Anyone who opposes us, we’ll destroy.
As a matter of fact, anyone who doesn’t support us, we’ll destroy.

—Egil Krogh Jr.
in a 1969 conversation with Daniel E. Servatius, chairman of the political science department of the University of Chicago.

SOMETIMES in the spring of 1971, John Deanfield noticed that he and Tony Ullum had an "entrepreneurial and competitive" relationship. "For some reason," a former White House aide recalls, "it was decided that Casfield couldn’t handle the really heavy stuff." Krogh was assigned an associate—David Young, a 32-year-old lawyer from Kissinger’s National Security Council staff—and a secretary, 23-year-old Kathleen Chenow. To insiders, the outfit was often described simply as the "Room 16 Project," but it soon acquired another nickname. Miss Chenow recalled: "David Young’s mother-in-law or grandmother or somebody saw in The New York Times that Krogh and Young were working on leaks. She called the story to his attention, saying, ‘Your grandfather would be proud of you. Working on leaks at the White House. He was a plumber!’ So David put up a sign on the door which said, ‘Mr. Young—Plumber.’"

New urgency was attached to the Plumbers’ work as a result of several other developments that summer. One, Krogh recalls, was a report from the C.I.A. that a news story had put in jeopardy the life of an intelligence agent. But by far the most important came on July 23 when William Beecher produced another of his amazing scoops. This one began: "American negotiators have proposed to the Soviet Union an arms-control agreement that would halt construction of both land-based missiles and submarine.

Then, as 1971 came to a close, President Nixon announced the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. The President asked John Ehrlichman to supervise the project, and in early July Ehrlichman assigned 31-year-old Egil Krogh Jr., one of his assistants, to head the unit.

Many a month these past few years, a lone figure in a gray suit or behind a desk would have seen jogging around the ellipse below the White House.
The runner was Egil (Bad) Krogh, who jogged five miles a day to keep in shape. Krogh maintains a similar regimen in the rest of his life. One acquaintance describes him as "a brick, polite, dynamic young executive—he had all the facts, he’d done his homework. Never messed, never damped, absolutely spic and span." Others called him "straight as an arrow" and "a very spiritual guy" (like Ehrlichman, a nonpracticing Methodist). Krogh, who is a Christian Scientist, and some liked to call him "well Krogh," because he was so patronizingly the opposite. Brought to the White House by Ehrlichman, with whom he served in a Senate law firm, Krogh was assigned to the staff of the President’s Domestic Council, specializing in transportation and crime prevention. He was also the White House liaison man with the District of Columbia, seeking to create "a new psychological climate." Parry, that meant law and order, he said, but "it doesn’t mean repression. We’re trying to create a respect for authority, not necessarily for power."

The Special Investigations Unit opened offices in Room 16 in the basement of the Executive Office Building next to the White House. Krogh was assigned an associate—David Young, a 32-year-old lawyer from Kissinger’s National Security Council staff—and a secretary, 23-year-old Kathleen Chenow. To insiders, the outfit was often discussed simply as the "Room 16 Project," but it soon acquired another nickname. Miss Chenow recalls: "David Young’s mother-in-law or grandmother or somebody saw in The New York Times that Krogh and Young were working on leaks. She called the story to his attention, saying, ‘Your grandfather would be proud of you. Working on leaks at the White House. He was a plumber!’ So David put up a sign on the door which said, ‘Mr. Young—Plumber.’"

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and went on to spell out the American proposals at the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation (SALT) talks under way in Helsinki. Author John Newhouse says the Beecher story stirred "rage" in the White House. The U.S. and the Russians had a firm agreement not to release details of their proposals to the press. Not only was Beecher’s article full of such details, but it came out the morning before the U.S. delegation was to make its first presentation of the proposal to the Russians in Helsinki. And, worse yet, it disclosed one of the American fallback positions. Nevertheless, some observers believe the Administration was more concerned about domestic considerations, fearing that the proposal would now become the subject of political publicity and counterpunches at home.

