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Excerpts From John Dean's Testimony

Following are excerpts from the first half of the testimony of John W. Dean III, former White House counsel, before the Senate Watergate committee today.

To one who was in the White House and became somewhat familiar with its inter-workings, the Watergate matter was an inevitable outgrowth of a climate of excessive concern over the political impact of demonstrators, excessive concern over leaks, an insatiable appetite for political intelligence, all coupled with a do-it-yourself White House staff, regardless of the law.

However, the fact that many of the elements of this climate culminated with the creation of a covert intelligence operation as a part of the President's re-election committee was not by conscious designs, rather an accident of fate.

These, of course, are my conclusions, but I believe they are well founded in fact. This committee, however, is not interested in my conclusions, rather it is interested in the facts as I know them. Rather than my characterizing the climate and attitudes, I shall — as requested — present the facts which themselves evidence the precursors of the Watergate incident.

IT WAS NOT until I joined the White House staff in July of 1970 that I fully realized the strong feelings that the President and his staff had toward anti-war demonstrators — and demonstrators in general. But even before my joining the White House staff I was partially aware of this presidential concern, a concern that, in turn, permeated much of the White House.

During my tenure at the Justice Department, as an associate deputy attorney general, I was involved in representing the government in discussions with demonstration leaders regarding the terms of demonstration permits for activities in the Capital City. . . .

It was also because of my proximity to those involved with demonstrations at the Department of Justice that I became aware that the White House was continually seeking intelligence information about demonstration leaders and their supporters that would either discredit them personally or indicate that the demonstration was in fact sponsored by some foreign enemy. There were also White House requests for information regarding ties between major political figures (specifically members of the U.S. Senate) who opposed the President's war policies and the demonstration leaders.

I also recall that the information regarding demonstrators — or rather lack of information showing connections between the demonstration leaders and foreign governments or major political figures — was often reported to a disbelieving and

complaining White House staff that felt the entire system for gathering such intelligence was worthless.

As I shall elaborate shortly, this attitude toward the intelligence-gathering capability of the government regarding demonstrations prevailed through my tenure at the Justice Department and the White House, and I was hearing complaints from the President personally as late as March 12 of this year. . . .

IT WAS approximately one month after I arrived at the White House that I was informed about the project that had been going on before I arrived to restructure the government's intelligence-gathering capacities vis-a-vis demonstrators and domestic radicals. . . . The revised domestic intelligence plan was submitted in a document for the President.

The committee has in its possession a copy of that document and certain related memoranda pursuant to the order of Judge Sirica. After I was told of the presidentially approved plan, that called for bugging, burglarizing, mail covers and the like, I was instructed by Haldeman to see what I could do to get the plan implemented. I thought the plan was totally uncalled for and unjustified. . . .

The Interagency Evaluation Committee (IEC) was created, as I recall, in early 1971. I requested that Jack Caulfield, who had been assigned to my office, serve as the White House liaison to the IEC. . . . I am unaware of the IEC ever having engaged in any illegal assignments, and certainly no such assignment was ever requested by my office. . . .

In addition to the intelligence reports from the IEC, my office also received regular intelligence reports regarding demonstrators and radical groups from the FBI and on some occasions, from the CIA. A member of my staff would review the material to determine if it should be forwarded to Mr. Haldeman—that is, for bringing to the President's attention. . . .

I became directly and personally aware of the President's own interest in my reports regarding demonstrations when he called me during a demonstration of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War on the Mall in front of the Capitol. This was the occasion in May 1971 (I believe that is the date), when the government first sought to enjoin the demonstration and later backed down. The President called me for a first-hand report during the demonstration and expressed his concern that I keep him abreast of what was occurring. Accordingly, we prepared hourly status reports and sent them to the President.

I was made aware of the President's strong feelings about even the smallest of demonstrations during the late winter of 1971, when the President happened to look out the windows of the residence of the White House and saw a lone man with a large 10-foot sign stretched out in front of Lafayette Park. Mr. Higby called me to his office to tell me of the President's displeasure with the sign in the park and told me that Mr. Haldeman said the sign had to come down. . . .

In early February of 1972, I learned that any means — legal or illegal — were authorized by Mr. Haldeman to deal with demonstrators when the President was traveling or appearing some place. I would like to add that when I learned of the illegal means that were being employed, I advised that such tactics not be employed in the future and if demonstrations occurred — they occurred.

