

Witness Summary
EVERETT HOWARD HUNT

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Biographical Sketch

Everett Howard Hunt was born in Hamburg, New York, on October 9, 1918. In 1940, Hunt graduated from Brown University and volunteered for the Navy. Hunt was soon injured in an accident and discharged.

From 1941 to 1943 Hunt worked as a movie scriptwriter and then temporarily as a war correspondent. Hunt joined the Office of Strategic Services in 1943. Hunt joined the CIA in 1949 (only two years after its establishment by Congress) and was soon sent to Paris, where he married his late wife, Dorothy, who was then a secretary at the local CIA station. They have since had four children.

During his 21 years with the CIA, Hunt was transferred many times. He worked in Paris, Vienna, Mexico, Latin America, Japan, Spain, Washington, and Uruguay. He was involved in numerous clandestine operations, most notably, the abortive Bay of Pigs attempt, in which he acquired his Cuban-American contacts (particularly his assistant in that operation, Bernard Barker). In 1968, Hunt returned to Washington, D. C., at which time "The consensus among his CIA associates was that the agency had made it clear to him that he could expect no promotions." Hunt left the CIA April 30, 1970 after 20 years of service with a full pension.

Throughout Hunt's occupational life he has written spy novels and has had 42 works published under the pseudonyms of Robert Dietrich, David St. John, and Gordon Davis.

Mullen Company

The day after Hunt left the CIA, he began working for the Robert R. Mullen Co., a public relations (lobbying) firm in D. C. with a variety of clients including General Foods, the Mormon Church, and the Hughes Tool Co. The out placement officer at the CIA told Hunt that the firm had "cooperated" with the CIA in the past, and they would not be unreceptive. When Hunt was initially hired by

the Mullen Co., he had understood that Mullen was soon going to be retiring. Hunt planned to acquire the company with Robert Bennett and Douglas Caddy and manage it as a triumvirate. When it appeared that Caddy was not to join the firm, Mullen suggested Spencer Oliver, a prominent Democrat and the son of Robert Oliver, a Washington lobbyist retained by the firm. Mullen arranged a luncheon for Oliver, Hunt and Bennett to get acquainted. Afterwards Hunt told Mullen that he objected to Oliver as too liberal for the firm. Oliver is the young Democrat whose phone at the DNC was bugged, though McCord chose his phone at the last minute without Hunt's knowledge. When, in January 1971, Mr. Robert Bennett bought the company and became President, the notion of a triumvirate was lost. When Bennett came into the firm, he brought with him the Hughes Tool Company account.

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Contact with Cubans

On the tenth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, (Apr. 17, 1971), Hunt and his wife were in Miami, and he renewed his contact with the Cubans he had worked with in the Bay of Pigs operation, Barker, Martinez, DeDiego. Hunt said that the occasion was a social contact with no discussion of clandestine activities or the possibility of future covert operations for the W.H.

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Either in May or June of 1971, Barker came to Washington, D.C., to meet with Hunt and Douglas Caddy and to discuss a number of possible ventures including public relations work for the government of Nicaragua.

Relationship with Colson

Howard Hunt met Charles Colson at a luncheon of Brown University alumni, Washington, D.C., in 1965. As officials of the alumni club, they continued to see each other socially. Colson was active in the 1968 campaign and probed Hunt for his political analysis. Hunt recommended to Colson that, if elected, Nixon should revamp the entire State Department.

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In 1969, Colson joined the W.H. staff and the two men continued to have occasional contact. Colson invited Hunt to lunch at the White House in December, 1969, and to meet Lyn Nofziger and Jeb Magruder. Shortly thereafter Colson introduced Hunt to the retiring Executive Director and several board members of a public relations firm concerned with presenting a positive image of the Vietnam War and Hunt interviewed for the Executive Director's job. Since Hunt was not interested in the position and adequate financing for the organization was unavailable, further discussion was dropped. Haldeman was aware of consideration of Hunt for this job. In May or June 1971, Colson began discussions in vague terms with Hunt about the possibility of Hunt's working in the White House. Colson knew that Hunt had been involved in clandestine activities for the CIA and implied that this experience would be useful to Hunt in the White House.

Hunt explained to Colson that he did not think the White House would be willing to compensate him with a salary comparable to the combined incomes of CIA pension and the Robert Mullen Co. salary and Hunt noted that he could not work for the White House without losing his CIA pension. When Colson suggested that Hunt take leave from Mullen and Co. and work on a consulting basis at \$100

a day, without risking the loss of his pension, Hunt expressed interest.

Work at White House

On July 1, 1971 Colson talked with Hunt about his interest in seeing Ellsberg tried in the newspapers rather than the courts. On July 2, 1971 Colson sent a copy of the conversation to Haldeman noting that it would be worth his time to meet Hunt and that he had sounded out Hunt's ideas without even approaching "what we (Colson and Haldeman) had been talking about."

