

The Bullets of Dealey Plaza: Control of Evidence

Chapter VIII

The Bullets of Dealey Plaza: Control of Evidence

No other single point in the mass of assassination issues so strongly moved the Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the staff of the Warren Commission to control

the inquiry than the possibility proof of more than three bullets striking in Dealey Plaza outside the presidential limousine might appear to destroy their presumptive findings of no conspiracy. At

all costs knowledge of additional bullets must not emerge, or if it did somehow escape their control, its credibility must be immediately undermined. To this end scores of well schooled, otherwise fine men, knowingly tossed honor and decency overboard, tore up their oaths of office, spurned their allegiance to the American nation, turned their backs on Sunday School teachings and Boy Scout principles and moral guides followed all their lives, and broke the rules of their ancient professions. They avidly and schemingly sought to sustain the corruptive demands imposed by the predetermined conclusion, the sick vision of a dictator, that a single assassin fired only three bullets.

Official findings held that the lone assassin Lee Harvey Oswald fired only three shots from the easternmost window of the

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sixth floor of the large red brick, seven story Texas School Book Depository standing on the northeast corner of Dealey Plaza, wounding and killing President Kennedy and wounding Governor Connally who rode in the limousine and wounding citizen James

Tague who stood near the triple underpass. ^{neither more nor fewer} Oswald absolutely ~~could not have fired one round more or one round less.~~ The evidence is not only that precisely defined but also that ~~rigorously thrust down upon all facts,~~ ^{is more vital to the preconceived "solution";} ~~to the bane of any~~ dissenting questions.

Man three shots would be attributed to Oswald. The presumed "solution" required this but the witness refutes it. It is nothing. is more vital to the preconceived "solution";

The Warren Commission ^{decided} found that one of the three bullets missed both men in the car. One inflicted all seven non-fatal wounds on President Kennedy and Governor Connally. While the Commission also said that the missed bullet could have been the first or the second one fired, the iron facts of the single-

bullet-theory are such that the ^{and only the first} first bullet had to have ^{caused all} inflicted the wounds. ^{without question it is the third of the Commission and the FBI's theory that} And, the ~~third bullet~~ killed Kennedy. Whether the missed bullet or fragments of the third wounded Tague the ^{and they did not try to find out. They just ordained it.} commissioners did not know. ~~The official conclusion will not permit any other construction of these facts.~~

and they did not try to find out. They just ordained it.

The FBI and the Secret Service, though, steadfastly believe all three bullets hit either Kennedy or Connally.

But for all three federal agencies ^{too, acknowledging} the existence of a fourth bullet ^{means they acknowledged} is the certain basis for finding a conspiracy operated to

^{more} murder President Kennedy and the official findings are false. And ^{it would also} if they are false the inquiry failed. And if the inquiry failed the enormous resources and monies expended were for naught; the reputation of the highest officials of the land a charade; the

Neither the Commission nor the agencies were about to admit that there had been a conspiracy and that if they are false the inquiry failed. And if the inquiry failed the enormous resources and monies expended were for naught; the reputation of the highest officials of the land a charade; the

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venerated FBI ^{would appear} low, mean, and incompetent, ^{the} and ^{would appear to be} four score honorable men and women of the staff ~~the best~~ fools and liars and cowards.

A ^X It is physically impossible for ~~any~~ When the best shots in the country tried and were unable to duplicate the shooting attributed to Oswald, admitting that there had been a fourth bullet was impossible. It meant disaster, that there had been another rifleman and ipso facto, a conspiracy. ^{were made} bullets exist; ^{they are} they possess varying degrees of quality, ^{and they} require evaluation, but ^{they} sustain a conclusion, ^{that all} authorities refused to ^{investigate} really inquire into the assassination of President Kennedy. A surprising number of witnesses say they saw bullets hit on the turf or bounce off the ^{park streets and?} pavement or curbs. Their testimony or statements, some in full rig, others spare, can be found scattered haphazardly throughout the records and testimony of the Commission or in the oddments of the local press as related by the citizen critics. Regretfully, the federal government did not make a systematic inquiry into witness testimony and we are left with that which slipped through ^{its} the failure. Many references no doubt lie buried in the ^{and undisturbed} unstudied records.

Also, at various times following the assassination ordinary citizens stumbled upon bullets at or near the scene of the crime ^{and} possibly related to the murder ~~these you can hold in your hand.~~ These appeared over the years randomly and serendipitously. Additionally, two bullets left distinctive marks, one struck the north sidewalk of Elm Street and one struck the Main Street curb wounding James T. Tague ^{and the Commission was shown that only three bullets were fired.} alone they are incompatible with the FBI's ~~evidence sustaining the three bullets conclusion of the Commission~~

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and the FBI.

Let us first examine the evidence from eyewitnesses ^{that} ~~for~~ bullets ^{striking} ~~striking~~ ^{in course} outside the car. ¶ Several observations come from testimony before the Commission. In Dallas, on July 22, 1964, eight months after the murder, Miss Virgie Rachley appeared before Commission assistant counsel Wesley J. Liebeler in room 301 of the Post Office Building at Bryan and Ervay Streets, Dallas, the office of United States attorney Barefoot Sanders. Liebeler took her eyewitness deposition. A bookkeeper at the Texas School Book Depository Miss Rachley had gone outside the building with several other co-workers to view the motorcade. She stood "just at the edge of Elm Street at the side of the Depository." After Kennedy had passed she heard a shot. Then, she told Liebeler, "I saw a shot or something hit the pavement. . . . you could see the sparks from it . . ." ^{That} The bullet hit ^{The Depository,} ~~near the curb~~ on the side of ~~the street away from the Depository,~~ ^{of Elm Street,} in the middle of the left-hand lane, behind the car, "near the first sign on the right-hand side of Elm Street."

Then she heard the second shot.

^{meant at least a fourth shot} Her testimony clashed with the physical imperatives imposed

upon the Commission's conclusions. Officials attempted to avoid her eyewitness information. As late as June 11 no one ^{from} in the FBI

or ~~from~~ the Commission staff had yet interviewed her. By then the Commission staff had severe problems forcing the wounds ^{accounting for all the (misses) being inflicted on} and

^{with victims within the 5.6 seconds established} physical constraints of the shooting evidence into the time frame

imposed by the Zapruder film whose carefully measured running

time acted as a ^{time} precise/clock and yet account for the wounding of

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Kennedy and Connally. To have the first shot miss meant the second shot had to inflict the wounds and it simply could not do. There were seven nonfatal wounds alone on Kennedy and Connally, there was the fatal shot and there was Tague's wounding. None of those bullets could possible have been the one whose impact Rachley saw and testified to.

chambered and fired.)