I stated earlier that there was a continuing dissatisfaction with the available intelligence reports. The most frequent critic was Mr. Haldeman, but the President himself discussed this with me in early March of this year, as a part of the planned counter-offensive for dealing with the Senate

Watergate investigation. The President wanted to show that his opponents had employed demonstrators against him during his re-election campaign. . . .

WE NEVER found a scintilla of viable evidence indicating that these demonstrators were part of a master plan; nor that they were funded by the Democratic political funds; nor that they had any direct connection with the McGovern campaign.

This was explained to Mr. Haldeman, but the President believed that the opposite was, in fact, true. I have submitted to the committee (Exhibit 1) the text of the President's memorandum to me on the subject. . . .

The committee has asked me about concern over leaks. I believe that most anyone who worked at the White House during the past four years can attest to the concern that prevailed regarding leaks—any and all—leaks. . . . I have submitted to the committee (Exhibit No. 2) documents evidencing the types of investigations made.

I began to understand the high degree of concern after I got to know Mr. Jack Caul-

field, who had been assigned to my staff. I would guess that I had been at the White House almost a year before Caulfield told me that he had been directed by Ehrlichman to wiretap a newsman's telephone in pursuit of a leak. . . .

The wiretap was undertaken, as I recall, in late 1969 or early 1970. . . .

I do not know what information, if any, they obtained, nor do I know any other details other than what I have related above. I have no idea if the reason for the wiretap was related to national security and I believe Caulfield told me it was Joseph Kraft's telephone they tapped.

WHILE THERE was an always-present concern about leaks, that concern took a quantum jump when The New York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers in June of 1971. . . .

To the best of my recollection — I have been unable to get confirmation through the White House records — it was late June or early July that Jack Caulfield came to me to tell me that Colson had called him in, at Ehrlichman's direction and instructed him to burglarize the Brookings Institute in an effort to determine if they had certain leaked documents.

What prompted Mr. Caulfield to come to me was that he thought the matter was most unwise and that his instructions from Colson were insane. He informed me that Mr. Ulasewicz had "cased" the Brookings Institute . . . but the security system at the Brookings building was extremely tight and it would be very difficult to break in. Caulfield told me that he had so informed Colson, but Colson had instructed him to pursue the matter and if necessary nt a fire bomb in the building and retrieve the documents during the commotion that would ensue.

Caulfield convinced me that Colson was intent on proceeding, by one means or another, so I advised Caulfield that he should do nothing further, that I would immediately fly to California and tell Ehrlichman that this entire thing was insane. . . . I sat with Mr. Robert Mardian on the flight, who told me he was going to see the President about a highly important matter that he could not discuss with me — a matter which I will refer to later.

When I arrived in California I arranged to see Ehrlichman and told him that the burglary of Brookings was insane. . . . He said OK and he called Mr. Colson to call it off, and I called Mr. Caulfield to tell him it was called off.

It was not until almost a year later that I learned the reason for Mardian's trip to see the President. Mr. Mardian later told me, in a social conversation, that he had gone to see the President to get instructions regarding the disposition of wiretap logs that related to newsmen and White House staffers who were suspected of leaking. These logs had been in possession of Mr. William Sullivan, an assistant director of the FBI, and were, per Mr. Mardian's instructions from the President, given to Ehrlichman.

I had occasion to raise a question about

these logs with Ehrlichman during the fall of 1972, and he flatly denied to me that he had the logs. I did not tell him at that time I had been told he had them.

About Feb. 22 or 23 of this year, Time magazine notified the White House it was going to print a story that the White House had undertaken wiretaps of newsmen and White House staff and requested a response.

The White House press office notified me of this inquiry. I called Mr. Mark Felt at the FBI to ask him first, what the facts were, and secondly, how such a story could leak. Mr. Felt told me that it was true, that Mr. Sullivan knew all the facts and that he had no idea how it leaked. . . . I then called Mr. Ehrlichman and told him about the fourth-coming story in Time magazine. . . . I also told him I knew he had the logs because Mr. Mardian had told me. This time he admitted they were in his safe. I asked him how Mr. Ziegler should handle it. He said Mr. Ziegler should flatly deny it — period. I thanked him, called Mr. Ziegler and so advised him.