In subsequent statements, White House officials have given the impression that this and other leaks were part of a plot orchestrated by the radical left and aided by its allies in Government. But the known facts on the SALT leak do not support that premise. The precise identity of Beecher’s source has never been revealed. But six Pentagon officials were shifted out of their positions supposedly as a result of the leak. And the State Department asked three of its officials known to have talked to Beecher during that period to take lie-detector tests, administered by the C.I.A., in apparent violation of the statute that bars that agency from domestic operations. A State Department spokesman says the officials still occupy "positions of responsibility" in the department. Some believe Beecher’s story came from Pentagon officials who sought to sabotage the SALT talks because they disapproved of any rapprochement with the Soviets; others think it came from those who wanted to "force" the United States negotiating position. But it almost certainly came from Government officials with no current ties to Dan Ellsberg or the Weathermen.

By then, it hardly mattered where it came from. That summer of ’71, many men in the White House apparently felt events closing in on them, as if somehow all the people on their "enemies list" had joined hands to destroy them. In part, their fears involved national-security considerations. But plainly there were political considerations, too. By that summer, the President knew that he was going to be campaigning for re-election largely in Peking and Moscow. Any obstacles on his road to these two capitals also blocked his parallel campaign trail. Part of the problem in succeeding months may have been the inability of the President and the men around him adequately to distinguish between those the President, the man whom he had first met five years before at a Brown University party and whom he had since come to know well.

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE/JULY 22, 1973 13
Plumbers (cont.)

“We became lawless in a day. It was a struggle for the rule of law — semi-outlaws who risked their lives to put down the savagery of others,” says Peter Ward, a C.I.A. agent in Saigon. “I was a book called ‘Hazardous Duty’ by David St. John—also known as John Baxter. George Davis, Robert Mullen & Company, a Washington pub-

lic-relations firm with strong ties to the conservative wing of the Republican party. But he missed the C.I.A. desperately. “You see, our government people live for myself to do these things and do them successfully,” he explained later. “It becomes a way of life for a person like me.” So, in retire-

came to see him, Cushman says, he knew him to be “a highly respected and honorably retired C.I.A. employee.” According to Cushman, Hunt said he had “a very sensitive one-time interview that the White House wanted him to hold with a person whose ideology he was not sure of, and that he dare not reveal his [Hunt’s] true identity.” Therefore, he would need a physical disguise and some false identification.

The next day, a representative of the C.I.A.’s Technical Services Division called Hunt and in-

structed him to come to a “safe house”—a clandestine C.I.A. meeting place—on Massachusetts Avenue near the National Cathedral. There he was furnished with a weapon and a speech-alter-

ning device (a plate which fits into the mouth and alters the tone of the speaker’s voice as well as a Social Security card, a driver’s license and sev-

eral miscellaneous membership cards in the name of Edward Joseph Warren). Early that year, Hunt was called upon to serve as the guarantor of a false passport for a CIA operative who was to make a trip to Europe. Hunt had been in contact with the European section of the CIA for some time, and had been asked to make sure that all of the papers were in order before the man was to leave for Europe.

On July 22, Hunt visited Cushman in his office at the C.I.A.’s secluded Langley, Va., headquarters. The two men had known each other for years and once shared an office when Cushman had served previously with the agency. So when Hunt

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His campaign literature ("He knows the answer is law and order, not weak-kneed sociology, Gordon Liddy doesn't tell them out—he puts them in") featured a picture of him wielding a police spotlight at a crowd of angry blacks. Although he lost the primary, Liddy had the Conservative party nomination. But he declined to run in the general election, and a few months later Congressmen Fish recommended him for his job at Treasury.

If Ted Kennedy was the first of the "them," by June, 1971, Daniel Ellsberg was a very close second. "Because of the extreme gravity of the situation, and not then knowing what additional secrets Mr. Ellsberg might disclose," the President recalls, he told Egil Krogh that "as a matter of first priority the Special Investigations unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg's associates and his motives."

This separate investigation of Ellsberg—outside normal F.B.I. channels—was necessary, Krogh recalls, because Hoover was a close personal friend of Louis Marx, father of Ellsberg's second wife, Patricia. Marx and Hoover were indeed close friends, but the ultracconservative millionare had little sympathy for his son-in-law's current activities and refused to contribute money to his defense.

