

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Communist Asian nations are beginning to look with increasing favor on the prospect of a permanent umbrella of U.S. protection—an attitude that has been visibly fortified by the emergence of Peking's violent Red Guard movement and by China's expanding nuclear war potential. Avowed neutrals like India and Indonesia, for instance, publicly continue to profess nonalignment, but they have been making it plain in private for months that however earnestly they desire peace in Vietnam, they would regard any U.S. withdrawal from the far Pacific as a disaster.

'Very Great Effect': In Japan, where domestic political opposition to the Vietnam war is particularly vociferous, President Johnson's tour was the object of some of the most forthright praise of all. Thus Kiichi Miyazawa, a top policy adviser to Japan's ruling Liberal Democrats Party, argued that the President's trip "may yet account for making him one of the truly great American Presidents in history . . . Johnson's trip," said Miyazawa, "has paralleled for Asia Truman's postwar interest in Europe . . . So far his trip has not produced anything concrete, but its magnitude may not be seen until many years later . . . It may have a very great effect in future years."

The skeptics, meanwhile, doubted that the enemy would respond to the U.S. Manila pledge to withdraw its troops from Vietnam within six months after Hanoi begins to pull back its forces. The joker was seen in the fact that the timing of any such withdrawal would apparently be decided unilaterally by the U.S. The President, however, seemed pleased that the South Vietnamese, at least, had approved the pledge, for both his own advisers and South Vietnam's Foreign Minister had told him that Premier Nguyen Cao Ky would never agree to any such speedy U.S. withdrawal. When Mr. Johnson himself broached the question of the six-month withdrawal provision to Ky, the young marshal promptly agreed.

"But what about your Foreign Minister?" the President asked.

"Don't worry," said Ky. "He will agree, too."

Influence: The inclusion of the six-month withdrawal provision was of particular importance to the President, who went to Manila fresh from a series of nuts-and-bolts talks on Vietnam with visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Gromyko stressed that one obstacle to peace is North Vietnam's desire for proof that the U.S. does not intend to stay in Vietnam permanently. Then the Soviet Foreign Minister added (for what is thought to be the first time it has been said directly), "our influence in Hanoi is considerable."


Seen from this perspective, the Ma-

nila conference seems to have had two major policy consequences—one to reaffirm the permanence of the U.S. commitment in the Far East, the other to advance diplomatic efforts with the Soviet Union to see if Moscow can use its "considerable influence" to get Hanoi to come to the conference table.

ASSASSINATION:

The Missing Link

Of all the loose ends in the John F. Kennedy murder case, few have so fascinated the conspiracy theorists as a single mystery within a mystery: what became of the photos and X-rays of the JFK autopsy? Those pictures, so doubters argued, might well knock the heart out of the Warren commission's case against Lee Harvey Oswald as the lone assassin—and the inevitable allegation was that they had been "suppressed" for



Single-bullet theory: Commission's re-enactment of Oswald's double hit

precisely that reason. Fanciful? Perhaps. But official Washington could only offer the vaguest rejoinder—until last week, when, three years after the fact, the 65 X-rays, color slides and black-and-white negatives were at last delivered to the National Archives. If the pictures still remained off limits to all but Federal investigators for the next five years, the mystery within a mystery at least was solved: the pictures, in effect if not in fact, had been in the possession of the Kennedy family all along.

What made them important was their potential value in settling a pivotal point of the investigation: whether or not a single bullet ripped through Kennedy's neck and inflicted multiple wounds on Texas Gov. John Connally. Films of the assassination indicated the two men were hit no more than 1.8 seconds apart—too fast for anyone to rip off two shots with Oswald's obsolescent Italian rifle. If the two men were hit by separate bullets, the almost inescapable conclu-

sion would be that two riflemen were involved. But the commission came up with the one-rifleman, one-bullet theory. In doing so, it relied on the official autopsy report, the testimony of the doctors who performed it at Bethesda (Md.) Naval Hospital, a series of reconstructions posing agents as Kennedy and Connally and some artists' conceptions of the path of the bullet through JFK's neck. Assured by the doctors that the actual autopsy pictures—pinpointing the exact location of the wounds—weren't necessary, no commission members demanded to see them.

Dark Surmise: Only this year did the pictures become a serious issue—notably with the publication of Harvard graduate student Edward Jay Epstein's "Inquest," a critical study of the commission inquiry. Epstein argued that the government's own evidence—including a rough autopsy drawing and photos of JFK's coat and shirt—indicated the shot hit the

late President too low on the back to have exited at his necktie knot and caused all of Connally's wounds. And, in the archives, he found two FBI reports that said the bullet actually had lodged in Kennedy's back and had apparently dropped out without passing through the body. Epstein's dark surmise: the official autopsy report may have been rigged to sustain the single-assassin theory. Plainly, the substantive points could be settled only by the autopsy pictures—and the pictures, as commission staffers vaguely noted, were "unavailable."

As it turned out, Bethesda had given the pictures to the Secret Service; the Secret Service, by one inside version, held onto them but—as is customary in routine autopsies—surrendered actual ownership to the family. And the Kennedys, in turn, withheld them from public view—including even the commission record—as a matter of taste. For nearly three years, neither the commis-

sion nor the government pressed them.

Only in mid-September, with the drumfire of doubt mounting in the U.S., did the Justice Department broach the subject to Sen. Robert F. Kennedy—a man still so deeply scarred that not even intimates will raise the subject of the assassination with him. Kennedy turned over negotiations to his old Justice Department colleague, Burke Marshall, now general counsel for IBM and lawyer for the executors of JFK's estate. The public version was that the Kennedys had simply delivered the pictures in time for the Nov. 2 statutory deadline for the U.S. to take title to all evidence in the case. But the delicacy of the negotiations was made plain by the terms the Kennedys set on the grant.