TURNING now to the so-called “plumbers” unit that was created to deal with leaks. The first I heard of the plumbers unit was in late July of 1971. I do not recall ever being actually advised in advance that such a unit was being created in the White House, but I stumbled into it unknowingly when Mr. Egil Krogh happened to mention it to me. I was not involved in its establishment; I only know that Mr. Krogh and Mr. David Young were running it under Ehrlichman’s direction. . . .

I never discussed with Krogh or Young what they were doing or how they were doing it. It was through Jack Caulfield that I learned that Mr. Gordon Liddy was working with Mr. Krogh. . . . I did not realize that Mr. Howard Hunt worked — most of his time while at the White House — in the plumbers unit until after June 17, 1972. I had seen Hunt on many occasions in Colson’s office, and finally asked Colson who he was. He told me that he was doing some consultant work for him and then introduced me. That was the only time I ever talked with Mr. Hunt. . . .

As I have indicated, the June 1971 publication of the Pentagon Papers caused general consternation at the White House over the leak problem. On June 29, 1971, the President brought the subject of leaks up in a Cabinet meeting as a part of a White

House orchestrated effort to curtail all leaks.

As a part of that effort, Mr. Haldeman instructed Mr. Fred Malek, Mr. Larry Higby, Mr. Gordon Strachan and myself to develop a follow-up strategy for dealing with leaks. Mr. Malek and I never took the project very seriously, but Mr. Strachan and Mr. Higby continued to push. I have submitted to the committee memoranda outlining the project that finally developed. . . . To the best of my knowledge this project never uncovered the source of a single leak. . . .

THE PRE re-election White House thrived on political gossip and political intelligence. I knew of the type of information they sought even before I joined the White House staff. During the summer of 1969, while I was working at the Justice Department, the then-deputy attorney general, Richard Kleindienst, called me into his office and told me that the White House wanted some very important information. Mr. Kleindienst instructed me to call Mr. DeLoach, then deputy director of the FBI, and obtain from him information regarding the foreign travels of Mary Jo Kopechne. I was told that Mr. DeLoach would be expecting a call from me and once I had the information in hand, I was to give it to Jack Caulfield at the White House. . . .

It was not until I joined the White House staff and Caulfield was placed on my staff that I learned that Caulfield was assigned to develop political intelligence on Sen. Edward Kennedy. Mr. Caulfield told me that within some six hours of the accident at Chappaquiddick on July 18, 1969, he had a friend named Tony on the scene, who remained on the scene conducting a private investigation of the matter and reporting pertinent information back to him.

It was not until this spring that I knew or could remember Tony’s full name — Anthony Ulasewicz. . . .

I was told by Caulfield that although he had been assigned to my staff that he would continue to perform various intelligence-gathering functions assigned to him by Ehrlichman or Haldeman.

I recall only once becoming involved in Mr. Caulfield’s activities relating to Sen. Kennedy. That occurred in the fall of 1971 when I received a call from Larry Higby, who told me that Haldeman wanted 24-hour surveillance of Sen. Kennedy and regular reports on his activities. I passed this on to Caulfield and we discussed it. He told me that he thought that this was most unwise. . . . Instead, Caulfield was to keep a general overview of Sen. Kennedy’s activities and pursue specific investigations of activities that might be of interest. . . .

THE PERSONS on the White House staff who were most interested in political intelligence were Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Colson. . . . I do have some documents that evidence a fair sampling of the type of requests that were frequently made and how they were handled by my office. The documents are extremely sensitive and could be injurious to innocent people whose names are mentioned in them. Accordingly, I have submitted them for the committee’s use. . . .

There were also frequent efforts to obtain politically embarrassing information on Mr. Lawrence O’Brien, the Democratic National Committee chairman, Sen. Muskie and Sen. McGovern. . . .

I would now like to turn to a political intelligence and security plan that was designed for the campaign, but ultimately was rejected.

While Caulfield was a member of my

staff, the use of Mr. Ulasewicz slowly diminished, in that I had no need for such investigative work, and I only requested Caulfield to obtain investigative information when someone else on the staff requested it. While I did try to find assignments for Caulfield that related to the work of the counsel's office it was difficult in that he was not a lawyer.