On July 6, 1971, after Colson briefly informed Hunt of some of the activities he would be engaged in, Colson took him over to Ehrlichman's office for a brief interview. Colson informed Ehrlichman that Hunt would be working on the Pentagon Papers and the leaks. Ehrlichman called to formally approve hiring Hunt later that afternoon. Hunt said that he was put on Colson's budget as a consultant. Hunt was given several assignments by Colson, all of which he worked simultaneously. Colson's initial directive to Hunt was to become the resident White House expert on the origins of the Vietnam War including how the Nixon Administration had been dragged into the war. Colson wanted Hunt to stay abreast of the problems associated with the leak of the Pentagon Papers and other leak problems. Colson's principal focus was to have Hunt develop derogatory information on Daniel Ellsberg and prepare this information for dissemination by Hunt or Colson to mass media. Throughout the month of July, Hunt was in and out of Room 16 where he originally met Gordon Liddy. In Room 16, Hunt had access to all the FBI reports on Ellsberg. Hunt noted that one FBI report appeared to him to clearly indicate a wiretap and included a dialogue from a phone call by Ellsberg to his psychiatrist in which Ellsberg had expressed tremendous relief after having leaked the Pentagon Papers. Hunt notes that Colson's principal objective in developing information on Ellsberg was to publicly discredit Ellsberg. The job of the other members of the Plumbers, Liddy, Krogh and Young, was to strengthen the legal case against Ellsberg while Hunt's job was to develop materials for a public relations campaign which Colson would direct
* against Ellsberg.

Hunt was concerned with developing information on Ellsberg's personal life (sexual habits, drug experimentation), possible motivations for leaking the papers, and the identity of other conspirators. Hunt kept Colson abreast of all information he received and of the general course of the investigation. Hunt proposed to Colson on July 28, 1971 in a memorandum entitled "Neutralization of Ellsberg" that he (Hunt) build a file of "all available overt, covert and derogatory information," including *obtaining "Ellsberg's files from his psychiatric analyst." Attempts were made to have the CIA construct a psychiatric profile on Ellsberg from available information. On August 12, 1971 Hunt met with Dr. Bernard Malloy to discuss the improvement of the profile which the CIA had prepared. A subsequently submitted profile was also deemed inadequate and the matter was dropped.

On August 27, 1971 Ehrlichman asked Colson for "a game plan" as to how and when to use the materials to be obtained in Hunt/Liddy Special Project #1. Hunt now states that he believes that Colson knew the nature of Hunt/Liddy Special Project #1 to be a break-in, but that he (Hunt) did not inform Colson.

Hunt and Liddy prepared a feasibility study on Fielding's office. They flew out to L. A. in mid-August and analyzed the possibility of a break-in of Fielding's office. They prepared photos, diagrams, evaluations of the participants, the pros and cons of the operation, etc. The assessment was that the entry could be made. Kathleen Chenow typed the memo and it was submitted to Krogh and Young. Hunt did not remember ever seeing the memo again. (The photographs attached to it came back and were filed in Room 16, but not the substantive part of the memo.)

With days, Liddy told Hunt that the plan had been approved. The next conversation Hunt had with either Krogh or Young was a discussion of the costs.

Hunt reunited Barker, Martinez, and DeDiego for the entry operation. The men broke into Fielding's office on September 3, 1971.

Then men used materials which Hunt had obtained from Carl Wagner of the CIA. In addition to supplying a high-speed indoor camera, the CIA developed the film for Hunt,

returning both the photos and the negatives.

Hunt showed the results of the operation to Liddy and Krogh. When he attempted to show Colson the results of the operation he was rebuffed. Hunt approached Colson and said he had some things to show Colson "in relation to my activities last weekend." Colson replied, "I do not want to hear anything about it."

Hunt's espoused motive for the Fielding operation has also been revised. He originally only discussed two possible motivations for the entry (1) to explore the possibility of espionage (2) for the prosecutorial aspects of the case. Hunt now admits a third motivation for the break-in: "There was the possibility of obtaining derogatory information for Colson's usages."

Clifton DeMotte Interview

In June, 1971, when Hunt first came to the White House, he passed along a tip from his employer, Robert Bennett, that Clifton DeMotte, a resident of Rhode Island, had some derogatory information about the Kennedys, including information about the so-called Chappaquidick incident. Hunt passed this information to Colson who felt that Hunt should immediately interview DeMotte. Colson emphasized that there should be no connection between Hunt and the White House. Hunt suggested he should wear a disguise and asked if Colson could obtain such a disguise from the FBI or the Secret Service. Colson felt that this was too sensitive an assignment for the Secret Service and expressed a lack of confidence in the FBI. Colson in turn suggested Hunt should get the material from the CIA. Hunt protested that he could no longer utilize CIA resources and Colson offered to look into it. A few days later, Hunt received a call from Colson that he could then get in touch with the CIA. Hunt called Carl Wagner at the CIA who indicated that Hunt should arrange an appointment with General Cushman. Cushman agreed to supply Hunt with material that he needed and mentioned in the

course of conversation that Ehrlichman had made the referral to him (Cushman). Shortly thereafter, Robert Bennett arranged a meeting with DeMotte and one week later Hunt interviewed DeMotte near Providence. DeMotte had no substantive information on the Kennedys at that time but did seem to have a lead on some information related to close associates of the Kennedys. Hunt asked DeMotte to check further. They continued to exchange phone calls, but according to Hunt, no substantive information was developed and he so reported to Colson.

Conein Interview

Almost immediately upon starting work, Hunt interviewed Major Lucien Conein, a CIA operative who had been in Vietnam during the assassination of Diem. This interview was originally to have been staged in Haldeman's office while Haldeman was on a trip to San Clemente.

Use of a large office was in order to impress Conein with the importance of Hunt. During the interview, Hunt attempted to develop derogatory information on Ellsberg and to attempt to link the Kennedy Administration with the assassination of Diem. Hunt attempted to tape record the interview but the equipment did not work for a portion of the interview. The next day, Hunt called Conein back to review portions of the conversation. During this period, Charles Colson listened in to most of the conversation and Hunt introduced him on the line as Fred Charles. The telephone transcription which Colson made of that conversation implies that Conein was being considered for use as a consultant on the Ellsberg public relations project. Hunt, however, felt that Conein was too well known in Vietnam, especially for undercover work contacting people that Ellsberg had previously known and the idea never proceeded further.