Liebeler's ^{distracting,} diverting and muddled questioning of her, consistently confuses her information, making it difficult to follow the part of her testimony dealing with the ^{shot she saw - but the street} bouncing shot.

He jumps around, questioning first one point and then another. ^{He makes} Rachley displays confusion over the location of the ^{bullet hit,} bullet hit, ^{appear to be confused about}

^{to be} puzzled over the precise spot ^{she saw it} when she attempts to mark it on a photograph, Liebeler gives her. From the wrangle over the ^{this?} map a reader comes away with the ^{impression} suggestion she is perhaps not clear on what she saw, diminishing her credibility. ^{no wonder!}

But when the ^{photograph} ~~map~~ Liebeler used ^{not in the Report but} ~~which is printed~~ in another ^{she separates} volume of the Hearings and Exhibits volumes) is examined the ^{Liebeler alerted of all the Commission many pictures one that does not show the street where} reason Rachley had difficulty becomes obvious: The photograph ^{she said it impacted? It was taken looking up hill, from the opposite end of Dealey} Liebeler showed her ^{confused} the area she deposed to. It was

^{Plaza;} taken ~~from the opposite end of the street, from the triple~~ underpass looking toward the TSBD, and ~~from far away~~. The picture has no perspective, does not even show where she stood. It has improper exposure, is fuzzy. It is impossible to locate anything in her testimony with that photograph. ^{At this} ~~And, it is not because~~ Liebeler did not have proper photographs, ^{and} maps, and the resources to acquire the best if he wanted them. ~~He should have. He did~~ not want them. Liebeler tricked her to obfuscate the evidence she ^{confuse and}

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~~testifying~~
was witness to and damage her credibility.

On April 8 and 9, 1964, the Commission staff took depositions from eyewitnesses who had been on the overpass. Two related seeing bullets hit the pavement. ^{1216.} ^{Testified to} ^{was deposed}

On April 8 at 2:45 in the afternoon Royce G. Skelton testified in the U.S. attorney's office in Dallas where Assistant Consul Joseph Ball ^{was} deposed him. Skelton worked as a mail clerk for the Texas & Louisiana Freight Bureau ^{he} and had gone to the triple overpass to watch the motorcade. He stood over the right (north) lane of Elm Street and had an excellent view of the assassination. During ^{Ball's} ^{interrogation} his brief examination Skelton stated that after the second shot he heard another ^{he saw} and ~~saw~~ a bullet "hit in the left front of the President's car on the cement." The hit caused "smoke" or fine debris to rise, which drifted southwest in a line away from the TSBD. He then marked on a diagram Ball furnished where ^{marked where} he stood and where he had ^{saw} seen the bullet ^{impact} strike and the smoke ^{or fine debris} drift. [?] The Warren Report discussed his testimony:

Royce G. Skelton, who watched the motorcade from the railroad bridge, testified that after two shots "the car came on down close to the Triple Underpass" and an additional shot "hit in the left front of the President's car on the cement." Skelton thought that there had been a total of four shots, either the third or fourth of which hit in the vicinity of the underpass. . . . Examination of this area, however, disclosed no indication that a bullet struck at the locations indicated by Skelton . . .

The Report omitted, and Ball did not bring up, the ^{contradiction} clash with

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Skelton's original statement of November 22, 1963, given to the sheriff's department and printed as Decker Exhibit 5323, that he had seen two bullets hit the pavement. "I saw something hit the pavement at the left rear ^(sic) of the car," he said, "then the car got in the right hand lane and I heard two more shots." Then he heard yet another shot "and saw the bullet hit the pavement. The His statement that he saw the impact to the "rear" of the limousine is consistent with Kachow's testimony. pavement in c.

The Report dissembles when it says Skelton's mark could not be found. Within a week of the assassination Dallas had repaved Elm Street, covering up any possible evidence of such a hit.

The manipulation of Skelton appears in more striking terms when one examines the diagram he marked for attorney Ball. (Skelton Exhibit 1). The diagram ^{As was given?} was actually a childlike map sketched out for Ball and assistant counsel David Belin that morning by Patrolman Joe E. Murphy who had testified at 9:50 a.m. about his duties that day atop the triple overpass. (Murphy Exhibit 1) Throughout that day and the next as overpass witnesses would come in they would take turns marking up the diagram, until a hodge podge of marks and circles and numbers peppered it.

The diagram was crude, entirely without perspective or even reasonable placement of the buildings. Further, in the Skelton exhibit form it is printed darkly with extreme care having to be taken to even know what one is looking at. A long rectangular block represents the triple overpass, another big one the Stemmons Freeway. Poorly drawn streets of Commerce, Main, and Elm are placed with odd shaped boxes for the various buildings. Then in

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one of the strangest features on any of the Warren Commissions maps and sketches, there runs at right angles to the Stemmons Expressway block in the upper righthand side at the edge a rectangular block that represents the T & P R. R. overpass of Stemmons Expressway. In trying to puzzle out the strange sketch Skelton lost his orientation when asked to sign his name and mark an X where he had stood. This did not bother the assistant counsel though who told him to just forget the rest of the diagram and consider the T & P the triple overpass. Skelton put his X under the T & P and signed his name!

One has to search to find Skelton's mark where he saw the bullet hit, the diagram is so dark. One finally finds the slight arrow on Elm pointing away from the TSBD, but the building is a baby-type small square, not properly located or proportioned. If one follows the direction of the arrow of the mark backwards it goes to the west end of the Depository. But the clincher is the location of the mark on the pavement at a place incompatible with The Commission had precise surveyor's plats and aerial photographs. Not using them and using the crude sketch assured confusion if it was not designed to create it.

questions. ~~The staff attorney~~ did not make even a feeble attempt to provide a serious first quality map of the plaza scene nor to orient carefully the witness before asking questions. ^{insert}

The same day Austin Miller appeared before Joe Ball. Ball trotted him through his testimony and dismissed the crucial eyewitness without much detail being drawn from him. We see too the effort of ~~the assistant counsel~~ to confuse him. ^{also} Ball gave him

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Murphy's diagram to locate his position on the overpass and Miller struggled manfully to mark it. ^{Ball} He did not probe Miller's knowledge of a street hit.

When we turn to earlier documents we find a disparity between Miller's original views given to authorities and his later testimony before Liebler. In a notarized statement given on November 22 to the Sheriff's Department, Miller had said, "One shot apparently hit the street past the car." But Ball made no effort to bring this out or to ask if he saw what his buddy Skelton had seen.

During the April 1 testimony of Roger D. Craig before assistant counsel David Belin in the office of the U. S. attorney in Dallas ^{there is} another reference to a bullet ^{impact} ~~strike~~ is made. Craig was a deputy sheriff who stood in front of the Sheriff's office at 505 Main Street watching President Kennedy pass by. When shots rung out, he ran to the railroad yards to search them, found nothing and returned. Then he was told to help search for a bullet hit on Elm Street. In a November 23 ^{not} deposition he said he had been told a bullet "had struck the curb on the south side of Elm Street." On April 1 he reiterated this information with detail.