In the early stages of the Plumbers' investigation, Krogh recalls, he received "information suggesting that Dr. Ellsberg did not act alone." So the unit concentrated for a while on discovering whether the Plumbers' disclosure was "an individual act, the act of a small group, or the result of a wider conspiracy to engage in espionage." As part of this effort, the Plumbers were reportedly getting transcripts from a phone tap placed on Ellsberg's home phone that day. The F.B.I. is said to have been investigating Ellsberg even before publication of the Pentagon Papers. But the Plumbers themselves apparently initiated wiretaps on two New York Times reporters: Neil Sheehan, the reporter responsible for obtaining the Pentagon Papers, and Ted Sorel, who covered the State Department.

Another suspected conspirator was Mort Halpert, the target of earlier F.B.I. taps. By about this time he had been elevated to the "top 20 of the enemies list with the notation "aascal would be most helpful." Halpert, who had been in overall charge of the Pentagon Papers project, was then at the Brookings Institution, a private research institute staffed by many former Kennedy and Johnson Administration officials. According to John Dean, Caulfield told him that Chuck Colson had instructed him in June or July to burglarize an office at Brookings (said to be Halpert's) and seize any "sealed documents." Caulfield said Ulasewicz had "cased" the institution and made "friendly contact with a security guard there. According to Dean, Caulfield told Colson that security at Brookings was "extremely tight," but Colson said that "if necessary he should plant a firebomb in the building and retrieve the documents during the confusion that would ensue." Dean says he flew to California and persuaded Ehrlichman that the Brookings burglary was "in-sane." He says Ehrlichman phoned Colson to "call it off." Colson denies the whole story, although an associate says he may have suggested the bombing as a joke.

Gradually, the Plumbers began zeroing in on Ellsberg himself. Hunt explains that there was "concurn" in the White House about prosecuting Ellsberg for fear that he would become a martyr. Some officials pressed for information which would allow them to determine Ellsberg's "prosecutability"—presumably not merely his role in publishing the Papers but aspects of his background which would make him vulnerable. Ellsberg had been in psychoanalysis in Los Angeles, and Hunt says the unit soon concluded that the best

"instant source" would be the psychiatrist's files.

Two F.B.I. agents visited the psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, on July 20 in his office at 450 North Bedford Drive in Beverly Hills. Dr. Fielding, a slender man in his mid-50's with a shaved Yul Brynner-style head, recalls that the agents wanted to discuss Dr. Ellsberg. He said he would consult his attorney, and the next day the attorney called the F.B.I. and said his client would not violate the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship.

Krogh recalls that when Dr. Fielding refused to cooperate, Ehrlichman gave the unit a "general authorization to engage in covert activity to obtain a psychological history of Ellsberg. Hunt recalls that about this time the idea of a burglary—a "bug job"—on the psychiatrist's office became the subject of "low-key" conversations around the office. Hunt says that at one point he inquired why the F.B.I. couldn't do the burglary and Liddy told him that in recent years the bureau had ceased training agents for that type of operation. "The agents had been reassigned or lost their skills," he said. He then asked why the Secret Service couldn't do it and Liddy told him the White House didn't trust them for that kind of job.

Prosecutors are said to have a copy of a memo from Krogh and Young to Ehrlichman, dated some time before Sept. 1, which outlines in detail plans to burglarize Dr. Fielding's office. Young has testified that Ehrlichman saw the memo and approved the burglary. Ehrlichman has refused to confirm or deny this. And John Dean says Krogh told him that orders for the burglary came "directly from the Oval Office." Hunt says those who approved the burglary made clear that "no one with any association with the White House could be involved in any way directly with such an operation." . . . do I was asked whether or not, as a result of my old C.I.A. contacts, I could come up with a team capable of making such an entry.

He immediately thought of an old friend, Bernard Barker, who—under the code name "Macho"—had been his principal assistant in the Bay of Pigs operation. For the past decade, they had kept in touch only through an occasional letter. Then, on April 16, 1971, Hunt and his wife were in Miami for a reunion the next day of the Bay of Pigs veterans. Hunt stopped by Barker's house and pinned a note to his door, saying "if you are the same Barker I once knew," he should contact Hunt at a Miami Beach hotel. A few hours later, Barker called and the two "freedom fighters" and their wives had lunch together in a Cuban restaurant and talked about "old times."

