

# Sections of the President's Foreign-Policy

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 25—Following are excerpts from sections of President Nixon's report on foreign policy that deal with areas other than Indo-China:

## Europe

The cruel and unnatural division of Europe is no longer accepted as inevitable or permanent. Today there is a growing impatience with confrontation. We and our allies seek a European détente. But we know that we cannot achieve it if we let slip away the close friendships in the West and the basic conditions of stability which have set the stage for it. This obligates our allies and ourselves to conduct our diplomacy in harmony, as we jointly and severally seek concrete negotiations on the range of issues in order to make détente a reality.

The economic strength of the NATO nations makes us considerably stronger in military potential than the Warsaw Pact.

The actual balance of conventional military forces in Europe is much closer, however. NATO's active forces in peacetime are roughly comparable to those of the Warsaw Pact. Following mobilization, NATO is capable of maintaining forces larger than the Warsaw Pact. But geographic proximity and differences in domestic systems give the Warsaw Pact the significant advantage of being able to mobilize its reserves and reinforce more rapidly than NATO.

It follows as a practical matter that:

¶ NATO must be alert for warning of an impending attack so that we can act as promptly as possible to mobilize and reinforce.

¶ We must improve NATO's conventional deterrent, especially correcting qualitative deficiencies in present allied forces.

¶ We must maintain a sufficient tactical and strategic nuclear deterrent as a complement to our conventional forces.

¶ We must continue our consultation—as I urged in last year's report—on defining the precise role of tactical nuclear weapons.

The United States faced pressures to withdraw our forces from Western Europe for budgetary reasons and pressures to keep them there for purely symbolic reasons. All these arguments evaded the crucial question: What defense function do and should our forces in Europe perform?

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## Report on Other Areas

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I decided, despite these pressures, that given a similar approach by our allies, the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe and not reduce them without reciprocal action by our adversaries. This decision, which I announced at the December NATO meeting, flowed directly from the analysis we had conducted in the N.S.C. (National Security Council) system and reinforced in NATO consultation. It had become clear to me that without undiminished American participation in European defense, neither the alliance's strategy nor America's commitment nor Western cohesion would be credible.

America's presence in substantial force is psychologically crucial as well. It provides the sense of security which encourages our partners' efforts to unite and to do more for themselves. Our direct and large-scale involvement in Europe is the essential ingredient of the cohesion of the West which has set the stage for the effort to negotiate a reduction of tension.

In our view, détente means negotiating the concrete conditions of mutual security that will allow for expanded intra-European contact and cooperation without jeopardizing the security of any country. Soviet policies and doctrine, however, too often interpret détente in terms of Western ratification of the status quo and acknowledgement of continuing Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. Beyond this, Soviet policy has been tempted to offer a relaxation of tension selectively to some allies but not to others, and only on limited issues of primary interest to the U.S.S.R. In view of this fundamental difference, a major question for the alliance to face is whether we can overcome the East-West stalemate while maintaining unity among ourselves and avoiding internal divisions in our countries.

Obviously, the Western countries do not have identical national concerns and cannot be expected to agree automatically on priorities or solutions. Each ally is the best judge of its own national interest. But our principal objective should be to harmonize our policies and insure that our efforts for détente are complementary. A differentiated détente, limited to the U.S.S.R. and certain Western allies but not others, would be illusory. It would cause strains among allies. It would turn the desire for détente into an instrument of political warfare. Far from contributing to reconciliation in Europe, it would postpone it indefinitely.

Today's pursuit of détente is taking place simultaneously with efforts to strengthen the economic and political solidarity of Western Europe. The West cannot afford to allow the momentum of individual approaches to the East to put allies inadvertently in the painful position of having to choose between their national concerns and their European responsibilities.

East-West détente and Western cohesion can be mutually supporting if the alliance consults thoughtfully to strike a balance between individual and common interests. The United States applies such a code of consultation to itself; we have been scrupulous to maintain a dialogue with our allies on the issues and developments in SALT; in turn, our allies have worked in consultation with us on major East-West issues. It is crucial that this continue.

Allied efforts toward mutual force reductions in Europe will continue in the coming year. Reducing the military confrontation in Europe is in the common interest of East and West. Our mutual objective should be to create a more stable military balance at lower levels and lower costs.

