

# Text of Cablegram Sent by Moynihan

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 27—Following is the text of a cablegram from Daniel P. Moynihan, the United States delegate at the United Nations, to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and all American embassies.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1976

## to Kissinger and All American

## Embassies

[1]

Two bits of intelligence coming out of Africa suggest the time may be at hand to consider whether we have not made considerable progress this year toward a basic foreign policy goal, that of breaking up the massive blocs of nations, mostly new nations, which for so long have been arrayed against us in international forums and in diplomatic encounters generally. Obviously, this was going to be difficult and it is by no means fully accomplished. At most we begin to see some signs of success. Not surprisingly, however, there is clear evidence that the department [State Department] is reluctant to recognize these signs, or at least slow to do so. This becomes a problem in itself, and is the subject of this brief essay.

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The problem arises because such success as we are having is the result of a tactic which the conventional wisdom in the department said would fail. NOR was this a parochial view. What the department thought was what most of the "experts" thought. It is what the journals thought. It was, to repeat, the conventional wisdom. Any organization acquires an interest in its predictions and will protect them as long as possible. To protect them too long, however, usually leads to organization failure, and it is this outcome that we would hope might be avoided.

[3]

The tactic, initiated at this mission on the instructions of the President and the Secretary of State, has been to respond to attack by counterattack. A recent article in the London Times described us as having "taken the war to the enemy." This was generous, but perhaps not accurate. Save on a very few issues, such as the proposal of a world wide amnesty for political prisoners, our position at the United Nations had been re-active. From a distance it may have appeared confrontational, but this is simply because the United Nations General Assembly had become the setting of sustained, daily attacks on the United States, such that our counterattacks made it look like all hell was breaking loose up here. Actually we had a normal session which looked abnormal only because we had got into the practice of responding in ways which oth-

erwise would seem quite normal and predictable. I recall a luncheon early in the fall at which I was asking the Yugoslav Ambassador to try to understand our concern that the Decolonization Committee (The Committee of 240, of which his country is a member, had seemed so determined to launch an insurgency in Puerto Rico by giving official observer status to the Puerto Rican Liberation Movement, which

status had already been accorded by the "non-aligned" at their Lima meeting in August. In the most placatory way I suggested that he certainly would not like the United States to start supporting some Croation liberation movement at the United Nations. Well he sure wouldn't. He turned purple and started raving about Fascism. In no time our embassy in Belgrade was being asked for an explanation of this outrageous provocation. Fortunately our Ambassador there was not about to be intimidated, but it is the fact that the Yugoslav reaction was, generally speaking, normal, while our willingness to put up with vastly greater provocations has been singular. Whatever the original sources of this policy, it came to be defended on the grounds that to do otherwise—to resist aggressive acts—would seem unfriendly and would lead to even greater aggression. Now clearly those involved would object to this characterization, and would argue that they only oppose needlessly provocative responses. But it is the experience of this mission that almost any response will be characterized as needlessly provocative. This does not take place at the highest levels of the department, but is endemic to the system. For months the rumor mills in Washington have ground out assertions or insinuations that the U.S. mission to the United Nations has been needlessly provocative and in consequence has lost crucial votes and has aroused yet new levels of hostility from various blocs of nations, especially the so-called "nonaligned."

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Just as clearly, the nations which have been objects of counterattack have sought to confirm this view. Thus in August 1975 the Secretary directed that notes be sent to a number of members of the Decolonization Committee to the U.N. stating that support for the Cuban resolution on Puerto Rico would be regarded by us as an unfriendly act. Our previous pattern of nonresponse had become so fixed that some nations sensed that we had made a costly blunder. Copies of our note to the Government of Tanzania, chairman of the committee, were reproduced and distributed at the nonaligned conference at Lima as evidence of American perfidy for which compensation would have to be paid. The Government of Tanzania even sent copies to American Congressmen, who it was assumed would demand that our Government retract and make amends. In early January, a State Department officer sent a long memorandum to a New York Times reporter revealing the shocking news that the United States had begun the practice of withholding favors to nations which voted against us on important U.N. issues, and trying for a bit extra to those who supported us.

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All the more impressive, then, are recent reports which suggest that our new stance is having more or less the effect that was hoped for—that governments are beginning to think that



anti-American postures at the U.N. and elsewhere are not without cost and that the cost has to be calculated.

[6]

Item. In a report we are sending, we describe the reaction of the U.N. Assistant Secretary General for special political questions Abdulrahim Farah of Somalia, (protect), the highest African in the U.N. hierarchy, who was present at the O.A.U. summit at Addis Ababa. In accounting for the failure of the Soviets and others to obtain endorsement for the M.P.L.A. in Angola, Farah ascribed some of the success to the serious consideration, as he said it, given by Africans to V.O.A. reports that U.S. aid would be decreased to those countries in Africa not sympathetic to U.S. positions. The officer who met with Farah denied that there was any "black list," but Farah observed that whether it existed or not Africans were taking seriously and that it was, in his words, all to the good.

