

4/ 5/1/77

JDW, HR,

More than three pages of this morning's Post's main news section are Nixon-Frost/Watergate stories. Together with an ongoing local scandal exposure it is most of the news space in that section, never large on Sundays.

There are new transcripts, clearly enough leaked. There are summaries of confidential interviews, supposedly confidential, the Frost staff made on interviews with those promised confidentiality, like former Watergate prosecutor staffers. Surely and deliberately leaked.

Several days ago there were radio news stories saying Jaworski would go public with more if Nixon covered up more. I wondered then what Jaworski was worried about. Now I find myself wondering whether some of his younger and more dissatisfied former staffers were not determined to end his self-service over his part in covering up.

Frost's people have worries - they've not sold enough of the shows. I think their leaking has the purpose of trying a last-minute sales job. By normal standards there is enough to the story to have this result.

In tape content there is not that much new. Mostly the Old Old Nixon and his Old Old associates in the same old tawdry/

There are repeated references to the involvement of the Cuban Committee, not otherwise identified. I suspect this was the front for payoffs, not an operational gang.

What interested me most of all is a reference between Nixon and Haldeman to talking "about the other jobs we did." This is in an alleged National Security context, Nixon-Haldeman style, and by the Plumbers. It is in the plural and is not limited to Ellsberg, which by then had been reported.

One of the Frost leaks that I enjoyed is the pseudo-shrink Hutschnecker's diagnosis of his patient exactly as I had analyzed, a man who knew his lack of worth and had to keep reassuring himself that he really was something.

I've not listened to radio news today so I do not know the play this got. It was not on last night's CBS evening TV news, the show I caught.

It and the pretense that Frost was out to get Nixon should build interest in the airings, their audience had perhaps time sales.

8:55 a.m. AP radio copy shows the NYTimes also had leaks of transcripts to it for today's use. The hard one the Times had is Nixon's knowledge three days after the breakin. The Post's lead is that he knew of hushmoney in January while claiming not to until March. So what else is new?

H(hum)W

Nixon Knew of 'Hush Money'

He'll Be on TV Wednesday, and the Traps are Laid

By Nancy Collins
and Haynes Johnson

Washington Post Staff Writers

Richard M. Nixon faces another crisis this week, one of his own making and one from which he profits personally. He returns to public view Wednesday night in the first of a series of televised interviews with David Frost and answers carefully plotted questions about his Watergate role.

Frost's clear strategy, as shown in internal memoranda and preliminary scripts of the Watergate show obtained by The Washington Post, was deliberately to confront Nixon with new and damaging information. The program is designed to lead Nixon on

and trap him into admissions of guilt or at least concessions of error. Nixon is reported to be receiving \$650,000 for his interviews.

"We looked upon the Watergate taping as the trial Nixon never had," said Robert Zelnick, editor-in-chief of the Frost production team. "We tried to look at ourselves as senior litigation partners in a law firm. But we knew we could ask questions and draw legal conclusions at times that a prosecutor can't draw in court. We knew we could use certain internal legal analyses and blast him with it. We were in close touch, you know, with many of the people who had prosecuted the Watergate trials."

How well Frost's plan works will not be known until Wednesday. But the way the program was put together belies earlier published reports about it being a "soft" encounter.

There is also nothing soft about the merchandising of the Nixon program. It's hard-sell all the way. As Nixon prepares to enter our living rooms via TV for the first time after nearly three years of exile, his appearance already is generating headlines, news leaks and cover stories.

Out in California, Time Magazine has the inside track, but Newsweek magazine is standing close by. One of Time's reporters, John Stacks, has had

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W. Post.

SUNDAY, MAY 1, 1977

Before Burglars' Trial

White House Tapes Contradict His Previous Claim

By Bob Woodward
and Scott Armstrong

Washington Post Staff Writers

Former President Richard M. Nixon was aware in early January, 1973, that "hush money" was being sought to keep the Watergate burglars silent, according to transcripts of White House tape recordings never before made public.

Nixon has maintained, and no previous tapes have contradicted, that he first learned of the requests for the "hush money" from White House Counsel John W. Dean III at a March 21, 1973, meeting in the Oval Office. The date became Nixon's principal line of defense in refuting charges

that he was aware of the Watergate cover-up earlier than March 21.

Yet 2½ months earlier, in a Jan. 8, 1973, meeting with his special counsel and intimate, Charles W. Colson, Nixon said, "God damn hush money, uh, how are we going to (unintelligible) how do we get this stuff..." according to a newly available transcript.

This conversation took place one week before the first news stories about support payments to the Watergate burglars. It had particular relevance because the first Watergate trial began that day. The "hush money" reference is the first such ref-

erence in the available White House transcripts.


