

Many bizarre and inexplicable questions remained when the autopsy protocol was completed. There were even more puzzles, less understandable and not justifiable, when the Commission issued its Report and went out of business. One that struck me on my initial study of the testimony and the examination of the medical witnesses by the Commission, meaning, really, by Arlen Specter, is the utter inadequacy of the deposition taken from Dr. Robert N. McClelland.

McClelland is an experienced surgeon. He taught surgery at the University of Texas, Southwestern Medical School, where he was associate professor of surgery. He testified March 21, 1964 (6H30 ff).

On November 22, 1963, he was a busy surgeon. He attended both the President and the Governor. According to Parkland Hospital operative records, he assisted Dr. Tom Shires in the surgery on Governor Connally's thigh until 4:20 p.m. These records do not list all the doctors in attendance. The senior physicians are noted.

Apparently the first thing McClelland did after he scrubbed up following this surgery was to prepare a "Statement Regarding Assassination of President Kennedy". This is dated twenty-five minutes later, at 4:45 p.m. The first twenty-two pages of Volume 17 of the exhibits are a series of "Medical reports from doctors at Parkland Hospital...concerning treatment of President Kennedy..." McClelland's is on pages 11-12. He wrote it in longhand on the hospital's printed "admission note" form.

Later, all the doctors were under considerable Commission and public pressure because their observations when they examined and treated the President were not consistent with the subsequent official version of the shooting and injuries. There is, as I noted (WHITEWASH 180) the question of whether there was both perjury and the subornation of perjury in some of it.

During the tracheotomy, McClelland "was standing at the end of the stretcher on which the President was lying, immediately at the head..." (6H32) where "I was in such a position that I could very closely examine the head wound" (6H33). So, McClelland is one doctor who was in a position to and who did "very closely examine" the front of the President's head. In his contemporaneous report this is what he said of it:

"Cause of death was due to massive head and brain injury from a gunshot wound of the left temple." After close study of his testimony, I commented (WHITEWASH 169), "It is perhaps significant that...Doctor McClelland was not asked to retract this conclusion, and he reaffirmed his statement."

What struck me immediately and then baffled me is this: here was a senior surgeon, an experienced and competent man who, after close examination, said "the cause of death" was "a gunshot wound ^{to} the left temple", exactly opposite to the Commission's conclusions. ^{in his questioning} Yet when Arlen Specter questioned him, ~~Specter avoided this statement that urgently required examination, as though it would cause an explosion.~~ ^{Left temple wound wiped with} Specter ^{interrupted} questioned McClelland about many things, but not this, the most significant thing in his contemporaneous statement.

Instead, at the end of the brief deposition, Specter showed him the the statement, asked him to identify it as his own and the signature as his and then asked, "Are all the facts set forth true and correct..."/to which 6 McClelland swore affirmatively (6H35).

This is a odd mechanism Specter evolved. He has, since issuance of the Report, been glib in his various explanations. Presumably he'll have one concocted to address this. But when he had, under oath and facing him, a second doctor who also had said that the President had been shot from the front - a statement that wrecked the entire case Specter in particular

was building, the case against Oswald as a lone and unassisted assassin - Specter, for the second time, elected not to confront this second doctor with the medical evidence destructive of that prosecution case he was putting together. Whether he went into this with McClelland before he began to take the deposition the record does not show and we may never know. The record does show (6H35-6) that they did discuss the testimony off the record - before it began officially.

And it does show that McClelland did reaffirm his statement, the essence of which is that President Kennedy's "fatal" wound was from the front, not the back.

That Specter would dare ignore this essential evidence - the evidence that ruined the pet case he was building - raises questions not about his competence, which is beyond question, but of his integrity and that of the entire Commission and its Report.

It is Specter who, more than anyone else, sold the Commission and through it the world on the single-bullet theory, which alone made possible the invalid conclusion that Oswald was the lone assassin. Without it, there is little doubt Oswald would have been "exonerated," as the evidence compels. When confronted by a direct challenge to it, Specter asked the doctor about everything but that, the one thing above all he should have asked about.

That he did not - did not dare - is enough, particularly when McClelland reaffirmed that the President had been shot from the front - under oath and to Specter's face.

McClelland was not alone, although Specter, who was in charge of this aspect of the investigation, made it seem that way to anyone studying the record. Specter controlled what he asked the doctors, thus leaving out of their testimony what he wanted out and emphasizing or de-emphasizing to

suit his own and very clear preconceptions and desires. He also controlled whom he did not ask to testify.

Specter twice had Dr. Malcolm O. Perry, who had performed the tracheotomy on the President in Dallas, under oath and facing him (3H366 ff 6H7 ff), the second time Before the members of the Commission. Through the most elaborate evasions and pretenses (WHITEWASH 169-70) he avoided also the similar statement by Perry to the autopsy doctors, that the President's non-fatal injury had been inflicted from the front (WHITEWASH 198).

One of the doctors Specter did not call - whose name is not mentioned in the evidence because it was kept out by Specter - is Dr. David Stewart, who later moved to Gallatin, Tennessee. Dr. Stewart would have sworn to exactly what Dr. McClelland said, that the President was killed by a shot from the front, which, very obviously, Oswald, had he been in the sixth-floor window, ^{and} some 300 feet ~~and~~ behind the President, could not have fired.