The Diem Cables

During the period, Hunt reviewed for the State Department a variety of cables sent by the American Embassy in Saigon to the White House and into the State Department and returned cables back to the Embassy in Saigon. He discovered

that several cables were missing from the period shortly before Diem's assassination. Hunt hypothesized to Colson that the missing material may have linked the Kennedy Administration to the assassination of Diem and both expressed great regret that such material was not available. Colson then suggested that Hunt might be able to "improve" on the existing material and proceeded to suggest a forgery. Hunt said that he would need additional assistance to accomplish an effective forgery. Colson said that such assistance was too sensitive and that Hunt should proceed independently. Hunt proceeded to cut and paste falsified cables which he presented to Colson and Colson thought were very adequate. Hunt explained that detailed analysis would reveal the cables to be forgeries and they should not be released from their control. Colson then introduced Hunt to a Life magazine reporter named William Lambert. Hunt showed Lambert the falsified cables but since Lambert was unable to secure a copy of the cables and thereby authenticate them, Lambert never wrote the story based on the cables.

In November 1971, Colson suggested to Hunt that Hunt contact Lucien Conein who was about to do an interview for an NBC special on Vietnam and convince Conein to discuss the involvement of the Kennedy Administration in the origins of the Vietnam War and in the assassination of Diem. In order to facilitate this, Colson suggested that Hunt provide Conein with a set of the forged cables. Hunt contacted Conein and discovered that the interview had already been filmed. However, by providing him with the forged cables and convincing him that it was his duty to point out the involvement of the Kennedy Administration in the assassination of Diem, he did succeed in precipitating Conein's again contacting NBC and the filming of a second interview in which Conein discussed the Kennedy Administration complicity in the assassination of Diem and Diem's brother. Colson noted to Hunt particularly that he wished to illustrate the participation of a Catholic President, Kennedy, in the assassination of the Catholic Premier of Vietnam, Diem. Colson felt that this fact would have a heavily adverse effect on the Catholic vote in the 1972 election if Ted Kennedy were a candidate. Portions of Conein's interview appeared on NBC on December 22, 1971 at 10 p.m. EST.

Boudin Profile

In the latter part of 1972, Hunt prepared a profile on Daniel Ellsberg's attorney, Leonard D. Boudin. Hunt noted Boudin's name in the FBI reports on Ellsberg and felt that it would be worth his while to prepare an analysis of Boudin's career since Boudin could easily be associated with the extreme left, thus discrediting both Boudin and Ellsberg. When Hunt completed the analysis of Boudin's career, he gave it to Colson who in turn gave it to Jerry TerHorst of the Detroit News. Portions of this information were published in the News on January 30, 1972, by TerHorst.

CRP Intelligence Plan Preparation

In November 1971, Hunt was first informed by Gordon Liddy that Liddy had been approached by John Dean, who informed Liddy that Mitchell wanted Liddy to transfer to CRP as General Counsel. Liddy was to perform two functions, one overt as General Counsel to the Committee, particularly in connection with interpretation of new electoral laws, but secondly Liddy would have a covert role as the director of a massive intelligence complex. Liddy described this plan to Hunt as an all embracing intelligence gathering and political action plan. The intelligence gathering, Liddy told Hunt, would involve the use of electronic surveillance. As of November 1971, Liddy had not met with Mitchell. Liddy asked Hunt to move over to CRP in a covert role. Hunt was to receive \$100 per day for his services.

Four or five days after Hunt and Liddy's first conversation concerning the over-all intelligence complex and political action program, Liddy told Hunt that Liddy had finally spoken with Mitchell. Mitchell and Liddy discussed the terms of Liddy's employment, Liddy's salary and his function at the CRP. Liddy again indicated to Hunt that it was Mitchell's desire every available method be utilized to obtain relevant information during the period prior to the 1972 election. Hunt assisted Liddy in preparing drafts of individual project charts and budgets. Liddy used the draft charts that Hunt and Liddy jointly prepared as the basis for his presentation to Mitchell. Hunt in preparation for possible covert activities

contacted Jack Bauman of Winterhaven, Florida, a former CIA agent. Hunt asked Bauman if Bauman knew of anyone who had skills as a locksmith. Bauman suggested that Hunt contact Thomas Amato. Bauman, himself, was not interested in participating with Hunt in these covert activities. Another CIA agent, Jack Stewart, was contacted by Bernard Barker. Stewart was not interested in the covert activities. The date of these contacts was December 1971. Hunt also asked Barker to begin recruiting other operatives from among Bay of Pigs veterans.