This and other new transcripts show that Nixon was keenly aware that these payments were central to the cover-up and, if revealed, would present his greatest personal criminal vulnerability.

The transcripts also contain the first documentation that:

- Nixon feared Dean would expose Nixon's contact with Thomas A. Pappas, a major Republican fund-raiser who was allegedly involved in raising "hush money."

- Nixon privately expressed concern that the cover-up might unravel

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Associated Press

Former President Nixon and David Frost emerge from their first television interview taping session in March.

NIXON, From A1

access to the inner workings of the show. He reportedly is being given advance Nixon material. Newsweek, show sources say, also will get a share of the tidbits. And Mike Wallace of CBS's "60 Minutes" also has been given an inside look, it is said.

As an exercise in media hype, Nixon's emergence from the shadows of San Clemente is a classic in the genre of promotion.

Yet, according to the available evidence and the words of the program principals, the Frost effort has been an intensely serious one—both in strategy and content.

Those working on the program plotted, researched, uncovered new material, delved into his background, ex-

plored questions about his sex life, compiled a personal "psychohistory," talked to doctors, psychiatrists, psychohistorians, and interviewed a host of familiar names from the Watergate period. John Dean and Fred Buzhardt, Bob Woodward and Lawrence Higby were among them.

From that material, and from the lines of questioning suggested by many of those principal Watergate actors, emerged the strategy of trying to trap Nixon.

For instance: Frost's Watergate script draft, obtained by The Post, carefully spells out a series of suggested questions. Frost is urged to pursue a relentless string of questions on subject after subject. On the notorious 18½-minute gap in a critical Watergate tape, the questions flow briskly: Did Nixon erase that tape? Didn't he discuss other criminal activities on that tape? Does he mean that

his aides erased the tape? And so on.

But if none of these questions elicits a satisfactory response, the script advises this course for Frost:

"Assuming the worst, that Richard offers no explanation for the 18½ minutes, and that further he maintains that he had no interest this early in a cover-up, David will keep the following as a final back-up: His excerpts from another conversation on June 20, this time with Charles Colson, and these comments have never been made public. It shows Nixon talking about 'stonewalling' for the first time, and about 'leaving this where it is: with the Cubans.'"

The scriptwriter then instructs Frost:

"This is a trap for Nixon, and should be sprung deftly."

The Colson-Nixon conversations were among previously undisclosed

transcripts the Frost staff uncovered.

Not the least of the fascination with the way the programs were fashioned concerns the private advice given by a number of Watergate era principals.

All of those interviews by the Frost staff supposedly were to be kept confidential. The staff itself was asked to sign confidentiality clauses. Not surprisingly, that "private" material is leaking.

Some of those interviews offer an ironic commentary. John Dean, for one.

The memo about Dean's interview of last December begins:

"John Dean has the air of a television personality now. He's deeply tanned and well dressed and surrounded by literary agents and television producers.

When Frost's staff asked Dean what he would ask Nixon now, Dean's reply immediately came back:

"Dean answered that he would like to be in our shoes. That rather than a friendly chat with Nixon, he would like to be his interrogator."

Last summer, during lunch with two members of the Watergate prosecution staff, Richard Ben Veniste and George Frampton, the Frost researchers were told:

"By way of general advice on Nixon interrogation, Frampton suggested the technique of placing the worst construction on the facts of Watergate as we know them and then devising a line of questioning intended to disclose the truth."

And: "Ben Veniste also noted that a

classic lawyer questioning on interrogation technique was to embody insinuations and questions. Example: Mr. Nixon, is there any question in your mind that the money was being used to buy silence? When did you first become aware that the money was being used to buy silence?"

With Philip A. Lacovara, also of the prosecution staff:

"On taxes, he recalled that Nixon said . . . he would voluntarily pay the IRS \$400,000 on one year and \$300,000 on another (back taxes) and thought it would be interesting to hear what Nixon has to say on why he has not done that."

With Higby, Haldeman's former assistant:

"Higby felt Watergate program was

potential for significant journalism if we do not let Nixon talk (he states Nixon is a good talker) but do some interspersing and reporting on goings on at the time in the White House and Congress. He said [House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter W.] Rodino was simply the dupe for Phil Burton who was really running the impeachment hearings and Tip O'Neill, and that we should trace motivations."

With Buzhardt, Nixon's former counsel:

"Nixon was a man who always put on a great front, to Buzhardt. While the tapes reveal indecisiveness, vacillation, in other situations, not Watergate-related, he could be decisive and incisive. Not that in his decisive mood he was always admirable. He often put up a hard front but after he lost his temper and came down hard on people, he could be compassionate afterwards."

