassies the C.I.A. agents outnumber the regular political and economic officers.



Air Photographics, Inc.

HOME OF THE C.I.A.: Central Intelligence Agency has its headquarters at Langley, Va., near the Potomac River

In a few they have made up as much as 75 per cent of the diplomatic mission.

The chief of station often has more money than the Ambassador. Sometimes he has been in the country longer and is better informed than the Ambassador.

For all these reasons the host government, especially in underdeveloped areas of the world, may prefer to deal with the chief of station rather than the Ambassador, believing him to have readier access to top policy-making officials in Washington.

Top Quality People

Obviously the number of agents abroad is a closely held secret, kept from even such close Presidential advisers in the past as the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. In his book "A Thousand Days," Mr. Schlesinger states that those "under official cover overseas" number almost as many as State Department employes. This would be roughly 6,600. The actual number, however, is believed to be considerably less, probably around 2,200.

The secrecy of identification can lead to some amusing situations. Once when Allen Dulles, then C.I.A. director, visited New Delhi, every known "spook" (C.I.A. man) was lined up in an anteroom of the embassy to greet him. At that moment a newspaper correspondent who had been interviewing Mr. Dulles walked out of the inner office. A look of bewilderment crossed the faces of the C.I.A. men, plainly asking, "Is this one we didn't know about?"

Mr. Schlesinger has written that "in some areas the C.I.A. had outstripped the State Department in the quality of its personnel."

Almost without exception, correspondents of The New York Times reported that the men at the top overseas were men of "high competence and discipline," "extremely knowing," "imaginative," "sharp and scholarly" and "generally somewhat better than those in State in work and dedication."

But they also found that below the top many C.I.A. people were "a little thin" and did not compare so favorably with Foreign Service officers on the same level.

The C.I.A. screens and re-screens applicants; because it is quite aware of the attraction that secrecy holds for the psychopath, the misfit and the immature person.

The greatest danger obviously lies in the area of special operations. Although it is generally agreed that the agents — overt and covert — have been for the most part men of competence and character, the C.I.A. has also permitted some of limited intelligence and of emotional instability to get through its screen and has even assigned them to sensitive tasks, with disastrous results.

One example was the assignment of a man known as "Frank Bender" as contact with Cuban exile leaders during the preliminaries of the Bay of Pigs operation. A German refugee with only a smattering of Spanish and no understanding of Latin America or Latin

character, Bender antagonized the more liberal of the leaders by his bullying and his obvious partiality for the Cuban right.

Offices in This Country

The C.I.A. maintains field offices in 30 American cities. These offices are overt but discreet. Their telephone numbers are listed under "Central Intelligence Agency" or "United States Government," but no address is given. Anyone wanting the address must know the name of the office director, whose telephone number and address are listed.

At one time these field offices sought out scholars, businessmen, students and even ordinary tourists whom they knew to be planning a trip behind the Iron Curtain and asked them to record their observations and report to the C.I.A. on their return.

Very little of this assertedly is done any more, probably because of some embarrassing arrests and imprisonment of tourists and students. While the C.I.A. deals frankly with businessmen, it reputedly does not compromise their traveling representatives.

Most of the work of domestic field agents involves contacts with industry and universities. For example, an agent, on instructions from headquarters, will seek evaluation of captured equipment, analysis of the color of factory smoke as a clue to production, an estimate of production capacity from the size of a factory, or critiques of articles in technical and scientific journals.

The Human Inadequacy

In greater secrecy, the C.I.A. subsidizes, in whole or in part, a wide range of enterprises — "private" foundations, book and magazine publishers, schools of international studies in universities, law offices, "businesses" of various kinds and foreign broadcasting stations. Some of these perform real and valuable work for the C.I.A. Others are not much more than "mail drops."

Yet all these human activities, all the value received and the dangers surmounted, all the organization and secrecy, all the trouble averted and all the setbacks encountered, still do not describe the work of the C.I.A. For the most gifted of analysts, the most crafty of agents — like all human beings — have their limitations.

At the time when the Americans were successfully keeping the Congo out of the Communist orbit, it still took the same men several months to slip an African agent into Stanleyville in the Congo to check on the lives and fate of some arrested Americans.

Men are fallible and limited, and the demands on the C.I.A. are almost infinite; that is why, today, some of the most valuable spies are not human and some of the most omnipotent agents hum through the heavens, and above.

Tomorrow: The C.I.A. in action.