January 29, 1972 Liddy presented his plan to Mitchell, Magruder and Dean. At this meeting Liddy's plan was turned down because of its excessive budget. Liddy and Hunt then met after this January 29, 1972 meeting to reorganize the plan and to make some budget cuts. One piece of equipment which was eliminated from this plan was a chase plane to be used to surveil the opposition's aircraft. The next meeting was held February 4, 1972. During this meeting, Liddy presented his revised plan to Mitchell, Dean, and Magruder. According to McCord, Mitchell insisted that among the specific targets be outlined, the home of Larry O'Brien should be included. Also discussed during this meeting was the possibility of breaking in to Hank Greenspun's (publisher of the Las Vegas Sun) office. It had been discussed earlier that Greenspun possessed information which would "blow Muskie out of the water." (See discussion below.) Hunt and Liddy were regularly in contact between the February 4th and the March 30th meeting. Hunt was unsure if Liddy's plan was ever going to be approved because of problems with the budget. During this period of time Liddy came to Hunt and told Hunt that Mitchell would be leaving the Administration fairly soon and that since Liddy was identified as a Mitchell man whereas Hunt was identified as a Colson man, Liddy thought it would be to his best advantage to be introduced to Colson. Hunt readily agreed and called Colson's secretary to arrange an appointment. An appointment was set up for around 6:00 that evening.

In January, Hunt had informed Colson of Hunt's projected assistance to Liddy on the intelligence plan. Because of Hunt's increasing involvement with Liddy the amount of time in which Hunt was able to spend in the White House was drastically reduced. Colson told Hunt during this January 1972 meeting that he understood this and was well aware of that fact.

Colson still permitted Hunt to retain Hunt's White House pass and White House safe. It was during this conversation that Hunt explained to Colson that a large-scale plan was afoot in connection with the acquisition of convention and campaign intelligence. Hunt also explained that Liddy was in charge of this plan. Hunt recalls that Colson said, "Well, I think you are more qualified than Mr. Liddy. Maybe you had better be in charge of it." Hunt declined Colson's suggestion saying that he was perfectly satisfied with the arrangements as they were. Hunt had the impression that Colson was well aware of the convention intelligence plan. Hunt also had the impression that Colson had been discussing these plans with someone at CRP regarding Hunt's possible employment there.

During the February 1972 meeting, where Hunt introduced Liddy to Colson, Hunt divorced himself from Colson's and Liddy's conversation, since he thought the conversation was to deal with Liddy's personal plans. Hunt is unsure of what Liddy and Colson actually spoke about or if Colson made a phone call to Magruder, although he does recall Colson's speaking on the phone. After the meeting, however, Liddy told Hunt, "Well, I think I may have done us some good." Hunt understood this comment to be in reference to getting approval for Liddy's plan. Because Colson did have prior knowledge to Liddy's plan before Colson actually met Liddy, this statement from Liddy led Hunt to believe that Liddy and Colson conversation did concern the plan and its future approval. With this understanding, Hunt believes if Magruder was in fact contacted by Colson and encouraged to approve the budget for the Liddy plan, then Colson must have realized what general elements of the plan he was recommending to Magruder.

March 30, 1972 Liddy presented his plan for a third time. During this meeting Liddy's plan was approved with a budget of \$250,000. After this meeting, sometime in April, Hunt met McCord for the first time. During this meeting Hunt learned that the actual targets of the intelligence plan would be the DNC headquarters. During the next two months Hunt and Liddy recruited men to help initiate this plan.

Fat Jack

Hunt began contacts with "Fat Jack" in February 1972, meeting him on the street corner of Pennsylvania

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Avenue, where the Roger Smith Hotel is located. Hunt received initial instructions and a physical description of "Fat Jack" from Liddy. The materials received from Jack were generally blown up photographs of advance schedules for Senator Muskie's headquarters.

Hunt met Jack 12-15 times, until Muskie was no longer a viable candidate. Hunt would often deliver cash in an envelope to "Fat Jack" in payment for bills submitted by him.

Segretti

4. In January 1972, Liddy, who at that time was working for CRP, reported to Hunt that there seemed to be an effort being made by the Democratic Party to penetrate certain local or state headquarters of the Republican Party. The reason for Liddy's conclusion was based upon the fact that an individual had approached certain Republican headquarters, implying in his statement to these various Party leaders that he came directly from Washington. These uninvited approaches by the individual who called himself Simmons were reported back to CRP. Liddy told Hunt that he had been asked to make a determination as to the identity of this individual and for whom he was working. A few days later Liddy told Hunt that this individual was working for somebody else and that Liddy and Hunt were directed to make an evaluation of the individual as a political operative and of the operations in which he was involved.

Liddy and Hunt made arrangements to go to Miami, Florida to meet this individual. The meeting took place at the Frolic Motel in late January or February 1972. Segretti introduced himself as Don Simmons. During the meeting Hunt gave Segretti an unlisted telephone number which Hunt had at the Mullen Company. In turn Segretti provided Liddy with an answering service phone on the West Coast as well as a mail drop address on the West Coast. The meeting lasted approximately thirty minutes.

Liddy and Hunt returned to Washington, D. C. after their meeting with Segretti. It was Hunt's impression that Liddy was to report to someone in the White House concerning their meeting with Segretti and Segretti's activities. Hunt does not know this for a fact. Liddy later told Hunt that they were instructed to keep in touch with Segretti in an attempt to keep him out of trouble.

It was Hunt's belief that Liddy had more frequent telephonic contact with Segretti than Hunt did. Hunt assumes that Liddy received these calls from Segretti at Liddy's office at CRP. C...

Liddy, however, never actually told Hunt where his information concerning Segretti came from.

Hunt called Segretti long distance no more than four times. The time period for these calls is January-June 1972.

Hunt's next meeting with Segretti was in Miami, Florida. The date of this meeting was around the Florida primary which would be March 1972. During this meeting Segretti requested Hunt to provide a name of a reliable printer who could do some work for Segretti. Hunt told Segretti that he would contact him at a later date with this information. (Liddy was not present during this meeting.) Segretti explained to Hunt that from time to time Segretti would need posters to be printed as well as hand bills.