Dr. Stewart made a Rotary-Club speech that was reported in the New Lebanon (Tennessee) Democrat of March 30, 1967.

Joe Dolan, of Radio Station KNEW, Oakland, has made a longer and closer study of the assassination and the Report than most of the press. He has presented all sides of the controversy on this top-rated show. Beginning a little before 8:15 a.m. April 10, 1967, he aired Dr. Stewart.

Stewart "was in attendance at the time" of the treatment rendered all three assassination patients, but "primarily my time was spent with Governor Connally and later with Lee Oswald". Another group of physicians was taking care of the President on his entry to the emergency room, "but of course I am aware of their findings as such".

(68) Dolan said he was particularly concerned with the "statement about

the shot" that killed the President "coming from the front". Stewart said, "Yes, sir. This was the finding of all the physicians who were in attendance. There was a small wound in the left front of the President's head and there was a quite massive wound of exit at the right backside of the head and it was felt by all of the physicians at the time to be a wound of entry which went in the front. And this was later corroborated, I think, by the films which showed the President with a rather violent lurch backward."

Stewart is quite right. This is the first of the incredible things I noted in my very first examination of the Zapruder movie when I saw it in early 1966. I recorded this in WHITEWASH II. As I record in PHOTOGRAPHIC WHITEWASH (25, 145), the Commission simply reversed the pictures in printing them to make it seem that the President's head moved forward. It did not. It snapped sharply backward before the President fell over ^{to his left.} onto his wife.

"And there was blood and brain substance found on one of the policemen riding behind on a motorcycle", Stewart said, to which Dolan added "Behind to the left". This, too, is correct. That motorcycle policeman was Billy Hargis. He was, as Dolan pointed out, both to the left and behind the President, making ^{officially} inexplicable the generous splashing of the President's blood and brains he and his cycle got. This spewing to the left of matter from an explosion allegedly out of a defect only on the right is inconsistent, officially unexplained and entirely avoided. Mrs. Connally (WHITEWASH 3), who was on the President's left, testified, "...it felt like buckshot falling all over us...it was the matter, brain tissue... Governor Connally (WHITEWASH 5), who was in front of the President, testified, "Immediately I could see on my clothes...on the interior of the car...brain tissue as big as almost my thumb (sic)" In his interrogation of AP Photographer James W. Altgens (WHITEWASH 70, 203) Wesley Liebler ^{PHOTOGRAPHIC} suppressed what Altgens told the FBI, "that pieces of flesh, blood and

bones appeared to fly from the right side of the President's head and pass in front of Mrs. Kennedy to the left of the Presidential limousine".

Instead of addressing this inconsistency, a seeming impossibility, rather than confronting unquestioned evidence that could invalidate the case they were building and the Report they planned, the Commission staff pretended the evidence did not exist.

Dr. Stewart interpreted this phenomenon as one that "completely substantiated the finding that this was a left frontal entry wound" and said the other doctors also did. He also declared the obvious, what any layman can also know with certainty, that it would be "impossible for a marksman in the sixth floor" window "to have created that kind of wound, shooting from behind."

These omissions are really suppressions. They are not unique in Specter's record with the Commission and he alone is not responsible for them, as the until-now secret record proves. Other vital evidence entirely opposite to the predetermined conclusions with which the Commission began its work were blatantly suppressed. Expert witnesses, examined in advance by Specter and others who declared themselves and their knowledge of science and evidence to be opposed to these official preconceptions, were either not called or were carefully questioned to avoid that ^{to} which they indicated in advance they would not swear to.

Specter is the chief offender. This, too, is consistent with his subsequent record of public dishonesty, a record he converted into political profit during his mayoralty campaign by his late June appearance on the CBS "specials". After the appearance of WHITEWASH he refused a dozen or more requests to confront me on radio and TV, including several repeated invitations in his own city, Philadelphia. Instead, he preferred and extensively exploited partisan, mass-distribution sources, like UPI, US News and World Report and CBS.

His disgraceful record prompted me, in writing WHITEWASH II, much of Part II of which is devoted to him and this record, to declare, "he lied without restraint, misrepresented without inhibition" (page 103). These I there described as "harsh words" and said, "They are not used by accident. If untrue they are actionable. If Specter thinks they are untrue, let him sue and confront...for the first time in the entire fake inquest an opposing lawyer".

That ^{book} was published ten months prior to this writing and got its first public attention in his city. He was silent, as he has remained, for the truth of these charges against him is also published in WHITEWASH II.

His appearances on the CBS shows were also characterized by lies. By this I mean not accidental errors, such as an uninformed man might innocently make, but false statements the truth of which Specter knew. Here are a few readily-apparent samples:

In the second of these shows he "explained" what was described as a "theory other than the single bullet theory that would support the conclusions in the Report:

"SPECTER: The Commission concluded that it was probable that one bullet inflicted the wound on the President's neck, and all of the wounds on Governor Connally. But you could have three separate bullets striking under thesequence as we know them. For example, the President could have been struck at frame 186 of the Zapruder film, which is a number given to the Zapruder film. Then Governor Connally could have been struck some 42 frames later, which would be a little over two and a quarter seconds at about frame 228 or 229; and then the third shot could have hit President Kennedy's head at frame 313, which was pretty clearly established. So that it is not indispensable to have the single bullet conclusion in order to come to the basic finding that Oswald was the sole assassin."

