

## [EDITORIAL]

## OPLAN NR 1-10

A FRIGHTENING DOCUMENT, designated in military jargon OPLAN (Operations Plan) NR 10-1, has created a tremendous controversy in this country and in Europe over the last few weeks. It has stirred a healthy and necessary furor, dramatically forcing into the open the kind of questions that responsible policy makers in America don't like to answer and usually manage to avoid.

The document outlines a top secret U.S. contingency plan for waging "unconventional warfare" in Eastern and Central Europe, including detailed instructions for the use of nuclear and chemical-biological weapons (CB), not only against the Soviet Bloc but also against such countries as Italy, Greece, Turkey (all NATO members), Norway and Sweden.

The OPLAN comes into play in a state of war in Europe. The precise contingencies are not clearly defined, but it is assumed that some neutral or pro-U.S. countries would have fallen to the Russians. The plan makes clear that U.S. policy for its allies is Better Dead Than Red, even if the death is a most horrible one from American germs and nuclear bombs.

Obviously the first question raised is that of the document's authenticity. At press time the Defense Department continued to insult the American public by pretending to be unable to provide an answer on this. It was our judgment that only full and immediate revelation of all available details could generate the kind of pressure necessary to break through this arrogant reticence. Accordingly, rather than withhold our story of the document for the three weeks it would take for the magazine to reach our readers, we have made it freely available to all media. Important questions have been raised and cannot wait.

Realistically, one can hardly hope for a fully responsive and satisfactory account from the Pentagon pressmen. But the significance of the entire episode remains, even if this first question of authenticity were definitively settled and the OPLAN rejected as a consummate hoax.

In any case, the question remains: does any U.S. plan covering the same contingencies differ from it on the fundamental points of controversy? Surely we have a right to hear

In a sense the most depressing aspect of this whole affair is the very extremity of public pressure that is required to give people a chance to find out what they have every right to know. Here was a story of profound and ominous implications, but it was only through great difficulty that it received a serious hearing. Its odyssey is well told by the British journalist Schofield Coryell, whose persistence helped keep the story alive, and whose assistance provided RAMPARTS with the document itself, the story behind it and a keen insight into its significance.

The following is from Coryell's report:

THE DOCUMENT ARRIVED IN THE MAIL with a Rome postmark and no return address. The accompanying letter signed with an illegible signature, explained that the material had been entrusted to the sender by the late Major-General Horst Wendland of the German Secret Service (BND), with instructions to publish it at an "appropriate time." Major-General Wendland committed suicide last August, creating a considerable stir in military circles.

The letter went on to say: "My friend [Major-General Wendland] was particularly disturbed by the fact that the

Americans could use atomic, chemical, and bacteriological weapons without prior consent of the U.S. Congress or the President, since permission to use them follows automatically when these weapons are supplied to these special groups.

When the two British journals, Peace News and Sanity, published essential elements of the war plans in an attempt to arouse of the British press, only the London Times made any serious mention of it. The Times' piece, totally missing the point, was headlined: "Alleged Secret Documents Published: U.S. to Hand out H-Bombs," and the article mistakenly assumed that the operational plans involved turning over atomic weapons to "indigenous partisan groups," although a careful reading of the material makes it clear that the weapons were at all times to be kept under the control of *American Special Forces*. In view of this gross misinterpretation, it is not surprising that the Times journalist was able to report: "American officials I spoke to in Western Europe were extremely skeptical about the idea that America was apparently so cheerfully prepared to hand out nuclear munitions."

The Times went on to say, however, that: "the alleged secret papers use authentic-sounding American military jargon and military abbreviations and show a knowledge of command structure and other details. If they are forgeries, someone put in an enormous amount of work on them." The reporter concluded: "People I spoke to who take an interest in intelligence work favored the East Germans as the likely authors, if the material is indeed forged."

There is a particularly strong internal indication in the document that makes the idea of an elaborate communist forgery seem unlikely. The fact that Orleans, France, is designated as the operational base and that the loading point for eventual bombing missions is Evreux suggests that the plans are at least two years old. These locations would have been natural before De Gaulle practically withdrew France from participation in NATO and asked that it take its headquarters elsewhere. Also dating the document are the APO (Army Post Office) numbers which were converted from three to five digits in July 1963. Why, then, should enemy intelligence attempt to discredit the U.S. by fabricating an operational scheme that is out-of-date?

DISCOURAGED BY THE MEAGER RESULTS of their efforts in England, Coryell and the peace magazines decided to send the document, along with Coryell's account of its background, to RAMPARTS in hopes that some impact might be made in the United States. RAMPARTS looked into it and made preparations to run the story. Meanwhile the German magazine Der Stern, which had received a copy of the document from the same anonymous correspondent, published a story announcing its existence and describing its general content. This story, presumably because it originated in Germany itself and because of Der Stern's stature, broke into the press. In this country there remained considerable confusion about the nature of the document and the details of the plans contained in it. Thanks to Mr. Coryell and his associates, RAMPARTS has been able to help remedy this and hopefully to keep the pressure mounting on those oracles of national policy from whom some clear explanations are long overdue.

the MPLA, the Angolan movement, opened a front in eastern Angola which rapidly extended along lines similar to the struggle in Mozambique.