Buddy Walthers, a criminal investigator for the Sheriff's department, had told Craig and Officer Lemmy Lewis that one of the bullets "had ricocheted off the south curb of Elm Street." So they crossed Elm Street to "look for the place where the bullet might have hit." When asked by Belin why he thought this, Craig replied that "someone said that one of them had." They did not find any

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Ignored but readily available news photographs show Walthers and an unidentified man examining an object on the grass, near the curb.

*See below maybe use of the
Foster*

DATA ...

At 1:30 p. m. on April 1, 1964, ~~assistant counsel Joseph~~ Ball ^{deposed} interviewed Patrolman J. W. Foster of the Dallas Police Department in the United States attorney's office. Foster worked as a traffic investigator for the (DPD) and had been assigned to patrol the overpass during the motorcade. After the assassination he joined the search of the murder scene. On Elm he found "where one shot had hit the turf there at the location." When Ball asked him if had "found any marks on the street in any place?" Foster replied he had. "It was hit. They caught the manhole cover right at the corner . . ." Whereupon Ball showed him a photograph, marked as Commission Exhibit No. 2111, of the manhole cover and asked him if he saw any marks of a bullet on it? Foster said he did not, but it "went into the turf." Officers recovered no bullet. Foster had notified the department and the crime laboratory came down and snapped a photograph of the mark. (Commission Exhibit No. 2111) The Commission had prepared for Foster.

Two months before, on February 13, 1964, Forest Sorrels of the Dallas Secret Service wrote to Inspector ^{Tom} Kelley in Washington stating he had inspected the slab. "I did not see any mark that in my opinion could have been caused by a bullet and I did not see how it could have been possible for any fragment of any of the three bullets that were fired to have hit this concrete slab." The Warren Report noted no indication of the reported shot could

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be found.

Here again the predisposition to the conclusion of a sole assassin shooting ^{and only three times} three times, from the easternmost ^{south-west} window of the Texas School Book Depository appears. Sorrels remarks it could not be one of the three bullets and thus Foster's testimony to a manhole clip is not possible. Of course, this baldly assumes before he started to investigate that there were three bullets; a sound and responsible inquiry would have gone with the facts of the physical evidence alone and then drawn conclusion. What if there were four bullets and one of them from a different gun? But a further problem enters into the questioning of Foster.

Ball did not take Foster to the scene to ask where he saw the bullet mark, and it was only a few blocks away from where the deposition was being ^{taken} received. Neither did he ask Foster to describe in great detail the physical characteristics of the hit on the curb--the size, color, precise place, depth, exact ^{relationship to the curb} relationships. Instead Ball offered Foster a deceptive photograph. Foster had to dope out the hit through shadows cast across portions of the corner of the slab where he had said the hit occurred. The photograph is not of high quality. It is not a close-up, but taken from several feet away. The corner where Foster claimed to have seen the mark is partially covered with grass and shadows. If a mark was on it, in fact, how could one ^{the camera could not} see it? _{record it}

The police photographer should also have been deposed, presumably he snapped a picture of something and did not ^{just} commit random photography that day? What did he see to shoot? It should _{photograph at random}

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be recalled that two of the marks left by shots that struck ^{elsewhere in} ~~on~~ Dealey Plaza, the ^{Columbia Street} curb and the ^{Elm Street} sidewalk, were later discovered to have been patched by persons unknown ~~to simulate the texture of~~

the surrounding cement. It cannot be assumed that this did not

occur with the manhole slab. ^{existing replaced} In other words Sorrels did not

establish the integrity of the object being viewed. ^{at the physical investigation at the best interest of} Neither did

the Commission attorney.

^{a publicist} Foster called in a ^{police} photographer to snap a photograph of a strike he in fact saw ~~on the slab~~ on November 22.

There are other witness statements on bullets hitting the road or turf. In the Dallas Times-Herald of the 22d Sheriff Bill Decker who rode in the lead car ahead of the limousine is quoted as telling a reporter that he "may have seen one of the bullets hit the concrete and bounce." This is never referred to again by Decker.

When New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison tried Clay Shaw for conspiracy to murder President Kennedy he brought into the court several witnesses to the murder. In January 1969, the construction worker Richard Randolph Carr testified. He had been atop an unfinished building near the southeast corner of Dealey Plaza and had seen the assassination from his high perch. Like so many other witnesses he had not been sought out by officials and had not been able to give his evidence ^{to} before the Warren Commission. He said "one of the shots 'knocked a bunch of grass up.'"

In the mid-1970s the House Select Committee launched an ill-starred probe of the assassination, which brought forth several

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new?
belated witnesses to the murder. Charles Rodgers related he had stood [?] on Dealey Plaza with Mike Nally. Nally's uncle had been a motorcycle policeman in the motorcade. After the murder the uncle related that when he hearded the shots being fired, he heard a clanging noise on the fender of his motorcycle. He looked down and saw a .45 caliber slug roll off into the street, but had to leave to accompany the fleeing limousine. The House Select Committee said it could not locate this uncle.

Another motorcycle policeman, Starvis Ellis, who rode 100-125 feet in front of the limousine, told the House Committee that "just as he started down the hill of Elm Street, he looked back toward President Kennedy's car and saw debris come up from the ground at a nearby curb."

On August 6, 1964, the FBI interviewed Wayne E. Hartman and his wife Edna. The Hartmans had heard over the radio the FBI was conducting additional investigations in the area where President Kennedy had been assassinated and was looking for another bullet that "might possibly have been fired at the time of the assassination." So, they contacted the Dallas Bureau. Later they recalled the FBI did not seem very interested in us." *Special Agents A. Raymond Switzer and Robert M. Barrett* ^{*spoke to them*} ~~took down~~ their information and typed it up on a FD 302 form dated August 10.

On November 22, the Hartmans had business at the courthouse in Dallas and had proceeded from it to Mullendore's Cafeteria at 601 Main Street. While eating someone announced that President Kennedy's motorcade would pass by on the street outside. Wayne and Edna went outside and watched the motorcade, afterwards they

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returned inside when soon they heard some shots. They left and walked west to (the grassy area). Out of curiosity they proceeded down the grassy slope to ask a police officer what had happened.