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69

Instead, we asked Arlen Specter, Assistant Counsel to the Commission, and now District Attorney of Philadelphia, and the author of the single bullet theory.

SPECTER: The possibility of one bullet having inflicted the wounds on both the President's neck and the Governor's body came in a very gradual way. For example, the first insight was given when Dr. Humes testified, based on his autopsy findings. And at that time it was made clear for the first time that the bullet that went through the President's neck hit no bone, hit no solid muscle. And, according to Dr. Humes, came out with great velocity.

Now, it was at that juncture that we wondered for the first time what happened to the bullet. Where did the bullet go? The probability is that it went into Governor Connally, because it struck nothing else in the car. That is the single most convincing piece of evidence, that the one bullet hit both men, because looking down the trajectory, as I did through Oswald's own rifle, and others did too, the trajectory was such that it was almost certain that the bullet which came out of the President's neck with great velocity would have had to have hit either the car or someone in the car.

RAIHER: It stated in the Warren Commission Report that belief in the single bullet theory is, quote, "not essential" - end of quotation - to support in the conclusion of the Warren Commission Report.

Now, can you describe for us any other theory, besides the single bullet theory, that would support the conclusions in the Report?

SPECTER: The Commission concluded that it was probable that one bullet inflicted the wound on the President's neck, and all of the wounds on Governor Connally. But you could have three separate bullets striking under the sequence as we know them. For example, the President could have been struck at frame 186 of the Zapruder film, which is a number given to the Zapruder film. Then Governor Connally could have been struck some 42 frames later, which would be a little over two and a quarter seconds at about frame 228 or 229; and then the third shot could have hit President Kennedy's head at frame 313, which was pretty clearly established. So that it is not indispensable to have the single bullet conclusion in order to come to the basic finding that Oswald was the sole assassin.

CRONKITE: The Commission's dilemma lay in the fact that it had to choose between two unpalatable alternatives in order to make its case stand up. Having decided that three shots were fired, and having three sets of wounds to explain, the Commission could only find either that all three shots hit their marks, or that one of the three bullets hit two men.

RATHER: One of the men Mr. Epstein interviewed for his "Inquest" is Arlon Specter, now District Attorney of Philadelphia, but in 1964, one of the principal investigators for the Warren Commission, charged with establishing the basic facts of the assassination. Mr. Specter thinks the Commission did its job well and came up with the right answers.

SPECTER: I would say after having prosecuted a great many cases that seldom would you ever find a case which was as persuasive that Oswald was the assassin and, in fact, the lone assassin, and we convict people in the criminal courts every day right here in City Hall, Philadelphia. And the times the death penalties are imposed or life imprisonment - so that - so that the case does fit together.

RATHER: In separate interviews we asked critic Epstein and investigator Specter to discuss some of the central issues that must determine how well or how badly the Warren Commission did its work.

EPSTEIN: Part of the job of the Warren Commission was restoring confidence in the American government. And for this he had to pick seven very respectable men, men who would lend their name and lend probity to the report. And so that the problem was, in any seven men he picked of this sort, they would have very little time for the investigation.

They would also have two purposes. One purpose would be to find the truth, all the facts. The other purpose would be to allay rumors, to dispel conspiracy theories and material of that sort.

SPECTER: My view is that there is absolutely no foundation for that type of a charge. When the President selected the Commissioners, he chose men of unblemished reputation and very high standing. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States would have no reason whatsoever to be expedient or to search for political truths. Nor would Allen W. Dulles, the former head of the C.I.A., nor would John McCloy, with his distinguished service in government, nor would the Congressional or Senatorial representatives.

Now, the same thing was true of the staff members. When it came time to select the individuals to serve as assistant counsel and general counsel, men were chosen from various parts of the United States who had no connection with government.

EPSTEIN: For example, there were rumors concerning the F.B.I. or various intelligence agencies. I noticed that there were a number of memorandums where the--where--from Warren to the Secretary of the Treasury, who was in charge of the Secret Service, assuring that their findings wouldn't impair the efficiency or the morale of the Secret Service. And the same

thing again with the F.B.I., a question of whether there was ever any possible connection between Oswald--and by connection I don't mean anything sinister, I simply meant that he was furnishing information and there were some rumors to this effect--and they, rather than investigating these rumors, they preferred to give it to the F.B.I. to investigate the rumors themselves. As J. Lee Rankin, their General Counsel, said, they would rather that agency clear its own skirts. Well, what this meant, of course, is that if the F.B.I. would have discretion if it did find a connection between Oswald and itself, the discretion of either reporting it or not reporting it.

SPECTER: In the main, the F.B.I. conducted the basic line of investigation. But the Commission used its independent judgment wherever, say, the F.B.I. or the Secret Service was involved itself so that they would not investigate themselves on the subjects where they were directly involved, and I think the Commission showed its independence in that regard by criticizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation and by criticizing the Secret Service where the facts warranted such criticism.

