

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

.....
MADON WEINER,
:

Plaintiff,
:

v.
:

Civil Action
:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
:

No. 2201-79
:

Defendant.
:
:
:
.....

ANSWER OF PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff denies that there are no issues of fact and that there is no claim upon which relief can be granted.

I.

QUESTIONS OF FACT AND MIXED
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW.

In its "Preliminary Statement" on page 1 of its "Memorandum of Points and Authorities," Defendant states that it requested permission to inspect certain spectrographic samples of bullets and bullet fragments recovered from the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas, on November 23, 1963.

Bullets and bullet fragments may have been "recovered" in Dealey Plaza, the "scene" of the assassination, on November 23, 1963. However, if so, plaintiff is unaware of where the fragments were "recovered" from a piece of marking in Dealey Plaza. It is plaintiff's belief that this was an issue of fact.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

.....
HAROLD WEISBERG,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Defendant

Civil Action

No. 1961-70

.....
AGREEMENT OF PLAINTIFF TO DEPARTMENT'S
AGREEMENT TO WEISBERG CO., IN THE ALLEN-
DIXON, FOR DEPARTMENT JUSTICE

Plaintiff states that there are no issues of material
fact and that there is no claim upon which relief can be granted.

1.

AGREEMENT OF DEPT AND WEISBERG
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In its "Preliminary Statement" on page 1 of its "Memo-
randa of Points and Authorities," defendant states that plaintiff
"has requested permission to inspect certain spectrographic analyses
of bullets and bullet fragments recovered from the scene of the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas on
November 23, 1963."

Bullets and bullet fragments may have been "recovered"
in Dealey Plaza, the "scene" of the assassination, on November 23,
1963. However, if so, plaintiff is unaware of them; a fragment or
fragments were "recovered" from a piece of curbing in Dealey Plaza
but it is plaintiff's belief that this was as late as July, 1964.

The bullets and bullet fragments, spectrographic analysis of which are sought by plaintiff, were "recovered" primarily on November 22nd, the date of the assassination, but some were "recovered" on November 23rd and at later times. They were "recovered" generally not at the "scene" but at Bellas' Parkland Hospital, Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland, and at other places, including Washington, D.C.

More important, defendant states as a matter of fact (see page one of his Statement of Material Fact) that the records sought "are part of an 'investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes.'" It is plaintiff's contention that this is incorrect and that the records in fact were not compiled for law enforcement purposes but exclusively as part of an investigation requested by President Lyndon B. Johnson on November 22, 1963, Executive Order 11307, and S. J. Res. 197, 88th Congress, 1963, none of which involved "law enforcement."

The remainder of this answer will deal with the question which appears to be a mixed question of fact and law.

II.

LAW ENFORCEMENT.

On page two of its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, defendant properly cites exemption (b) (7) exactly as "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." Plaintiff then adds: "The thrust of the exemption is to prevent disclosure all files which the government compiles in the course of law enforcement investigations which may or may not be..."

The bullets and bullet fragments, spectrographic analyses of which are sought by plaintiff, were "recovered" primarily on November 22nd, the date of the assassination, but some were "recovered" on November 23rd and at later times. They were "recovered" generally not at the "scene" but at Balila's Washburn Hospital, Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland, and at other places, including Washington, D.C.

More important, defendant states as a matter of fact (see page one of his Statement of Material Facts) that the records sought "are part of an 'investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes.'" It is plaintiff's contention that this is incorrect and that the records in fact were not compiled for any law enforcement purpose but exclusively as part of an investigation requested by President Lyndon B. Johnson on November 24, 1963 pursuant to Executive Order 11652 and S. J. Res. 137, 85th Congress... none of which involved "law enforcement."

The remainder of this cover will deal with this latter question which appears to be a mixed question of fact and law.

II.
DISCUSSION

On page two of his Statement of Facts and Authorities, defendant properly cites exemption (b) (7) correctly as "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." Plaintiff then adds: "The thrust of the exemption is to protect from disclosure all files which the government compiles in the course of law enforcement investigations which may or may not lead to

formal proceedings." (underscoring added.). The thrust may or may not be in accordance with the underscored clause, but it is clear that there are two explicit limitations on the exception for "investigatory files":

- 1) they are exempt only if compiled for law enforcement purposes, and
- 2) they are exempt only if they would not be available by law to a private party.

As to whether there was a "law enforcement purpose" in acquisition of the sought spectrographic analyses, no better witness can be found than FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. In testimony before the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, the following colloquy took place between Mr. Hoover and Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel to the Commission:

Mr. Rankin. You have provided many things to us in assisting the Commission in connection with this investigation and I assume, at least in a general way, you are familiar with the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, is that correct?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct. When President Johnson returned to Washington he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and asked the Bureau to pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there is no Federal jurisdiction for such an investigation. It is not a Federal crime to kill or attack the President or the Vice President or any of the uplinquity of officers who would succeed to the Presidency.

However, the President has a right to request the Bureau to make special investigations, and in this instance he asked that this investigation be made. I immediately assigned a special force headed by the special agent in charge at Dallas, Texas, to initiate the investigation, and to get all details and facts concerning it, which we obtained, and then prepared a report which we submitted to the Attorney General for transmission to the President.