While there they noted disturbances in the turf. At this point the FBI changed their information. They actually saw "two separate gouges, more or less running parallel" for four or five feet in the grass. The FBI gave an incorrect report of a single gouge running 18 to 24 inches. But Wayne Hartman pressed down on the damaged grass to see how far it went. The FBI also reported falsely that the gouge lined up with the Texas School Book Depository, when the Hartmans clearly stated the two gouges lines up with the north grassy knoll. A Fort Worth photographer, Harry Cadluck took photographs of the gouges and said "there was more than one piece of turf knocked. . . . like someone shoved in a screwdriver and peeled it back a little . . ." A second piece was not as big. The FBI reports do not mention the photographer or his pictures. The Hartmans stood about five feet south of where the culvert or manhole cover was located.

When the Hartmans returned on November 24 to inspect the scene again they found the grass in the area where they had observed the gouged out holes had been trampled down and they could not locate the hit. How this is possible by random foot traffic was not gone into by the ^{FBI?} Special Agents.

In his September 9, 1964, report to headquarters, Dallas SA Robert P. Gemberling included the sanitized and corrupted version of the Hartman information. At headquarters Assistant to the Director Belmont read it and through ~~his~~ assistant William A.

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asked Dallas
Branigan on September 17 queried whether the agents had checked the area with a mine detector to determine if a bullet had been recovered? Nothing had been done. So the FBI shipped in a mine detector, a Detectron, Model 27, metal detector. FBI Agents Nat A. Pinkston and Robert M. Barrett searched a three hundred square foot area around the culvert, discovered no bullet, but a couple of miscellaneous metal objects. Case closed. But could the naked } word of FBI agents who had falsified information to begin with be accepted as valid by history and reality? Only their superiors could accept it.

An instance of a possible additional bullet came from the press. A series of nine photographs appeared in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram depicting officials at the scene of the crime searching for bullets. Buddy Walthers and a Dallas policeman are shown standing on the south curb of Elm Street west of and near the manhole cover slab. In the progression, the two stoop to examine the grass, an unknown man in a suit takes up the search while the two stand and watch. Then the suited hand of the third man reaches for an object. The unknown man is shown as he walks away with the object clutched in his left hand.

In the New Republic of December 21, 1963. Richard Dudman of the Saint Louis Post Dispatch who was on Dealey Plaza that day wrote, "A group of police officers were examining the area at the side of the street where the President was hit, and a police inspector told me they had just found another bullet in the grass." The British journalist Nerin E. Gun in his book Red Roses from Texas, published in early 1964 and the subject of a remark in

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the Warren Commission executive hearings by Allen Dulles, wrote that Buddy Walthers "described to me himself how he found the bullet and a picture taken immediately after the shooting by a Dallas Times photographer shows this detection and a Secret Service man in the act of retrieving a bullet from the turf at the roadside."

No further information is known about this incident; the Commission did not investigate it.

7
Two critics Gary Shaw and Larry Harris relate that a Dallas television personality, Bert Shipp, said that an unidentified mailman that afternoon handed a television cameraman from his station an empty 30.06 cartridge asking it be given to Shipp. He said it had found it in the bushes near the Texas School Book Depository. There are only so many mailmen in Texas and he could have been located and along with Shipp could have been called to testify. Shipp still has the cartridge.

Of the Shipp account no further information seems to exist.

Six other instances of bullet cases or the bullets themselves exit.

In July or August, 1966, William A. Barbee found a bullet embedded in the roof of a building located at 1615 Stemmons Freeway, Dallas. In December, 1967, he had read a Life magazine article on the assassination that prompted him to furnish the bullet to the FBI. On December 11, 1967, the Dallas Field Office submitted the bullet to the FBI in Washington for examination.

On December 14, 1967, ^{Laboratory SA} R. H. Jevons ^{his boss, assistant director W. A. M.} in a LHM to Mr. Conrad ^{subtyped them} related the results of laboratory tests and furnished the same to
FBI Dallas

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Did they test it?

Dallas by teletype. The fabled laboratory reported that the slug was a .30 caliber carbine-type, "entirely different from any ammunition specimens examined in connection with the assassination evidence. It could not have been fired in the assassination rifle." On December 27, 1967, Headquarters telephoned Dallas to order further clarification of the location of the cartridge with respect to its proximity to the TSBD. ^{Investigative Clerk} The Dallas IC Steve Albright and SA Wallace R. Heitman surveyed the area on December 29, 1967, and said the site was one mile north of the Depository. From ground floor one cannot see the TSBD. From the ground floor of the TSBD one cannot see the 1615 Stemmons Freeway building. (The bullet of course was found in the roof. Can the roof be seen from Dealey Plaza and vice versa?--yes.) The Dallas December 29th Airtel to the Director, FBI, containing the results of the survey, concluded by remarking,

"Bearing in mind that LEE HARVEY OSWALD fired from the Southeast 6th floor window of the Texas Schoolbook Depository, the building at 1615 Stemmons Freeway would not be in any way in the line of fire."

The FBI took no further action.

when in (Of course, the obvious ^{is} conclusion is that other sites around Dealey Plaza ^{and} could have been used by and they could have fired this errant bullet that ultimately struck the roof, ^{it} but this would ^{mean} have required a conspiracy. ^{if} The episode again illustrates how the FBI controlled the inquiry by ^{ignoring every thing except} postulating only the mystical official scenario ^{Nothing else was real} was reality, nothing else could have happened. ^{bullet} ^{FBI's} The treatment of the Barbee shot is similar to that accorded the

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one found by
Rex M. Oliver shot.

During October or November, 1968, he could not recall the exact time, Rex M. Oliver worked for the Texas Highway Department in the city of Dallas. While working in the vicinity of Commerce and Stemmons Freeway, "at the entrance to north Stemmons Freeway" he found a bullet "which appeared to have ricocheted off of something." He picked up the bullet and put it in his pocket and had kept it since. It was "somewhat corroded as if it had been in the weather for a long time." When he mentioned his find to his engineer he suggested to Oliver it might be the "third bullet", which he had heard about in connection with the assassination since Oliver found it "in just about the right spot."

For two or three weeks Oliver tried to contact Jim Garrison in New Orleans but ^{was} had been unsuccessful. So on February 15, 1969, he contacted the Dallas office of the FBI by telephone to furnish them the bullet, "if you want it." Oliver did not know what caliber the bullet was, but only that the "front" was the only damaged portion. The FBI picked up the bullet and on February 20 mailed it to its Washington crime laboratory for analysis.

On February 27 the FBI laboratory reported to Dallas that the specimen was a .45 caliber steel-jacketed soft point bullet which has been fired from a barrel having six lands and grooves, left twist. The rifling impressions were the same as those produced by Colt, Norwegian and Star automatic pistols and Colt revolvers. "It was not possible to determine the length of time that this bullet has been exposed to the weather." Then, the laboratory

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commented: "It is to be noted that this bullet is different from any ammunition examined in the assassination case and could not have been fired from the assassination rifle." Washington returned the bullet to Dallas and took no further action. Here once more the FBI utilized the Procrustean control determinate: if a bullet did not fit Oswald's rifle it was not legitimate evidence. Of course, a different caliber weapon required another assassin.