After Hunt and Segretti's March 1972 meeting in Florida, Hunt contacted Bernard Barker to find the name of a printer Segretti could use in Miami, Florida. Barker did not have the name of the printer immediately so Hunt arranged a setup whereby Segretti could telephone Barker under an assumed name in Miami to get this information. Hunt never learned the name of the printer from either Barker or Segretti.

On one occasion Hunt suggested that Liddy have a Newsweek article describing Mrs. Muskie's alcoholic discussion reprinted in handbill form. This suggestion was probably made during the March 1972 meeting.

Hunt and Segretti had a third meeting in Miami, Florida. Hunt was staying at the Dupont Plaza. During this meeting, Hunt suggested that Segretti distribute false invitations to a Muskie picnic. Hunt did not ask Segretti to conduct any specific activity against a particular candidate. Hunt never asked Segretti to attend a Muskie Fund Raising party. Besides the two suggestions Hunt made to Segretti; one concerning false invitations to Muskie picnic; and the other to reprint the Newsweek article concerning Mrs. Muskie, Hunt made no other suggestions to Segretti with reference to how Segretti should operate. Hunt's function was merely to monitor Segretti's activities. Segretti never furnished any written reports to Hunt concerning what Segretti was doing.

Hunt and Segretti met for a last time in Washington, D. C. The date of this meeting is May 1972. Liddy was staying at the Washington Statler Hilton Hotel. Liddy called Hunt and asked Hunt to meet him, and Hunt agreed. Hunt felt obliged to accomodate Segretti inasmuch as Liddy had instructed Hunt to

maintain a liaison with him. Hunt had nothing to convey to Segretti and Segretti in turn had nothing to convey to Hunt. Hunt had no idea what Segretti was doing in Washington. After the meeting Hunt reported back to Liddy that they had met. According to Hunt this was the last time Segretti and Hunt met.

Segretti knew Hunt as Ed Warren, and Liddy as George Leonard. They knew him as Don Simmons. Segretti only recalls two meetings with Hunt; one in February and the other in June, 1972.

According to Hunt, Segretti told him about a group Segretti was organizing to conduct demonstrations in Florida. Hunt may have told Segretti about Hunt's plan to enlist a group of hippies from the Coconut Grove. Hunt, however, never indicated to Segretti that the two groups of demonstrators should intermingle. Hunt did not tell Segretti to organize a group of demonstrators at the Democratic Convention.

Thomas Gregory

In early 1972 Hunt approached the nephew of his employer, Robert Fletcher, and asked Fletcher to refer a college student who might be interested in assisting in campaign work. Fletcher referred Thomas Gregory, a friend of his from Salt Lake City. Gregory, a young student, met with Hunt on February 20, 1972 at which time Hunt instructed him to infiltrate Muskie's campaign and begin collecting information. In particular Hunt sought any information on policy or position papers which he might ascertain prior to release. It was also sought to determine how much money was flowing into the Muskie campaign and particularly for Gregory to look for any indications of the amounts and any indications of foreign sources of funds. In addition Gregory was requested to look for speaking schedule for Senator Muskie and copies of speeches. Gregory soon went to work for the Muskie campaign and began reporting to Hunt once a week in a drug store at Farragut Square in Washington. Information that Gregory furnished was extremely general although it did give some indication of rivalries within the staff and on occasion included notations of the daily cash receipts which Gregory would take down to the bank. Gregory was unable to provide much in the way of facsimile information since he did not have access to a Xerox machine. Gregory also provided information on who was volunteering for the campaign and what individuals were offering to write position papers and were interested in being included on the policy making echelon of the Muskie campaign. Hunt provided Liddy with a report of all information obtained from Gregory.

In the middle of April 1972 Hunt told Gregory to switch to McGovern's campaign and collect similar information. Gregory did so and also provided Hunt at Hunt's request a copy of a floor plan of McGovern's headquarters, specifically of Frank Mankiewicz's and Gary Hart's offices. In June 1972 Gregory became nervous about his discussions with Hunt which seemed to include a break-in to McGovern's headquarters. Gregory talked to Fletcher about terminating his relationship with Hunt and Fletcher in turn suggested that Gregory speak to his Uncle, Bob Bennett. Gregory, after participating in one planning meeting, anticipating the first Watergate break-in where he met Cuban members of Hunt's break-in team, spoke to Bennett. Bennett suggested that Gregory terminate his relationship with Hunt and had Gregory write a letter stating his desire to terminate the relationship. Bennett delivered this letter to Hunt and the relationship ended.

Las Vegas Venture

Hunt learned from Robert Bennett that Hank Greenspun, a Las Vegas publisher, had information concerning Senator Muskie which if known would "blow Muskie out of the water". Hunt passed this information to Liddy.

Liddy reported this to his superiors who Hunt thought were Mitchell and Magruder, and returned with their approval to proceed. Thereafter, Hunt went to Bennett's office where he met Ralph Winte, the Chief of Security for the Howard Hughes Tool Company. According to Hunt, the Hughes' people wanted to get information from the Greenspun safe that related to a legal dispute between Hughes and a Robert Maheu. Hunt then went to his office with Winte where plans were discussed concerning the break-in i.e. diagram of Greenspun Publishing Offices, location of the safe, hotels in the area etc.