The problem of defining a fair agreement in precise terms is extremely complex. As in the preparations for SALT, I instructed our Government to develop the analytical building blocks of an

agreement and evaluate them in differing combinations, as our contribution to the alliance's collective deliberations. Our technical analysis is described in the arms control chapter of this report. The U.S.S.R. has frequently proposed a general conference on European security. But such a conference, in the Soviet formulation, would not address the main security issues—the German question, Berlin, mutual force reductions—but only very general themes. We and our allies are prepared to negotiate with the East in any forum. But we see little value in a conference whose agenda would be unlikely to yield progress on concrete issues but would only deflect our energies to drafting statements and declarations the interpretation of which would inevitably be a continuing source of disagreements. Once a political basis for improving relations is created through specific negotiations already in process, a general conference might build on it to discuss other intra-European issues and forms of cooperation.

Any lasting relaxation of tension in Europe must include progress in resolving the issues related to the division of Germany.

The German national question is basically one for the German people. It is only natural that the Government of the Federal Republic should assign it high priority. But as Chancellor Brandt has emphasized, it is the strength of the Western coalition and West Germany's secure place in it that have enabled his Government to take initiatives which mark a new stage in the evolution of the German question. The reshaping of German relations with the East inevitably affects the interests of all European states, as well as the relationship between the U. S. and the Soviet Union.

Therefore, there has been full consultation within the alliance during the evolution of the Federal Republic's new policies and the negotiation of its new treaties with the U.S.S.R. and Poland. It is clearly established that allied responsibilities and rights are not affected by the terms of these treaties. I emphasized in my talks with Chancellor Brandt in Washington and in intensive allied consultation in 1970 that we support West Germany's objective of normalizing relations with its eastern neighbors, and that we view its anguish at the unnatural division of the German nation with profound compassion.

## China

It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile toward it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia.

We are prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking. We cannot accept its ideological precepts or the notion that Communist China must exercise hegemony over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests.

The evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of international order or our own commitments. Our attitude is public and clear. We will continue to honor our treaty commitments to the security of our Asian allies. An honorable relationship with Peking cannot be constructed at their expense.

Our present commitment to the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan stems from our 1954 treaty. The purpose of the treaty is exclusively defensive, and it controls the entire range of our military relationship with the Republic of China.



Associated Press

**WATCHFUL WAITING:** An Israeli soldier at the Suez Canal. "In the Middle East, the United States took the initiative to stop the fighting and start the process of peace," said Mr. Nixon. "We are seeing to it that the balance of power, so necessary to discourage a new outbreak of fighting, is not upset."

I do not believe that this honorable and peaceful association need constitute an obstacle to the movement toward normal relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China. As I have tried to make clear since the beginning of my Administration, while I cannot foretell the ultimate resolution of the differences between Taipei and Peking, we believe these differences must be resolved by peaceful means.

In that connection, I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations. The question of its place in the United Nations is not, however, merely a question of whether it should participate. It is also a question of whether Peking should be permitted to dictate to the world the terms of its participation. For a number of years attempts have been made to deprive the Republic of China of its place as a member of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. We have opposed these attempts. We will continue to oppose them.

We continue to believe that practical measures on our part will, over time,

make evident to the leaders in Peking that we are prepared for a serious dialogue. In the past year we took several such steps:

¶In January and February of 1970 two meetings were held between our representatives in Warsaw, thus restoring an important channel of communication. The subsequent canceling of the scheduled May meeting was at Chinese initiative.

¶In April we authorized the selective licensing of goods for export to the People's Republic of China.

¶In August certain restrictions were lifted on American oil companies operating abroad, so that most foreign ships could use American-owned bunkering

facilities on voyages to and from mainland Chinese ports.

¶During 1970 the passports of 270 Americans were validated for travel to the People's Republic of China. This brought to nearly 1,000 the number so validated. Regrettably, only three holders of such passports were permitted entry to China.

In the coming year I will carefully examine what further steps we might take to create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and American peoples, and how we might remove needless obstacles to the realization of these opportunities. We hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of, reciprocity.

## Excerpts From Nixon's Address

*Following are excerpts from President Nixon's radio address to the nation yesterday announcing his annual message to Congress on foreign affairs, as recorded by The New York Times:*

Today I am sending to Congress my second annual comprehensive report on the conduct of our foreign affairs. It discusses not only what we have done, but why we have done it, and how we intend to proceed in the future.

The most immediate and anguishing problem that faced this Administration two years ago was the war in Vietnam. We have come a long way since then.

In Southeast Asia today aggression is failing—thanks to the determination of the South Vietnamese people and to the courage and sacrifice of America's fighting men.

That brings us to a point that we have been at several times before in this century: aggression turned back, a war ending.

