

VIET-NAM

INFORMATION NOTES

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THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIET-NAM

SUMMARY

The United States has consistently stated its readiness to negotiate peace in Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 on Viet-Nam and the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos. The ultimate goal of these agreements was the reestablishment of peace in the Indo-China area--Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam--and the security and territorial integrity of the countries involved.

Although the Government of North Viet-Nam signed the Agreement of July 20, 1954 on the Cessation of Hostilities and adhered to the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva conference and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, it never accepted the obligations and restrictions imposed by those three international instruments. Hanoi has never paused in its drive to take control of the South, and in 1959 it shifted from subversive terrorist tactics (beheading of village chiefs, murder of relatives of South Vietnamese serving in the army, kidnaping of school administrators, health officials, etc.) to overt military action (the sending of large numbers of battle-equipped guerrilla cadres and troops into South Viet-Nam to engage in military combat). It has flatly rejected or ridiculed all overtures or initiatives which might have led to a peaceful settlement.

Despite Hanoi's intransigence, President Johnson has pledged that our efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Viet-Nam situation "will continue day and night." The United States has welcomed the numerous proposals and initiatives of other governments of the world to bring the conflict to an end. As this paper demonstrates, there has been a virtual barrage of efforts, all of them futile, to bring Hanoi to the conference table.

THE UNITED NATIONS

A U.N. presence in the area and formal debate in the United Nations have long been urged by the United States. However, North Viet-Nam and Red China have repeatedly rejected any U.N. role in the area.

The United States joined South Viet-Nam in the U.N. Security Council during May 1964 in suggesting that a U.N.-sponsored peacekeep-

ing or observation group might be established on the border between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam to stabilize conditions upset by Viet Cong operations there. A fact-finding Security Council mission visited the area and reported that such a group might well be useful. Hanoi and Peiping, however, condemned even this limited U.N. involvement in Viet-Nam, and the border watch was not established.

In August 1964 the United States supported the Security Council invitation to the Hanoi government to discuss the U.S. complaint of North Vietnamese torpedo-boat attacks against U.S. naval vessels in international waters as well as the American military response. The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister replied that the Viet-Nam problem was not within the competence of the Security Council and that his government would consider any decisions by the Council as "null and void."

It was also in the autumn of 1964 that the late Adlai Stevenson was informed by Secretary-General U Thant that Hanoi had indicated to him indirectly that it would be willing to make contact with the United States. The Secretary-General suggested Rangoon as a suitable site. As Secretary Rusk later said in discussing these events, "When this matter arose, it was considered in the light of a great deal of information available at the time about the attitude of the authorities in Hanoi and, indeed, of other governments in the Communist world. . . . It seems clear beyond a peradventure of doubt that Hanoi was not prepared to discuss peace in Southeast Asia based upon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and looking toward the lifting of aggression against South Viet-Nam. . . . They undoubtedly felt that they were on the threshold of victory. Just yesterday Hanoi denied they they had made any proposals for negotiations." (Press conference of Nov. 26, 1965).

Speaking at San Francisco in June 1965 on the 20th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter, President Johnson appealed to members of the United Nations "individually and collectively to bring to the table those who seem determined to make war. We will support your efforts," he pledged, "as we support effective action by any agent or agency of these United Nations." The President reiterated this appeal on July 28 in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant. At the same time,

Ambassador Goldberg, in a letter to members of the Security Council, reminded them of their responsibility to persist in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security in Southeast Asia, and of U.S. readiness to collaborate unconditionally in this quest. Peiping termed this move "insidious and brazen," while Hanoi again demanded unconditional acceptance of its four points, which, in effect, would extend Hanoi's control throughout all Viet-Nam.

But the United States continued to seek a solution through the multilateral framework of the United Nations.

On January 31, 1966, the United States formally requested that the United Nations consider the problem of achieving a peaceful solution in Viet-Nam. Our Government proposed a draft resolution in the Security Council which called for immediate unconditional discussions to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia. The proposed resolution also recommended that the conference arrange a cease-fire under effective supervision, offered to provide arbitrators or mediators, and asked the Secretary-General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of the resolution. The Security Council voted on February 2 to inscribe the Viet-Nam problem on its agenda and adjourned immediately after the vote for private consultations among members to determine whether and in what manner the Council might assist in moving the conflict to the conference table.