On every subject where the Federal Bureau of Investigation had contact with the area of investigation with which I was intimately connected, I was fully satisfied with their thoroughness and with their competency and with their integrity.

CRONKITE: Despite Mr. Specter's defense, it is the opinion of CBS NEWS that the role of the F.B.I. as well as the Secret Service, both in the assassination and its aftermath, has been less than glorious. And, to some extent, the performance of these agencies weakens the credibility of the Warren Report. As to what the F.B.I. and the Secret Service did wrong before the assassination, we need look no further than the Report itself.

It notes the Secret Service agents assigned to protect the President had been drinking beer and liquor into the early hours of the morning, that no search was made of buildings along the route, and that, quote: "The procedures of the Secret Service, designed to identify and protect against persons considered serious threats to the President, were not adequate prior to the assassination," end of quote. That is, the Secret Service should have known about Lee Harvey Oswald.

But the Report goes on to point out that if the Secret Service did not know about him, the F.B.I. did, and did not see fit to mention his existence to the Secret Service. The report issues a mildly phrased yet devastating rebuke to the F.B.I., charging that it took an unduly restrictive view of its responsibilities. Knowing what the F.B.I. knew about Oswald, the Report says, an alert agency should have listed him as a potential menace to the President. Yet, after the assassination, the Commission itself relied heavily on these two agencies as its investigative arms.

most responsible for the corrupted medical and autopsy testimony and a political climber whose career was made possible by his political apostasy (In Oswald they called it "defection"), a man who "lied without restraint" and challenged him to sue me, he did not.

70
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My purpose was not spectacle, not sensation, but to establish a record, a record as the law recongizes it, not as he and his associates corrupted it in their official Commission function, a record before a judge and a jury, a record of fact tested by that machine for the establishment of truth, as lawyers call cross examination.

Never once did I exploit ~~that~~ this challenge to sell my books, not even in his city, where it could have been used by his political opponents. When I made broadcasts in his city on WHITEWASH II I never once mentioned it. Of course, this made it easier for him to ignore it, but I did not want to be the one to inject the assassination of the President and its contrived official investigation into Pennsylvania politics.

However, in pursuing his ambition and his attempts at self-justification, Specter has paced his lying with an assortment of devices ranging from the unbagging of cats to hiding behind the Chief Justice's judicial robes. This and his false statements and ~~his~~ misrepresentations are important because of the function he had on the Commission and because of his until-now secret record in that function.

He was interviewed by Joseph R. Daughen of the Philadelphia Bulletin Daughen's long account of it appeared August 28, 1966. In it he quotes Specter as saying of the autopsy and what derives from it, ^{that is} "rests squarely on the integrity of Humes, Boswell and Finck. We are talking about the integrity of the doctors and the autopsy."

At that point I wrote (WHITEWASH II, 100), "We are also talking about the integrity of Arlen Specter".

#6 In Arlen Specter's integrity, that of the doctors he named, the members of the Commission, in fact, that of the United States Government and all of its people, was vested.

116★ After his CBS appearances - after I obtained a transcript of his remarks - and prior to writing this, I offered him a chance to withdraw or retract his false statements that I believe cannot be accidental. Simple acknowledgment of error could not begin to catch up with the enormous audience that saw and heard Arlen Specter, candidate for public office and greater public trust, ^{work-me} tell these lies on CBS. His reply to my letter was a reiteration that he had been nothing less than accurate.

"I have full confidence in the accuracy of all the statements which I have made concerning the work of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy", he wrote.

On the remote chance that this paragon of political virtue did not recall what he had said, or the even lesser likelihood, that his intent had been distorted in editing, I sent him photocopies and asked that he read them and reaffirm that he had been only truthful.

To this the man then but two months away from the election to choose the mayor of one of the world's largest cities replied that his previous letter required "no amplification". In short, he persisted in his lies - this time for political benefit (see pp. 501-02).

Any inquiry into the investigation of the assassination inevitably is into the integrity of those who conducted it. From that vast suppression of what was in the files and known, should have been made public and wasn't, I dug up a number of other documents that, to the best of my knowledge, have never before been published if, indeed, seen by anyone not in official position. They relate very much to this question of integrity, that of Specter and of everyone else involved. We shall examine them after a backgrounding look into how the client truth was served.

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Whether or not they planned in advance the lies they would tell to lie out of the mess of the Report, government officials had them ready when first confronted with the first book that proved they lied. Had personal knowledge not been represented, it might be possible to consider this misinformation as less than lies, perhaps merely error. A major newspaper printed them, and fed them to other papers, possibly in good faith, and launched and helped achieve acceptability for the line Arlen Specter and others were to follow.

(11) I know because I am responsible for that newspaper interest. The book was WHITEWASH: THE REPORT ON THE WARREN REPORT; the newspaper, the Washington Post.

Prior to writing this book, I offered co-authorship to the Post, as soon as I finished my analysis of the Report. This was shortly after it was issued in the Fall of 1964. The Post decided against my offer, which was that some of its staff write the book while I continued my investigations.