Among other interviews were those with Dr. David Abrahamson, author of a book "Nixon vs. Nixon," and Dr. Arnold Hutschenecker, who had treated Nixon off and on beginning in 1952, and Fawn Brodie, the writer now working on a psychobiography of Nixon.

Abrahamson and Brodie both told the Frost interviewer, James Reston Jr., a program editor, that Nixon was the most complicated man they had studied. Brodie helped form suggested questions for the show.

"Any material that David could induce on the wellsprings of this man," her interview account reads, "his father and mother, his daughters, and particularly the early crises during Nixon's life such as the death of his two brothers would be enormously valuable to all future biographies of Nixon."

The description of Dr. Abrahamson's advice says:

"When we delve into the enemies list, Abrahamson suggests that you ask the question:

"Mr. President, who in your life do you feel was your greatest enemy?"

"And that we have in our own mind that the answer is Nixon himself."

From Dr. Hutschenecker came a more circumspect word. Reston's memo of his interview with the doctor says:

"Still in the abstract, Hutschenecker talked of political leaders, at the peak of power, who have 'neurotic ambition,' who have 'no clarity about themselves,' 'no self-worth or self-esteem.' He talked of how power can be a substitute for what is lacking in a politi-

cal man's personal life."

In preparing for the interviews, Frost and his aides held mock sessions, running through the line of questions, attempting to guess how Nixon himself would answer.

"David would throw the question sequence we had figured out at me," Zelnick recalled, "and I would answer in the way I thought Nixon would in some cases using the exact sentence and sequence of words I thought he might.

"Sometimes my arguments would be so persuasive that David would say, 'I don't know to respond to that argument,' so we would drop the question. I had done so much work on this project that I could almost think like Nixon."

The preliminary Watergate script it-

self, drafted by Reston, contains judgments on how Nixon would respond as well as doubts about certain areas.

"It is difficult to predict what Nixon will say in response to questions about the final days," the script says. "It will all be fascinating and, handled properly, it could be poignant.

"This will be the climax of the program and perhaps of the whole series, and David should cherish the opportunity and think about how it can be best handled. In the first 45 minutes, David must be the withering cross-examiner; in the next 45 minutes, a political buff fascinated by political strategy; in the last 30 minutes, he should be a sympathetic camp follower looking for human material.

Whether Frost turns out to be that "withering cross-examiner" and whether Nixon falls into the traps set for him are stories yet to be told. But

you can bet we'll be hearing much more about it before Richard Nixon again drops back into obscurity.

Interview's Salesmen Still Seek Sponsors

Backers of the David Frost interview with former President Nixon have been unable to sell a third of the advertising time available on the shows, Business Week magazine reports.

Syndicast Services, Inc., the sales organization for the series, had planned to sell six minutes of commercials on each of the four 90-minute shows. At \$125,000 a minute, total revenue was expected to be \$3 million. Overseas radio and other sales were expected to yield another \$1 million.

However, a week before the first broadcast, Syndicast had sold only four minutes, the magazine said. Seven companies had bought time, the

report said, but three refused to disclose their identities. Advertisers known to have signed up are the Radio Shack division of Tandy Corp.; Datsun, the Japanese car maker; Hilton Hotels, and Weed Eater, Inc., Business Week said.

Greyhound Lines, Inc., "was involved in the show a few weeks ago, but isn't now," the magazine quoted a source as saying.

To try to increase sales, Syndicast sold one of its national minutes to the local stations carrying the interviews.

The total cost of the venture was believed to be \$2 million, the magazine said.

15-Year Secrecy Limit Urged for Public Papers

United Press International

When Richard Nixon left office, he tried to take 42 million papers generated while he was in the White House.

Now Congress is being urged to make such papers public 15 years after a President departs.

The recommendation for a law to end the custom of high officials taking their papers with them comes from the Public Documents Commission, a panel of government officials, members of Congress and historians.

The commission was created by Congress in the uproar over Nixon's attempt to keep the papers and his White House tapes.

In a report filed last week, it said not only presidential documents but also papers generated by members of Congress, federal judges and their staffs should be turned over to the National Archivist and made available to public scrutiny within 15 years.

Historians would gain a new source of insight, but the information would be stale before a President's enemies could convert it into political ammunition.

The same law that created the commission blocked Nixon from taking possession of documents generated in his White House. Lower courts have upheld the law and the Supreme Court is expected to rule soon on Nixon's challenge to it.

It debating the issue, the commission split angrily at times, with two members wanting to make such documents available immediately.