Mr. Caulfield was aware of this situation and in the spring of 1971 he came to me and told me that he was thinking of leaving the White House staff and establishing an investigative-security consulting corporation. He felt that there was a need and a market for what he described as a "Republican intertel" — intertel being a firm that has been in existence for a number of years and working in the private investigation-security area. . . .

We casually discussed this on several occasions. The basic and initial concept he had developed was an operation that could be funded by contracts with corporations. Mr. Caulfield's firm would provide services for these corporations, but it would also provide free services to the 1972 re-election campaign. . . . Shortly after these conversations, Caulfield informed me that he had formed a group to develop a plan to submit to Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell. The planning group intended to become the principal officers of the corporation once it commenced its activity.

Caulfield and the group spent several months developing their plans and in early August or September of 1971 Caulfield brought me a copy of a memorandum entitled "operation San Wedge" and told me he was seeking a meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman to discuss the matter and requested that I assist him in getting a meeting with Mr. Mitchell. I don't know if Mr. Caulfield met with Mr. Ehrlichman. If he did, I was not present and have no knowledge of the meeting. . . .

To the best of my recollection "Operation Sand Wedge" envisioned the creation of a corporation called Security Consulting Group, Inc., which was to have offices in Washington, Chicago and New York. It was to have an "overt" and "covert" capacity. The covert capacity would have operated out of New York — presumably under the aegis of Mr. Ulasewicz. . . . The principal activity of the Security Consulting Group, Inc. was to provide private security for all phases of the campaign, but the New York "covert" operation would have the capacity to provide "bag men" to carry money and engage in electronic surveillance — if called upon to do so. . . .

I did discuss "Operation Sand Wedge" with Mr. Mitchell. I recall that he was not interested at all. He told me that he thought Jack Caulfield was a fine person, but he felt the principal problems would relate to security and the problems that demonstrators might pose to the cam-

aign. . . . I told him that Jack Caulfield had requested an opportunity to discuss his plan with him, and I told Jack I would convey the message. Mitchell did not wish to discuss the proposal. . . .

I also recall that Ehrlichman raised "Operation Sand Wedge" with me. I do not know if this was a result of his meeting with Caulfield or Caulfield sending him a copy of the memorandum. Ehrlichman told me that he would like to keep Tony Ulasewicz around during the campaign, but he did not think much of Caulfield's proposed grand plan. . . .

Meanwhile, Caulfield kept requesting an answer. . . . Every few weeks Caulfield would send an item to me to prompt me to take some action. . . . I would just file them and do nothing, as I had decided that the best course of action to save Jack's feelings was to let the matter die a natural death through no action. This indeed happened.

By November 1971, Caulfield realized that his plan was dead and he abandoned the idea. Realizing this, he told me he would like to work for Mr. Mitchell during the campaign. . . . Apparently, Caulfield convinced Mitchell that some greatly reduced versions of "Operation Sand Wedge" might be of value, or he was seeking to show Mitchell what he could do. At any rate, Caulfield continued to call his intelligence-gathering capabilities "Operation Sand Wedge." . . . I hasten to add that Caulfield employed no illegal procedures in gathering this information. . . .

To the best of my recollection, it was the spring of 1971 that Mr. Haldeman discussed with me what my office should do during the forthcoming campaign year. . . .

IT WAS decided that the principal area of concern for my office should be keeping the White House in compliance with the election laws and improving our intelligence regarding demonstrations. I was also told that I should provide legal assistance in establishing the re-election committee and insuring that they had their own capacity to deal with the potential threats of demonstrations during the campaign and particularly at the convention.

I advised Haldeman that Jack Caulfield was developing a security plan and that he wanted to discuss his plan with Mitchell and Ehrlichman. I also told him I would seek to get the Interagency Evaluation Committee working on the potential for demonstrations during the campaign and subsequently called Mr. Bernie Wells, the head of the IEC, to my office and told him of the concern of the White House for good intelligence during the coming campaign.

It was not until after the proposed "Operation Sand Wedge" had been shelved and Magruder had left the White House to form the re-election committee that I began receiving calls from Strachan and Magruder that I was expected to suggest a

lawyer to head up the demonstration intelligence operation at the re-election committee and to also serve as general counsel.