(Hearings before the Warren Commission, Vol. 5, p. 98. Underscoring added.)

Thus, according to the FBI's Director, there was no law and, hence, there could be no "law enforcement purpose." In fact,

according to Mr. Hoover, when the investigation was undertaken, there was no federal jurisdiction for it at all, except a request by the President.

Let the argument be made that perhaps the missing law was a law of the State of Texas, it should be noted that the spectrographic analyses were not given to either the Texas or Federal authorities.

In brief, the spectrographic analyses were made as part of an investigation requested by the President and by the FBI as the investigative arm of the Warren Commission. Backing up the claim of my "law enforcement purpose" is the following quote from the foreword to the Commission's Report (at p. XIV):

"The Commission has functioned neither as a court providing for an adversary proceeding nor as a prosecutor determined to prove a case, but as a fact finding agency committed to the ascertainment of the truth."

This contention is further strengthened by the Commission's

Truth Recommendations:

"The Commission recommends to Congress that it enact legislation which would make the assassinations of the President and Vice President a Federal crime. A matter of state where U.S. authorities have not clearly defined jurisdiction to investigate the assassination of a President is anomalous. [page 26 of the Report]"

"Law enforcement purposes" requires a law of some kind.

Therefore, the burden is on the defendant, if he wishes to avail himself of exception (b) (7), to state specifically (with citation to the law or laws in pursuance of which the spectrographic analyses were made. So far, he has not met that burden.

III.

EXEMPTION

The second qualification in (b) (7) is that "investigative files" cannot be withheld from the public if they would be "available by law to a party other than an agency."

Plaintiff is not an "agency" and it is his contention that under Jencks the spectrographic analyses would certainly have been available to Lee Harvey Oswald. Hence, they cannot be withheld from plaintiff.

As the Warren Commission said in its preface: "If Oswald had lived he could have had a trial by American standards of justice where he would have been able to exercise his full rights under the law."

IV.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT (5 U.S.C. 522)

Emphasis is placed in defendant's Memorandum of Facts and Authorities to the legislative history of exemption (b) (7), especially in the House of Representatives. Quoted herewith is the entire total of explanation given in the House Report on this exemption (Report No. 1497, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, at p.11):

" 7. Investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a private party. This exemption covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds of laws, labor and securities laws as well as criminal laws. This would include files prepared in connection with related Government litigation and adjudicative proceedings. It is not intended to give a private party indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he would have directly in such litigation or proceedings."

There is also considerable reference in the defendant's report
to the debate on the floor of the house. The quotations are
scattered, not in contact, and generally irrelevant in view of
the fact of exemption (b) (7). The debate is not very helpful in
ascertaining legislative intent. It is true that some members
opposed to both (b) (7) in its entirety or to amend it in part.
However, they did not prevail, (b) (7) stayed in, as reported
by the committee and it stayed in in its present text. The
debate is generally drawn in specific terms, and there is no
reference to "sensitive" government information as such, as in
the report.

In this regard, FBI files are like those of any other
agency. Whether a particular FBI file is exempt from disclosure
depends on whether it falls within one of the nine exemptions
listed, not whether it is "sensitive." Paraphrasing, what
is "sensitive" about spectrographic analysis of bullets and
fragments and in a fact finding investigation in 1967?

Spectrographic analysis, like other scientific procedures,
is not sensitive and should never be withheld. If
spectrographic analysis can be withheld from a defendant in a
criminal case, other scientific evidence, such as fingerprint
analysis, could also be withheld. This would lead to
potentially unfair results.

V.

Case Law

The primary allusion in defendant's guarantee from
United States v. Gandy, 371 F. Supp. 210 is to

following sentence from Attorney General Clark's Memorandum of June 1, 1947:

"... In addition, the House report makes it clear that litigants are not to obtain special benefits from this provision, stating that S. 1125 is not intended to give a private party indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he would have directly in such litigation or proceeding. (H. Report 11)"

In the case that the Attorney General was speaking, the litigant would be Lee Harvey Oswald. The plaintiff in the present case seeks no "earlier or greater access" than would have been granted to Oswald, had he lived to be tried; conversely, he wants even the same right of access as Oswald. And under Jencks, Oswald would have been entitled to the spectrographic analysis.

On page 3 of its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, defendant quotes at some length from Circuit Riders v. United States, 307 U.S. 490. Unfortunately, defendant omitted what is in the most important paragraph in the decision, the one immediately preceding the three quoted:

"The Court must agree that the determination of the Court in Barcolonate is sound, though not controlling on this Court. In addition to the common sense desirability of protecting the investigatory function and procedures of the Board, the legislative history of the Act itself makes it clear that the exemption is granted is not limited solely to original law enforcement but rather applies to law enforcement activities of all nature."

Concededly agreed that this is true, both Barcolonate and Circuit Riders are irrelevant in the present case where there is no law enforcement, criminal or otherwise. Further, there is no "common sense desirability" in protecting scientific tests such as spectrographic analysis, as compared to protecting witness statements before trial.