A Dallasite dug another bullet out of a building roof. In 1967 while working as a roofer on top of the Massey Roofing Co. building in the 1200 block of Elm Street, about eight blocks from the TSBD Richard Haythorne discovered a bullet. On April 20, 1977, his attorney Bill Mason sent it to the House Select Committee. The HSC employed a ballistic expert, ___ Wilson, from the Washington, D.C., Police Department who found that it was a "jacketed, soft-point," .30 caliber Remington-Peters bullet. Wilson "concluded that the physical characteristics of the bullet were different from those of Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition, as well as the rifling characteristics of the Mannlicher-Carcano ammunition and was not fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle."

Richard Harold Lester's experience matched Haythorne's. A night time security guard, Lester had a hobby of searching the assassination area on his days off with a metal detector. He uncovered many odds and ends of items. But sometime in 1974--the precise time is not remembered--in the cinders of the overpass he found a 6.5mm cartridge, sixty-one steps south of a point on the west side of the overpass, directly above the south side of

I think it was his hobby way next to his house to that area.

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Commerce Street. A narrow roadway runs along the westernmost railroad tracks, the spent cartridge fell between it and the fence.

Lester kept the cartridge private, not thinking it was of any significance until the brouhaha raised over the House Select Committee's inquiry into the murder again brought the subject to the fore as a ^Mlife issue. At 11:45 p.m. on November 22, 1976, he telephoned KRLD, a Dallas radio talk show, where he told a Dallas Times-Herald investigative reporter, Hugh Aynesworth, about his find. This initiated a story, with photographs of the scene, and a chain of events followed.

7, Roused by his reception on November 26 Lester telephoned the FBI office in Dallas and reported what he had found. On December 1 the FBI interviewed him, asking to borrow the slug for tests in the FBI Washington crime laboratory. Lester balked at that, not because he did not want to cooperate, but because he was afraid he would not get his bullet back. He suggested it be insured, thus the FBI would be certain to return it rather than lose the money. He did not want money, but was concerned he would lose it. The FBI finally convinced him to loan them the bullet, gave him a receipt, and assured him "that he will get the bullet back once the laboratory examinations have been conducted." For weeks afterwards, from time to time, Lester would phone to ask when he would get his bullet back, only to be told the tests were still being run.

After a nasty wrangle with the House Select Committee, on August 4, 1977 (nine months later) the FBI reported Lester had

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found a 6.5mm jacketed soft point bullet, but not a full metal jacketed one like the CE399 bullet recovered at Parkland Memorial Hospital November 22. (A different type of ammunition was involved.) Furthermore, the land and groove impressions of the rifling of a test bullet fired from the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository (Serial No. 2766, the alleged Oswald rifle.) and the Lester bullet, differ approximately .01 inch, a significant and definitive degree, meaning they were not made by the same rifle. The individual microscopic marks or striations were also compared "without effecting an identification." "Therefore," the laboratory concluded, "nothing was found to indicate the . . . bullet was fired from the previously submitted . . . 6.5mm Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, Serial Number C2766, represented by the . . . test bullet."

In other words the Lester bullet did not come from the rifle found in the TSBD. There all FBI interest just died. Procrustean control determinate: since the bullet had not come from "Oswald's rifle" it could not have been connected with the assassination. The FBI kept the bullet.

Two other found bullets are in the evidentiary base. On December 2, 1970, two college students, Melvin Gray and William Koye, claimed to have found a .30-06 caliber copper jacketed lead cored bullet in a planter along Houston Street, the edge of Dealey Plaza. A friend mailed the slug to critic Harold Weisberg, Frederick, MD. Weisberg promptly notified the local FBI agent stating that he thought it was a ghoulish plant by persons agitated by the Garrison inquiry.

*This part is added
to me. I got it
from Emory
Brown*

Ronald Lichtinger, the FBI's resident agent in Frederick, returned the bullet to Weisberg, without any covering letter. Instead he read what he had written on a lined yellow pad, apparently dictated to him by FBIHQ.

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After pausing to decide whether or not to accept anything from Weisberg who it thought ^{I don't think this was a fact or figure and would need to} (knowingly falsely) to be a communist as well as a critic of the Bureau, which was worse, the FBI ^{investigation} analyzed the bullet. Then they determined the planter had been built after the assassination and thus the bullet could not have been involved in the crime. They decided to keep their results secret from Weisberg who learned of it from the documents he recovered under a FOIA suit. ^{This is the one writing we see note ↓}

Emery Brown also found a .30-06 bullet in a planter on Dealey Plaza. need data

In addition to the accounts of bullets hitting the plaza and the seven bullets or cartridge cases citizens turned up, two bullets struck and scarred a sidewalk and a curb on Dealey Plaza and left smears that the FBI tested.

^{brought}
~~Citizen Eugene Aldredge~~ persisted in bringing a bullet scar on the north sidewalk of Elm Street to FBI attention.

On the day of the assassination KRLD-TV filmed the assassination scene and among other things showed a bullet scar on the sidewalk running along the northside of Elm Street, near the ^{T.S.B.D.} triple underpass. That evening Eugene Aldredge viewed the show. Seven months later, sometime in June, 1964, he visited the area and viewed the scar, which was approximately six inches long, one half inch wide, one quarter of an inch deep, with metallic smears in the trough. Photographs of the scar were taken, showing its line of trajectory and its size and location. ^{by whom?}

When the Warren Report appeared in September Aldredge ^{read it} and discovered it did not mention the sidewalk hit. On September

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29, 1964, he telephoned the Dallas FBI office to bring the matter to its attention. When they asked why he had waited so long to report the matter he stated "he felt that such [an] important point would be covered in the President Commission's Report." When it was not he had come forward. On September 30, SA Manning C. Clements and SA Richard J. Burnett visually inspected the sidewalk area for any scars. They found what they deemed to be a non-pertinent scar. Their airtel report to FBI Headquarters reads:

In the area of the second lamppost, approximately thirty-three feet east of the post, in the sixth large cement square, four feet from the street curb and six feet from the parkside curbing, is an approximately four inches long by one-half inch wide dug-out scar, which could possibly have been made by some blunt-end type instrument or projectile. It is noted that this scar lies in such a direction that if it had been made by a bullet, it could not have come from the direction of the window the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy has publicly stated was used by Lee Harvey Oswald when firing his assassination bullets at the late President.

It wasn't a flat angle, not fired from any real elevation
↓

It lines up with the far western corner of the TSBD. Someone would have to lean out of the window to shoot the bullet that made that scar, or be in the bushes at the base. Once more, the FBI employed its standard formula for assassination evidence: if facts does not fit the Oswald lone assassin configuration it is not evidence.

