

New Viet Report

A-Bombs Were Asked--Globe

BOSTON — (AP) — The Boston Globe printed today what it said were excerpts from a Pentagon study on the Vietnam war

It includes a report on a high-level meeting at which a top U.S. officer demanded that commanders be given the freedom to use tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

The report, taken from the 47-volume Pentagon study of the war, said that at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Honolulu in June, 1964, Adm. Harry Felt, then commander of the Pacific forces, demanded the option to use nuclear weapons "as had been assumed under various plans." There was no mention of the various plans.

Third Outlet

The Globe is the third U.S. newspaper to publish excerpts from the massive Pentagon study detailing American involvement in Vietnam.

In an editorial today the Globe hinted at more documents to come, saying the newspaper "has come into possession of many of the classified Pentagon papers, some already published and some not. It has decided to begin publishing them today

Congressman Paul McCloskey says the U.S. "was up to its eyeballs" in helping to overthrow South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Story on Page 4.

as a public service in support of the people's right to know."

Others Present

Also present at the JCS Honolulu meeting were Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the joint chiefs, and John

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Nuclear Weapons Request Bared

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McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The discussion about the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam arose, the Globe said, on the question of whether the Chinese Communist forces would enter the war.

"Secretary McNamara then went on to say that the possibility of major ground action also led to a serious question of having to use nuclear weapons at some point," the Globe quotes the report.

"Admiral Felt responded emphatically that there was no possible way to hold off the Communists on the ground without the use of tactical nuclear weapons and that it was essential that the commanders be given the freedom to use these as had been assumed under various plans," the report said.

Not Necessary

The Globe said discussions included the "desirability of obtaining a congressional resolution prior to wide U.S. action.

"Lodge felt it would not be necessary. But Defense Secretary McNamara, Rusk and CIA director McCone all argued in favor of the resolution," the Globe said.

Other excerpts in the Globe include a report on the 1968 Tet offensive by Gen. Earle Wheeler; an early Vietnamization plan by President Johnson as a result of that offensive, and three cables from Gen. Taylor to President Kennedy in which the general recommended the deployment of 8000 ground combat troops to Vietnam.

Flood Control

Taylor recommended that 8000 U.S. ground combat troops be sent into Vietnam under the pretext of flood control. Taylor said this might increase world tensions and widen the war. The



HARRY D. FELT
Urged nuclear option?

Globe said Kennedy did not approve Taylor's request.

Taylor's cable, sent in late October, 1961, recommended that the United States "initiate guerrilla action, including United States advisers if necessary" in the Sepone area of Laos, and send troops to support the government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

"My view is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time of providing a United States military presence," the study reportedly said.

Request to Soviets

The Globe said there was a request to the Soviet Union in May, 1965, asking them to officially inform Hanoi that the United States would temporarily halt bombing North Vietnam as a peace feeler. The Soviets refused, the Globe said, because they felt China would charge collusion with the United States.

The Globe said it was making public for the first time "the role of the Kennedy ad-

ministration in the escalation of the war."

"As early as May 11, 1961, President Kennedy," the article said, "had approved programs for covert action which had been recommended by a Vietnam Task Force.

"Among these actions were:

"1—Dispatch of agents into North Vietnam.

"2—Aerial resupply of agents in North Vietnam through the use of civilian mercenary air crews.

"3—Infiltration of special South Vietnam forces into Southeast Laos to locate and attack Communist bases and lines of communication.

"4—Formulation of 'networks of resistance, covert bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment' inside North Vietnam.

"5—Conduct of overflights of North Vietnam for the purpose of dropping leaflets.

Covert Actions

"These covert actions which were approved by President Kennedy were contained, according to the Pentagon study, in a National Security Action Memorandum number 52."

The Globe said that "President Kennedy stepped up covert actions against North Vietnam and increased the number of advisors to 16,000 men before he was assassinated in November, 1963, but he never committed the United States ground unit as Taylor had suggested."

The Globe also said the Pentagon study shows that when "President Johnson announced publicly that he would not run for re-election in March, 1968, he was also deciding privately that a policy of Vietnamization was the best one for the nation to follow in the war."

"The President's speech was also a denial of Gen.

William Westmoreland's request for an additional 206,000 troops," the Globe said.

The Globe said the two months between the Tet offensive and Johnson's speech "are described in the Pentagon study as a time of conflicting counsel coming to the White House and revolving around a request from General William Westmoreland, then U.S. Commander in Saigon, for 206,000 additional troops over the 525,000 ceiling that had previously been put on American forces there.

Reassessment

"The fireworks of the Tet Offensive had, it is clear from the Pentagon studies, shaken Washington's confidence in the eventual outcome of the war and kicked off what the writers describe as a 'reassessment from A to Z'" the Globe said.

In another excerpt from the Pentagon study, Gen. Wheeler, in a report on the Tet offensive, said, "The initial attack nearly succeeded in a dozen places, and defeat in those places was only averted by the timely reaction of the U.S. forces. In short, it was a very near thing."