Commission Chairman Herbert Brownell, who served as Attorney General in the Eisenhower administration, and Sen. Lowell P. Weicker, (R-Conn.) refused to sign the report.

Instead, they proposed making the Freedom of Information Act apply to all papers except personal documents such as diaries, or military and foreign policy secrets.

Brownell was supported by the commission's legal staff, headed by J. Lee Rankin, his former solicitor general. So bitter was the dispute the legal staff moved out of the commission's offices and was unavailable to the rest of the panel, members said.

WATERGATE, From A1

a full month before Watergate burglar James McCord exposed it publicly;

- Nixon and his top aide, H. R. Haldeman, intended to use the then secret presidential taping system to refute Dean's charges while still keeping it secret from even the most senior White House officials;

- Nixon characterized two Supreme Court justices as "boobs" and expressed concern that White House aides who were Jewish leaked information to Jewish reporters.

The new transcripts were among 23 prepared for the Watergate cover-up trial, but never made public. Several were withheld because the participants—Nixon and Colson—were not on trial.

In September, 1974, President Ford pardoned Nixon for any crimes he may have committed during his term and a half as President. Colson pleaded guilty in another case.

THE HUSH MONEY

The Jan. 8 Nixon-Colson meeting in which Nixon asked about "hush money" revealed a degree of early cover-up discussion by Nixon not previously known. The discussion opened with Colson reassuring Nixon that none of the defendants in the first Watergate trial will testify. Within a week, five of seven defendants had pleaded guilty.

The day before the Jan. 8 meeting, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) announced that a Senate committee would conduct a full-scale probe of Watergate. Nixon and Colson expressed their concern that a Senate committee will present a greater problem than the trial of the seven defendants.

"We've got to play every string we've got here, don't you agree," Nixon said. "God damn it, the Congress has voted the investigation while they [the trial] are still in—I think that's why the court proceeding has its advantage. As long as that court proceeding is on, the Congress should keep its God damn hands out."

Nixon characterized former Attorney General John N. Mitchell as "smart. He was close to it but not directly . . . Perjury is a hard rap to prove."

Nixon then indicated that the problem of getting the "hush money" is increased because of an investigation then being conducted by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.).

Kennedy's Senate Judiciary Committee was then set on the trail of Nixon's personal lawyer, Herbert W. Kalmbach. Kalmbach had up to that point provided most of the money for payments to defendants. Kennedy's subcommittee had subpoenaed his records.

PAPPAS

Nixon was particularly concerned, according to previously unreleased segment of the April 26, 1973, transcript, that Dean might recall Nixon's admission on March 21, 1973, that Nixon thought Pappas, a prominent Republican fund-raiser, had helped Mitchell raise part of the "hush money" for Watergate defendants.

In the course of six hours of conversation with Haldeman, his chief of staff, Nixon raised the Pappas problem seven times. Nixon repeatedly expressed his concern that he had recalled to Dean that he had personally thanked Pappas for the money.

Pappas, now 77, is a wealthy Greek-American with substantial investments in Greek oil refining, petrochemical plants, oil tankers, a Coca-Cola franchise, and a Boston food importing company. A man who has bragged publicly of his assistance to the CIA, Pappas has maintained close ties with the Greek junta, reportedly lobbying heavily on their behalf in the United States.

Active in Massachusetts Republican circles, Pappas was among the first to suggest Spiro T. Agnew as Nixon's 1968 running mate. In 1972, Pappas contributed over \$100,000 to the Nixon campaign in his own name. His testimony was unsuccessfully sought by the Senate Watergate committee to discuss allegations that he funneled

foreign campaign contributions through Greece to the Nixon campaign.

On April 26, 1973, Haldeman had just reviewed the tape of Nixon's meetings with Dean on March 21, 1973. Haldeman described how Dean had told Nixon of a call to Mitchell concerning Pappas and the money.

Nixon became concerned that Dean might recall aspects of this discussion. After a long strategy debate with Haldeman, Nixon discounted his vulnerability to Dean's possible charge that Nixon knew of hush-money payments.

Haldeman then recalled a noticeable acknowledgment by Nixon during the March 21 meeting that the President "knew" of the Pappas money.

" . . . He (Dean) was going on, you injected, 'I know,'" Haldeman told Nixon. "He had to be damn alert to have remembered that and put it

down."

Continuing to assure Nixon that Dean was unlikely to have picked up the reference, Haldeman added a qualification: "Unless he's got a tape or something else."

"I just can't believe that anybody, that even John Dean, would come into this office with a tape recorder," Nixon said.

The two men continued to pursue the problem through the afternoon and into the evening, when Nixon said: "And I say, 'Yes, I know about Pappas (unintelligible) Pappas and I didn't discuss this, believe me.'"