In May 1965, about three months after I completed the book, a Congressman friend who was also a member of the House Judiciary Committee, within whose jurisdiction consideration would fall were Congress to interest itself in the Report, read the book while recuperating from major surgery. After he was again up and around, he conferred with Alfred Friendly, then managing editor of the Post. Friendly was unwilling to believe what was reported to him, unwilling to read the manuscript and unwilling to assign it to a member of his staff. He made the compromise offer that the Congressman select several chapters; he would then have several members of the staff examine them simultaneously. The Congressman, on his part, wanted them to

read these chapters, which I reluctantly designated (what a way to determine the content of a book!), in his presence. Because this was an awkward arrangement, requiring a number of busy people all to be free at the same and a predictable time, it never was consummated.

Months later I suggested a compromise to my Congressman friend: would the Post ask a single trusted staff member to read the book, outside of working hours?[?]

This was agreed to and on September 24, 1965, I delivered ~~it~~ to Laurence Stern, national editor and one of the experienced staff men the Post had sent to Dallas to investigate the assassination.

118
Larry Stern also stayed busy. When a considerable period of time elapsed and I heard nothing from him, needing that copy I asked for the return of the book. I got ~~it~~ on November 24, 1965. His marker indicated Larry had read but the first three, the shortest, chapters, but Stern said he had skimmed more and when I could again spare a copy and he had the time he'd like to read the rest.

On February 17, 1966, the Post ran an editorial sympathetic to the plight of Russian writers, ^{whom} ~~which~~ it felt were abused and denied the appearance of their writings. That day I wrote Friendly a needling letter, telling him "It is as easy to dudgel the other fellow as ~~is~~ for pigs to find truffles...You would cast the mote from the Soviet eye - and with this I am in complete accord - but leave it in your own eye". Then I reminded him of the history of ^{WHITEWASH} ~~this book~~ and of that of the Washington Post with it.

In his response of March 25, Friendly regretted that "a multitude of events conspired against" his answering earlier, defended the decisions of the more than 50 publishers who had before then declined the book (which neither he nor any member of his staff had read) and, in attempted justification, used this, to me, fortuitous expression:

"Obviously, if you could demonstrate that the circumstances of the murder and the nature of the investigation were different in major degree than those we have been led to believe, you would not merely have an interesting account but the most sensational story since the assassination itself. Any publisher who provided you the vehicle for such a demonstration would be showered with riches and honor".

He concluded, in effect, that the publishers were correct or I was paranoid.

With the efficiency with which my mail has been handled since I interested myself in the assassination and its official investigation, that letter took but six days to travel the 30 miles that separated us.

I quoted these two sentences back at him and asked, "Yet, with the value this could have to a newspaper, with syndication rights available, you will not personally make the simple gesture required to see for your self whether or not I have what I say. You will not, for your own responsibility as a journalist and an editor, for your obligations to the owners of your paper if not, indeed, for history, let me prove it, and to you?"

That threat, that the "riches and honors" might escape his stockholders did it. Friendly invited me in to see him and we arranged for my return on April 5. He was then too busy. Five days later I wrote to suggest that if he were going to stay busy perhaps he might have someone else read the book for him.

Meanwhile, I heard from a responsible and knowledgeable European correspondent that Benjamin Bradlee, by then the Post's managing editor (Friendly had been promoted to associate editor) and a great friend of the late President, was "afraid" of me. I suggested to this correspondent that he meant Friendly, not Bradlee, for I had never met Bradlee. He insisted his information was correct and identified his source. A week later

I heard a different version, that Bradlee feared I might have what I claimed and the Post might miss out on it.

April 13 Friendly found about five minutes and I showed him photocopies of the first and eighteenth pages of the FBI Report of December 9, which I believed would be a graphic way of indicating there might be something wrong with the Report. He recalled the Commission acknowledged that there had been the "missed" bullet and could see that the FBI accounted for three shots without it and without accounting for the wound in the front of the President's neck.

April 18 he wrote me that he was about to go abroad for several months "and whatever the Post is going to do with your manuscript, somebody else has got to do it. I feel sure that Larry Stern will fall to the problem with dispatch, either handling it himself or getting another qualified, high class executive person to do it."

The next day I saw Larry Stern. He continued too busy and assigned the reading to Dan Kurzman, an experienced investigative reporter who had had similar troubles effecting publication of his own book ^{working} on Dominican Dictator Trujillo, support of whom had been official United States policy. Meanwhile, I proceeded with an earlier decision to put the book into general circulation as a private printing. There was no real alternative.

120
Kurzman, too, is a busy man. It took him some time to get into the book. When he did, it excited him. By mid-May he finished it, with enthusiasm for it. It was about the best "investigative reporting job" he had seen and read "like a non-fiction detective story." He and Stern and I met in the Post's coffee shop and discussed what to do to test it, which they seemed to feel they had to do, instead of checking it against the cited sources of the entire text, all of which the Post had in its library. We agreed that they would confront ~~Howard P.~~ Willens, former

Commission staff director, ^{returned to the} ~~and a~~ Department of Justice, ~~lawyer,~~ for whom Stern had respect. He or Stern did not want me present.

Instead, I prepared a short series of questions on the autopsy and the single-bullet theory taking up but a single page. We agreed that if Willens disputed me I would be given the opportunity to cite the evidence.