Subsequent to the first meeting with Winte, Hunt and Liddy travelled to L. A. where they met Winte and went over everything discussed earlier. At this meeting Winte produced a diagram of the ground offices of the Greenspun establishment. Hunt and Liddy were to provide the personnel and give the contents of the safe to the Hughes Tool Company except for the information on Muskie. Plans were also discussed relative to a getaway, especially the prospect of using a Hughes aircraft. Bennett reported later to Hunt that Hughes Tool Company executives had rejected the suggested break-in. The Muskie candidacy "became moot" and there was no valid purpose in pursuing plans.

Dita Beard

In March, 1972 Hunt went to Denver to interview Dita Beard pursuant to orders of Colson. While talking with Beard Hunt would occasionally call Colson in Washington, D.C. to report what he had discovered. While interviewing Hunt wore a brunette wig furnished by the CIA. Hunt says he has no knowledge as to any involvement of Liddy in spiriting Beard to Denver.

Hoover Funeral

On the occasion of J. Edgar Hoover's death, in May of 1972, Liddy requested Hunt to recruit some of his Cubans to come up to the Hoover funeral and provide an informal bodyguard for the casket which was lying in state in the Capitol. Liddy expressed some apprehension that peace groups which were demonstrating on the other side of the Capitol might desecrate Hoover's casket. Hunt recruited through Barker a team of Cubans who flew up from Miami. The Cubans visited Hoover's casket briefly and then walked out onto the Capitol area when the demonstration was proceeding. Apparently several of the Cubans began heckling the speakers and gradually became involved in fisticuffs. They were apprehended by the police but almost immediately released on the authority of an unidentified official.

Arthur Bremer

On the day following the shooting of George Wallace (May 2, 1972), Colson's office called Hunt and told Hunt to meet with Colson. Colson asked Hunt: "Well would you be willing or could you get out to Milwaukee ... and get into the apartment of Bremer?" Colson explained to Hunt that he was interested in knowing what sort of political literature was in Bremer's apartment. Hunt replied that Bremer's apartment was probably staked out by the FBI and it would be difficult to get into. Colson said that: "Well, all right, let's hold it the way it is and I will get back to you, but in the meantime you can look up plane schedules to Milwaukee." Later that day Hunt received a phone call from Colson saying: "Forget the trip."

Convention Plans

At Hunt's request, Barker recruited several Cuban, Bay of Pigs veterans to be "squad leaders" in providing informal (civilian) convention security for the Republican convention in San Diego. This additional security was deemed necessary due to the open access on all sides to the San Diego. This "additional security" was deemed necessary due to the open access on all sides to the San Diego convention site and the poor image of having military or police personnel surrounding the site.

When the site was changed to Miami, Barker began recruiting in the Miami area for the same purpose. He also recruited Miami hotel personnel to provide intelligence during the Democratic convention. Barker also was to arrange for men to disrupt the Democratic convention and to pay poorly dressed "hippies" to appear at the Doral and pose as McGovern supporters.

Break-in at DNC

Barker was recruited by Hunt about two weeks prior to the first break-in. Barker then recruited the other Cuban participants, Martinez, Gonzales, Sturgis, DiDiego, Pico. Hunt was in charge of the photographic aspects of the operation; McCord the electronics. The two men did the basic planning for the DNC break-ins.

Hunt had told the Cubans that the break-in had been authorized by people in high places and that it was a National Security matter. Hunt instructed the Cubans to look for evidence of Communist financing given to the Democratic party. This rationale was a substantial enough basis for Cuban participation.

There were two unsuccessful attempts to enter the DNC headquarters. The third attempt was successful. McCord placed the bugs and Hunt's recruits covered the photographic aspect. Barker read the documents and indicated which were to be photographed. Approximately one week after the successful entry Liddy told McCord that another entry would have to be made. A bug was malfunctioning and there was a desire for additional documents. Though Hunt advised against this entry attempt, it was attempted and McCord, Barker, Martinez, Gonzales and Sturgis were apprehended.

Throughout this period of late May and early June, Hunt, Liddy and the Cubans were also focusing on McGovern's headquarters. There were two bungled attempts to make an entry into McGovern headquarters in late May. McCord also made an effort to place a bug during the day. This, too, failed. All three attempts at the McGovern headquarters were done with the assistance of Thomas Gregory, an individual who had infiltrated the McGovern offices.

Post Break-In

After leaving Howard Johnson's, Hunt went directly to the Executive Office Building, locked McCord's briefcase in his safe, called Caddy and left. He took \$10,000 in contingency money before leaving. He never returned to his EOB office after June 19. He said his safe contained a great number of cables, his wife's 25-caliber Browning, and subject files on projects he was involved in. He's not sure if the Ellsberg photo was there. The cables that Gray later destroyed, which Hunt described as his work product, were there.

After leaving his office on June 17, he called Mrs. Barker in Miami from the Mullen office and told her to call Caddy. He then drove to Caddy's apartment. While at Caddy's aptment, Caddy decided to call Rafferty. Hunt thereafter went home. Hunt retained Caddy for the apprehended men and paid him \$8,500.

Hunt was contacted by the FBI on June 17 as a result of his name being found in Barker's notebook and the check from Lakeland C. C. He refused to cooperate without the presence of counsel and called Liddy, who advised him not to talk to the FBI. He went back to his Executive Office Building office on June 19 to review his files and the contents of McCord's briefcase, which was full of miscellaneous bugging equipment. He also removed a letter and a carbon reply from his wife of a personal nature.