"I was not there to think. I was there to follow orders," Bernard Barker was to say later in describing his relationship with Hunt. For most of his life, Bernard Barker has been following orders. Born of American parents in Havana, he spent his youth alternating between schools in Cuba and the United States. As with so many sons of uncertain heritage, he became a fierce patriot. The day after Pearl Harbor, he went to the American Embassy and enlisted in the Army Air Corps—the first volunteer in the Second World War from Cuba." He proudly proclaims. When his plane went down over Germany, Captain Barker spent 16 months as a prisoner of war. His sense of discipline was reinforced by postwar service in the Cuban police force—during which he once served as a bodyguard for Mrs. Truman and his daughter, Margaret; Castro's seizure of power and Barker into exile and several years of determined resistance work—in the Bay of Pigs and other clandestine operations. Gradually he settled

Watergate cash: Some of the bills found on the men arrested in the burglary of D.N.C. headquarters.
Plumbers (cont.)
down to make money in Miami, working as an assistant store manager; studying at night to get a real-estate license, finally opening his own realtor's office—Barber Associates—with a staff of 10 salesmen.

Four months after their Bay of Pigs reunion, Hunt and Barber moved to Los Angeles, where Barber and his comrade in arms. He asked, Barber recalls, "would I be willing to help him in a matter of national security?" Barber says Hunt contended that the "national-security organization" to which he then belonged was "above both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I." He was vague about the specific mission, saying only that it involved "a trainer to this country who had given information to a foreign embassy." Barber eagerly signed on, believing, "Mr. Hunt's position in the White House would be a decisive factor at a later date for obtaining help in the liberation of Cuba."

Hunt then asked him to recruit two others. Barber chose two of his own real-estate salesmen: Felipe DeDiego, 43, who Barber said had taken part in a successful raid to capture Castro Government documents; and Eugenio R. Martinez, 43, whom Barber credits with "over 300 infiltrations into Castro Cuba."

Late in August, Hunt got a Toshiba camera concealed in a tobacco pouch from his C.I.A. contact and also arranged for Liddy to be outfitted with false identification and a disguise. On Aug. 29, Liddy and Hunt flew to Los Angeles for what Hunt called "a preliminary vulnerability and feasibility study." Wearing dark glasses, Liddy posed by some bright flowering bushes outside Dr. Fielding's office building, while Hunt, using his photographic tobacco pouch, mapped some pictures of the buildings, a nondescript three-story structure decorated with Hawaiian grass and a spotlit parking lot. Then they walked through the walled-pavement hallways to Fielding's office in Room 213, brushed through the changing rooms, taking pictures. Suddenly, Maria Martinez, the cleaning man's mother, entered the office. Hunt said calmly in Spanish, "I am a doctor." Mrs. Martinez seemed satisfied and left. That evening, Hunt called the C.I.A. and asked to be moved when he and Liddy arrived the next day at Dulles Airport. There they handed a roll of film to an agent who got it developed and returned it to Hunt that same evening.

On "D minus two" (Sept. 2), the two branches of the burglary team converged on Beverly Hills: Barber, Martinez and DeDiego flying directly from Miami to Los Angeles; Liddy and Hunt stopping off in Chicago to pick up several walkie-talkies and other equipment. On the morning of Sept. 3, the Miami men were briefed by Hunt and then made a "visual reconnaissance" of the target. At 9 P.M. that evening, two of them returned dressed in delivery man's uniforms and carrying a large green suitcase addressed to Dr. Fielding and marked with "Air-Express" and "Rush" stickers. Efrain Martinez, the cleaning man, let them into Fielding's office where they placed the suitcase on the floor.

