Marines to Vietnam?

Anderson reveals kison contingency plan

by Jack Anderson

JACK ANDERSON

WASHINGTON - There is no longer any doubt that the showdown battle over South Vietnam is now raging on several fronts.

It is also evident from secret White House papers in our possession that the timing has upset President Nixon's strategy for ending American involvement in the Vietnam War.

He had gambled that Hanoi wouldn't force a military showdown until the U.S. pullout was complete. He, therefore, paced the withdrawal to give the South Vietnamese time to bolster their defenses.

His timing was also intended to delay the final offensive until he was safely past the November election. He did his best to persuade Hanoi, Peking and Moscow that the United would depart Vietnam but States would fight if provoked.

Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese have now thrown their entire army, except for two training divisions, into a victory drive at the worst possible time for the President.

Back to Vietnam?

military advisers agree that bombing will hamper but won't stop the Communist offensive. There are also grave doubts about South Vietnam's ability to withstand the assault. The President, therefore, is studying contingency plans to send the U.S. marines back to Vetnam.

This would certainly wreck his summit meeting in Moscow and jeopardize his goal of a "generation of peace." It would also cause disruptions at home that could jeopardize his re-elction.

Yet the secret White House papers show that the President was fully aware of South Vietnam's inability to stand alone when he began withdrawing U.S. forces. Shortly after he took over as commander-in-chief, his military advisers joined in a unanimous warning that the South Vietnamese would be unable to handle the Communist threat alone "in the foreseeable future."
They agreed: "Today's Republic of

Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), without full support of U.S. combat forces, could not cope with a sizeable level of North Vietnamese Army forces "The RVNAF, with their present

structure and degree of combat readiness, are inadequate to handle a sizeable level of North Vietnamese Army forces. The RVNAF simply are not capable of attaining the level of self-sufficiency and overwhelming force superiority that would be required to counter combined Viet Cong insurgency and North Viet-namese Army main force offen-

At best, the military advisers hoped that "by 1972" the South Vetnamese would be able "to handle the Viet Cong insurgency if the Viet Cong are not reinforced and supported by the North Vietnamese Army."

Will Saigon Lose?

The Defense Secretariat made this blunt additional assessment: "Without major reforms with the RV-NAF command and selection system, it is unlikely that the RVNAF as presently organized and led will ever constitute an effective political or military counter to the Viet Cong.

"Moreover, as the Government of Vietnam's major presence in the countryside, the RVNAF as presently constituted will only continue to widen the gap which exists between the government and the rural population."

South Vietnamese troops have alienated the rural population. The secret papers allege: "Looting and other misconduct by Republic of Vietnam armed troops toward the civilian populace have undermined the confidence of the people in RV-NAF. Despite some efforts to correct the situation, efforts to undertake the required attitudinal changes of RVNAF towards the populace have not been productive.

In particular, it was noted that "the tension between those officers who have fought hardest and advanced least versus those who have had little fighting experience but rapid advancement is likely to hamper the ability of the GVN to successfully carry out major transfer of fighting responsibilities."

Although President Nixon did his best to achieve reforms and to strengthen the South Vietnamese, he hoped to postpone the inevitable test until the United States had cleared out of Vietnam. Unhappily, the showdown has come while he still has one foot stuck in the coun-