On June 19, Hunt told Mrs. Hall, Colson's secretary, to tell Colson that "his (Hunt's) safe was loaded." He then left and went to Mullen and Co. to work. At noon Liddy called him, met him on the corner near the USIA Building, and told him he had gotten a call saying that Hunt should leave town. Liddy suggested he join his wife and family in Europe. Forty-five minutes later Liddy called and said Hunt should not leave, but Hunt had already made arrangements to go to New York. The newspapers were full of news of the Watergate break-in and he spoke to his wife, who said she wanted to return from London. He said no, "it will all blow over."

Hunt then called either Liddy or Caddy and said he was leaving for California. He then called a friend in California, Morton Jackson, and asked if he could stay with him for a few days. Hunt left Washington and went to New York where he worked on Mullen and Co. business during the course of June 20. From New York he departed for California.

Hunt arrived in California on June 20. Liddy arrived on June 21, came to Jackson's house, gave Hunt \$1,000, and assured Hunt that everything would be taken care of and a lawyer would be hired to represent him. On Thursday or Friday of that week Hunt went to Florida under an assumed name to talk to Mrs. Barker and tell her everything would be OK. The Barker home was surrounded by the press and cameras, so Hunt left, tried to call but got no answer, and Flew back to Los Angeles.

Bittman Retained

Hunt stayed in California about ten days, then went to Chicago and stayed with his wife's cousin. A day or two later Mrs. Hunt came to Chicago and stayed overnight, leaving the next day. While in Chicago Hunt called William Bittman, an attorney in Washington whose name had been given to Hunt by Morton Jackson, and asked Bittman whether he would consider representing him in the matter. A meeting was arranged and July 3 Hunt flew to Dulles Airport, met his wife, and they both went to Bittman's home to discuss his legal problems. Bittman was retained and given a \$1,000 retainer by Hunt and Bittman thereupon notified Earl Silbert, the assistant U.S. attorney, of his representation of Hunt

On July 4 Mrs. Hunt informed Hunt of several conversations she had had with Caddy, who had refused to give her a referral for an attorney to represent him, how she went to CRP and demanded to see Paul O'Brien, with whom she had had sharp words and from whom she demanded prompt action on Hunt's behalf.

Finances

On July 6 at Bittman's home Bittman stated that he had gotten a call from a Mr. Rivers, who had asked to talk to the writer's wife. Bittman refused to talk to Mr. Rivers and subsequently received a call from Paul O'Brien stating that it would be desirable for Mrs. Hunt to speak to Mr. Rivers. Bittman received a subsequent call from Rivers. Mrs. Hunt then got a call from Mr. Rivers at home and she was sent to a pay phone in Potomac Village and talked to Rivers, who was first concerned that all defendants' legal fees would be paid, that the families would be taken care of, and efforts would be made to rehabilitate if there were convictions. Mr. Rivers wanted all dealings to be with Mrs. Hunt only and not with the defendants or their families. He requested a budget for all of the defendants for the next six or eight months, which Mrs. Hunt prepared after contacting the various defendants and their families. Hunt was aware of the fact that Mrs. Hunt picked up money from Rivers at National Airport and on one occasion went himself for that purpose when his wife was not able to get to the airport on time. Hunt denied knowing how much money his wife received nor how much was distributed to the various defendants and their families. He did observe her placing currency in envelopes but did not know the method by which she delivered same. The last of these pickups was made during October or mid-November, which pickup was on a Sunday after noon at Potomac Village near a Safeway.

On December 8 Mrs. Hunt was killed in a crash at Midway and Hunt immediately told Bittman that he could not stand the stress of a trial

and would plead guilty and requested that Bittman attempt to bargain with the Prosecutors. At the time of Mrs. Hunt's death she was in possession of \$10,000 in \$100 bills which Hunt claims was to be used in the purchase of a Holiday Inn in Nicaragua.

On July 7, 1972, Bittman received an envelope in a phone booth located in a corridor of his office building containing \$25,000 which he informed Hunt was understood to be applied towards Hunt's legal fees. In mid-October, Hunt received a call from Bittman saying that he, Bittman, had an envelope for Hunt which contained \$20,000 and was given to Bittman again for legal fees. After Mrs. Hunt's death, Bittman called and informed Hunt that he had received another envelope at his home which was for Hunt's use, and upon receiving the envelope, Hunt found \$15,000 with no instructions with regard to this money. Hunt remembered that his wife had told him that the Miami committee would be getting some seed money in the amount of \$10,000 to \$12,000 and, therefore, five days later, gave Dr. Manuel Artime \$12,000 of the \$15,000. Hunt retained \$3,000 which his wife had told him was owed them as a result of an advancement she had made in providing payments to the other defendants. During January or early February, 1973, Hunt received \$260,000 which were proceeds from life insurance policies on his wife's life, \$50,000 of which Hunt turned over to Bittman as additional legal fees for his representation. In February, 1973, Bittman received an envelope containing \$50,000 in cash which Bittman turned over to Hunt. On March 20, 1973, Bittman received a final \$75,000 in cash which he turned over to Hunt. Hunt, thereafter, issued two checks totalling \$60,000 to Bittman which was the final fee paid to Bittman for his representation of Hunt. During August of 1973, as a result of an apparent conflict as pointed out by the Special Prosecutor, Bittman was required to withdraw as counsel for Hunt. At the time, Bittman's law firm maintained that it was owed between \$30,000 to \$40,000 for legal services rendered Hunt, but in light of the fact that they were required to withdraw from the case, the firm would waive those fees. Hunt was never rendered an accounting of the fees paid to Mr. Bittman's firm nor of the basis upon which the charges were determined. Mr. Bittman's firm received a total of \$156,000.