Mr. Krogh . . . suggested that Mr. Gordon Liddy might be available, in that he had just about completed his work. Krogh spoke very highly of Liddy's ability as a lawyer and said that his FBI-Treasury Department background in law enforcement would qualify him to handle a demonstration intelligence and security operation for the re-election committee. I did not know Mr. Liddy but I respected Krogh's judgment, both as to his judgment of other lawyers and his knowledge of law enforcement. Bud had dealt with the demonstration problems for the White House before I joined the staff. I asked Krogh to find out if Liddy was interested.

SEVERAL DAYS later Mr. Krogh informed me that Liddy was interested and asked me to come to his (Krogh's) office and meet Mr. Liddy and describe the job. I did this. I told Liddy that the primary responsibility of the job was to serve as the lawyer for the re-election committee, but among the responsibilities of the general counsel would be keeping abreast of the potential of demonstrations that might affect the campaign.

Liddy said he was interested. Krogh said that he first would have to clear it with Ehrlichman. I advised them that Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder would be making the decision on filling the post, and if Krogh got the OK from Ehrlichman, I would set up a meeting for Liddy to be interviewed by Mitchell.

When Krogh gave me the OK from Ehrlichman, I called Mr. Mitchell and told him that Krogh, with Ehrlichman's approval, had suggested Mr. Gordon Liddy for the general counsel post and I arranged for Liddy to meet with Mitchell on Nov. 24, 1971, after Mr. Caulfield met with Mitchell.

While I cannot recall every detail that was discussed, I do recall that it was a very general type of job interview. . . .

There was virtually no discussion of intelligence plans, other than that Liddy would draw up some sort of plans. . . .

AFTER THIS meeting, Mitchell called me to say that he wanted Magruder to interview Liddy because Magruder would be the man working with him most. I so advised Liddy and on Dec. 8, 1971, Mr. Magruder requested I bring Liddy over to his office for an interview. The interview in Magruder's office on Dec. 8 was brief and non-substantive. . . .

After Liddy was hired at the re-election committee, I informed my staff — Mr. Fred Fielding and Mr. David Wilson — that they should assist Liddy in becoming familiar with the election laws. I made my election law files available to Liddy and believe that he used them and he had periodic contact with my staff and myself on

election law matters.

I can recall that I had several discussions with Liddy about his responsibilities with the committee in complying with the election laws. He told me that he had more work than there were hours in the day to complete it. I urged him to get volunteer lawyers to assist him and suggested several names of lawyers who might assist him.

I can also recall that several weeks after Liddy left the White House he was asked to turn in his White House pass. Liddy came to me and asked me to intervene on his behalf so that he might retain his pass. . . . This request was turned down. . . .

The next time I recall meeting with Mr. Liddy was at a meeting in Mitchell's office

on Jan. 27, 1972. Magruder called my office to set up the meeting and only after I called Magruder to ask why he wanted me to attend the meeting did I learn that Liddy was going to present his intelligence plan. I met Magruder and Liddy at Mitchell's office. Liddy had a series of charts or diagrams which he placed on an easel and the presentation by Liddy began.

I did not fully understand everything Mr. Liddy was recommending at the time because some of the concepts were mind-boggling and the charts were in code names, but I shall attempt to reconstruct the high points that I remember as best I can.

LIDDY WAS really making a sales pitch. He said that the operations he had developed would be totally removed from the campaign and carried out by professionals. Plans called for mugging squads, kidnaping teams, prostitutes to compromise the opposition, and electronic surveillance.

He explained that the mugging squad could, for example, rough up demonstrators that were causing problems. The kidnaping teams could remove demonstration leaders and take them below the Mexican border and thereby diminish the ability of the demonstrators to cause problems at the San Diego convention.

The prostitutes could be used at the Democratic convention to get information as well as compromise the person involved. I recall Liddy saying that the girls would be high-class and the best in the business.

When discussing the electronic surveillance he said that he had consulted with one of the best authorities in the country and his plan envisioned far more than bugging and tapping phones. He said that, under his plan, communication between ground facilities and aircraft could also be intercepted.

EACH MAJOR aspect of his proposal was on a chart, with one chart showing the inter-relationship with the others. Each operation was given a code name. I have no recollection of these code names.

With regard to surveillance, and I do not recall that this was necessarily limited to

electronic surveillance, he suggested several potential targets. I cannot recall for certain if it was during this meeting or at the second meeting in early February that he suggested the potential targets.

The targets that I recall he suggested were Mr. Larry O'Brien, the Democratic headquarters and the Fountainsbleu Hotel during the Democratic convention.