We are at a critical moment in history. What America does or fails to do will determine whether peace and freedom can be won in the coming generation. That is why the way in which we end this conflict is so crucial to our efforts to build a lasting peace in coming decades.

The right way out of Vietnam is crucial to our changing role in the world and to peace in the world.

We have learned in recent years the dangers of overinvolvement. The other danger—a grave risk we are equally determined to avoid—is underinvolvement. After a long and unpopular war,

there is temptation to turn inward—to withdraw from the world, to back away from our commitments. That deceptively smooth road of the new isolationism is surely the road to war.

Our foreign policy today steers a steady course between the past danger of overinvolvement and the new temptation of underinvolvement.

That policy, which I first enunciated in Guam 19 months ago, represents our basic approach to the world: We will maintain our commitments, but we will make sure our own troop levels or any financial support to other nations is appropriate to current threats and needs.

We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

But we will look to threatened countries and their neighbors to assume primary responsibility for their own defense and we will provide support where our interests call for that support and where it can make a difference.

These principles are not limited to security matters.

In carrying out what is referred to as the Nixon doctrine, we recognize that we cannot transfer burdens too swiftly. We must strike a balance between doing too much and preventing self-reliance and suddenly doing too little and undermining self-confidence.

We intend to give our friends the time and the means to adjust, materially and psychologically, to a new form of American participation in the world.

# The Middle East

It is not for the United States to attempt to set the precise terms of a Middle East peace settlement. That can be done only by the parties directly in conflict, and only by a process of negotiation with each other.

However, some of the principles and elements that must be included if a settlement is to be reached are clear and evident:

¶The Arab Governments will not accept a settlement which does not provide for recovery of territories lost in the 1967 war. Without such acceptance, no settlement can have the essential quality of assured permanence.

¶Israel will not agree to withdraw from occupied Arab territories, which she sees as enhancing her physical security, unless she has confidence in the permanence of the peace settlement. She also believes that the final borders to which she will withdraw must be negotiated and agreed in a binding peace settlement. She must, therefore, have confidence that no attack is forthcoming, and confidence in her acceptance by her neighbors and in other assurances.

¶The lack of mutual confidence between Israel and the Arab countries is so deep that supplementary major-power guarantees could add an element of assurance. Such guarantees, coupled in time with a reduction of the armed strength on both sides, can give the agreement permanence.

¶No lasting settlement can be achieved in the Middle East without addressing the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people. For over two decades they have been the victims of conditions that command sympathy. Peace requires fruitful lives for them and their children, and a just settlement of their claims.

For over a century the Middle East has been an area of great concern to the major powers. To NATO and Europe its independence is vital, militarily and economically. Similarly the Soviet Union has important interests which we recognize.

Any effort by any major power to secure a dominant position could exacerbate local disputes, affect Europe's security and increase the danger to world peace. We seek no such position; we cannot allow others to establish one.

We repeatedly made clear to the Soviet leaders our desire to limit the arms race in the Middle East on a reciprocal basis.

While indicating that the U.S. preferred restraint in the shipment of arms, I have also repeatedly stated that the military balance between the Arab states and Israel must be maintained.

The Soviet Union's disregard for this essential foundation for peace talks raised serious doubts about its readiness to cooperate in the effort to achieve peace.

The U.S. continues to welcome Soviet suggestions for a settlement. But to be concerns of not one but both sides. serious, they must meet the legitimate

## Trade

Whether we continue a liberal trade policy in the nineteen-seventy's or not will have a profound impact at home and abroad. This Administration is committed to the principles of free trade. We recognize that our preponderant size in the world economy gives us an international responsibility to continue on this path just as we have an international responsibility to manage our domestic economy well. I am convinced that liberal trade is in both our domestic economic interest and our foreign policy interest.

This past year's events have not been encouraging for those who support a liberal trade policy. In my report a year ago, I noted three main tasks for trade policy in the immediate future:

¶Passage of the trade bill I submitted in 1969, which would have maintained momentum for a liberal trade policy.

¶Progress in the international negotiations on nontariff barriers and impediments to agricultural trade.

¶Successful resolution of the international negotiations on tariff preferences.

Only the last was achieved in 1970. The failure of the Administration's trade bill and the near-success of protectionist legislation in the Congress were closely related to the slow pace of the international negotiations on trade barriers. These developments make clear that other countries can no longer proceed on the facile assumption that no matter what policies they pursue, liberal trade policies in the United States can be taken for granted.

