

# President

FEB 28 1972

## On the

## Way Home

SFChronicle

By Max Frankel  
N.Y. Times Service

Shanghai

President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai concluded a week of negotiations here today and parted with an American pledge to arrange a gradual withdrawal of United States forces from Taiwan and a joint pledge for a gradual increase in American-Chinese contacts and exchanges.

Mr. Nixon, contending that "this was the week that changed the world," headed home with a conviction that both are committed to "build a bridge" across the Pacific Ocean and 22 years of hostility. The President is scheduled to reach Washington, after a stop-over in Alaska, at 9 p.m. EST today.

The President took off from Shanghai at 10:13 a.m. (6:13 p.m. PST yesterday). Premier Chou saw his guests off at the airport.

The Nixon-Chou communique alternated between statements of agreement and separate statements of divergent position, a technique that is not uncommon in diplomacy but which was applied rather extensively by the two leaders.

### TAIWAN

The document said on behalf of the United States side that "Taiwan is a part of China." It committed the United States not to challenge that contention, which is made by both the Communist and Nationalist Chinese. It reported Washington's desire for a peaceful settlement "by the Chinese themselves" and with that "prospect" in mind asserted the President's "ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. Forces and military installations from Taiwan."

Mr. Nixon promised that in the meantime, but without a timetable, the 8000-man American garrison on the island would be pro-

See Back Page

### From Page 1

gressively reduced "as the tension in the area diminishes." Almost all those troops have been placed there in support of the fighting in South Vietnam but the Nixon administration appears now to be earmarking them for diplomatic use in the developing relationship with China.

On behalf of the Peking government, the communique said the Taiwan issue remained "the crucial question obstructing" normal relations with the United States. But it agreed to several steps, also without timetable, toward closer contacts.

### CONTACTS

The Chinese promised to stay in touch with the United States government through various official channels, including the occasional dispatch to Peking of a senior American representative for diplomatic discussions. They agreed to "facilitate" further unofficial contacts in sci-

---

### More Nixon's China news on Pages 12-15

---

ence, technology, culture, sports and journalism. And the Chinese agreed to permit the progressive development of trade with the United States.

These provisions on Taiwan and contacts formed the core of the bargain struck by Mr. Nixon and Chou in 15 hours of formal talks.

The President had wanted an even faster pace of diplomatic and private communications and exchanges. The Premier had wanted a firmer recognition of Peking as the sole and legal government on Taiwan.

### CONCESSIONS

Both sides moved somewhat from past positions, but their concessions were in the realm of future actions. Therefore, the degree to which these concessions are carried out can be regulated to match the performance of the other side. The withdrawal from Taiwan and the admission of Americans to China were not directly linked in the accord, but Henry Kissinger, the President's principal adviser, acknowledged that they could "become interdependent again" at any time.

Kissinger's use of the

word "again" was the clearest indication of the trade-off that has been arranged in the talks. But the President and the Premier had indicated their contending objectives on many other occasions, including the public toasts that they exchanged at alternately warm and restrained banquets.

Mr. Nixon and Chou wound up their week of contacts in high spirits, at least outwardly. They downed a number of thimble-sized drinks in mutual tribute at a dinner here last night and stood up to shake hands warmly on impulse when their host at the dinner, Chang Chun-chiao, the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, celebrated the agreement in his city.

#### STIMULUS

The desire to collaborate in the search for stability in Asia after the Vietnam war was plainly a major impulse for agreement, as it had been for the summit meeting in the first place. The communique said both sides had benefited from the candid discussions at a time of "important changes and great upheavals" in the world.

Mr. Nixon said in his dinner toast that the fact of agreement here and the future conduct of the two nations were even more important than the letter and the words of the communique.

Kissinger, commenting on the accord at a news conference and of reducing proach. He said the direction of the new relationship was more important than the accomplishments of the past week because the two

sides had agreed to begin a process of coordinating action when their interests converged and of reducing frictions when their interests differed.

A desire to help one another relieve the pressures generated by the Soviet Union was deemed to be another important stimulus toward agreement. On behalf of China, and also as an expression of shared attitudes, the communique twice vowed opposition to any effort to establish "hegemony" in the Asia-Pacific region. It did not mention the Soviet Union, which Mr. Nixon will visit in late May for another summit conference, and Kissinger insisted that the language here was not aimed against any specific country.

Kissinger said Mr. Nixon's one-hour talk with Mao Tse-tung, the 78-year-old patriarch of Chinese Communism, had been general but not merely philosophical and that the American delegation had reason to believe that the Chairman was consulted by the premier "at every step along the way."

#### COMMUNIQUE

The 18,000-word communique contained separate statements by the two sides of their divergent views on Indochina, Korea, Japan and South Asia. They offered opposing statements of support for the rival positions of Hanoi and Saigon in the deadlocked negotiations for a settlement in Vietnam.

They recited support for South and North Korea, with the United States stressing the need for "relaxation" of tension and China stressing the aim of "unification."

Neither mentioned its military defense commitments in Korea, where the two countries fought their only major conflict, 22 years ago.

They recorded Washington's pre-eminent desire for "friendly relations" with Japan, and China's concern about Japanese "militarism."

The communique also included an agreement on general principles of international conduct, with Mr. Nixon subscribing fully to the premier's longstanding definition of peaceful coexistence, as first defined at the Bandung conference of non-aligned nations in 1955, and Chou accepting an American statement that international disputes should be settled without threat or use of force.

This did not amount to a renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan because Peking deems Taiwan to be a province of China and therefore a strictly internal problem. However, China apparently lacks the force she would need to wrest the island from the Nationalist army in the foreseeable future.

#### WITHDRAWAL

There were separate Chinese and American statements on Taiwan, the first calling for an American withdrawal and the second promising it by stages but conditionally. Kissinger would not specify the "tension in the area" that he said would delay the American force reduction for some time.

He had previously indicated that nearly all of the troops on Taiwan were neces-

sary, mostly in support of war efforts in Vietnam. Before the build-up in Indochina only a few hundred American troops were in Taiwan, engaged in naval activities and on advisory and aid missions to the Nationalist government.

But Kissinger avoided any suggestion that an end of the fighting in Indochina would permit — or assure — the promised pullout. On the contrary, the Nixon administration appears eager to draw out the process of withdrawal to retain leverage in the unfolding relationship with China.

#### DIPLOMACY

Kissinger indicated that the Chinese would refuse to send official representatives to Washington as long as Taiwan maintained diplomatic status there. For the same reason, the Peking government appears determined to move more slowly and in largely indirect ways on all forms of exchange and contact.

The communique did not mention it directly, but Kissinger said he thought a "contact point" between Washington and Peking would be established in the "reasonably near future," though not in the United States.

Kissinger insisted that the American delegation did not look upon the relationship here with a scoreboard mentality, registering points for or against one side or the other on various issues. But as one diplomatic reporter observed, the negotiating side that feels it is coming out ahead does not usually disdain a look at the scoreboard.