

# Excerpts From Kissinger's

Following are excerpts from a news briefing by Henry A. Kissinger in Washington yesterday, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of A.B.C. news:

I thought I would speak to you about our expectations with respect to the forthcoming summit between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev. Try to give you our preparations for it, what we expect to come out of it, and then I'll take your questions on that, or any other subject.

Throughout almost the entire postwar period, with only brief interruptions, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were characterized by an atmosphere of hostility compounded by ideological opposition, of geopolitical rivalry and of the fact that we and the Soviet Union represented two great nuclear powers in the world on which the security of many other countries depended.

The interruptions that occurred were very frequently largely atmospheric. And while we, early in this Administration, made it very clear that we were prepared to change course—expressed in the President's first inaugural in which he called for an era of negotiation instead of confrontation and in his press conference statement early in the Administration that we wanted to proceed on a broad front—it is nevertheless true that the first two years of the first term were devoted, were characterized by many of the same attitudes, or at least by many of the same tensions, that had characterized the entire post war period.

## Change of Course in 1971

We had the building of a Soviet naval base in Cienfuegos. We had a crisis in the Middle East. We had tensions in many other parts of the world. But as a result of developments in these crises as well as of the intensive exchange that was always going on between the President and other levels of our Government and the Soviet leaders, a change of course began to emerge early in 1971.

This change of course reflected the realities that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to peace between the great nuclear countries. Not only do they have an obligation to avoid conflict, but they have an obligation to exercise restraint in their relations to third countries.

An ultimately, they should strive to move from the easing of tensions to the achievement of positive goals for the benefit of their people and the people everywhere.

The process, which started hesitantly and slowly in 1971 over the negotiations on Berlin, accelerated in the second half of 1971 and culminated in the Moscow summit of May, 1972.

## Cites Moscow Meeting

You're all familiar with the principal achievements of the Moscow summit of May, 1972. There were a series of bilateral agreements in various

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## News Briefing on the Forthcoming

### Visit by Brezhnev

#### Brezhnev Arrives Saturday

The General Secretary, as you know, is arriving on Saturday, and he will be resting at Camp David on Sunday. He will be received at the White House by the President on Monday. On that day the conversations between the President and the General Secretary will begin. There will be a state dinner that evening. The conversations will continue on Tuesday. On Wednesday, part of Thursday, the President and the General Secretary are planning to go to Camp David to continue their conversations. On Thursday afternoon they expect to return to Washington.

There will be a dinner at the Soviet Embassy on Thursday night. On Friday afternoon, the President and the General Secretary will go to San Clemente. They will be able to continue their conversations on the plane. The General Secretary is planning to leave San Clemente on Sunday, probably spend overnight at Camp David Sunday night and return to the Soviet Union on Monday.

#### Substance of Talks

The General Secretary will have an opportunity to meet with Congressional leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and also with leaders of the business community and with any other group that he may choose to invite.

As you know, he's planning a television address during his stay here, probably from San Clemente.

Now let me talk about the substance. First, the occasion of the summit will mark the completion of a period of bilateral agreements that have

fields. There was the SALT agreement in which the two nuclear countries for the first time agreed to place their central armament, on which their security and survival depended, under restraint.

And finally—and that's in historical perspective as important as the complete agreement—was the declaration of principles in which the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to lay down a code of conduct for each other in relation to each other and in relation to third countries.

Since then we have attempted to consolidate this project. And this summit between the General Secretary and the President will be an opportunity to take stock and to attempt to see what further progress can be made—not just in the avoidance of war—but in the building of an international system in which the fear of war becomes, comes to play a less and less crucial role and in which the positive aspirations of mankind can become the central focus for the concern of all the countries, and especially of those countries who have it in their power to bring such untold suffering to mankind.





Associated Press

A boy and his father being searched and questioned after their capture by Cambodian soldiers in Ang Snuol. They were accused of collaborating with Communist troops who had occupied the town, but were later released.

been intensively studied. Now they have been intensively negotiated over recent months and have been covered in some of the national newspapers.

They will deal with the fields of oceanography, transportation, agriculture, scientific exchanges and other fields.

We will not pretend to you that these meetings directly produce these bilateral agreements. Many of these agreements were in the process of negotiation in any event, but what the meetings do is to raise the discussion from the level of experts to the political level. They accelerate the negotiations. They make it possible to achieve a rapid solution. They enable us to move forward simultaneously on a broad front.

They give the two leaders an opportunity to commit themselves personally to many fields of direct benefit to their two peoples from a broad perspective. And just as some of the agreements that were achieved last May could not have occurred—at least so rapidly, and almost certainly not in that form—but for the meeting in Moscow.

#### On Controlling Arms

The second category of problems with which we shall deal concerns means of mitigating the arms race and of dealing with the control of the most dangerous weapons.

Last year the two leaders met at the end of nearly three years of negotiations on SALT. And they achieved

an agreement—a permanent agreement—on the limitation of defensive weapons and an agreement on the limitation of offensive weapons.

The limitations agreed upon last year were quantitative; they confirmed the numbers of weapons each side could have in specified categories. And in the case of offensive weapons, the agreement was limited to five years.

Since then negotiations for a permanent agreement on the limitation of strategic arms has started and has been in progress for about six months. They are more complex than the negotiations that lead to the SALT agreement last May on two counts.

#### Qualitative Changes in Arms

They're more complex because we are now talking about a permanent agreement that will affect therefore the security of ourselves and of those countries that depend on us for the indefinite future. They're more complex also because it has, in the last year it has become ever more evident that the arms race now is fueled not so much by quantitative but by qualitative changes. Improvements in accuracy, changes in the numbers of warheads on individual missiles and similar technological changes can have a more profound impact on the strategic balance than a mere change in numbers.