Thus, international cooperation is absolutely essential if we are to maintain a liberal trade policy in the United States. Our full support for the European Community continues, but its policies—including those related to the expansion of its membership, which we also support—must take full account

reduction of the trade and investment restrictions which have long been inappropriate for the second largest national economy in the non-Communist world. It is essential that all other industrialized countries cooperate in this effort as well.

## The Soviet Union

Mutual restraint, accommodation of interests and the changed strategic situation open broad opportunities to the Soviet Union and the United States. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will recognize, as we do, that our futures are best served by serious negotiation of the issues which divide us. We have taken the initiative in establishing an agenda on which agreement could profoundly alter the substance of our relationship:

**SALT.** Given the available resources, neither of us will concede a significant strategic advantage to the other. Yet the temptation to attempt to achieve such advantage is ever present, and modern technology makes such an attempt feasible. With our current strategic capabilities, we have a unique opportunity to design a stable and mutually acceptable strategic relationship.

We did not expect agreements to emerge quickly, for the most vital of interests are engaged. A resolution will not be achieved by agreement on generalities. We have put forward precise and serious proposals that would create no unilateral advantages and would cope with the major concerns of both sides.

We do not yet know what conclusions the Soviet Union will draw from the facts of the situation. If its leaders share our assessment, we can unquestionably bring competition in strategic weapons under control.

**Europe.** With our allies, we have entered into negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to improve the Berlin situation. Arrangements which, in fact, bring an end to the 24 years of tension over Berlin, would enable us to move beyond the vestiges of the postwar period that have dominated our relationship for so long. A broader era of negotiations in Europe then becomes possible.

Progress toward this goal also could be obtained through a successful agreement on mutual reduction of military forces, especially in Central Europe where confrontation could be most dangerous.



**RED CHINA'S LEADERS:** Chairman Mao Tse-tung with Premier Chou En-lai, left, and Vice Chairman Lin Biao. "We will search for constructive discussions with Communist China," Mr. Nixon said. "When the Government of the People's Republic of China is ready to engage in talks, it will find us receptive."

Estfoto

The Middle East is heavy with the danger that local and regional conflict may engulf the great powers in confrontation.

We recognize that the U.S.S.R. has acquired important interests and influence in the area and that a lasting settlement cannot be achieved unless the Soviet Union sees it to be in its interest.

We continue to believe that it is in the Soviet interest to support a reasonable settlement. The U.S.S.R. is not, however, contributing to that end by providing increasingly large and dangerous numbers of weapons to the Arab states or by building military positions for its own purposes. We are prepared to seek agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the other major powers to limit arms shipments to the Middle East.

We have not tried to lay down a rigid order of priorities within this agenda. It is a fact of international politics, however, that major issues are related. The successful resolution of one such issue cannot help but improve the prospects for solving other problems. Similarly, aggressive action in one area is bound to exert a disturbing influence in other areas.

An assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations at this point in my Administration has to be mixed. There have been some encouraging developments and we welcome them. We are engaged in a serious dialogue in SALT. We have both signed the treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons from the seabeds. We have both ratified the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We have entered negotiations on the issue of Berlin. We have taken the first step toward practical cooperation in outer space.

On the other hand, certain Soviet actions in the Middle East, Berlin and Cuba are not encouraging. Taken against a background of intensive and unrestrained anti-American propaganda, these actions inevitably suggest that intransigence remains a cardinal feature of the Soviet system.

## Strategic Forces

The U.S.S.R., over the past year, has continued to add significantly to its capabilities.

### *Operational United States and Soviet Missiles*

	1965	End 1969	End 1970
<i>Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles</i>			
United States	934	1,054	1,054
U.S.S.R.	224	1,109	1,440
<i>Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles</i>			
United States	464	656	656
U.S.S.R.	107	240	350

On the other hand, the Soviet Union in the past few months appears to have slowed the deployment of land-based strategic missile launchers. The significance of this development is not clear. The U.S.S.R. could be exercising self-restraint. Its leaders may have concluded, as we have, that the number of ICBM's now deployed is sufficient for their needs. Or, the slowdown could be temporary and could be followed, in due course, by a resumption of new missile deployment. The delay could mean that the Soviet Union is preparing to introduce major qualitative improvements, such as a new warhead or guidance system. Finally, the slowdown could pre-empt the deployment of an altogether new missile system.

We will continue to watch Soviet deployments carefully. If the U.S.S.R. is in fact exercising restraint, we welcome this action and will take it into account in our planning. If it turns out to be preparatory to a new intensification of the strategic arms race, it will be necessary for us to react appropriately.