

EA6 (480)

ADVANCE FOR 5 P.M., EST

AMS BUDGET

SORENSEN

(ADVANCE)..NEW YORK, JULY 20 (AP)-THEODORE C. SORENSEN, A TOP AIDE TO THE LATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, SAYS THAT AFTER THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS FIASCO HE HEARD KENNEDY ASK HIMSELF "HOW COULD I HAVE BEEN SO STUPID, TO LET THEM GO AHEAD?"

SORENSEN GIVES HIS ACCOUNT OF KENNEDY'S ROLE IN THE ABORTIVE CUBAN INVASION IN THE CURRENT LOOK MAGAZINE. THE ARTICLE IS THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF EXCERPTS FROM A FORTHCOMING BOOK.

SORENSEN SAYS THE WHOLE BAY OF PIGS DISASTER "SEEMED TO MOVE MYSTERIOUSLY AND INEXORABLY TOWARD EXECUTION WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT'S BEING ABLE EITHER TO OBTAIN A FIRM GRIP ON IT OR REVERSE IT."

SORENSEN'S ACCOUNT AGREES IN SUBSTANCE WITH THE VERSION OF ANOTHER KENNEDY AIDE, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., PUBLISHED BY LIFE MAGAZINE THIS WEEK. WHILE SCHLESINGER WAS IN ON THE INASION PLAN AND ADVISED KENNEDY AGAINST IT, SORENSEN LEARNED OF IT AFTERWARD IN LONG TALKS WITH KENNEDY.

BOTH THE KENNEDY AIDES DIFFER WITH RICHARD M. BISSELL JR., A FORMER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL, WHO SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT THE INVASION MIGHT HAVE SUCCEEDED IF KENNEDY HADN'T CANCELED A SECOND AIR STRIKE AT FIDEL CASTRO'S AIRFIELDS.

EA7

THE FIRST STRIKE WAS MADE EARLY SATURDAY, APRIL 15, TWO DAYS BEFORE THE LANDING. THE SECOND STRIKE WAS SCHEDULED FOR DAWN MONDAY AFTER THE LANDING PARTY WAS ASHORE.

SORENSEN SAID THE CANCELLATION OF THE AIR STRIKE WAS UNIMPORTANT BECAUSE THE PROJECT WAS DOOMED LONG BEFORE THAT. HE SAID KENNEDY TOLD HIM LATER HE SHOULD HAVE CANCELED THE ENTIRE OPERATION, NOT MERELY THE AIR STRIKE.

"FOR IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM BY THEN," SORENSEN WROTE, "THAT HE HAD IN FACT APPROVED A PLAN BEARING LITTLE RESEMBLANCE TO WHAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD APPROVED."

SORENSEN SAID THERE HAD BEEN OBJECTIONS FROM SUCH MEN AS SCHLES-  
INGER AND SEN. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK., AND THERE WERE EVEN  
DOUBTS AMONG SOME OF THE CIA AND MILITARY PLANNERS.

BUT THOSE DOUBTS WERE NOT PRESSED, SORENSEN WROTE, BECAUSE "BOTH THE CIA AND THE JOINT CHIEFS WERE MOVED MORE BY THE NECESSITY OF ACTING SWIFTLY AGAINST CASTRO THAN BY THE NECESSITY FOR CAUTION AND SUCCESS."

"HE SHOULD HAVE PAID MORE ATTENTION TO HIS OWN POLITICALLY SOUND INSTINCTS AND TO THE POLITICALLY KNOWLEDGEABLE MEN WHO DID VOICE OBJECTIONS DIRECTLY," SORENSEN WROTE, "INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING ONLY THE ADVICE OF LATIN AMERICAN EXPERTS ADOLF BERLE JR. AND THOMAS MANN."

MANN WAS NOT DIRECTLY AVAILABLE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT DECLINED COMMENT ON THE MATTER. BERLE WAS VACATIONING AND UNAVAILABLE FOR COMMENT.

EA8

AFTER THE DISASTER, SORENSEN SAID KENNEDY WAS "AGHAST AT THE ENORMITY OF HIS ERROR, ANGRY AT HAVING BEEN BADLY ADVISED BY SOME AND LET DOWN BY OTHERS."