They saw Willens. By appointment, I was in the Post's newsroom when they returned. Stern spoke to Bradlee briefly while Kurzman told me they had ^{the} only disturbing evasions and they had got/satisfactory answers to nothing. Stern then told me that while there had been no decision on syndication there would be a story and I would be credited with what I had taken to the Post a year earlier.

This was just prior to an election in the Dominican Republic. Dan Kurzman was the Post's Dominican expert. He was sent there. Richard Harwood, also an experienced investigative reporter, was assigned to this story. It turned out that in a week he had to read WHITEWASH, familiarize himself with the Report and the 26 appended volumes, and then with "Inquest" Edward J. Epstein's book due for publication the end of the following month, of which the Post had obtained an advance copy.

(73) Harwood was opposed to WHITEWASH. He argued against it to me, without having read it. He liked the doctrine of "Inquest", which assumes, without question or questioning, the Commission's central conclusion of Oswald's guilt. Need one know fact to like doctrine?

(121) Harwood's story appeared in a major front-page display in the issue of May 29. It mentioned both books, carefully selected a few of the criticisms that, with apparent official assistance, it pretended to answer, using a technique that later became popular. This should have convinced those who, like Specter, were responsible for the monstrous and unnecessary second tragedy, the fake inquest, that they could get away with almost anything so far as the press was concerned.

Harwood acknowledged that:

"On December 18, 1963, The Washington Post and other newspapers reported on the basis of rumors from Dallas, that the first bullet to strike the President was found deep in his shoulder'. This report was confirmed prior to publication by the FBI."

The Post's December 18, 1963, story was written by its honored science writer, Nate Haseltine, whose scientific connections are the best. Those of the Post with the FBI are not as good, for it is not friendly to J. Edgar Hoover. Haseltine did not attribute his information to "rumors from Dallas". The headline on it read, "Kennedy Autopsy Report". He attributed the information to the autopsy report, not the FBI. In part he wrote:

"President Kennedy was shot twice, both times from the rear, and would readily have survived the first bullet which was found deep in his shoulder.

"The second bullet to hit the President, however, tore off the right rear portion of his head so destructively as to be "completely incompatible with life'. A fragment was delected and passed out the front of the throat, creating an erroneous belief he may have been shot from two angles.

"These are the findings of the as yet unofficial report of the pathologists who performed the autopsy...

"...the first shot hitting him high in the back shoulder (sic)..."

"The disclosure that a bullet hit the President in the back shoulder (sic), 5 to 7 inches below the collar line, came as a complete surprise to the Dallas ^hospital."

If this was inaccurate, it was not corrected. The Post did not retract. More than a month later, on January 26, 1964, the New York Times

reported largely the same thing, saying, in part:

~~"Investigators"~~ "The third bullet, according to an autopsy in Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland, ripped away a portion of the back of the President's head on the right side. Fragments from the bullets cut a wound in the President's throat and damaged the windshield of the Presidential limousine."

"Investigators are now satisfied that the first of three bullets hit the President in the back of his right shoulder, several inches below the collar line. That bullet lodged in his shoulder. The second bullet wounded Governor John B. Connally, of Texas."

If this was in the autopsy, there was an official conspiracy of unimaginable magnitude, for it is not in the official version subsequently published. Dr. Humes swore he had completed that on Sunday, November 24 (see ~~Page~~ *Chapter 3*).

Harwood devoted most of his space to justification of the claimed error of the FBI report and pretended representation of the medical evidence. This was so grossly misrepresented it is difficult to conceive that in the limited time he had he could have committed such widespread error without assistance. Official ~~aid~~ aid is most likely. Certainly no other interest was served by misrepresentation of the medical evidence.

Of the FBI report he said:

"This report, the FBI said last week, was based on the medical evidence at that time. But there is other evidence that it was based on nothing more than hearsay.

"The autopsy on the President began at Bethesda Naval Hospital at about 8 p.m. on the night of Nov. 22.

Wound Confused Doctors.]

"Two FBI agents who were present overheard Dr. Humes, Dr. Finck and

Dr. J. T. Boswell speculate about the President's ~~his~~ shoulder wound. The doctors were confused by it because an incision made in the front of the President's throat in Dallas obscured the exit wound.

"Before the three doctors at Bethesda had completed the autopsy and before they had traced the path of the bullet from the President's shoulder to his throat, the FBI observers left the room and called in a report that the bullet had not passed through the President's body.

"Incredibly, this verbal report became the basis of the erroneous statement that appears in the Dec. 9, five-volume summary submitted to the Warren Commission.

"The official autopsy report which contradicts the FBI was in the hands of the Secret Service, not the Bureau, and may never have been supplied to the FBI.

"In any case, the basic error was repeated in the Jan. 13 report from the FBI which unaccountably acknowledges that there was an exit wound in the President's throat."

123
The Sunday that this story appeared, I prepared a lengthy memorandum citing the official proof of most of its errors. The next day I delivered it to the Post, which neither printed nor disputed it.

There was no other "medical evidence at that time", only that of the doctors and the autopsy. What the FBI agents reported is exactly what the autopsy doctors said and believed, as they testified to before the Commission.