The United States in a letter on December 19 appealed to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to "take whatever steps are necessary" to "bring about the necessary discussions" which could lead to a mutual cessation of hostilities. On the following day Communist China urged North Viet-Nam and the Communist Viet Cong to reject such attempts to draw them into negotiations.

The 21st General Assembly debated the Viet-Nam issue, but was unable to take effective action because some key members were unwilling to give their consent. There was some feeling that because of Hanoi's opposition to U.N. involvement, more progress might be made through other diplomatic channels.

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

In an effort to get peace negotiations under way the United States has engaged in talks with hundreds of world figures, including officials of the Hanoi government.

In 1965 U.S. officials engaged in some 300 high-level private talks for peace in Viet-Nam with friends and adversaries throughout the world. In the 2-month period December 1965-January 1966 alone, President Johnson dis-

patched 5 special envoys—among them Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman—to 34 world capitals to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

The President communicated the American position on Viet-Nam to many more chiefs of government and to numerous international organizations.

Discussions were held with His Holiness Pope Paul VI, the North Atlantic Council of NATO, the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

During this worldwide peace effort seeking negotiations without conditions, the United States made private contact with North Vietnamese officials in one of the 22 capitals with which both countries maintain diplomatic relations. The U.S. message was accepted, but within a week the Hanoi government had issued an official statement calling the peace probe a "trick" and demanding an "unconditional" end of all acts of war against it.

On March 25, 1965, the President declared that the United States "looks forward to the day when the people and governments of all Southeast Asia may be free from terror . . . when they will need . . . only economic and social cooperation for progress in peace." In his speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 7 he elaborated further, saying that in addition to being ready at all times to hold "unconditional discussions" aimed at bringing about an end to the conflict in Viet-Nam, the United States also is ready to see North Viet-Nam take its place in a cooperative billion-dollar regional development plan for Asia as soon as peace is achieved.

PRESIDENT'S ASIAN JOURNEY

In October 1966 President Johnson visited seven nations of Asia and the Pacific to consider with them "ways of bringing about an honorable peace at the earliest possible moment" in Viet-Nam. The high point of the journey was the Manila Summit Conference on October 24-25. There the United States and six Asian-Pacific nations (Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, South Viet-Nam) declared that the search for peace would continue despite Hanoi's unresponsiveness, and a timetable was announced for the withdrawal of allied forces in the hope this would meet some of Hanoi's conditions. Conference participants pledged in a communique at the close of the Conference that allied forces would be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam not later than 6 months after the North Vietnamese Army units are recalled across the 17th parallel.

Continuing his Pacific journey from Manila, President Johnson appealed from the platform of Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University on Oc-

tober 29 to the leaders in Hanoi: "Let us lay aside our arms and sit down at the table of reason. Let us renounce the works of death—and take up, instead, the tasks of the living. . ."

Immediately after the Manila Conference, President Johnson sent Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman on a second mission to explain to a number of friendly governments the purpose and results of the Conference and to make clear our continued willingness to discuss the issue of peace in Viet-Nam with the other side at any time or place, and in any forum. Ambassador Harriman's trip included Indonesia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Iran, Italy—where he had an audience with His Holiness the Pope—France, Germany, Britain, and Morocco. Several weeks later he made a separate trip to Tunis, Algiers, and Madrid on a similar mission.

As the year drew to a close, Secretary Rusk, in Paris for the NATO Ministerial Council Meeting, declared (December 13) that we would welcome help "from all quarters" in bringing the war in Viet-Nam to a prompt and satisfactory conclusion. He asserted it was "important" that the war be "wound up promptly and on a basis that is satisfactory to the security of the South Vietnamese people and the interests of the free world."

U.S. FOURTEEN POINTS

In contacts with the governments of 113 nations, the United States set forth the elements which it believes should be included in a peace settlement in Southeast Asia. Following are the 14 points which represent the official U. S. position:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or any part thereof:

--We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, which observance was called for in the declaration on Viet-Nam of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest on July 6, 1966. And we will support a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or an Asian conference, or any other generally acceptable forum.