Haldeman suggested that the meeting with Pappas was only to thank him for his help in the campaign.

Nixon corrected him: "I think it's a matter of fact though that somebody said be sure to talk to Pappas because he's being very helpful on the, uh, Watergate thing."

Elsewhere Nixon recalled that when Pappas came to the Oval office one day he said he was helping on Mitchell's "special projects."

The 'I know' reference which Haldeman and Nixon agonized over was apparently inaudible to federal investigators who prepared transcripts of the tape. No such reference appears in any transcripts of March 21.

When Pappas eventually appeared before the Watergate grand jury here, he denied contributing any funds for the defendants. The Watergate special prosecutor was unable to develop any evidence to show such payments beyond Nixon and Haldeman's concern.

UNRAVELING OF COVER-UP

Prior to the March 19, 1973, letter

from Watergate burglar McCord to Judge John J. Sirica outlining the cover-up, Nixon began protecting himself from possible exposure, according to the new transcripts.

On Feb. 13, 1973, Nixon articulated his concern that one of the seven original Watergate defendants might talk. Everything will be fine, he said, "unless one of the seven begins to talk. That's the problem."

On Feb. 14, 1973, Nixon told Colson: "We gotta cut our losses. My losses are to be cut. The President's losses got to be cut on the cover-up deal."

Soon Nixon reflected on the "good intentions" of the burglars: "I mean, this is a tough one, because there's so many players, and so God damn said I think of those seven guys . . ."

"So do I," said Colson.

" . . . who are involved, you know, Jesus Christ, they did it with good intentions (unintelligible). Of course, I guess they, they must have known that they had to take this kind of risk

(unintelligible)."

Later on March 21, 1973, with Colson, Nixon addresses help for the defendants. "That had to be done," Nixon said, and then the transcript indicated he laughed.

TAPES AND THE NIXON DEFENSE

The new transcripts of April 26, and June 4, 1973, show the extent to which Nixon intended to use his tapes to defend himself and his closest aides, Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman. First the tapes were to be used to refresh the recollections of Haldeman and Nixon. They were to be used also to chip away at Dean's accusations, pointing out minor inaccuracies and inconsistencies.

Nixon took great comfort when told Dean kept few notes of his conversations and the President realized the taping system would give the White House an advantage over Dean.

At another point, Nixon instructed Haldeman to tell no one about the system, not even Ehrlichman. If the system was ever discovered, Nixon suggested they would say that only national security matters were taped and transcribed.

The new transcripts show that what Nixon said on the White House tapes indicated an ignorance of aspects of the cover-up, aspects which earlier tapes established he had full awareness.

SUPREME COURT AND JEWS

A full 188-page transcript of June 4, 1973, when Nixon listened to tapes and talked with White House press secretary Ron Ziegler and chief of staff Alexander M. Haig Jr. dealt with Nixon's reflections on the Supreme Court, its ethnic composition and the problems of ethnically inspired news leaks.

Nixon told Ziegler what he had heard on tapes of his conversations with Dean:

"I said, uh, (William J.) Brennan's a boob; (Thurgood) Marshall's a boob.' I said, (Potter) Stewart is a very nice fellow, but weak.' I said, uh, (Byron) White was above average.' I said, uh, (Harry) Blackmun was above average; (William) Rehnquist was way above average; (Lewis) Powell was way above average; and of course the chief justice (Warren) Burger was way above average.' Douglas, of course, I didn't even mention him."

DIDN'T EVEN

MENTION HIM...

"... And I talked about Jews," said Nixon.

"Of course," Ziegler said.

"I said we're not going to—there's no Jewish seat," Nixon said. "I said, 'I've got them all around me.' I said, 'I've got Kissinger and I've got (Herbert) Stein, and (unintelligible).' But I said, 'It's time to get a few ethnics on the court. You've got to take some people and bring them up.' I said, 'The Democrats are much better than we are. The Republicans are snobs.' I said, 'We've got to spread the base (unintelligible).' So, we talked about (unintelligible) Sullivan (unintelligible), called (associate director of the FBI, Mark) Felt the 'White Rat.' Known as the 'White Rat.' Uh, the question was whether he's Jewish. Uh, and I said, and I pointed out our Jewish friends—even on our White House staff—leak to Jews. But Dean says, 'There'll never be a leak out of me. I just don't know how to leak.'"

Ziegler laughed, the transcript indicates.