Those terms specified that only Federal investigators could look at the pictures during the next five years—a span chosen, said Marshall, “on the grounds that by that time there will not be a lot of people making money out of the assassination.” Even after that, Marshall will screen applicants and grant access only to “recognized experts—so long as their intent is serious and not sensational.” Those restrictions will stand for the lifetime not only of Kennedy's widow, parents, brothers and sisters but Caroline and John Jr. as well—a proviso likely to foreclose the pictures to public view into the 21st century.

The Doctors: They were examined last week by two of the autopsy doctors, who insisted that the pictures only confirmed what they had originally told the commission. But the family's Feds-only rule would also permit an independent review by a Congressional committee. Neither was likely to suit the doubters. New York lawyer Mark Lane, the best-known of the skeptics, threatened to file a taxpayer's suit to break the restrictions on outside scrutiny of the pictures. And even some cooler heads thought an independent check was in order; one commission staffer, indeed, suggested showing the pictures to an ad hoc blue-ribbon panel.

But there were some powerful countervailing voices. Lyndon Baines Johnson, for one, thought it was enough that the evidence was available to any official body: “. . . I think that every American can understand the reasons why we wouldn't want to have . . . everything paraded out in every sewing circle in the country to be exploited and used without serving any good or official purpose.” And there was an improbable second from none other than Edward Jay Epstein, who had helped raise the great photo mystery in the first place. The restrictions, said Epstein, sounded “very reasonable” to him—and he thought the possibility of a second assassin would, thanks to the pictures, “probably be reduced to nil.”

NEW YORK:

The Patriots

By their visible credentials they seemed a random cross section of New York City's yeoman middle class. They were mostly family men, in their late 20s and early 30s, engaged in a diversity of respectable trades. Among them were a milkman, a landscaper, a mechanic, a fireman, a plasterer, a draftsman, a cabdriver, a subway conductor, a trucker, a gardener. What the nineteen had in common, said police after arresting them last week, was, generally, a fear of Reds, a penchant for weaponry, a predilection for secrecy and, specifically, a conspiratorial intent to launch surprise military attacks on several centers identified with leftist causes in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.

Such was the nub of an alleged con-



N.Y. Daily News

Minutemen arms: Even a crossbow

spiracy that New York police announced they had nipped in a series of early-morning raids on Long Island, in New York City and in upstate New York. The cops hauled in tons of weapons and ammunition and identified their prisoners as members of the Minutemen, a small nationwide organization of gun-loving patriots who cast themselves as the guerrilla fighters of the future destined to liberate America after the Communists take over. Ever since the Minutemen movement was born in 1959 its design has been well advertised. The only surprise that came out of last week's crackdown was that guerrilla action seemed to be so close at hand.

Law-enforcement officials charged that Minutemen disguised as hunters had planned to launch a firebomb attack against four separate targets: the Brooklyn campaign headquarters of

Herbert Aptheker, a Communist Peace-and-Freedom Congressional candidate, and three other sites, identified with far-left agitation—Camp Unity at Wingdale, N.Y., Camp Midvale at Ringwood, N.J., and “Pacifist Farm” in Voluntown, Conn.

Arsenal: By count of Queens District Attorney Nat H. Hentel, a Republican who directed the raids and who coincidentally was up for election this week, police collected 125 rifles (single shot and automatic), 10 pipe bombs, 5 mortars, 12 machine guns (.30 caliber), 25 hand guns, 20 brass knuckles (with daggers attached), 220 knives (hunting, throwing, cleavers and machetes), 1 bazooka, 3 grenade launchers, 6 hand grenades. There were a million rounds of ammunition. There was even a trusty crossbow.

Arraigned on conspiracy charges and bailed for a total of \$81,000, the defendants left the explanations to their lawyers. Attorney John Schettino, for instance, told newsmen that his client—Jack Lynn Boyce, 40, a student identified as the leader of the nineteen—was a longtime gun fancier, a hobby that accounted for the two howitzers displayed on the porch of Boyce's hillside home in Katonah, N.Y., and presumably also for the weapons that state police found inside the Boyce residence. These included 10 machine guns, 15 rifles, a sawed-off shotgun, 3 mortars, a bazooka, 12 walkie-talkie sets, a tank radio transmitter, an antitank projectile, 10,000 rounds of high-velocity ammunition and a quantity of illegal fireworks.

Pea Cans: For cloak-and-dagger trimmings—no less than for the ingredient of implausible lunacy—the alleged Minutemen conspiracy ranked with last year's abortive plot to blow up the Statue of Liberty (NEWSWEEK, March 1, 1965). By infiltration and surveillance for nine months, authorities built a fat dossier on the New York Minutemen and their friends—including, Hentel said later, a state cop who passed them stolen guns and tips on FBI and police investigators. The police records included one report by a neighbor who watched leader Boyce at target practice with his brother—firing cans of peas from a mortar at a herd of cows. Boyce says he was firing cans of dirt—and *not* at the cows.

As authorities got ready to submit the case to a grand jury, relatives of the defendants seemed dismayed that this sort of thing could happen in the U.S. “They may be Birchers,” said Mrs. Lucy Ferraro, mother of two of the defendants, “but they're not extremists.” Lawrence Conklin, father of another of the Minutemen, echoed her protest. “It's a helluva thing,” he said, “that they molest real Americans and leave the Communists and the Cosa Nostra alone. Every last one of these boys is a dyed-in-the-wool patriot.”