

^{thin}
its eminent faces, because it was a physical impossibility for Oswald or anyone else
in that sixth-floor window and with that rifle to have ^{committed the assassination} fired ~~the~~ three shots.
^{The three acknowledged shots}
that if each of them, ~~hit~~ in Redlich's words, "struck the occupants of the Presidential
limousine."

How strange it is that this had to be a demand from the staff! Imagine
a Presidential Commission rolling unconcernedly to its predetermined conclusions with
out knowing that it was within the realm of physical possibility!

Unfortunately, the Commission did not answer the facts in its own files
"with facts". ^{including} Its answers are the "fanciful theories" Redlich predicted, the single-
bullet ~~assumption~~ fraud.

Note that Redlich has described the "conclusion" the Commission then had
already reached as a "hypothesis" or "assumptions".

His penultimate paragraph is less than generous to the federal police:

Lil-tr from previous page.

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Redlich did not see fit to delineate what he meant by "totally incorrect"
investigative reports. However, from his own first sentence it cannot be the general
the
agreement that each of the three shots "struck ~~an~~ occupants of the Presidential
limousine".

Perhaps this was well enough known among the staff and to its head to
require no expositions.

Those who seek to defend the Commission and its Report claim it is ~~a~~
honest and impartial because it is critical of the federal police. What little it did
^{of them} say is ~~a~~ ridiculously little, in view of the record. However, it did not at any
point or in any way ~~say~~ tell the people that their FBI and Secret Service investigated
the murder of their President and filed reports that "are totally incorrect" and
"will present a completely misleading picture".

Redlich's words are an adequate representation ~~of~~ of the doctrine and
methods of this Commission. Oswald is guilty, we know that before we begin, and it is
our responsibility to prove it, doing whatever it takes, or we'll soon catch hell from
our own evidence. No further elaboration is necessary.

However, respects are due Redlich's foresight. His devils did find the
scripture he and his associates left, and just where he predicted.

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It is Arlen Specter who in this book interests me most and who, ^{is also found} in these ^{that were} documents, suppressed until September 20 ~~also~~ ^{interests me most}. Those two withheld of the until-then suppressed Commission staff files on the President's autopsy were both Specter memoranda to Rankin. The earlier one, dated April 30, 1964, is headed "Autopsy Photographs and X-Rays of President John F. Kennedy". ~~THE~~ That of ~~the~~ ^{the} May 12 preceeds this title with "examination of". It reads, "Examination of Photographs and X-Rays of President Kennedy".

Specter is less well represented in the other until-then suppressed Commission files than others of the staff. In his file there are copies of pro-forma memoranda only, and very few of them. However, some of the memos he addressed Rankin, in Rankin's ^{the} files, are not of the kind he could use in his political campaigns. They do not give Specter a good character.

Although it is chronologically out of order to do so, I think the first that should be noted is the shortest. It is two sentences long, requiring only five short lines of typing. It is dated June 11. It reads:

"If additional depositions are taken in Dallas, I suggest that Jim Tague 2424 Inwood, Apartment 253, and Virgie Rachley, 405 Wood Street be deposed to determine the knowledge of each on where the missing bullet struck. These two witnesses were mentioned in the early FBI reports, but they have never been deposed."

Brief as this is, it admits much.

The staff knew about Tague from the beginning, for he was in new stories ^{on} and ~~in~~ the police radio. The government had a number of transcripts of the police broadcasts, all contradictory, but Tague is an early feature. Although it is a secret ^{withheld} from the report and the 26 volumes of ~~appended~~ ^{the} exhibits, it also, very early, obtained sound transcripts and had the actual voices in the actual ^{the} broadcasts. The FBI reports

are enough to establish the fact, and these Specter acknowledges. He thus acknowledges both personal and Commission knowledge of the fact of Tague's wounding and, as he put it, of "the missing bullet".

here The Commission had originally planned to end its work by June. On June 11 Specter recommends only that "if" the Commission is to examine additional Dallas witnesses, Tague be one of the two he believes should be examined. (He thus had no interest in some of the most important witnesses, like Mrs. Sylvia Odie, who had been told by anti-Castro agents escorting "The False Oswald" that Kennedy should be murdered and The False Oswald had told them how; or in any of those who had taken the vital, actual assassination film, like Zapruder, Altgens and Willis, none of whom had been examined by the Commission and none of whose film had been authenticated.)

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Thus we have a picture of the Commission that was willing to come to the end of its "investigation" of the murder of the President without accounting for the bullet it knew had been fired during the assassination, the bullet that it had not accounted for while accounting for all it acknowledged had been fired during the assassination. Thus, too, we have the Specter of the single-bullet theory who was part of this with ~~his~~ personal knowledge of it. All he could bring himself to do was suggest that perhaps Tague might be questioned. So mild and understated is Specter's brief memo that ~~he~~ it does not record the wounding of Tague by this "missing" bullet.

