

Most Authors Were Given A Promise of Anonymity

JUN 18 1971

NYTimes

By NEIL SHEEHAN

The majority of the approximately 36 authors who wrote the narrative-analysis sections of the Pentagon papers were career military and civilian officials who were promised anonymity when they were recruited for the project, according to former Government officials.

These sources said that the promise of anonymity was given to enable the authors to make candid judgments in the documentary histories they were writing and not to have these judgments later affect their careers by displeasing higher authorities.

Because of the promise of

anonymity, only a relatively small number of authors' names have so far emerged. These include:

Leslie Gelb, the former head of policy planning in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Pentagon, who is now a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. Mr. Gelb was the overall coordinator of the project, a task he was assigned by Mr. McNamara in the summer of 1967 at the outset of the study.

Col. Paul F. Gorman, now commanding a brigade of the

Continued on Page 15, Column 6

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

101st Airborne Division in Vietnam, who was assigned to Washington at the time of the study. Colonel Gorman is reported to be under consideration for promotion to brigadier general.

Richard Moorstein, a former staff member of the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs, who is now with the Rand Corporation, a Government-funded research institute.

Richard Holbrooke, a career foreign service officer who was an assistant to Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach at the time the study was conducted. He is now chief of the Peace Corps in Morocco.

Melvia Gurtev, a historian and staff member of the Rand Corporation, and one of the group of such defense-oriented intellectuals from Rand and other Government-financed research institutes who participated in the study with career Government officials.

Daniel Ellsberg, a former Rand member who served as assistant for pacification to the Deputy United States Ambassador in Saigon in 1966 and 1967 and who is now a research fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Hans Heymann, an economist for the Rand Corporation who headed a study for the United States in 1958 on Soviet air power.

An indication of the caliber of the men sought is that an attempt was made to recruit Brig. Gen. Alexander Haig, then a colonel. General Haig is currently deputy to Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's special assistant for national security affairs.

Some of the authors are known to have become disillusioned with American strategy in Vietnam in late 1967, after the study had begun, and even more so after the enemy's Lunar New Year, or Tet, offensive in January and February of 1968.

The Tet offensive created general disillusionment with Vietnam policy within the Johnson Administration, and on March 31 of that year President Johnson announced his decision to seek a negotiated settlement and retire from office.

The private attitudes toward the war of the majority of the authors at the time the study was conducted in 1967 and 1968 is unknown, however, and participants state that no attempt was made to ascertain their views when they were recruited.

The qualifications sought, these sources say, were experience in government and sufficient academic qualifications to enable the authors to analyze the documents soundly. An effort was also made to have them support any judg-

ments made within the narrative analyses with adequate material from the source documents themselves.

The analyses, however, vary considerably in the sharpness of the judgments made.

The studies on the first phases of the air and ground wars in Vietnam in early 1965 have a distinctly more critical quality than, for example, the study on the Tonkin Gulf incident itself in August of 1964.

This study is reported to have been written by an Air Force colonel then working at Rand whose name is still unknown. It is noticeably blander in tone than the studies that follow it.

Because the study was meant to be an anonymous bureaucratic history written only for the highest decision-makers within the Government, it was also structured that way, participants said.

Both the research and writ-

ing of some of the individual chapters was done by two or more authors. The study as a whole thus has a fragmented quality with no general theme throughout. The judgments in one section are not necessarily developed in succeeding ones.

Another reason for this sense of fragmentation, participants said, was that the magnitude of the study only became apparent as it developed and the participants realized the voluminous documentation that would have to be analysed.

Thus more authors had to be recruited as the work load grew. Careful coordination between various sections became very difficult to achieve and thus individual authors and sub-teams of authors were left more or less to work on their own.