

South Africa Impact in Angola Depicted

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PRETORIA, South Africa, Dec. 22—South African military strategists say that there has been no appreciable step-up in terrorism in South-West Africa during the last four years and they therefore suggest that their country's partial mobilization and increased military activity is due entirely to the situation in Angola.

These strategists also contend that until South African units moved into the Angolan civil war shortly before the Portuguese withdrew on Nov. 11, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, using Cuban soldiers and Soviet arms, was sweeping toward victory over the two other nationalist factions.

Using detailed maps of Angola, the sources indicated that the battle lines had changed radically after the South African intervention, which they still will not describe other than to say that troops are supplying logistical and support services to Angolans fighting against the Popular Movement.

Nor will they specify who these Angolans are, said one of these sources, who added: "You realize that if we were only to identify our allies we would, with the world being what it is, embarrass them."

Nonetheless it has been reported within Angola that both the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola have benefited from South African assistance.

One map, labeled "The Military Situation in Angola, August 1975," showed the Popular Movement in command of much of Angola, its territory extending from a line in the north that ran from Ambriz to Mangando near the Zaire border. The National Front held the small region to the north of this line. The National Union held a piece of territory in the south.

Changed Situation Shown

A map entitled "Military Situation, December," shows Popular Movement territory shrunken both in the north and south. The National Front and National Union, now ostensibly operating under a joint command, were shown to have extended their northern holdings a bit to the south and west.

But the major advances shown were in the south where the combined forces, with the assistance of South Africans and armored cars, took the coastal region up to a point near Novo Redondo. Their holdings were shown to extend from this coastal footing eastward, northeastward and southeastward.

The strategists said that despite public statements made here suggesting that recent small reserve call-ups were due to an assault by terrorists in South-West Africa, there has



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Area shown between light broken lines was held by Soviet-backed movement in August, according to South Africans, but the group is now said to be confined to the region between heavy lines.

been no real increase in terrorist activity in the region. They said that what is referred to here either as "the border" or "the operational area" extends deep into Angola. This information, while given to foreign newsmen, has not been published in this country, where daily radio programs are devoted to transmitting Christmas greetings from families to individual soldiers "on the border."

Still there is considerable private speculation here about the location of the border and currently there is some debate in the country whether South Africa would have moved into Angola without having assurances from the West, notably from the United States.

This is denied categorically by authoritative South Africans. Western sources also say there may be "a mutuality of interest," between South Africa and the United States on the Angola question but that no backing has been sought by South Africa, nor have there been any consultations between the two governments on Angolan strategy.

While noting the recent statement in which the South African defense minister said his country "would not protect Western interests until the last African," one United States official said that South Africa was essentially motivated in its actions by what it saw as its own self interest. He added that its emphasis on forestalling a possible Soviet threat to the cape sea route was ultimately not as important to South Africa as preventing an encirclement by leftist-leaning governments from Angola in the west to Mozambique in the east.

No one here will discuss the numbers of men involved in the South African incursion into Angola nor the types of South African material being used. Presumably the assistance is relatively modest. There has been no general mobilization and South Africa's entire standing defense force numbers only 16,500. In addition to this num-

ber there are at any one time 35,400 conscripts who are doing a year's military service.

In terms of equipment, the defense forces rely largely on matériel purchased from the French. A United States embargo on the sale of weapons to South Africa has been in effect for nearly 10 years. The air force, almost certainly the most modern and well-trained in sub-Saharan Africa, has Mirage and Alouette helicopters.

The country also produces Panhard armored cars under license as well as automatic rifles. Its small navy includes four French submarines.