3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as called for by 17 nonaligned nations* in an appeal delivered to Secretary Rusk on April 1, 1965.

*The "Appeal of the Heads of State and Government of Seventeen Non-aligned Countries Concerning Crisis in Viet-Nam" was handed to Secretary Rusk for President Johnson on April 1, 1965, by a delegation composed of Ambassadors of Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Ghana (the other 13 nations were: Algeria, Cyprus, Ceylon, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nepal, Syrian Arab Republic, Zambia, and Uganda). It also was delivered on the same day to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. We would welcome "unconditional discussions" as called for by President Johnson on April 7, 1965:

--If the other side will not come to a conference, we are prepared to engage in direct discussions or discussions through an intermediary.

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions:

--We have attempted, many times, to engage the other side in a discussion of a mutual deescalation of the level of violence, and we remain prepared to engage in such a mutual deescalation.

--We stand ready to cooperate fully in getting discussions which could lead to a cessation of hostilities started promptly and brought to a successful completion.

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others may wish to propose:

--We would be prepared to accept preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points as a basis for negotiations.

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia:

--We are prepared to assist in the conversion of these bases for peaceful uses that will benefit the peoples of the entire area.

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured:

--We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, no permanent American "presence" of any kind in South Viet-Nam.

--We have pledged in the Manila Communique that "Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice:

--We support the development of broadly based democratic institutions in South Viet-Nam.

--We do not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision:

--It should not be decided by the use of force.

--We are fully prepared to support the decision of the Vietnamese people.

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option:

--We do not seek to impose a policy of alignment on South Viet-Nam.

--We support the neutrality policy of the Royal Government of Laos, and we support the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars:

--We support the growing efforts by the nations of the area to cooperate in the achievement of their economic and social goals.

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression. And I would not think that would be an unsurmountable problem at all."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped:

--We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam, the moment we are assured--privately or otherwise--that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate deescalation of the other side.

--We do not seek the unconditional surrender of North Viet-Nam; what we do seek is to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the right to decide their own political destiny, free of force.

SUSPENSIONS OF BOMBING

The United States has three times suspended the bombing of North Viet-Nam in the hope of some "response in kind" from the Hanoi government. The response has been negative.

The first suspension of U.S. bombing was ordered by President Johnson May 13-17, 1965, in an effort to seek Hanoi's cooperation toward a peaceful settlement. On the third day of the pause Hanoi denounced it as a "trick"; Peiping assailed it as a "swindle." Only after the harsh rejection of this peace overture were the U.S. air attacks resumed.

A second and greatly extended bombing pause was carried out during the 1965 Christmas truce. This time, in response to the contention of a number of governments that a bombing pause might create a situation in which the possibilities of peace could be greatly improved, the United States suspended the bombing of North Viet-Nam for 37 days, from

December 24, 1965, to January 30, 1966. Hanoi was informed of the pause in advance in direct, private messages from the United States, and was told that if it would reciprocate by taking some concrete step to reduce its military effort in South Viet-Nam the pause might be extended. Hanoi, in return, demanded U.S. recognition of the (Communist) National Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Viet-Nam, and reiterated its call for withdrawal of U. S. troops and material from South Viet-Nam, with no suggestion of any slackening of the North Vietnamese assault.

The third bombing pause took place as part of the general cease-fire which South Viet-Nam and its allies observed from December 24-26, 1966, and from December 31, 1966-January 2, 1967. Hanoi and Peiping attacked the motives behind these arrangements, and during the Christmas-New Year pause the cease-fire was marred by 178 Communist incidents. At the same time, Saigon announced similar arrangements for the lunar New Year holidays, February 8-12, 1967, and indicated its willingness to meet with Hanoi's representatives to discuss extending this suspension of military activity to 7 days or even longer.

OTHER PEACE PROPOSALS

The United States and Great Britain in quiet conversations in Moscow during April 1966 sought to determine whether the Soviet Union was ready to use its influence in Hanoi to urge peace negotiations. The Soviet Union refused to cooperate.