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Item. Embassy Khartoum reports that at the Afro-Arab symposium on liberation and development held there earlier this month, Tanzania told the conference that the United States had suspended \$28 million in aid because of Tanzania's unhelpful voting record at the last General Assembly. The Tanzanian representative urged the meeting to take a stand specifically condemning the U.S.

Government for such pressure tactics. The conference declined to do so.

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Item. In December the United States presented to the General Assembly a report on political prisoners in South Africa that was without precedent in its specificity and detail. We may be so bold as to suggest that in moving from the level of abstract generality to that of minute particulars in the discussion of human rights issues at the U.N., we may have introduced a change in methodology comparable to the appearance of the "Brandeis Brief" in American legal practice. This was not, however, the reaction of the General Assembly, where the delegates barely listened to Mr. Mitchell's statement. The Tanzanian delegation, which sits next to ours, never interrupted a noisy conference about some wholly unrelated matter. The chairman of the Apartheid Committee never ceased walking about the assembly chamber, talking to other delegates, whilst ours was speaking from the podium. Such was the reception given by the very same Africans who had appealed to us for years to make this kind of statement. We were not amused. Within 10 minutes I protested to the Tanzanian Ambassador (who was not himself present). A mission officer protested to the chairman of the Apartheid Committee. In the weeks that followed this mission did indeed verge on the need-

lessly provocative, as we missed no opportunity to suggest that the behavior of the General Assembly that day cast genuine doubt on the seriousness of the anti-apartheid positions most governments assume. Today, however, we learn that the Apartheid Committee has reproduced in one of its publications a condensed version of the Mitchell brief. This is the first occasion any of us here can recall any such favorable response to the United States by that committee.

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These are merely items. Much more important is the pattern of voting and decision making on major issues. Angola is such an issue. Clearly the pattern of American diplomacy has been complex in this matter, as it should be, and this mission probably does not even know about most of the measures we took to bring about the successful outcome at Addis Ababa. But we are clear that we took the issue head on here in New York. On Dec. 8, a routine anti-South Africa resolution passing the General Assembly was amended to include a condemnation of intervention in Angola. Zaire protested that South Africa was not the only foreign power intervening there, the United States followed by reading to the General Assembly the morning New York Times, recounting Soviet and Cuban involvement. European armies were back in Africa, we said, the

recolonization of the continent had begun. The question was whether the General Assembly cared so little about this, that it would not even acknowledge what was happening. Now this provoked many delegations, no doubt, but debate on the resolution was immediately halted, and two days later the amendment was withdrawn.

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There is nothing surprising about this. The nonaligned or the Group of 77, or whatever, are groups made up of extraordinarily disparate nations, with greatly disparate interests. Their recent bloc-like unity was artificial and was bound to break up. Maintaining solid ranks was simply too expensive for too many members, as witness the cost of saying nothing about the O.P.E.C. price increases which hurt the developing nations far more than the developed ones. Just so Angola. It is no accident that save for Congo not a single African country anywhere near Angola has recognized the M.P.L.A. regime, with its Russian arms and Cuban Gurkhas. At the recent General Assembly, the nonaligned were similarly divided in the voting on the Sahara and on Timor.

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To repeat, the surprising thing is that the department is having so much difficulty recognizing that our present policy, which is designed to

help what comes naturally, is beginning to show some results. The department response on the Zionism vote at the last U.N.G.A. was a classic instance of refusing to acknowledge what was in truth a considerable success. Now the facts are these. In the crucial vote to postpone consideration of the resolution, 19 sub-Saharan nations either voted with us, or were absent or abstained. Twenty-one voted against us. Almost a perfect split. Leaving out those sub-Saharan nations with substantial Moslem populations, the vote becomes 18 for the U.S. position, as against only 12 opposed. In other words, the United States had quite a success with these African nations. Yet from the day of the vote we have found ourselves talking to reporters who have been told in the State Department that because the U.S. delegation had been "needlessly provocative" crucial African votes had been lost. No one in the department has ever had the courtesy or courage to name a single such crucial vote. Whatever crucial means. The fact is we were never anywhere near winning on the Zionism issue. But in any event, the real phenomenon to explain is how we came to get so many votes. Not why we didn't get more. But those in the department who were convinced we would get none, are impervious to the evidence that this is not so. This mission does not expect such persons to change their

minds. We do ask, however, that out of a decent respect for their profession they stop blabbing to the press what is not so.

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More generally, and more importantly, it appears to this mission that there is enough evidence in to make a general, interim assessment of our new posture at the United Nations. We like to think that we would be open to evidence of failure, and are aware that no one should accept our own assessment of success without some independent inquiry. But we do fear that there necessarily remains in the department a large faction which has an interest in our performance being judged to have failed. This faction has not hesitated to pass this assessment on to the press and to Congress, and to parts of the department that otherwise would have no view one way or the other. This is bad for the President's policy which the Secretary strives to carry out. At a time when we have so few allies, and so many of them are slipping into almost irreversible patterns of appeasement based on the assumption that American power is irreversibly declining, we would hope that some brave spirits in Washington and around the world would examine the evidence, and that if convinced that things have not gone that badly up here, take some foreign diplomat to lunch and tell him so.