OTHER REFERENCES

In one reference on April 19, 1973, Ehrlichman and Nixon discussed the failing memory of special presidential counsel Richard Moore during the televised Senate Watergate hearings. Seven days later, April 26, Nixon told Haldeman:

"And, uh, well, Moore, Moore spent some money and Kalmbach spent some money and so forth and so on and so on, but anyway, my point is this, speaking of Moore, there's that and so I'm gratified. I am also gratified with Moore's recollection of La Costa has now dimmed a bit. It was God damn sharp when he was here in the office and I want you (unintelligible)."

In July the white-haired Moore gained a reputation during the televised Watergate hearings for his inability to recall events under questioning.

In a Colson-Nixon conversation on March 21, 1973, Colson described a call he received from an aide to Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), the ranking minority member on the Senate Watergate committee. According to Colson, the aide sought advice on Baker's behalf on how to help Nixon. "Howard really wants to work with us, totally," Colson said. "... he said don't pay any attention to what he has been saying (publically)..."

Colson described Baker's fear that his secret consultation with Attorney General Richard Kleindienst during the Senate Watergate investigation might be discovered. Colson also related that an aide to Baker confided

at one point that Baker wanted to be able to "keep at bay, and be able to control" Watergate Committee Chairman Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.).

On April 26, 1973, Nixon and Haldeman discussed the loyalty of Henry Petersen, the top Justice Department official in charge of the investigation.

"I am in a totally defensible position...", Nixon said.

"You are if Petersen holds up," Haldeman responded.

"He's gonna hold up, I think...", Nixon said.

"... depends on how much Dean has on him and he's got a lot," Haldeman said.

"I know," Nixon agreed.

"And Petersen may be just as worried at his level about what Dean's got on him as you are at yours about what he may have on you," Haldeman observed.

"Petersen, I think, is gonna hold up on that point...", Nixon said.

"Our lawyers [John Wilson and Frank Strickler, lawyers for Haldeman and Ehrlichman] don't even agree with him as a counsel. Our lawyers totally distrust Petersen," Haldeman said.

"Yeah I know," said Nixon. "They distrust him... But I, but he's all I got Bob, and uh, — I think though, that Petersen on the other level, other hand, I, I had repeated that so often to him I never failed to (unintelligible) we just, we'll just say, 'we got that taped, Henry.'"

A transcript of the June 20, 1972 meeting between Nixon and Colson, just three days after the Watergate break-in, provides the earliest detailed account of Nixon's reaction.

The transcript, portions of which appeared in Dean's book "Blind Ambition," includes a description of the burglars as "pretty hard line guys." A moment later Nixon adds: "It doesn't sound like a, a skillful job. (Unintelligible). If we didn't know better, would have thought it was deliberately botched."

Nixon at one point discusses the overall strategy: "At times, uh I just — stonewall it."

Because the Democrats had just filed a civil suit, Nixon said: "We're gonna have a court case and indeed the difficulty we'll have ahead, we have got to have lawyers smart enough to have our people delay (unintelligible) avoid deposition, of course."

In one transcript just four days before Haldeman and Ehrlichman re-

signed on April 30, 1973, Nixon discussed a counteroffensive to prove that the tactics of his administration might have been appropriate.

"We've got to get out the God damn story. People have forgotten the violent years involved . . . I mean, 'D--- you Mr. President,' 'F--- you Tricia,' and all that s---, not just words but what violence, the destruction, the tear-gassing at the convention ..

"Get together and-- the -- Secret Service can do one thing--I want the threats collected, remember. I told you that, will they do it?"

"Yeah, yeah, yeah," Haldeman replied.

"...the number of threats, the number of uh, the number of demonstrations, uh, get all the hate letters that you can, good God, let's put out the

Chamber of Horrors "

Nixon: It Should Never 'Get Out

Following are excerpts from the transcript of a telephone conversation between President Nixon and his former special counsel, Charles W. Colson, on March 21, 1973, from 7:35 to 8:24 p.m.:

COLSON: . . . we'll defend the Administration if we know what the facts are

PRESIDENT: What's your judgment as to what, (clears throat) what ought to be done now. You know, there's various discussions about, uh, whether, uh, should be, uh, a uh, report made or something, you know, a, uh, report to, uh, the President or just hunker down and take it or what, what have you, and so forth and so on.

COLSON: Well, my feelings, Mr. President, uh, thus far, frankly, is that you're not being hurt by this at all. That this is, a, a, a Washington story still and that, that sounds incredible after all this time and all this publicity but I, I, I'm convinced that, uh, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: But you see, looking to the future, I suppose, Chuck, what some of our fellows that are, you know, like, uh, when Dean, who's really done a superb job here keeping all the fires out, he's, (clears throat) he's concerned about, you know, what, what bubbles out, you know.