President Johnson on numerous occasions has welcomed proposals for conferences on Viet-Nam. In April 1966 he indicated approval of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's call for an Asian nation to organize a conference including the United States, North Viet-Nam, Communist China, and "such elements in South Viet-Nam as may be essential to the making and keeping of a peaceful settlement." At his August 1966 press conference he warmly endorsed the proposal of Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, that an all-Asia conference be called to settle the Viet-Nam war. "I am willing to go to a conference on the Viet-Nam issue anywhere where I think it would be helpful," he said. And he stated on December 31, 1966, that the United States "would be prepared to meet promptly with the Governments of North and South Viet-Nam as proposed by the United Kingdom on December 30." The British Government had called for a three-way meeting at once to end the war, and in messages to the United States, North Viet-Nam, and South Viet-Nam offered to make facilities available in any suitable British territory--any of the several Indian Ocean or

Pacific Islands or Hong Kong. Hanoi scorned the British proposal as an attempt to "deceive world opinion."

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Collectively and individually, nations of the West, of the nonaligned or neutral countries, and some Communist-bloc members, have sought to bring the Viet-Nam issue to the conference table. World leaders have exerted their influence to persuade Hanoi to discuss rather than fight. All these overtures have been rejected by North Viet-Nam.

Soviet Union

The U.S.S.R. in August 1964 initiated in the U. N. Security Council an invitation to the Hanoi government to use that forum to present its views and enter into discussions for a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict. The Hanoi government rejected the opportunity.

United Kingdom

In February 1965 the United Kingdom proposed to the Soviet Union that as Co-chairmen of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conferences they explore the basis of a possible Viet-Nam settlement with all the countries which participated in those meetings. The Soviet Union was unwilling to undertake such a task.

In April, the British Government sent its distinguished statesman Patrick Gordon-Walker to visit interested countries and explore once again the basis for a settlement in Viet-Nam. Although he was able to visit a number of countries in Southeast Asia, Peiping and Hanoi declined to receive him.

In July Mr. Harold Davies, a junior Minister of the British Government, visited Hanoi to explore the willingness of the North Vietnamese Government to receive a special mission representing the Commonwealth to "explore the circumstances in which a conference might be held to end the fighting in Viet-Nam." Prime Minister Wilson reported on July 15 that Mr. Davies found conviction among the North Vietnamese that their chances of victory were "too imminent to induce them to forsake the battlefield for the conference table."

In December 1965 the United Kingdom proposed a 12-nation appeal to North Viet-Nam to stop the fighting and negotiate a peaceful settlement. Britain called on the Soviet Union to join in organizing this appeal, which was to be signed by the nine nations participating in the 1954 Geneva conference plus India, Canada, and Poland, the members of the Interna-

tional Control Commission established by that conference to supervise the carrying out of the Geneva accords. Both Moscow and North Viet-Nam rejected the proposal.

India

The Government of India in April 1965 put forward a proposal in the United Nations for the cessation of hostilities by both sides in Viet-Nam, the policing of borders by an Afro-Asian patrol force, and the maintenance of present boundaries in Viet-Nam as long as the Vietnamese people so desire. Hanoi and Peiping turned this down.

Following talks in Belgrade in August 1965, Indian Prime Minister Shastri and Yugoslav President Tito called for a conference on Viet-Nam. Hanoi condemned this initiative.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in July 1966 made a detailed proposal for negotiations within the framework of the Geneva agreements and proposed a reconvening of the Geneva conference. Hanoi rejected the main features of the proposal through its army newspaper.

Others

Seventeen nonaligned nations appealed collectively in the United Nations during April 1965 for "negotiations without preconditions" in Viet-Nam. The response from Hanoi was negative.

Secretary-General U Thant indicated in April 1965 that he would be willing to visit certain world capitals, including Hanoi and Peiping, to discuss prospects for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. Hanoi rejected "meddling by the U.N." or any approach which tended to secure U.N. intervention in a Viet-Nam settlement.

At Christmas 1965 His Holiness Pope Paul VI publicly appealed for a truce in Viet-Nam during the holiday season and for efforts by all parties to move toward negotiations. He addressed a similar appeal directly to Hanoi through private channels. Ho Chi Minh replied that U.S. talk about "unconditional negotiations" is a "maneuver to cover up plans for further war intensification." His Holiness renewed the appeals during the Christmas season 1966.