These two armed struggles were and are a serious drain on Portugal's resources, diverting well over 100,000 troops and 50 per cent of its military budget. But Portugal is not alone. Together, the Unholy Trinity could probably keep the Mozambique and Angolan insurrections under control (South Africa has already sent equipment and troops) *if* they could be contained within the Portuguese colonies.

Thus it was a development of immeasurable significance when the combined force of ZAPU and ANC guerrillas went into action in August 1967 in the Wankie area of Zimbabwe against Ian Smith's South African-reinforced troops. Though the armed struggle remains considerably smaller than those in Angola and Mozambique, the opening of a guerrilla front in Zimbabwe has closed the geographic and strategic gap which existed before. Now from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic there is continuous activity: Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe (and the sporadic guerrilla activity in South West Africa and the Caprivi strip). The South African regime has been forced to extend itself beyond its borders: already there are at least 1700 South African troops in Zimbabwe which are indispensable to the maintenance of Ian Smith's regime. South African public opinion is being softened up for the dispatch of a qualitatively larger troop contingent to the Portuguese territories. South Africa is being forced to overextend itself; it must defend white privilege throughout the subcontinent or become an isolated enclave on its own. The whole of Southern Africa,

then, is a single theater of struggle. The commencement of fighting within South Africa itself becomes a matter for strategic decision, timing and coordination—although ultimately it seems clear that it must occur, since political activity and international gestures by themselves have proved so impotent.

This is not to say that the guerrillas have abandoned political activity. They recognize it as a critical, indeed an inseparable, part of waging armed struggle—as the story presented here so eloquently shows. Nor should international action be undervalued; it has been and continues to be an indispensable weapon of the revolution. It is, after all, international support which sustains the white minority regimes. American arms supplied through NATO make the Portuguese military effort possible. The refusal to impose sanctions on Portugal and South Africa makes even those that are imposed against Ian Smith a mere diplomatic pleasantries. It was only the massive infusion of emergency financing from the U.S. that saved South Africa from a serious economic crisis following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960. Only domestic popular action can force the Western powers to disengage from their support of the Southern African regimes—in particular, to deter the U.S. from backing the white South Africans in a mad, desperate assault against black Africa as the guerrilla movements gain strength. Organization, education, action; raising funds for the armed struggle; demanding disengagement. We too are part of the struggle in Southern Africa.

—AFRICA RESEARCH GROUP

*The Africa Research Group is a Cambridge-based organization devoted to research on African affairs from a radical perspective.*

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*This account of the experiences of an ANC guerrilla in a place which, like the fighter himself, must remain unnamed, was obtained by Ramparts from the ANC through the Africa Research Group.*

THE FIGHTING ALLIANCE MADE BY the African National Congress of South Africa was reflected in our group, which consisted mainly of ZAPU members and a few of us from the ANC. The commander was an able comrade from ZAPU, with remarkable leadership qualities. Both at the political and personal level, our fighting was unique. We all realized that the liberation of Zimbabwe was the job of the Zimbabwe people. But we also knew that the unity of the white regimes and particularly the occupation of Zimbabwe by South African forces made cooperation in the liberation front not only desirable, but indispensable, both for our own victory and for the victory of the Zimbabwe people.

After the last big engagement and the continuous bombing which followed during the daylight hours, our commander split the detachment into a number of smaller groups. Our section made its way to our general area of operations. We were hungry and thirsty, but morale on the whole was good. The previous four months taught us a great deal both about ourselves and the enemy. No one had dared to say during that frustrating, dangerous period of inactivity and waiting that we might not be a match for the enemy; deep in our minds, however, we weren't so certain.

But now at last we'd been through it. We'd seen the enemy run in more than one engagement, leaving his dead and wounded. Doubt was replaced by certainty. It would not be

easy, this we knew. A few had already lost their lives, a few had been injured and one, so far, had lost his stomach for the fight and had deserted. But those months had taught us that victory is certain, whether we personally survive the fight or not. The weeks that were to follow strengthened this conviction. We continued to give a good account of ourselves. But more than that, it was our village which taught us. It taught us the reality of this thing called "the people" and how it is possible that an enemy a thousand-fold more powerful than ourselves can be defeated.

I remember that morning clearly. For a week we had had no proper food, and no contact with people. Suddenly the sound of a muffled drum and then a cock crowing and donkeys braying. Imagine our joy! The commander sent two of the men who spoke the local language to investigate. Some hours later the reconnaissance group returned and reported that after making an unsuccessful approach to a man in a house on the outskirts, they had been directed to the main village where, in the first house they entered, they had met Old Man. This was our name for him, even though he was a man in his middle twenties. He had a wife and two young children.

"We are fishermen on the river. We are hungry and we have run out of food. Could you give us something to eat and also . . ." Before they could finish Old Man said: "I am not to be played with. I have heard of the war. You must be honest with me. If you are freedom fighters, say so. If you are not, say so."

After some evasion, they became convinced that his expressions of sympathy for our struggle were genuine, and admitted who they were. His response was warming. He shook their hands and hugged them, and for the first time they saw the