COLSON: Yeah, well Dean has a problem also, Mr. President. I, I didn't want to say this to you, uh, Monday night when you mentioned to me that, uh, uh, that, that Dean has done a spectacular job. I don't think anybody could do as good a job as John has done. The, the problem I foresee in this is not what has happened so far—I mean I, I think the, uh, the mystery of the Watergate, uh, I don't know whether somebody's gonna, uh, somebody else higher up in the Committee for the Re-Election is gonna get named or not but, uh, to me that isn't of very great consequence to the country if it, if it happens. Then thing that worries me is that, is the possibility of somebody, uh, charging an obstruction of justice problem—in other words that the subsequent actions would worry me more than anything and it, that's where John has, you know, he's done all the things that have to be done but, that, that makes him a little more of a participant than, than you would like if you, if you, if, uh, he's the fellow that has to, uh, coordinate it all. It's in, uh—of course, he's got the best privilege, he's got a double privilege but, you know the, the sub-

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sequent developments would be the only ones that would worry me. I don't worry about the, uh, how the Watergate came about. I think that's been so milked out that they get someone else, well they get 'em, that's all. And if there's testimony, it'll . . .

PRESIDENT: Um huh.

COLSON: . . . it will get so God-damn confused. It's, it's may be the stuff after, uh, afterward that . . .

PRESIDENT: You mean, uh, the me, you, been saying uh, the, the, with regard to the defendants? Of course, that was all . . .

COLSON: Yeah, that, that's, that's that area I mean, that general area.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. Of course, that was . . .

COLSON: I don't want to burden you with any . . .

PRESIDENT: . . . that had to be done. (Laughs)

COLSON: Hell, yeah. No, I'm not—no second thoughts. That's not the point.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

COLSON: The point is that, just that, it limits the ability now to . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

COLSON: . . . to stand up to it. I don't know, uh, I've thought of several things. I've thought of trying to get a, uh, a special counsel in to you that could, uh, uh, you, you . . .

PRESIDENT: We could appoint, you mean?

COLSON: Yeah, that you could appoint Not, not as an investigator but as a counsel. Just to handle the God-damn thing on the grounds that you don't want the Justice Department handling it, and you don't want the regular White House staff handling it—they've got their work to do.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

COLSON: And, uh, you appoint a

man of . . .

PRESIDENT: Which has . . .

COLSON: . . . totally impeccable uh, credentials, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: Um, huh.

COLSON: . . . a man known for his integrity, uh, standing before the Bar, you know, that kind of thing. But, a guy who is also totally loyal or just a damned good lawyer who would be professional then. That's one thought that I've been playing with the last couple of days.

PRESIDENT: Yeap. Hum.

COLSON: We have an advantage, you see, of getting all the, the people who have been in one way or another participating out of the damn thing so that you, you've got a guy who, uh, frankly can, can deal with, uh, deal with anybody he has to deal with.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

COLSON: Special counsel.

PRESIDENT: I think they have, of course, of course, you've got the problem of what the judge is gonna say Friday. I suppose he's gonna have quite an harangue, isn't he?

COLSON: Oh yeah, yeah, he's he's . . .

then, of course, you've got the problem of, uh, the defendants, particularly Hunt. What he, what's he gonna do. That's always a problem, I know.

COLSON: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Of course he's got problems if he does anything. You know whether he's, uh . . .

COLSON: Oh, that's right.

PRESIDENT: You know what I mean, He's, uh . . .

COLSON: Yes, sir. I, my own opinion of that is that he, uh, that he just will hang in where he is. I mean,

I think he, uh, that, at the moment I think that's in, in as good shape as it can be. Uh, you never know—lot of . . .

PRESIDENT: There're a lot of pressures on him, lot of pressures. Sure are

COLSON: Yeah, hell of a lot. But it's uh, but, no—I think what you'll

get is another harangue from the judge and, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: Probably calling don't you imagine, for the grand jury to go back into session and call everybody again.

COLSON: Yes sir, yeah, U.S. attorney's already, uh, already indicated he was gonna do that, so, the judge is bound to use that, that ploy to grandstand that but that doesn't trouble me too much . . .

PRESIDENT: Well, I wo-, I don't have any problem frankly, if, I'd hell of a lot rather have—everybody in the White House staff and former White House staff members called before a grand jury than I would before, uh, (laughs) the committee, wouldn't you?

COLSON: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely, there's nothing, as a matter of fact, well, all, uh, everybody in the White House staff, former White House staff has been before the grand jury.

PRESIDENT: Right, except, except for, of course, Haldeman, Ehrlichman.

COLSON: That's right, I guess now . . .

PRESIDENT: See you . . .