As a member of the International Control Commission, Canada has persistently tried to carry out its supervisory role in both North and South Viet-Nam. In June 1965 the Canadian representative on the ICC discussed in Hanoi the possibilities for peace with representatives of the North Vietnamese Government, but received no encouragement. In March 1966 Ambassador Chester A. Ronning visited Hanoi to discuss the Viet-Nam conflict. He reported that North Viet-Nam's attitude toward negotiations was unchanged.

In August 1966 Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman proposed that the Asian powers join in an appeal to the leaders of all countries involved in the Viet-Nam conflict to come to the conference table. The Association of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines) endorsed this proposal. Peiping and Hanoi rejected it.

POLICY OF NORTH VIET-NAM

The United States is not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past 5 years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. All reports of "peace feelers" upon close investigation have inevitably turned out to be initiatives being taken by third parties. Hanoi itself has categorically denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers."

Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of North Viet-Nam has defined his government's position in four basic points, which he contends are correct implementation of the terms of the 1954 Geneva agreements. These points are:

1. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Viet-Nam all U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its military alliance with South Viet-Nam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Viet-Nam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. must stop its acts of war against North Viet-Nam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam, while Viet-Nam is still temporarily divided into 2 zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements must be strictly respected. . . the 2 zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries; there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel in their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

"If this basis is recognized," Prime Minister Pham Van Dong stated in April 1965, "favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Viet-Nam. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

Government declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Viet-Nam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam."

In November 1965 Amintore Fanfani, then U.N. General Assembly President, reported that North Viet-Nam President Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong had expressed the desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Viet-Nam during conversations with two of Mr. Fanfani's countrymen. President Ho was reported to have urged a cease-fire throughout all Viet-Nam, cessation of all belligerent operations including debarkation of further American troops in Viet-Nam, and a declaration that the 1954 Geneva agreements will be taken as a basis for negotiations. There was also an indication by the Hanoi government leaders, according to the Italian spokesmen, that Hanoi would be prepared to initiate negotiations without first requiring withdrawal of American troops. Responding for President Johnson in a letter to Mr. Fanfani, Secretary of State Dean Rusk on December 4 reiterated American willingness to enter into discussions with any government at any time without any preconditions whatsoever. The essential observations of Secretary Rusk were delivered to North Viet-Nam by December 13, according to Mr. Fanfani. There was no response from Hanoi.

On January 4, 1966, the Foreign Ministry of North Viet-Nam denounced the "largescale deceptive peace campaign [of the U.S.] coupled with the trick of 'temporary suspension of air attacks' on North Viet-Nam." It assailed the United States for "impudently sabotaging the 1954 Geneva agreements" and for its refusal to "recognize the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation, the sole genuine representative of the people of South Viet-Nam" and to "allow the people of South Viet-Nam to settle by themselves their own affairs in accordance with the program of the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation." It reaffirmed the four points enunciated by Pham Van Dong and called on the "governments and peoples of Socialist countries" of Asia, Africa, and Latin America "to extend still more active support and assistance to the Vietnamese people's just, patriotic struggle and to oppose still more resolutely and vigorously all the U.S. imperialists' plans for intensified war."

U.S. EFFORTS CONTINUE

Nonetheless, the United States and its allies continue the search for a just and peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

President Johnson said on July 23, 1966, at Jeffersonville, Indiana:

"Our Government and your administration is ready at this hour, as it has been every hour since I have been President, to talk instead of fight, to negotiate instead of bomb, to reason instead of resort to force. This is not a one-way street. It takes two to enter into an agreement. You can't have a unilateral treaty. You can't stop everything you are doing unless the other fellow will stop some of the things he is doing. So we continue to hope and work and try to hold our hand out, but keep our guard up."

The President again affirmed his readiness to seek any clear road to peace in his State of the Union message on January 10, 1967, declaring:

"We will support all appropriate initiatives by the United Nations and others which can bring the several parties together for unconditional discussion of peace, anywhere, any time. And we will continue to take every possible initiative ourselves to constantly probe for peace."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8196
East Asian and Pacific Series 156

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O-252-216 (128)

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