£:

Justice Powell's Continued Conservatism

By WARREN WEAVER Jr.

Special to The New York Times

liberal lawyers and judges who have been hopefully predicting for the last two years that President Nixon would come to regret his appointment of Lewis F. Powell Jr. to the Supreme Court was strangely silent last and loyalty oath re-

constitutional right of the per-

F. Powell Jr. to the Supreme Court was strangely silent last week.

From the time of his nomination for the high court, Mr. Powell has been the single Nixon selection who was regarded by courtwatchers as a potential Hugo L. Black, a potential Hugo L. Black, a parties.

That a loyalty oath renouncing advocacy of the forcible overthrow of the Government could arguably be required of Presidential and other Federal and state political candidates as long as it was potential Hugo L. Black, a papiled evenhandedly to all parties.

Biss."

In the second case, Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which the other three Nixon appointees—Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Associate Justices Harry A. Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist—joined.

Applying the rule to grand son against whom it may be jury investigations as well as WASHINGTON, Jan. 13—The used but merely a court to criminal trials, the Justice

evenhandedly to all blackmun and William H. Rehnquist—joined.

In a series of past loyalty oath cases, the high court has distinguished between advocacy of Government overthrow as an abstract principle and actual inciting of lawless action. Retof his pen when he wrote, on consecutive days, opinions contending as follows:

That suppression of illegalpotted without tainting the entire ly obtained evidence is not all was blackmun and William H. Rehnquist—joined.

In a series of past loyalty oath cases, the high court has distinguished between advocacy of Government overthrow as an abstract principle and actual inciting of lawless action. Requiring citizens to renounce abstract advocacy, the Court consistently held is an unconstitutional limit on free speech.

Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist—joined.

In a series of past loyalty oath cases, the high court has distinguished between advocacy of Government overthrow as an abstract principle and actual inciting of lawless action. Requiring citizens to renounce abstract advocacy, the Court consistently held is an unconstitutional limit on free speech.

Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist—joined.

In a series of past loyalty oath cases, the high court has distinguished between advocacy of Government overthrow as an abstract principle and actual inciting of lawless action. Requiring citizens to renounce abstract advocacy, the Court consistently held is an unconstitutional limit on free speech.

Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist—joined.

In a series of past loyalty oath cases, the high court has distinguished between advocacy of Government overthrow as an abstract principle and actual inciting of lawless action. Requiring citizens to renounce abstract advocacy, the Court consistently held is an unconstitutional limit on free speech.

But Justice Harry A.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JANUARY 14, 1974

Reflected in Two Opinions

