

after the election. "The first thing they did was take a good, decent and fine man like Barry Goldwater and kidnap his mind and force upon him many convictions which I think normally and on reflection, he might not have willingly conceived of himself."

But Scott is proud of much of the Party's record. "I think that most Vandenbergites would agree that we have

largely succeeded in our mission of making the United States a more free and democratic country. We have done this by the support of the people and the leadership of the Senate. We have done this by the support of the people and the leadership of the Senate. We have done this by the support of the people and the leadership of the Senate. We have done this by the support of the people and the leadership of the Senate.

What's Behind the Book

The book is written by Kirkpatrick, who served in the CIA from 1954 to 1965. It is a detailed account of the CIA's operations and its role in the world. Kirkpatrick is a former CIA officer and a well-known author. The book is a critical look at the CIA's activities and its impact on the world.

By FAREX ROBERTSON

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Beaumont Newhall, who had wanted to see the CIA plan stand up. Few are qualified to make positive identifications. Like Kirkpatrick, he is qualified, indeed, his knowledge should guard that of any person not to publish on the subject. Kirkpatrick served in CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, during World War II and was on hand at CIA when he was executive assistant to General Walter Bedell Smith, CIA's director in its most important formative years. Kirkpatrick came through the agency after WWII, incapacitated by a crippling polio, only to be named in 1952 to become inspector for the next eight years. As executive

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director he was No. 3 man in the agency's high command until he resigned in 1965 to teach political science at Brown University.

In *The Real CIA* Kirkpatrick traces the evolution of the U.S. intelligence system, as well as the progress of his own career. Only in America could someone with his privileged security knowledge publish such a book. Kirkpatrick's plan is to set straight the actual record. At least that part of it open to dispute. He is convinced that most public opinion about the CIA has been formed by propaganda. Although not meant to be a critique of the CIA, from its inception to the present, it is a critique of those who would radically change the assignment of its major functions to the CIA.

Most of the information Kirkpatrick provides here was already in the public record. The book's greatest value is its validation of certain facts about the CIA's rather obscure organizational history. From this insider's view, much is to be learned about bureaucratic mingling and departmental jealousies. We are told, for example, how the CIA due to its size and complexity, is one of the two most powerful agencies in government, and for years because its protocol rank in Washington, D.C., was third-fourth. This, writes Kirkpatrick, could actually affect the willingness of people to listen to him in important meetings. Although the director's rank has recently been elevated, the authority of agencies that they are still those who try to reduce the role of

the director of Central Intelligence.

Kirkpatrick's opinions and observations deserve serious consideration because they derive from a thoughtful mind and unique experience. Nevertheless there are important and perhaps crucial questions on which he offers little enlightenment. How did an agency set up by Congress in 1947 to perform intelligence (information) activities come to undertake secret political operations? Did Congress ever intend the CIA to overthrow foreign governments or secretly subsidize American domestic institutions? Here the book falls short of the promise of its title. In his brief discussion of covert political action Kirkpatrick makes clear that he thinks it wise to combine "action" and "intelligence" under the CIA roof. He believes, however, that covert political action should be used "only in the most serious national emergency, and as a last resort before the use of military power."

One can quickly agree with Kirkpatrick that "a strong intelligence organization is an essential element of our national security, provided that it is effective, objective, and properly controlled." Most quickly would this reviewer agree that these provisos have been met, or that we have the information to so assume. It has been easier to create committees for control than to effect real control of secret operations. The *Los Pueblo* incident may be an example of continuing deficiencies in this regard. And with respect to effectiveness, the Southeast Asian crisis may be a tragic example of another colossal American intelligence failure.



Scott
"It wants to buy us out."