The autopsy doctors never "traced the path" of the non-fatal bullet, and they didn't claim to (WHITEWASH 179; 2H368).

If both FBI agents had left the room together for a single phone call, with a phone in the room, which is highly improbable, they also returned and remained there for the remainder of the autopsy and through the embalming, leaving at about 4 a.m. Their phone call was about 9 p.m. The autopsy examination began about 8 p.m. *We shall have more on this.*

To say, as Harwood was told and repeated, that the FBI did not have any of the eight original copies of the autopsy report or any of the countless Xerox copies made is to dispute Hoover himself, for he testified (WHITEWASH II, 223) that "When ~~xxx~~ President Johnson returned to Washington he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and asked the Bureau to pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there is no federal jurisdiction for such an investigation...However, the President has the right to request the Bureau to make special investigations..."

In his testimony, as the contemporaneous newspapers also did, Hoover made clear that from the first he and the FBI were in charge of the investigation. The Commission's files prove that the Secret Service then turned its evidence over to the FBI. The FBI's was to be the definitive investigation, ^{prompt and thorough} ~~complete and prompt~~. Hoover testified that "it was the desire of the President to have this report completed by the Bureau just as quickly as possible and as thoroughly as possible..."

Without the official autopsy this was impossible. It is not possible to believe that this could have been done without access to that autopsy report, or that the FBI couldn't get it and didn't have it.

As Harwood could not help but acknowledge and as the appendix of this book shows (pp. ~~xxv~~), that same error was repeated in its supplementary report, after the FBI officially admits it had a copy of the autopsy report.

But suppose the facile lies were correct. Can the FBI be trusted with anything at all if it can err so grievously when it investigates and reports to his successor on the murder of an American President? Can its word ever be taken, in or out of court, in any kind of proceeding? Should anyone ever be convicted on FBI testimony if it can made such spectacular, unequalled "mistakes"? Can it - should it - ever be again trusted to make any kind of investigation?

The indignant editorials that could have been expected had this been done by any agency other than ^{DC.} Saint Edgar's were totally missing. The Washington Post, anything but his friend, maintained a discreet editorial silence.

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It was the same with the Post's representation of the medical evidence. Harwood wrote:

"The second contradiction involves the conflicting medical testimony on the likelihood that one bullet wounded both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Connally

"The bullet which caused these wounds was found and was virtually intact. It weighed about 158 grains, as against an original weight of about 161 grains.

"Commander Humes and Lt. Col. Finck, the presidential autopsists, doubted that this bullet could have caused all of Gov. Connally's wounds because they had read a medical report from Dallas describing the presence of fragments in his wrist wound. Thus, they thought the bullet must have been broken into fragments rather than emerging intact.

"There were unaware that these fragments were miniscule and that Connally's principal surgeon, Dr. Robert Shaw, was convinced that the intact bullet did cause the wounds. The "fragments" it left in the Governor's body were thin shavings, not much larger than dust particles.

"The final problem - Gov. Connally's own recollection of what happened - cannot be dismissed.

"But his surgeon, Dr. Shaw, had an explanation for that, too. It is not uncommon, he testified, for people to suffer a wound without knowing it immediately.

"This would account for Mr. Connally's belief that he was not hit by the first bullet and this explanation is consistent to hear the ernor's failure to hear the "second shot"(sic) which he believed caused his wound and his recollection of the final shot which smashed the President's skull.

"The 'single-shot' theory developed by Specter and the Commission, in other words, is not refuted by the apparent inconsistencies in the record which Weisberg and Epstein recite.

"And so long as that theory holds up, assumptions that there was a second assassin in Dallas On Nov. 22 can only be assumptions."

125
All of this was, in advance, disproved in WHITEWASH, Printing it was but an effort to make an unofficial apology for what could not and cannot be explained by the evidence. It also is not a reflection of the Commission's own evidence, all of which was in Harwood's hands.

The problem was not only the presumed slight loss of metal by this bullet but its lack of mutilation or deformity. It was almost pristine, almost entirely unutilated, which the doctors found impossible with the history attributed to it. Rather than being "convinced that the intact bullet did cause the wounds", Dr. Shaw had actually testified (6H91) that "I have always felt that" the thigh wound was caused by "a fragment of it" breaking off in the wrist and "going into his left thigh", exactly what the newspapers had said and what the police report said. He could not have said - and he didn't say - that an "intact" bullet had also fragmented.

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for p. 146
(76) →
As an example of Harwood's or the Post's intentions, it should be noted that Shaw is not accurately described as Connally's "principal surgeon". He was in charge of one of the three operations; he was not in charge of the case. Dr. Shires, who was - and who alone of the Dallas doctors testified in a deposition taken by Specter that there was additional fragmentation in the Governor's chest (WHITEWASH 174) - was not presented to the members of the Commission, although he was in charge of the case. His testimony that there was metal in the Governor's chest could account for this "oversight" of not calling the man in charge to give testimony to the members. If not that alone, then perhaps his testimony

that the Secret Service manufactured medical "evidence" (WHITEWASH 177,199) helped.