Imagine! a man was wounded during the assassination and he had been ignored until *months* after the commission had planned to finish its work and at that late date, more than six months after the assassination, Specter was only suggesting that if it wasn't too much trouble, *Arden* maybe someone ought to speak to him.

What uncompromising integrity! For six months the government's investigators and lawyers have been contentedly accounting for all of the ~~firings~~ shooting during the assassination, blandly pretending "Jim Tague" didn't get hurt by the bullet it pretended hadn't been fired!

Thanks to this memo, we do know that during the gestation of his child ("bastard" to Ray Marcus), we do know that Arlen Specter, father of the single-bullet theory, did know and ignored this "missing" bullet.

Extra Space

One of Specter's earlier assignments had been the preparations of the questions to be asked of a number of prominent witnesses. There are a series of these in the once-suppressed files. All are incorporated into memoranda address to Rankin on March 31, 1967.

When Mrs. Kennedy was ~~asked~~ ^{a witness (5H178ff),} the Commission would heard from the only close eyewitness ~~xxxxxxx~~ of her husband's murder in the entire world. There were quite a number of others who were not far away ^{also} who were not called. Phil Willis told me he now understands the real reason his wife ^{was not} ~~had never been~~ called as a witness when she was so much closer to the actual murder and had such a clear recollection. Mrs. Willis also saw the President's head snap sharply backward when the "fatal" shot hit. The Commission took testimony from not a single person who would have so testified, for this would have made clear ~~xxx~~ what it also suppressed and misrepresented ~~xxxxxxx~~ about the Zapruder and other films: ^{it should} the "fatal" wound was from the front. When the FBI reported its belated interview with Mrs. Marilyn Willis (~~White~~ PHOTOGRAPHIC WHITEWASH 179-80), it managed to exclude this intelligence also. Specter was like the FBI, only more so. Mrs. Kennedy was less than half an arms length from her husband and looking directly at him during that most awful moment through which a woman could live. She alone of those close to him also was looking at him. What better ~~was~~ reason did Specter need for leaving out of the questions to be asked her what she from her own observation knew of ~~the~~ ^{this} wounds and ^{his reaction to} the wounding. Of course, all the schmalz that is not useful in an investigation of the murder he did include, and questions about all the chitchat.

When Governor Connally was a witness (4H129ff), it is Specter who conducted the questioning. In the list of questions he prepared in advance, Specter got to the shooting with No. 19. He planned to asked Connally to mark a photograph

The closest Specter came to ^{planning} asking a question of genuine significance about the President's wounds was in Question No. 62. There, unbarred cats again he

A When Mrs. Kennedy's testimony was taken, Rankin asked the questions.

At the point where she got to the wounds, her only possible significant testimony, the printed transcript (5H190) reads, in brackets, "Reference to wounds deleted".

From this transcript it appears that Mrs. Kennedy volunteered this testimony about the wounds. It is not in response to a question about them, for there was none.

What could have been meaningful with the photographs, Specter avoided, in his prepared questions and during the examination, ~~xxx~~ ^{he} should have shown Connally the Zapruder movie and asked this. He dared not, however, for as he well knew, as we have already noted, ~~on April 14, Connally testified that~~ Connally would have testified that the first shot came earlier than the Commission would concede, at a time it could not have been fired by a solitary, sixth-floor-window assassin. The staff knew this, if the members didn't.

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1316 What could have been meaningful with the photographs, Specter avoided, in his prepared questions and during the examination, ~~xxx~~ he should have shown Connally the Zapruder movie and asked this. He dared not, however, for as he well knew, as we have already noted, ~~ON APRIL 14 CONNALLY TALKS SPECTER~~ Connally would have testified that the first shot came earlier than the Commission would concede, at a time it could not have been fired by a solitary, sixth-floor-window assassin. The staff knew this, if the members didn't.

No par. Failure to ask Connally this while he was looking at the Zapruder movie is consistent only with deliberate suppression

Consistent with this is the failure to plan to ask him to identify the frame of the Zapruder film in which he was struck. There is no projected question about the Zapruder film and what it shows or Connally sees it in. Not one!

With the "best evidence" of Connally's wound Connally's body, ^{Specter had no plan} ~~there was no~~ plan for him to display his wounds to the Commission. This was especially important so they could decide not whether a single bullet had inflicted all the non-fatal injuries on both men but whether it was at all possible.

Before the Commission, ^{Connally} he did display his wounds. And he did testify to the frame of the Zapruder movie in which he believed he had been struck.

His testimony has no ~~extra space~~ comfort to single bullet theorists in the authors of the report. If it is correct, the report is wrong. Specter's preparation was to plan to omit this vital part of Connally's testimony.

F. V. ...