A week after his telephone report to the FBI Aldredge

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mentioned the mark to his friend George Booth who said he wanted to see it. So, the two went to Dealey Plaza and found to their amazement that the mark, formerly about 1/4 inch deep, "had been filled in with what appeared to be a mixture of concrete and asbestos A crude attempt had been made to make the altered mark appear weatherworn to match the surrounding concrete." The *Dallas FBI said?* mark lined up with the southwest corner of the TSBD and could not have come from the window where Oswald was reported to have been firing.

On October 20, FBI headquarters told Dallas its report did not seem to ^{refer to} cover the area Aldredge had originally described. Dallas should look into this further and Aldredge should be requested to further identify the place. On November 5 FBI agents interviewed Aldredge at his home where he was confined with illness. Aldredge minutely described the location of the mark on Elm Street. Then he stated that the scar was covered over in a sloppy patch job. In his opinion the hole was covered in order to protect the Soviets. He had only mentioned the scar to two people, a local newspaper reporter and an FBI agent. (The FBI interview with the reporter disclosed he did not believe Aldredge and thought he was a nut case and merely listened to him on the phone to get him off the line.) Aldredge thought the Soviets had infiltrated the FBI. The agents "politely, but firmly, advised that his supposition in [that] . . . regard" was wrong and absurd. Hoover noted in the margin of the paragraph of the report relating this, "right."

^{u,} Dallas located the scar. They confirmed "that there is now

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some sort of foreign material partially covering this nick in the sidewalk." They scraped a specimen from it and sent it to the laboratory requesting a report. On the routing FD 340 form Dallas ticked the square requesting the laboratory keep the specimen. But the laboratory sent it right back to them. Two years later the laboratory requested the specimen again.

Whereupon the subject of the sidewalk scar entered into the silent world of the FBI and nothing more is known of it.

The last known evidence of a shot on Dealey Plaza exterior to the automobile is the bullet that struck the Commerce Street curbstone and wounded citizen James T. Tague. We have discussed this in a previous chapter and need only to summarize the information.

On November 22 James T. Tague ^{driving} attempted to drive east on Commerce ^{Street, was} ~~through Dealey Plaza~~ only to be stopped by traffic at the triple underpass. Learning of the President's passing he got out and walked to the plaza to view the motorcade. He stood on the south side of Main Street, twenty-odd feet from the ^{bridge} ~~pass~~ abutment. As he watched the motorcade, shots rang out. A bullet striking the curbstone near him caused concrete debris to spray and hit and wound him ^{slightly} just beneath the right eye. ~~Two-drops~~ of blood-flowed.

Deputy Sheriff Eddy P. "Buddy" Walthers, Chief Criminal Deputy Sheriff Alan Sweatt, and police officers saw his blood. A motorcycle policeman, L. L. Hill, called it in to his central command, leaving a record on the police logs. Officers searched and found a fresh chip on the curb, twenty three feet and four

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inches from the eastern edge of the tripe underpass on the south curb of Main Street. It was about the size of a silver dollar, the depth of a nickel, ^{i think smaller. So true?} with metallic smear in the trough.

At the police station an officer took Tague's statement down. This disappeared from the record and has never been seen since. ^{WFAA TV News took motion picture} The next day James Underwood of ~~a~~ local television station took a ~~television-reel shot~~ of the chip and Tom Dillard of the Dallas Morning News snapped ~~a~~ still picture. The mark is clear. A photograph of the curbstone appeared in the Dallas Morning News, November 24. Still no FBI agent contacted Tague. When on December 13 the Dallas Morning News ran a news story headlined, "Questions raised on Murder Bullets," Tague contacted the FBI. ^{did he}

Special Agents Henry J. Oliver and Louis M. Kelley interviewed him, but seemed to be more interested in whether he knew Jack Ruby. Their report dated the 16th ^{is} limited. Later when the Bureau analyzed a June 5, 1964, story on Tague by James C. Lehrer ^{then} (a reporter for the Dallas Times Herald it was prejudiced against him, describing him as a "used car salesman," when he ^{was} ~~is~~ in fleet sales ^{then?} and new car sales management. The report distorts the facts, calls Tague a publicity seeker and one who is after money, when in fact the very story relates that the person (Tague) does not wish his name used and Lehrer did not use it. There was never any reference to money. ~~And so forth.~~

During his ^{deposition} ~~testimony before the Warren Commission staff~~ counsel Wesley Liebeler questioned him. Liebeler asked him about his home movies taken of the curbstone. Tague had taken the film in May, ¹⁹⁶⁴ stored it in his dresser drawer, told no one about it.

on 21

investigate. He found the spot easily by using the existing photographs. But there was no longer any "mark" or "scar" or "hole". It obviously had been patched, when Oswald could not have done it. As the Dallas ~~case~~ JFK assassination case agent, Robert P. Gemberling put it in his ^{summary} of the bound reports he sent to FBIHQ of which this is part, "

Nonetheless Shaneyfelt had the ^{city} ~~cut~~ removed that section of curbstone and then saw off a piece about a foot long where the hole had been. He flew it back to ^{the} ~~Washington~~ FBI lab in Washington and unabashedly the lab went through the charade of testing it for bullet residues, knowing it was ^{testing} the patch!

Spectrographic analysis, accord^{ing} to the FBI's notes, no formal report having been made, detected ^{only} lead and antimony, two of the 11 (?) elements of the alleged bullet. SA Robert Frazier, the ballistic expert, not the spectrographer, noted that what had been alchemized from a hole or scar to a "smear," could also have been caused by an "automobile wheel weight," a possibility he did not mention in his Warren Commission testimony.

~~In Weisberg's second FOIA lawsuit for the results of all the FBI's second testing Spectrographic analysis is performed by buring^{ing} a minute specimen, photographing and then analyzing the flame.~~

^(CA 15-226)
In Weisberg's second FOIA lawsuit for the results of the FBI's JFK assassination second testing the FBI failed to produce this film of that spectrographic testing. The FBI's explanation, ^{unknown and not} ~~not~~ made of personal knowledge and an undisguised conjecture, is that this thin film had been discarded to save space in the incredibly enormous FBI files!

In fact any such destruction was prohibited.

The patch, of course, made it impossible to determine the composition of what cause that hole, ^{or} scar, or mark

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*The park up
the tower
Barefoot Sanders
put him in
that hole and
Nasser in jail*

Yet the film had disappeared and now Liebelser had it. How was that possible? Liebelser changed the subject.

