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**Nixon Letter Has Warning**

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon's bitter charge yesterday that Congress has frustrated his policy in Cambodia carries implications that cut across the whole range of U.S. foreign policy.

Through his caustic letter to Congress, the President was assigning responsibility, in advance, to Capitol Hill for whatever occurs throughout Indochina to rob him of his claim that he achieved "peace with honor" there.

But even beyond Indochina, the President virtually was charging that a rebellious Congress is liable for anything that goes awry globally through the

"profound impact in other countries" of its legislated restrictions on his actions.

Watergate, of course, was not mentioned in the President's letter to the leaders of the Senate and the House. But the mood of angry presidential reaction to what he regards as unwarranted re- crimination and retaliation over the Watergate affair

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was fully apparent in Mr. Nixon's unusual letter.

High administration officials, in private, label their Cambodian policy "a casualty of Watergate." The night before the President sent his letter, national security

adviser Henry A. Kissinger ruefully said publicly, "The present ordeal of the whole nation is too obvious to require commentary." Kissinger warned, "The consensus that sustained our international participation is in danger of being exhausted. It must be restored."

The President's policy opponents, led by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), yesterday totally rejected his claim that they are responsible for undermining his Cambodian policy, or that dire consequence will flow from it. Their constant position has been that the United States never should have entered Cambodia, that

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the Nixon administration grossly exaggerated the significance of Cambodia, and the sooner out it, the better.

The war critics' apprehension since Congress voted the Aug. 15 bombing cutoff has been that the Nixon administration will find, or contrive, justification to continue the use of armed force in Cambodia despite the legislative deadline.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) expressed that concern on the Senate floor yesterday. He suggested that President Nixon might claim justification to introduce U.S. Marines or air forces "to protect American lives and property" in Cambodia, despite the legislative ban.

Fulbright, however, said he had been assured by Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that any such intervention is foreclosed.

Moorer also is reported to have informed Congress that the United States will not finance "mercenaries" in Cambodia and that the Nixon administration has no plans to support combat operations by South Vietnam or other third countries in Cambodia.

Some suspicions, nevertheless, remain.

President Nixon said yesterday that "North Vietnam would be making a very dangerous error if it mistook the cessation of bombing in Cambodia for an invitation to fresh aggression or further provocations. The American people would respond to such aggression with appropriate action."

Under the bombing halt voted by Congress and signed by the President on July 1, however, there is a total cutoff of American combat operations not only in Cambodia, but throughout Indochina. This fact has not registered fully with the American public.

The legislation states:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after Aug. 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shore of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia."

In his letter yesterday, the President declared that until his strategy was "undermined" by Congress, his administration "had every confidence" of achieving a satisfactory negotiated settlement in Cambodia. His critics in Congress challenge that claim.

The administration contends that in June it was headed toward negotiations with deposed Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk, but it was obliged to wait until he returned to Peking in July, and by then its strategy was short-circuited by Congress. Sihanouk, however, has said that his overtures for negotiations repeatedly were rejected by the Nixon administration.

Kissinger, before passage of the bombing cutoff, told members of Congress that if they held off, by September he could show productive diplomatic results. But Congress was in a mood of revolt, inflamed by the Wa-

tergate scandal. Its distrust of administration intentions in Cambodia was greatly intensified by the recent disclosure that for 14 months, in 1969-70, the administration concealed systematic B-52 bombing in Cambodia.

The time to have negotiated on Cambodia, critics charge, was around the period of the cease-fire in Vietnam, at the end of January.

To negotiate with Sihanouk then, administration strategists argued, would have meant badly selling out the American-backed Cambodian regime of Lon Nol, as President Kennedy abandoned President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, leading to Diem's death.

President Nixon, when he sent U.S. ground forces into Cambodia on April 30, 1970, said the alternative was to turn the United States into "a pitiful, helpless giant." In a press conference on Nov. 15, 1971, Mr. Nixon said "Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form."

The President, in the eyes of his critics, unjustifi-

ably "nailed himself to the mast" on Cambodia.

Cambodia was labeled "Nixon's war" in the massive demonstrations that swept the nation's campuses in the spring of 1970. That uproar, in turn, stimulated a siege mentality inside the White House, planting roots for the clandestine operations now labeled Watergate. Now the counter-reaction to Watergate has struck back, in Cambodia.