Mr. Liddy concluded his presentation by saying that the plan would cost approximately one million dollars.

I do not recall Magruder's reaction, because he was seated beside me, but I do recall Mitchell's reaction to the "Mission Impossible" plan. He was amazed. At one point I gave him a look of bewilderment and he winked.

Knowing Mitchell, I knew that he was not going to throw Liddy out of his office or tell him he was out of his mind, rather he did what I expected.

When the presentation was completed, he took a few long puffs on his pipe and told Liddy that the plan he had developed was not quite what he had in mind and the cost was out of the question.

He suggested he go back and revise his plan, keeping in mind that he was most interested in the demonstration problem.

I remained in Mitchell's office for a brief moment after the meeting ended. Mitchell indicated to me that Mr. Liddy's proposal was out of the question. I joined Magruder and Liddy and as we left the office I told Liddy to destroy the charts.

Mr. Liddy said that he would revise the plans and submit a new proposal. At that point I thought the plan as dead, because I doubted if Mitchell would reconsider the matter. I rode back to my office with Liddy and Magruder, but there was no further conversation of the plan.

The next time I am aware of any discussions of such plans occurred on, I believe, Feb. 4, 1972. Magruder had scheduled another meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office on a revised intelligence plan. I arrived at the meeting very late and when I came in, Mr. Liddy was presented a scaled-down version of his earlier plan.

I listened for a few minutes and decided I had to interject myself into the discussions. Mr. Mitchell, I felt, was being put on the spot.

The only polite way I thought I could end the discussions was to inject that these discussions could not go on in the office of the attorney general of the United States and that the meeting should terminate immediately.

At this point the meeting ended. I do not know to this day who kept pushing for these plans. Whether Liddy was pushing or whether Magruder was pushing or whether someone was pushing Magruder. . . .

After I ended the second meeting, I told Liddy that I would never again discuss this matter with him. I told him that if any such plan were approved, I did not want to

know. One thing was certain in my mind, while someone wanted this operation, I did not want any part of it, nor would I have any part of it.

AFTER THIS second meeting in Mitchell's office, I sought a meeting with Mr. Haldeman to tell him what was occurring, but it took me several days to get to see him. . . .

I told Haldeman what had been presented by Liddy and told him that I felt it was incredible, unnecessary and unwise. I told him that no one at the White House should have anything to do with this. I said that while the re-election committee needed an ability to deal with demonstrations, it did not need bugging, mugging, prostitutes and kidnapers. Haldeman agreed and told me I should have no further dealings on the matter.

I have thought back over the sequence of events and tried to determine if I in any way may have encouraged Mr. Liddy and his intelligence plans. I am certain of this — I did not encourage him to develop illegal techniques, because I was unaware he was developing such plans. . . .

IN LATE MAY of 1972 the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs asked me to deliver a graduation address at its training school in Manila, Philippines, on Saturday, June 17, 1972. . . .

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I returned from this four-day trip to the Far East on the morning of June 18. When I landed in San Francisco, after 20 hours of flying, I called my assistant, Fred Fielding, to check in and tell him that I was going to spend an additional day in San Francisco to get some sleep before I re-

turned to Washington, and, accordingly, I would not be in the office until Tuesday. It was at this time that I first learned from Mr. Fielding of the break-in at the DNC headquarters. . . .

Accordingly, I flew back to Washington and arrived on Sunday evening. I had a brief conversation with Mr. Fielding and

he informed me that he had learned from Jack Caulfield that Mr. McCord from the re-election committee was among those arrested in the DNC on Saturday and also that one of the Cubans arrested had a check that was made out by Howard Hunt to some country club.

I recall that my immediate reaction was that Chuck Colson was probably involved.

I was truly exhausted at this point so I told Mr. Fielding that I couldn't do anything at this time and I went to bed without doing a thing.

On Monday morning, June 19, I arrived at my office about 9:15, my normal arrival time at the office. While reading the news accounts of the incident, I received a call from Jack Caulfield who repeated what

Mr. Fielding had told me on Sunday evening. . . . I next received a call from Magruder and, as best I can recall, Magruder said something to the effect that this might create some problems and I should look into it. He also stated that this was all Liddy's fault and he volunteered a few harsh epithets regarding Liddy. . . .