We are therefore involved in extraordinarily complex negotiations. We do not ex-

pect—indeed, we do not aim—for a settlement of these questions at this meeting.

We will not force the pace of any negotiations to fit a particular schedule that has been established.

#### Sees Acceleration of Talks

What we do expect is that the President and the General Secretary will have very extensive discussions as to the nature of the problems and as to the direction in which a solution might be sought; discussions which might open the way to more harmonious instruction, or more compatible instruction, to the two negotiating teams in Geneva.

We expect that one result of this meeting will be an acceleration of the SALT negotiations. And we hope that this meeting will be seen in retrospect as our having marked a turning point in these negotiations, much as an earlier agreement in 1971 marked the turning point in SALT I.

Then, the two leaders will unquestionably—the second area of arms limitation that has been much discussed is that of mutual balanced force reductions.

#### A General Review

If the subject should be discussed, and of course it will be, our conclusions, the results of these discussions will be fully communicated to our allies and they will be negotiated in the forums established for that purpose.

So on that subject, the talks can only be exploratory.

Another subject that will be, another range of subjects that will be discussed will be a general review of the international situation as it presents itself to the two leaders a year after their last encounter, from the particular point of view of what can be done to reduce the dangers of war and to ease tensions.

Now last year was the first summit meeting between the President and the Soviet leaders. We expect that these meetings will become more regular features of international diplomacy and therefore the breakthroughs that were achieved last year will in this and future meetings be consolidated by a series of concrete steps but along a route now that we hope will become increasingly familiar and will be considered increasingly regular.

One of the principal goals of the President since he came into office has been to create a structure of peace based on the recognition by all countries that they have a stake in the preservation of the international order, that energy should be turned to the achievement of human aspirations and the recognition that the two great unclear powers—precisely because they have the capability of inflicting such untold damage—have a special obligation to their peoples and to history to make a special effort in this direction.

This is how we view the visit of the General Secretary



which begins officially next Monday. This is the spirit in which we will conduct it, and we will brief you regularly during the week to let you know about results as they emerge.

### Questions and Answers

Now I'll be glad to answer questions.

**Q.** These are both summit questions. First of all, if it is the case that you do not expect a SALT II agreement out of this meeting and all the further questions through the negotiators and so forth, why did the President say in his TV speech last night that he suspected very substantial progress in the arms-control negotiations. What was he talking about in comparison to what you're talking about? And secondly, you made no mention in the schedule part of any stops by Mr. Brezhnev in Houston, the space center, or Chicago or any other place he's been reported going. Could you address yourself to that aspect?

**A.** There were various ideas for various possible stops, but given that fact that maximum amount of time was always intended to be devoted to discuss, given the fact that the General Secretary also wanted to meet with a number of nongovernmental groups both Congressional and private, it simply proved impossible to fit into the schedule what would in any event have been only a two or three-hour stop.

What the President may have had in mind is exactly what I have described to you, and it is believed that by making progress in the direction of these talks and perhaps by discussing other areas that this will constitute a significant progress, but I repeat there will not be an agreement on the substance of SALT other than of the kind that I have described to you. Each person chooses his own adjectives.

### Jewish Issue Raised

**Q.** Among the private groups that the General Secretary will see, will any of those groups be Jewish-American groups with whom he will discuss the problem of Jewish immigration from Russia? And the second question is: were any of the stops restricted because of the fear of demonstrations by Jewish-American groups?

**A.** The reason for the itinerary of the General Secretary is precisely what I gave, and has evolved exactly as I described it.

With respect to the Jewish leaders, some are invited to the state dinner on Monday night at the White House. And of course the General Secretary, as I said, is free to see any group with which he wishes to take up contacts.

**Q.** Mr. Kissinger, are you at all concerned at the time Brezhnev is going to be here, the Watergate hearings are going to be in progress and

especially that former counsel John Dean is going to be testifying on very recent disclosures and accusations that could be very serious in terms of the President?

**A.** When the summit was planned, the domestic evolution was not considered. But at the same time, it is, it was our view that we should proceed with a program that had evolved on the basis of careful negotiations, over an extended period of time, that attempts to achieve a peace of benefit to all Americans. And the consequences of having it take place at the same time as the hearings I will leave to others to judge.

But there was no reason for us to change the summit.

### A Private Understanding?

**Q.** Doctor, is there a private understanding on Vietnam's communiqué that gives you confidence it will be carried out better this time than the original?

**A.** Now let me answer that in two parts. First, the war in Indochina has been going on for 25 years. The American role in it has been significant for nearly 12 years. In these circumstances it is too much to expect that one would have a transition from war to peace in one day and as the result of one decision.

Given the hostility that has existed and the distrust among the parties, the agreement that was signed on Jan. 27 has worked reasonably well.

It is probably also true that some of the signatories at least entered this agreement with the intention—or looking at it—as a continuation of the struggle by other means.

I have the impression that the realization that military victory cannot be achieved within Vietnam by either of the contending sides is becoming clearer.

So as a result, while words themselves are never an ultimate guarantee, we hope that the peace can now be consolidated and the cease-fire more strictly observed. And also that this communiqué marks one further step on the road to the military disengagement of the United States from the conflict in Indochina.

**Q.** Dr. Kissinger, what assurance can you give to a Senator or a Congressman that your negotiations could lead to an end of the bombing in Cambodia within a definite time. Can you give any assurances?

**A.** I can — we can only give a judgment and the record has been in the past that the judgment has not always been wrong, and therefore it is our best judgment that the possibilities for peace in Indochina have been strengthened. It is our objective to bring about the military disengagement of the United States as rapidly as we can—an objective we have consistently pursued, which we will continue to pursue. In all of these negotiations there are elements of uncertainty. This is our best judgment.