Meetings with Colson, Shapiro and O'Brien

Mr. Hunt maintains that at all times the payments for legal fees and family support were slow in coming, and at one point in November, 1972, Hunt called Charles Colson to complain about the problem. On December 31, 1972, twelve days before Hunt's guilty plea, Hunt wrote a letter to Colson informing him of the fact that he was going to plead guilty and expressed the fact that as a result of his wife's death, he could not sustain the pressure

of a trial. A few days later, Mr. Bittman went to see Colson on Hunt's behalf to discuss the fact that he had decided to plead guilty and to discuss a forthcoming motion to suppress and some questions regarding Colson's annuity as a former CIA agent. Hunt denies asking Bittman to speak to Colson about money or executive clemency, but does acknowledge that Bittman and Colson had a guarded conversation wherein Colson stated that he would do whatever he could for his friend, Howard. Hunt received a message back from Colson through Mr. Bittman to the effect that Mr. Colson would always be his friend, that Mr. Colson was sorry about his wife's death, and that he would be willing to take Hunt's children into his home if that were necessary.

Approximately ten days before Hunt was to be sentenced (on March 23, 1973) at a time when Bittman had been pressing hard for \$60,000 in legal fees due him, Hunt met with Paul O'Brien in Bittman's office without Bittman being present. At this meeting which took place on March 12 or 13, Hunt informed O'Brien that legal fees and support payments had become far too delinquent. O'Brien was immediately apologetic about his failure to keep commitments. O'Brien stated that he no longer had any leverage to make sure that the commitments were maintained. Hunt stated that he needed \$60,000 in legal fees and two years of living expenses which he believes he estimated at the time to amount to \$3,000 per month or a total of \$72,000. Hunt emphasized that he must have this money by March 21.

Hunt noted that Watergate was not the only seamy activity he had been involved in and implied that if questioned about other activities he may have to reveal them. Hunt also stated to O'Brien that he felt that if anyone deserved consideration, it was Hunt and the group of Cubans that he had worked with because of the previous activities they had done and their loyalty to the White House. O'Brien stated that he would pass this information along to his principal which at the time Hunt thought to be Mitchell. O'Brien further suggested that saying he was unable to guarantee the commitments that had previously been made, Hunt should write a stern memo to Colson. O'Brien stated that it was "our feeling that Colson has stayed out of things too long, that it is time for him to get his feet wet with the rest of us." Hunt considered this meeting very unsatisfactory. When he returned and discussed it with Bittman however, he realized that if he wrote Colson a memo, it might cause additional difficulties which would work against both Colson and himself. He therefore decided he would rather meet with Colson and asked Bittman to set up a meeting in Colson's office. Bittman called him later and told him that he would not see Colson, but that he would be able to see Shapiro. Hunt met with Shapiro on March 16, 1973, in Shapiro's office. Mr. Shapiro stated that he was Colson's counsel, and that he, Shapiro, would therefore have to protect Mr. Colson's interests, and that it was Mr. Shapiro's recommendation that Colson not see Hunt personally. Mr. Shapiro further stated that he did not want to discuss money with Hunt and that he, Shapiro, would not guarantee to convey the entire nature of the conversation or meeting to Colson. Hunt became irate and expressed to Shapiro the

desperateness of the situation facing him, stating that he was about to go to jail, he owed his attorney \$60,000, and he had been unable to obtain funds guaranteed him to support his family. He believes he stated at this time that he was due a two years support for his family and believes he may have included the estimate that that was in the area of \$72,000. Hunt again pointed out that he had been involved in many other seamy operations for the White House and that he would soon be appearing before the grand jury to whom he might have to reveal that information. Lastly, Hunt again pointed out that he and the Cubans with whom he had worked had been loyal to the White House and because of their previous activities were entitled to consideration more than anyone else.

CIA Defense

As pointed out, Hunt was required to change lawyers in August, 1973. Hunt has stated that during the period of time that Bittman was his attorney and prior to his plea of guilty, that some discussion took place concerning the CIA defense mentioned by James McCord in his testimony. Hunt states that the defense was merely mentioned and that it was discarded as not being true and, therefore, not feasible. On April 5, 1973, Hunt signed an affidavit which disclaimed any advanced knowledge on the part of Charles Colson of the break-in at DNC headquarters at the Watergate on June 17. Hunt stated the affidavit was handed to him by Bittman, already prepared for his signature, and that Bittman stated he had received the affidavit from Colson's office.

McCord

Hunt states that he spoke with McCord only three times after the June 17 break-in. The first time was after McCord was initially released from jail and Hunt called him to question him on hiring Baldwin and to "chastise McCord for hiring a man of Baldwin's non-qualifications and uncertain political ethos." The second time was in the fall of 1972 in order to give a message to McCord for Mrs. Hunt with regard to arrangements being made by the two of them for McCord's payments. The communication merely was to have McCord call Mrs. Hunt at a specific number. The final communication occurred on December 6, 1972, when Hunt got a special letter from McCord concerning news releases alleging that Baldwin and the other Cubans had been hired by McCord. McCord threatened to blow the lid unless the story was corrected. Hunt went to Baldwin's home and from there called McCord. McCord was extremely defensive, said he had things on his mind and would call back to him.

2, 5, 6, 7, 8, R (Fat Jade n separate subject), 13(2), 15(2), 17(2), 18(2), 22, -