

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 15, 1964

Books of The Times

The Secret Power of the Secret Services

By ORVILLE PRESCOTT

THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT. By David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. 375 pages. Random House, \$5.95.

WHAT is the invisible government? According to the authors of this book it consists of the various secret intelligence agencies that have multiplied in number and grown in power since the end of World War II. The most important, and most often discussed in this book, is the Central Intelligence Agency created by President Truman in 1947. The others are the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence services of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Together, these secret organizations spend \$4 billion a year and employ 200,000 people, in the authors' estimate.

This is an able and interesting work of topical reporting written by two persistent and enterprising young journalists. David Wise, at 34, is chief of the Washington bureau of The New York Herald Tribune. Thomas Ross, also only 34, is a member of the Washington bureau of The Chicago Sun-Times. They have not been able to write an entirely clear or comprehensive book about our invisible government. That is impossible while it remains as invisible as possible. But they have managed to assemble quantities of facts from many diverse sources, and to present them in briskly readable journalistic prose.

No ordinary citizen could read this book without learning much that he never knew before. Probably even well-informed members of the Soviet intelligence will find parts of it instructive. Consequently, controversy stormed around "The Invisible Government" long before its publication.

Messrs. Wise and Ross defend their purpose in writing it as follows: "It is an attempt to describe a hidden American institution which the American people, who finance it, have a right to know about. The premise of this book is that even in a time of cold war, the United States Government must rest, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, on 'the consent of the governed.' And there can be no meaningful consent where those who are governed do not know to what they are consenting."

Some of the matters discussed in these startling pages are: the strange history of the Bay of Pigs fiasco; the success of the C.I.A. in arranging the coups d'état that threw out the Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953 and the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954; the C.I.A.'s disastrous support of Indonesian rebels in 1958 which hardly made Sukarno more sympathetic to the Western nations; the equally misguided C.I.A. support of Chinese Nationalist guerrillas in Burma, which antagonized the Burmese with equally grievous results; the electronic marvels of photography and space

satellites, which have introduced automation to espionage; and "black radio," which is secret propaganda broadcasting.

The C.I.A., say Messrs. Wise and Ross, performs two chief functions: gathering information and conducting "special operations." These, like the Bay of Pigs disaster, may involve many Government departments and—many men. Or they can be less ambitious. In theory the President and his advisers approve special operations. In fact, Messrs. Wise and Ross suggest, the C.I.A. has such a "quasi-independent status" that it seems frequently to be implementing its own policy. Often, ambassadors don't know what the C.I.A. may be up to in the countries where they are stationed, and sometimes high officers in the State Department don't know either.

In conclusion, Messrs. Wise and Ross argue that ambassadors should have actual as well as theoretical control over C.I.A. operations; that a joint Senate and House committee should be in general control, and that Government officials should cease lying in public about the C.I.A., since their lies are often embarrassingly exposed.

"The secret intelligence machinery of the government can never be reconciled with the traditions of a free republic. But in a time of cold war, the solution lies not in dismantling the machinery but in bringing it under greater control. The resultant danger of exposure is far less than the danger of secret power. If we err as a society, let it be on the side of control."