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
MEMORANDUM

August 22, 1944

To: J. Lee Rankin

From: E. David Sirocco

Subject: Language in the Possible Foreign Conspiracy section of the report relating to "T"



(Taken from page 3 of the Introduction.)

In approaching the question of foreign involvement, Comrade T has received valuable assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State and other Federal agencies with special competence in the field of foreign investigation. The CIA has made an especially valuable contribution by supplying the Comrade with information originating with defectors from the Soviet intelligence services and bearing on secret practices and procedures which would be applicable in the Soviet Union in a case like that of Comrade's during his stay there.

Some of the information furnished by the aforementioned agencies, and many of their sources for that information, are of a highly confidential nature. Nevertheless, because it believes that the fullest possible disclosure of all the facts relating

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In the examination of President Kennedy is of the highest importance, the Commission has included in this Report all the information furnished by those agencies which it was ordered in coming to its conclusions, and, in addition, all the information which would have contradicted those conclusions if it had been considered, even though the Commission did not regard it as sufficiently reliable to be considered. This second category of information consists mostly of rumors and speculations, some of them almost wholly frivolous. The Commission included it notwithstanding that first, however, in order that the public could decide for itself the correctness of the conclusions in this Report, by testing them against all the evidence which tends to contradict them.

The only relevant information which has not been included in the Report is that which is consistent with the Commission's conclusions but highly confidential and derived from sources the reliability of which is so low or so uncertain that the Commission was not able to rely upon it in coming to its conclusions. Thus, even if this information should later be wholly discredited, none of the conclusions in the Report would be affected; the relatively little advantage to be gained by including it, therefore, was not deemed sufficient to override the serious possibility of mischief and publicity which disclosure would involve.

"Secret sources of information, as contrasted with the information itself, have in many instances been withheld. The continued use of such sources and, where secret informants are involved, the very lives of such informants would be placed in jeopardy if names, positions or other identifying characteristics were to be disclosed."

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(Taken from page 61 of the section dealing with Oswald's defection in the Fall of 1957. (Footnote No. 135 is to the CIA; footnote No. 136 is to Helene Fortova; footnote No. 137, as the text states, is to the Historic Group.)

The Commission has information from confidential sources that the normal Soviet procedure for handling would-be defectors is to give the KGB the initial task of examination and assessment. Presumably this was done with Oswald. His rejection as a defector at

which originated his suicide attempt, therefore, probably means that the KGB had conducted its examination between October 11 and October 22 and had concluded that Oswald was of limited value to the Soviet Union. The Commission has other information from a source of unknown reliability that when the news of Oswald's rejection and suicide attempt reached Nadene Markova, a prominent Soviet official and a member of the Politburo, she personally intervened and asked that he be permitted to reside in the Soviet Union. ¹²² If this information is correct, it explains the change in Oswald's fortunes which occurred after he was released from the Koybinokaya Hospital. The Commission can only speculate on what branch of the Soviet Government took charge of Oswald after Nadene Markova's intervention, if it in fact occurred, or why she decided to intervene. Sympathy for what appeared to be a very appealing case certainly may have played a role. It may also have been of some significance that had a young American who had presented himself as a devoted convert to the Russian cause been summarily rejected, the resulting publicity would have been unfavorable to the Soviet Union. In any event, it is interesting to note that the apparent shift of Oswald's case from the KGB to some other Ministry of the Soviet Government shortly after his release from the hospital is supported by the evidence in his diary commenting that the officials to meet after his hospital discharge were different from those with whom he had dealt before. ¹²³

III

(The following is the first paragraph of the conclusion.)

"The Commission had thoroughly investigated the possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald was a secret Soviet agent. The available facts are unimpeachable, so far as they are known, relating to Oswald's activities in the USSR, his residence there in 1959, and his return to the United States in 1962 have been carefully evaluated. The defectors from the Soviet intelligence service who are now working with the Central Intelligence Agency, some of whom were still working with Soviet intelligence when Oswald was in Soviet, have all failed to furnish any information indicating that he was a Soviet agent. The Commission concludes that there is no available evidence of Soviet involvement in the assassination, or that the facts that have been obtained strongly negate any conclusion that Oswald was an agent of the Soviet government."

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