*see suggestion
new city*

As late ^{on} as July 17, 1964, the FBI told the Commission it had not been able to find any evidence of the missed bullet hitting the pavement. The stalling ceased after Tom Dillard told U. S.

earlier - what led to it

Attorney Barefoot Sanders about the bullet at a social function.

The FBI sent SA Lyndel Shaneyfelt to Dallas to see the curbstone portion out and bring it back to Washington for testing. The curb

Lab photo reply what investigate the spot and had the cut saw the curbstone obviously

had been patched by persons unknown and to the FBI a fact they did not wish to pursue with honesty for it suggested a conspirator might have covered it up to hide the impact. The FBI conducted scientific tests to determine the composition of metallic traces near the patch area. It was lead with some antimony, the composition of the core of a bullet, said the FBI and the Commission parroted them in its Report. On neutron activation tests done the FBI did not inform the Commission. The conclusions of these tests, on one sheet of paper, the FBI told Weisberg in federal court suit CA 75-226, they had destroyed when cleaning their files.

The chip on the curb was 600 feet from the Texas School Book Depository, ~~It was on an angle of 33° making a skipping shot,~~ or

of it having skipped to the curbstone after impact in a way with enough energy remaining to inflict secondary impact after hitting something else, not physically possible. For it to have been fired from the TSBD it would have been a direct shot from that window, according to the FBI, it would have had to have come at frame 410, pass eighteen feet in the air above the car and be fired 5.3" after the last shot, all an impossibility. But it was even more impossible because the FBI studies showed the direction of the shot was to the north, west of the TSBD. But just as the commission ordained that there had been only one, making this seem possible resolution in the

Grimm fairy tale of this part of the official my apology - Du - I do not understand the 2 lines & think they are not needed

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The Warren Report gave two deceptive paragraphs to the Tague shot. The mark they said could have originated from the lead core of a bullet but not from the complete copper-jacketed bullet found ^{from} Governor Connally's stretcher. Here again we encounter the

control determinate of ~~only permitting~~ ^{fixed,} three Oswald/copper-jacketed bullets to explain all ^{the known shooting, welded firmly to the two-conspiracy for} evidence. An obvious logical

conception neither the FBI nor the commission will consider the possibility of a different kind of bullet, which meant fired by another, a lead one, bullet from a different chamber was rifle hit the curb from the path to obliterate the metal tracks left by the bullet that would not have been deposited by the bullet itself. If instead they conjured up these two previous
If CE399's brother did not make the mark then how did it get

there? The Commission offered two scenarios; ^{just a stone could have} neither of merit. ^{had a piece of concrete grazed out by a fragment of the bullet that exploded on JFK's head and then} It could have come from a piece of the shot that hit JFK's head, ^{looked over to} ^{that was broken, somehow, in damage reduction of the laws of physics with enough energy remaining to make that piece of the concrete or stone} and exploded or it might be a fragment from the missed bullet that

ricocheted. ^{But} the shot that hit JFK exploded ^{on} the right side ^{his} of the head. The left half of his skull and the left hemisphere of his head were ^{in danger} of the head and a fragment could not, possibly have moved left for a ^{pro-}

most from this bullet to have damaged that curvature it first would have had to circumvent the earth and come back to
through unbroken skull to hit the curb. It is a physically ^{impossible} shot. A ricochet is not possible either the bullet ^{found hitting any person or thing a how could ricochet was never possible if the bullet were fired by Oswald} hit from the front ^{at} too steep an angle and was too distant (from that ^{direction} ^{hit} ^{trying} ^{to} ^{explain} ^{the} ^{impossible} ^{was} ^{the} ^{only} ^{means} ^{of} ^{getting} ^{away} ^{with} ^{asserting} ^{the} ^{impos-} ^{sible} ^{is} ^{the} ^{TSBD} ^{An} ^{Oswald} ^{shot} ^{is} ^{not} ^{possible} ^{either} ^{it} ^{is} ^{too} ^{far} ^{one} ^{of} ^{the} ^{ways} ⁱⁿ ^{which} ^{the} ^{vaulted} ^{FBI} ^{and} ^{the} ^{Commission} ^{of} ^{inquiries} ^{"proved"} ^{to} ^{be} ^{so} ^{convincing} ^{that} ^{the} ^{too} ^{late} ^{and} ^{too} ^{errant} ^{President} ^{was} ^{killd} ^{by} ^a ^{long} ^{but} ^{assassin} ^{not} ^{as} ^{the} ^{end} ^{product} ^{of} ^a ^{conspiracy} ^{[Extra} ^{space]} ^{This} ^{is} ^{what} ^{we} ^{have} ^{been} ^{permitted} ^{to} ^{after} ^{the} ^{Commission} ^{disappeared} ^{into} ^{our} ^{history} ^{what} ^{we} ^{have} ^{learned} ^{despite} ^{official} ^{suppression} ^{of} ^{it} ^{by} ^{means} ^{of} ^{fast} ^{litigation} ^{as}

The curbstone chip came from a shot fired far west ^{to} ^{the} ^{new} ^{year} ^{of} ^{the} ^{TSBD} and was a direct hit from a non-military bullet.

But there is no assurance of full and complete disclosure still.
This is the evidence of other bullets hitting outside the car. We must remember that only fragments of the evidence survived

in the form of eyewitness and physical data for there never was a serious attempt to gather the physical evidence in a scientific manner, e.g., by sealing the plaza and minutely searching it or by a careful sifting of the various types of evidence to gather the

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hundreds of witnesses and fully explore what they saw or to carefully collect, analyze, and coordinate the information in photographic film. It does not imply that each of these instances means another shot was fired in the assassination of President Kennedy. *on Phil no other shots were* Far from it.

Each instance has to be evaluated in its own terms, carefully analyzed with respect to scientific facts, defined by relationships to other evidence, and be judged by objective standards. The evidence is overwhelming, certain, and compelling that the Tague and Aldredge scars are the products of bullets beyond the official three. But to concentrate on the mind-stunning area of physical facts with their implications overlooks the central element in the bitter history of the bulletry of Dealey Plaza: the history of the bulletry external to the automobile demonstrates that local and federal authorities *President* never investigated the murder of President John F. Kennedy *and never intended to.*

when they could not entirely ignore the possibility of other shots having been fired, obscured, covered, misrepresented and distorted the evidence so that they could and would control the results of this evidence for possible other bulletry operated under one certain element. This evidence from the Commission's consideration and from its Report

How does one explain this ^{deliberate act?} Special Agents of the FBI and the staff of the Warren Commission investigating the evidence for possible other bulletry operated under one certain basic assumption: they would control the investigation to exclude

~~this evidence.~~

With few exceptions all they did they assumed would be locked away in eternal secrecy and no one would ever know what they had done. To brow beat a citizen like Randolph Carr to keep him from speaking to the press, to change the statement of the Hartmans, to slander Tague, to *the phony custom test and other* hide information that disproved the official conclusions in the Tague data, was never to be known to

(in political cases)

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~~do not, ignore, misrepresent, twist, distort and even lie about~~ the
anyone. Thus they could proceed confidently to block, thwart, or
evidence they had in spite of their valiant efforts not to have indications that more than
confuse the evidence for additional bulletry. The agents from the
three bullet were first and that is irrefutable proof that there had been a conspiracy.
The FBI has Bureau had a long tradition for working this way, as anyone who has
studied the Hiss, Rosenberg, ^{and similar cases} and so forth trials knows. All of its
~~their~~ lives the Bureau had ^{by} been able to hide misfeasance, nonfeasance
perversion of evidence, and other misdeeds with ^{and to get away with it,} no questions ever
Even compelled if still also in complete disclosure under the compulsion of the courts in
lodged against them or their files, pulled out into the sunlight of
FOIA litigation did not end the FBI's immunity.
public scrutiny.

