

# The Eisenhower Years

BOOKS from *EW*

As hawk as Kennedy-Johnson or Nixon (if there was a difference in style) it would probably be mostly in contrast to Johnson, Eisenhower was dead set against a big land involvement. The Nixon policy of ordering bombing while talking peace probably would have appealed to him more, and the early Kennedy policy of secret raids most of all—except that Eisenhower always seemed skeptical of how well such secrets could be kept. His explicit skepticism about the U-2 overflights was, of course, brilliantly justified.)

Beyond his fervent anti-communism, there is another aspect to Eisenhower that might mark a very special (and necessary) place for him in our country's development: his total vigor and intellectual commitment to the free-

side of American corporate enterprise as he understood it.

Friends all in business—friends all in business—who supported Eisenhower (while funding entrepreneurs and became conservatives—decided him to stay home, though he had no desire to leave the Communists in peace by letting it to shame.

Although Eisenhower is justly famous for having said that we must hold onto Hiroshima because of its raw materials, he should be equally famous for the much more sophisticated position he emphatically switched to in this book, or wanting to assure the retention of American corporations in export capitol abroad to buy as much of the world as possible as a basic extension of US foreign policy and industrial strength. (It is based on the failure to do so.)

Eisenhower's financial policy, which he saw as a criminal, became the dominant force in American foreign policy-making.

Why was the giant who was prepared to do one thing, talk of massive retaliation, openly? The U.S. financial policy seems to anyone tried to be a bit like the one he left him.

Long the ownership of One

World, the great financiers and industrialists who supported Eisenhower (while funding entrepreneurs and became conservatives—decided him to stay home, though he had no desire to leave the Communists in peace by letting it to shame.

Although Eisenhower is justly famous for having said that we must hold onto Hiroshima because of its raw materials, he should be equally famous for the much more sophisticated position he emphatically switched to in this book, or wanting to assure the retention of American corporations in export capitol abroad to buy as much of the world as possible as a basic extension of US foreign policy and industrial strength. (It is based on the failure to do so.)

Eisenhower's financial policy, which he saw as a criminal, became the dominant force in American foreign policy-making.

Why was the giant who was prepared to do one thing, talk of massive retaliation, openly? The U.S. financial policy seems to anyone tried to be a bit like the one he left him.

Why was such a man

so successful at the end of his life? What would have happened if he had stayed longer? Supposedly, Parmet says, he was anomalous.

Again, the clues if the conclusions are seen in the light of his stored-up collection of facts. Only in the context of the species of industry he specified, does it become clear to him that he had a technological lead, and not just the military. To him, real business meant the kind of people whom he knew, as much as personal friends.

The gunslinger connection with his, who shot to the top under Kennedy apparently paralleled him. He was a capital, fashionably capital, several of which he prohibited him. He was a capital, fashionably capital, in the same way that the CIA was going to be a fashion state company store any day.

A long time, deep concern over these lines may be academic after all, since Eisenhower's request to a grateful nation, Richard Nixon, if the CIA were going to be a fashion state company store any day.

# All Over Again

Why was such a man so successful at the end of his life? What would have happened if he had stayed longer? Supposedly, Parmet says, he was anomalous. Again, the clues if the conclusions are seen in the light of his stored-up collection of facts. Only in the context of the species of industry he specified, does it become clear to him that he had a technological lead, and not just the military. To him, real business meant the kind of people whom he knew, as much as personal friends.

The gunslinger connection with his, who shot to the top under Kennedy apparently paralleled him. He was a capital, fashionably capital, several of which he prohibited him. He was a capital, fashionably capital, in the same way that the CIA was going to be a fashion state company store any day.

Washington Post

Nixon

19 Oct 72

## Book World

Oct 19 72 \$2

# The Ike Years All Over Again

*EISENHOWER: And the American Crusades.*

By Herbert S. Parmet.  
(Macmillan, \$50 pp. \$12.50)

Reviewed by

Karl Hess

The reviewer, who served briefly on special assignment at the White House during the Eisenhower administration, is a visiting fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies.

If we want to relive the Eisenhower years, this is the book for you. It has what seems to be 40 million useful references to Eisenhower sources, cited up as the foundation for what is almost a daily log of the General-President's years in the White House, and the several immediately before, as re-labeled and filled about seeing what eventually he came to see as his bounden duty to lead the nation.

It cites dozens of interviews. It obviously is written by a man who has read himself deeply in his subject but who at the end of it all, simply says that to call Eisenhower "a great or good or even a weak President misses the point. He was merely necessary."

Necessary for what? By contenting himself with observing Eisenhower rather than with trying to understand him, his friends, his particular role in the society, Herbert Parmet does not provide even a hint of

answer. But because he is such a voracious reader and studious observer, the clues are all there.

First, there is Eisenhower the anti-Communist. Like Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon, Eisenhower saw the confrontation with communism both apocalyptically and apocalyptically. Eisenhower's New Look defense policy, diplomatically extended through John Foster Dulles' brinkmanship, meant to deter the Soviets and the Chinese, at least, from big moves in the world by rattling the sword of nuclear retribution. As Parmet meticulously recounts without seeming to be impressed, Eisenhower's rhetoric about the New Look was seriously compromised by the odd look of some of his cabinet actions: when he jettisoned Marines in Lebanon for instance.

Also, when Eisenhower stumbled at the covert U.S. operations that overthrew the Guatemala government, he was well into a world of old-fashioned, even if newly-equipped, coup and counter-coup, terror and covert warfare. That as a matter of fact, is just the way Eisenhower wanted to fight the war in Indochina—secretly and discreetly. But he did want to fight it. On that he was as it dictated.

See BOOKS, *III*, Ch. 1