A few minutes past midnight the team swung into action. Hunt stationed himself at Dr. Fielding's residence to make sure the psychiatrist remained at home. Liddy cruised the area in a rented car looking for police, keeping in touch with the others over a walkie-talkie. Meanwhile, the three Miami men returned to the building. Using masking tape and a glass cutter, they broke through a window on the ground floor and forced the door to Fielding's office. There they opened the green suitcase, which contained a 35-mm. camera, a spotlight and film. Barber piloted open a wooden cabinet and a metal filing cabinet, shoving their contents around the office as he looked for information on Elsberg. Here the participants' testimony differs. Barber says they found nothing on Elsberg except his name in one of the doctor's address books, but DeDiego says they did find Elsberg's file, and that Hunt and Liddy held the contents while Martinez photographed them. In any case, by 4 A.M. all five men had returned to the Beverly Hills. After their return to Washington, Hunt and Liddy showed Kragh pictures they had taken of Dr. Fielding's apartment and, apparently believing that the psychiatrist might be keeping some of Elsberg's records at home, recommended a burglary attempt there. Kragh says that Ehrlchman rejected the proposal. Ehrlchman says that as soon as he heard of the project he told Kragh and Young he "did not agree with this method of investigation" and they should "not do this again."

Following the burglary, the White House apparently renewed its request to the C.I.A. for a "psychological profile" of Elsberg. Hunt says he knew the agency had a division that did behavioral profiles on world leaders—the most celebrated being the one of Nikita Khrushchev just before President Kennedy met him in Vienna in 1961. The agency had done only one such profile on an American—Capt. Lloyd Bucher of the Pueblo, after he and his crew were captured by the North Koreans in 1965. This, at least, had some direct relation to the C.I.A.-mission abroad, but the request for Elsberg profile made the agency's two top medical men—Dr. John T. Flynn and Dr. Bernard Malloy—"apprehensive." They were overruled by their superiors, among them Director Richard Helms and General Cushman. A final profile on Elsberg, incorporating classified information from the Justice and State Departments, was delivered to the White House on Nov. 12. Meanwhile, Hunt drew up his own report—a 28-page chronology of Elsberg's life, later found in Hunt's safe.

The President has said that by the end of 1971 the Plumbers' work had "tapered off" and the unit had begun to disband. Some of its members were "recalled" to action in January, 1972, when Jack Anderson began printing minutes of secret National Security Council meetings. Hunt and Young were called to the White House and apologized for the lapses of the intelligence unit. Hunt maintained a clandestine telephone in the Plumbers' office until March, 1972, for which bills were sent to Hetty Callahan by an associate of John Ehrlchman (the phone was used chiefly for calls to Bernard Barber in Miami, Miss Chenow says). But with the approach of the election year, most of the Plumbers were moving on to more overtly political activities.

Dirty Money

I have often thought we had too much money.

—Herbert Porter, testimony to Ervin Committee, June 7, 1972.

In the top floor of Irvine Towers, where Herb, Kalmbach has his office, a man can watch the sparkling white yachts bobbing in the Pacific along "Millionaire's Row" in Newport Beach, Calif. Within a silver dollar's throw of the twin office towers, some 10 or 13 millionaires live in walled, well-guarded beachfront compounds. And many of those men belong to the Lincoln Club, an exclusive group of California businessmen that over the years has given vast sums of money to Richard Nixon—much of it funneled through the President's longtime personal lawyer, Herb Kalmbach.

By Jan. 28, 1971, Mr. Kalmbach had opened an account in the Newport Beach branch of the Bank of America, which has offices in Irvine Towers West. Over the next year, according to Government sources, he maintained up to $500,000 in that account—many of the deposits coming in cashier's checks which he purchased with cash at a branch of the Security Pacific National Bank, whose offices are in Irvine Towers West. Money was transferred back and forth between Irvine Towers East and Irvine Towers West in an apparent effort to blur its trail.

Kalmbach was the chief fundraiser for the Nixon campaign until February, 1972, and thereafter second only to Maurice Stans. His secret fund, established at least two years before the election, set the tone for the financial side of the White House effort.

Since Nixon entered the White House in 1969, a remarkable change has come over the Orange County roulette wheel of Kalmbach, DeMarco, Knaap & Chilingworth. It began to rise from the eighth floor of Century City to the 16th floor of a downtown Los Angeles business center to the 44th floor of the city's newest skyscraper (Kalmbach keeps a separate office in Newport Beach). A similar change has come over the firm's clientele, which in 1968 included the banks of the local Newport National Bank and Pacific Lighting—and today includes such companies as United Air Lines.