DESPITE FREQUENT BRIEFING, THE PRESIDENT WAS COMPLETELY MISLED ABOUT THE OPERATION, SORENSEN SAID. KENNEDY THOUGHT IT WAS TO BE A "QUIET INFILTRATION" WITH TWO POSSIBLE OUTCOMES--"NATIONAL REVOLT OR A FLIGHT TO THE HILLS," SORENSEN WROTE.

INSTEAD, THE AFFAIR WAS "TRUMPETED" IN ADVANCE AS AN INVASION, AND NEITHER A CUBAN UPRISING NOR ESCAPE OF THE INVADERS INTO THE HILLS WAS REMOTELY POSSIBLE, SORENSEN SAID.

IN ADDITION, SORENSEN SAID, KENNEDY THOUGHT THE CUBAN EXILE LEADERS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT OVERTLY HELP, WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE COUNTING ON IT.

(MORE)

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EA10 (350)

ADVANCE FOR 5 P.M., EST

(ADVANCE)..NEW YORK--FIRST ADD SORENSEN-KENNEDY BJT (A6) XXX ON IT.

AND, HE SAYS, KENNEDY WAS TOLD THE INVASION HAD TO BE RUSHED BEFORE CASTRO GOT STRONG ENOUGH TO REPEL IT, WHEN IN TRUTH HE ALREADY WAS THAT STRONG.

"THE PRESIDENT, HAVING APPROVED THE PLAN WITH ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD BE BOTH CLANDESTINE AND SUCCESSFUL, .THUS FOUND IN FACT THAT IT WAS TOO LARGE TO BE CLANDESTINE AND TOO SMALL TO BE SUCCESSFUL," SORENSEN WROTE.

"TEN THOUSAND EXILES MIGHT HAVE DONE IT--OR 20,000--BUT NOT 1,400, AS BRAVELY AND BRILLIANTLY AS THEY FOUGHT."

BISSELL, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF PLANNING THE INVASION FOR THE CIA, SAID IN A WASHINGTON STAR INTERVIEW THAT KENNEDY'S CANCELLATION OF A SECOND AIR STRIKE AGAINST CASTRO'S AIR FIELDS MIGHT HAVE MADE A CRITICAL DIFFERENCE.

"IF WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DUMP FIVE TIMES THE TONNAGE OF BOMBS ON CASTRO'S AIR FIELDS, WE WOULD HAVE HAD A DAMNED GOOD CHANCE," BISSELL SAID.

AFTER THE INVASION FORCE LANDED, CASTRO'S PLANES SANK SUPPLY SHIPS, THE INVADERS RAN OUT OF AMMUNITION AND WERE QUICKLY ROUNDED UP BY CASTRO'S SUPERIOR FORCES.

SORENSEN, HOWEVER, SAID THAT THE FIRST AIR RAID AGAINST CASTRO'S AIR FIELDS WAS "REMARKABLY INEFFECTIVE."

KENNEDY CALLED OFF THE SECOND WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT NOBODY WAS DECEIVED BY THE CIA'S COVERUP STORY THAT THE FIRST WAS THE WORK OF DEFECTING CUBAN AIR FORCE PILOTS, SORENSEN WROTE.

EA11

SCHLESINGER SAID KENNEDY LATER FELT CANCELLATION OF THE SECOND AIR STRIKE WAS AN ERROR, BUT NOT A DECISIVE ONE.

"FOR, EVEN ON THE MOST UNLIKELY ASSUMPTION THAT THE SECOND STRIKE ACHIEVED TOTAL SUCCESS AND WIPED OUT CASTRO'S AIR FORCE, IT WOULD STILL HAVE LEFT 1,200 MEN AGAINST 200,000," SCHLESINGER WROTE.

SCHLESINGER SAID THE SECOND AIR STRIKE MIGHT HAVE PROLONGED THE INVASION, OR MADE EVACUATION POSSIBLE.

"BUT THERE IS CERTAINLY NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT THE SECOND AIR STRIKE COULD POSSIBLY HAVE LED TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE CASTRO REGIME ON THE TERMS WHICH PRESIDENT KENNEDY LAID DOWN FROM THE START--THAT IS, WITHOUT U.S. INTERVENTION," SCHLESINGER SAID.

BISSELL AGREED THAT THE PLANNERS HAD MISCALCULATED THE CHANCES OF KEEPING U.S. PARTICIPATION SECRET AND "IT BECAME OBVIOUS TO ALL THAT WHAT WAS BEING DONE IN CUBA COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DONE BY AN UNAIDED EXILE GROUP."

WW132PED