The attorneys from the Warren Commission plucked their
principles of operation from the legal structure, in which all of
them were stellar instances of the best America could produce. In

American law an attorney acts on behalf of his client with the
opposing counsel or adversary taking the responsible to question
him, for ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~his~~ ^{is responsible for questioning and restraining} ~~errors and imprudent actions.~~ ^{his acts and correct his arguments,} the judge as a sort of referee
~~law, the one to keep them in line.~~ ^{is therefore and interpreter of the} ~~FBI with presidential commissions as with congressional~~
~~investigation, the adversary context was missing; it was not a~~
~~commission was not a court it decided before any real investigation was made~~
~~by the FBI.~~ ^{are trained and instructed in the normal restraints of an adversary system of justice for which they} ~~with the normal restraints of an adversary system of justice for which they~~
~~are trained and instructed in the normal restraints of an adversary system of justice for which they~~
~~judge to enforce absent they justified their actions by this crude fiction. They~~
~~rules and keep them honest. They~~
operated in secrecy, the public not privy to the deception, the ~~mis~~
~~deception~~ ^{did whatever they wanted to do without} ~~masking and the hiding, and they never had the correcting pressure~~
~~the restraints of both the~~ ^{and public opinion from which they were sheltered by} ~~and public opinion from which they were sheltered by~~
~~the complete secrecy in which they worked - not a compulsory secrecy but one of their~~
~~own choosing and enforcing.~~ ^{hidden and sheltered by the high reputations of the} ~~hidden and sheltered by the high reputations of the~~
They also operated under the screening device of the ~~the~~
~~prestigious members of the Commission,~~ ^{like the chairman, the 1st Senator} ~~the~~
~~head of the 1st Western Conservative Democrats, the respected Kentucky Republican, John A. Allen, Dudley~~
~~Russell, a Sherman Cooper, which quieted critical minds. At the~~
~~former Director, Central Intelligence Agency and the Republican leader in the House, Gerald Ford. These~~
~~reputations and those of the other, also prestigious members, seldom invited any criticism of their~~
~~star chamber, it enabled them to preserve complete secrecy save for the FBI to leak by~~
~~which it dominated the Commission and as a practical matter robbed the Commission~~
~~of its independence without and public a journalistic outcry. These procedures and~~

practices and the high regard here and abroad for the eminent commissioners had the effect of reassuring the public in general and particularly those who loved and respected the man - The Bullets of Dealey Plaza: Control of Evidence
~~but on a grimy and increasingly popular President despite widespread unease over the crime itself, a crime that in our society inevitably has the effect of a coup d'etat.~~

~~his charm, and the significance of his office, did not permit many citizens to raise any small inner doubts to the level of~~

~~criticism. Who could dream a president's murder would not be thoroughly and vigorously investigated? To the ignorant and reactionary Speaker of the House Carl Albert the whole issue of other bullets raised by a couple of lone voices in 1965 and 1966 struck him as absolutely absurd, and his comments, voice the views of other politicians: "why, what's another bullet in a thing like this?"~~
of the world? If there was some inside and doxyist little and poor a few only, but because the media was not troubled or uneasy it got very little attention and the nation, which it scorned, scorned in silence, without the agitation and complaint that would have been certain if there had been any implying at all of what was going on in that star chamber of total secrecy.

Until the Report was released and could be read, understood, and protested, as it was despite the uncritical acceptance by all the major media that then did not report the serious criticisms of the Report and its omissions, distortions, misrepresentations and, in plain English, its lies with out which it could not have issued with its unimpeachable confessions.

But among those of influence, those too busy with other duties and obligations to take the considerable amount of uninterrupted time required to read and understand the massive 900-page tome, there was full and unqualified acceptance of the Report and its "solution" to "the crime of the century" as it was not impenetrable, referred to it, it was not possible for anyone, especially not the huddled major media or political leaders, to evaluate the Report by comparing it with the Commission's work and because it was another two months before the Commission published the 26 volumes of its testimony, exhibits and its testimony that testimony and of other exhibits of the Commission's work, separate cloning. The rest was consigned to the locked vaults of the National Archives where it sat for 200 cubic feet had to be processed carefully, under law and regulation before anyone would have access to it. How many Americans could take the enormous amount of time required to read, comprehend and analyze the 900 pages of the Report and compare it with the voluminous scattered manuscript the 26 volumes the Commission published, about 15,000, 000 words? & For all still from this minute fraction of the people was the infinitesimally smaller who who could get a archive day without and to wade through those 200 cubic feet of documents so many of which were largely to completely illegible? The major media did not take that time and did not make the large financial investment of assigning many teams of trained and experienced investigative reporters and analysts to get swamped in those 10,000, 000 published words. How many of the Report were published or much later when the Commission 200 cubic feet of records became available in the Archives Building.

Without this being done the major media, if it so desired, as it did not, could not analyze, evaluate and inform the people about the official solution to the great and subversive crime of the assassin's shot. In turn, this meant that representative society could not work because that requires as its fundamental prerequisite that people be informed.

Neither the people nor their political leaders were informed, as a matter of reality, the Commission and the executive agencies saw to it that they could not be.

On this one issue of whether more than three bullets were fired in the assassination - which really means whether or not there had been a conspiracy and whether or not the Commission of the prestigious and eminent had lied to the nation about the subversive of crimes, after a few lone voices asked questions about it in 1965 and 1966, even the speaker of the House of Representatives, Carl Albert, found it absurd: "The leader of the national House of Representatives,"

"Why," he said, "what's another bullet in a thing like this?" Which one of the most important of our national leaders was and remains so ignorant of the most basic fact of the assassination - so ignorant he did not know enough not to make a fool of himself, the great importance to the FBI and to the Commission of "the bullets" of "Deadly Phage" in their "control of the violence" is apparent.