To Note 12/6
 Shaw also testified that as many as three bullets could have caused Connally's wounds and that, although a maximum of but 2.4 grains could be missing from this bullet without weight-loss alone ruling out the official hypothesis, in the wrist alone "There seem to be more than three grains of metal..." (WHITEWASH 174). There were, of course, in addition to the wrist bullet fragments, ^(in the) more than enough to end this speculation, other fragments in the chest and thigh.

Where Harwood pretends that Dr. Shaw testified that Connally could have sustained a delayed reaction to his wound, Shaw added, actually testified, as did the other doctors questioned, "in the case of a wound (sic) which strikes a bony substance, such as a rib, usually the reaction is quite prompt" (WHITEWASH 174). Connally's bones in three parts of his body were smashed and struck by whatever bullet or bullets caused his wounds. The evidence is contrary to Harwood's representation of it.

Thus it was, by simple and forthright misrepresentation of the evidence he said he was citing, that Harwood could conclude that "The 'single-shot' theory developed by Specter and the Commission, in other words is not refuted by the apparent inconsistencies (sic) in the record which Weisberg and Epstein recite".

Is there any wonder, when this is but part of the error a major paper went out of its way to make in defense of the Report and Specter's part of it, that Specter could have been encouraged to believe he could get away with anything?

With the available ^aevidence - that over which he had had so much control - so much against him, is it any wonder if Specter felt he had to try?

Extra space

It is not because the Post (and the same can be said for every newspaper and magazine and for the electronic media) did not have available to it more than enough evidence to invalidate the Report. Confronted with the reality, that a President had been murdered and buried with an official "solution" to the crime that solved nothing and left more questions unanswered than it began with, the Post preferred not to face that reality. Confronted with the sickening reality that the administration that came into power through that murder deliberately failed to investigate the crime that put it in power and instead whitewashed it - and the investigation and the investigators themselves - ^{compartmental} with a real-life, twentieth-century MacBeth situation, the Post preferred to close the eye not already blinded.

It even ordered its book reviewer not to review WHITEWASH, although he regarded it with favor. The reason given was that he was not in a position to evaluate its contents.

This, of course, is precisely the function of newspapers. Anyone can evaluate the contents of a book which uses official evidence as its sources if he has that official evidence and uses the references. The Post had the official evidence; WHITEWASH footnotes to all its major sources.

In its own whitewash, the Post could not avoid one of the crucial points on which the Report founders. It cited a few of the perplexing questions and said:

"The cumulative effect of the various statements was to raise very considerable doubt about the principle conclusion of the Warren Commission that 'the shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald'.

"They have no bearing on Oswald's involvement (the Post was not about to face the overwhelming evidence of Oswald's innocence) but, if true, they point unmistakably to the involvement of at least one other assassin.

"The Commission handled this crucial problem, in effect, by rendering a highly misleading verdict:

198 77
 "Although it is not necessary to any essential findings of the Commission to determine just which shot hit Gov. Connally, there is very persuasive evidence from the experts to indicate that the same bullet which pierced the President's throat also caused Gov. Connally's wounds. However, Gov. Connally's testimony and certain other factors have given rise to some differences of opinion as to this probability but there is no doubt in the mind of any member of the Commission that all the shots which caused the President's and Gov. Connally's wounds were fired from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository'."

(Harwood could not escape this, for there is no one writing on the subject who has missed this monumental nonsense.)

"Contrary to what the Commission reported, it was not only ~~unnecessary~~; 'necessary' but absolutely essential to determine which shot hit the Governor". He then quoted Assistant Counsel Norman Redlich as saying that if 'they were hit by separate bullets...there were two assassins.'" Here the Post and Harwood left it, unresolved. They just would not look at the proofs in their hands, from the Commission's own evidence, that Oswald could have killed no one and that the Commission, while alleging otherwise, proved there had to have been at least two assassins. In itself, this is no way to leave any murder, particularly that of a President.

Inadequate, superficial and loaded with factual error (possible only because it would not and did not face the responsibilities of a newspaper in a democratic society), the Post had little problem with itself in fabricating what Specter had every reason to take as a defense of his creation: the invalid single-bullet theory. The Post has not yet faced these responsibilities; but Specter, when the slightest question of legitimacy was raised, abandoned his own child.

By that time the Report was history. No major paper was willing to open the lid of this can of crawling, wriggling worms, and all closed ranks behind the official fiction, preferring an unsolved Presidential murder to the terrible truth none was willing to face. Almost without exception, the papers fell in line behind the government and sponsored or reprinted professional lickspittle writing pretending to validate the Report and debunk those of us whose writing proved it wrong.

~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Extra space

In that euphoric moment when the Post's writers returned from their meeting with Willens and Kurzman told me "you're in", Stern and I exchanged a few words along the line of Friendly's estimate of the honors that would ⁱenure to whoever gave me the vehicle. Stern assured me these would belong to me and I assured him that in the National Archives, in which I was then already probing for the graves of the numerous official dead cats, we would find more of the proofs required for the recapture of the national honor lost when a Presidential murder is unsolved while it is officially called "solved".

What I found in the official graves in the Archives, among many other things, directly address the single-bullet theory, the medical evidence, and the integrity of the investigation and those involved.

More than with others of his associates, these documents address the integrity of Arlen Specter and his work.