Paraphrasing, defendant goes on: "In the instant case, the records plaintiff seeks have not been made part of any case."

Agency proceeding to say not obtain their "should" status
if they had been "part of any record in any agency proceeding"
they could automatically be available. Also, the analysis
to release are by Warren Commission; as explained below, the
policy of the Commission's basic conclusion of a "single, un-
broken."

The last case cited by the defendant is Sligh v. Kirkwood, 50 F.R.D. 130-135 (D.D.C. 1976). Again, the quoted language is misleading. In the first place, the case concerns the scope of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not the scope of Rule 682 only in passing. Second, when discussing the scope of the Court reports the language of the Congressional report on the "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes" is not the subject available by law to a party other than the government. Third, the following telling paragraph is not quoted in the defendant's brief:

"In background for the present action, the Court notes that the United States has previously made available to the plaintiff copies of all documents in the FBI files which contain information from the surveillance. These include: (1) all copies of the surveillance, which are the actual handwritten notes of the agents who conducted the listening device; (2) all agency circulars prepared from the logs, which are typewritten summaries of the reports in the logs; (3) copies of all portions of reports which contain information obtained from the surveillance; and (4) two memoranda from the Director of the FBI as the Attorney General concerning the content of the information which had been obtained from the surveillance."

There is certainly no necessity to divulge all the information by defendant. In fact, to the extent that the defendant is not to be present even at all, it would appear to be in the best interest of plaintiff. Thus the very fact that the defendant is not to be present is additional evidence of overzealousness.

liberal viewpoint; revelation of these could harm interest groups, through the identity of informants, expose leads in other cases, expose the FBI, etc.; some of these items could be made available through making available the spectrographic analyses in the case.

In summary, none of the cases cited by defendant is directly in point, and to the extent that they are relevant, they simply are passed upon the question of the withholding of records of the nature sought in this case.

VI.

CONCLUSION

In signing the Freedom of Information Act (52 Stat. 1762) and law on July 2, 1966, President Johnson said: "I have always believed that freedom of information is so vital that only national security, not the desire of public officials or private citizens, should determine when it must be restricted." [The President's statement is quoted is reproduced as Exhibit I hereto.]

In making a Chicago declaration on the FBI Act in 1967, Attorney General Clark stated:

- * This law was initiated by Congress and signed by the President with several key concerns:
 - that disclosure be the general rule, not the exception;
 - that all individuals have equal rights of access;
 - that the burden be on the Government to justify the withholding when warranted, not on the person who requests it;
 - that individuals improperly denied access to documents have a right to seek injunctive relief in the courts;
 - that there be a change in Government policies and attitudes.

[This of Attorney General Clark's statement is reproduced as Exhibit II hereto.]

A provocative Note in the Harvard Law Review (Vol. 87, No. 1077, p. 214) suggests that "it seems that such investigations should be made available after the enforcement activity in question has been completed." Briefly so where there is no "enforcement activity" but only "fact finding."

In the Commission to its Memorandum of Points and Issues, defendant says that "Congress particularly drafted the Public Information Act a prohibition against the release to the public of the type of document plaintiff seeks to see disclosed. Yet, there is no prohibition, as evidenced in the Commission's report to another Freedom of Information suit in 1976 (73-76):

"Whether or not the documents you seek are specifically exempt under one or more of the provisions of 552(b), I have determined that you shall be granted access to them. The exemptions do not require that records falling within them be withheld; they merely authorize the withholding of such records, by exempting them from the Act's otherwise applicable compulsory disclosure requirements."

(The full text of this letter is printed as exhibit III hereto.)

When one looks at the history and spirit of 5 U.S.C. 552 and considers what is the real reason for withholding in the first place, there is no question of divulging the identities of informants. There is no question of divulging secret information or processes. There is no question of embarrassment to private citizens.

If the spectrographic analysis in fact proves that the government witnesses before the Warren Commission imply the existence of a "secret source" for all ballots and Dallas telephone calls, there would appear to be no valid reason why the government should withhold this... even as a matter of policy. If, on the other hand, it does not prove what the witnesses imply, there is no valid

reason to wish to withhold them, i.e., the whole matter should be
reported and its conclusions come tumbling down.

Plaintiff does not ask, however, that these records be
made available to him as a matter of policy or grace. It is his
right contention that he is entitled to access to these records
under 5 U.S.C. 552 as a matter of law.

Therefore, the court is asked to order the defendant
to disclose the records for summary judgment and to set the
case for trial near the head of the docket, as provided in
5 U.S.C. 552 (a) (3):

Except as to causes the court considers of
greater importance, proceedings before the
District Court, as authorized by this paragraph,
shall take precedence on the docket over all other
causes and shall be assigned for hearing and trial
at the earliest practicable date and expedited in
every way.

Plaintiff renounces his request that the court order
defendant to further withholding of the records sought.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of this document was
made upon Thomas A. Flannery, Joseph H. Hanson, and Robert
Wardig, Jr., U.S. Courthouse, Washington, D.C., on this
day of October, 1970.

BERNARD FRENKELMAN, JR.