COLSON: gave depositions. Uh, but there—of course Ehrlichman talked to the, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: FBI.

COLSON: . . . FBI. Yeah, (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: But that, that, see that's the part that they might want to get into, which I would understand.

COLSON: Sure, well that—that wouldn't bother me, of course, you, you do have privilege questions that, I mean, uh, there's the question of where and when you waive privilege that, uh, we'd have to worry of . . .

PRESIDENT: But it'd be very difficult to waive it—to, to claim it for a grand jury, I think.

COLSON: That's right. For a grand jury you could have . . .

PRESIDENT: I don't think you can really waive it. I don't think you can really, uh, stand with it, I mean. Before a Senate committee it's one thing. Before a grand jury I think something else.

COLSON: That's right. Yeah, or, or, uh, in a civil proceeding in open court or in a, uh, deposition in a civil proceeding or, or in a con-

gressional hearing you've got one set of rules, in the grand jury where there's secrecy . . .

PRESIDENT: That's a different matter.

COLSON: It's a different matter, that's right.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

COLSON: There'd be still some area that would be privileged but I think the privilege would be much narrower.

PRESIDENT: Right.

COLSON: Obviously some areas that would be privileged but I think that . . .

PRESIDENT: Right.

COLSON: . . . might be considered. I, I don't think really at this point in time, uh, Mr. President, that—it was interesting, I, I—Brenson said they'd had no reaction from Tennessee, none whatsoever. Uh, and I, I just don't think another harangue by the judge or, uh—I just . . .

PRESIDENT: Well, I think the harangue will probably have s-, you know, it will get another television story and we'll get a, uh, you know, uh, a little, a more the, that yo-, it'll, it will hit, hit the networks, it all—it's like ITT. It sort of builds up over a period of time.

COLSON: That's right. It doesn't, th-, th-, the—but they keep hitting at it because they just don't have anything else to use. Well, it's the . . .

PRESIDENT: That's quite true.

COLSON: They can make the mystery out of it and, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: That's right.

COLSON: . . . and that's the damn, damnable part.

PRESIDENT: That's why, uh, some kind of a, even a bland statement is probably worthwhile. I don't know how we can get it out, but maybe we have to at one point.

COLSON: Well, if, if there's anything to be, anything more to be said—I, I almost think you're in the, uh, in the right posture, right at the moment. The only question that I have in my mind, uh, Mr. President, is whether it's, whether it would be an advantage to you to have someone who, uh, has no, uh, background in this area at all, an-, and's had no involvement, has been on the outside, uh, brought in simply to, uh, to coordinate it all so that, uh—highly respected guy who could sort of . . .

PRESIDENT: Well, the ideal guy would be Fortas, if he, uh, hadn't been involved, huh?

COLSON: Yeah, he's uh, he's pretty tarred. He would be very good.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, He's what you need.

COLSON: Yeah, that's right. Another fellow, uh, uh, that I thought about is Rankin because he's, uh, highly respected. He, he, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: Walsh?

COLSON: Yeah, 'cept, yeah Walsh.

Following are excerpts of a transcript of a meeting between President Nixon and White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman on April 26, 1973, from 8:55 a.m. to 10:20 a.m. Haldeman has just finished reviewing tapes from the still-secret presidential taping system, and he is briefing Nixon:

PRESIDENT: Now let's look at this business. First with regard to these struct it, but I think that the, for, for your information, the directive I've given you is, uh, its been customary without, and I, I don't think it should ever get out that we taped this office, Bob. Have we got people that are trustworthy on that? I guess we have.

HALDEMAN: I think so.

PRESIDENT: If it does, the answer is yes. We only, but we only taped the national security, uh, information. All other, all other, all other information is scrapped, never transcribed. Get the point? That's what I want you to remember on these, if you will. See my point. That's just a memorandum for your file basically that you make, that you are, but, uh,—I think that's very important, very important. You never want to be in a position to say the President taped it, you know. I mean taped somebody.

HALDEMAN: Well, the whole purpose of this was for national security.

PRESIDENT: That's right, I uh, . . .

HALDEMAN: The reason they were

PRESIDENT: You mean . . .

HALDEMAN: . . . other steps were taken . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah. I know, I know.

HALDEMAN: . . . for taking other places.

PRESIDENT: I know but I just don't want this to be—I just don't want that tape for example, I don't want you to. I don't want you to disclose that to Ehrlichman or anybody else, I mean that's just something—I know what you can tell Ehrlichman. Just say you went over it and it's the same as . . .

HALDEMAN: I've, I've already, what I said to him is, is that the tape—he knows I . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: . . . went over it, of course. Uh, I said, "It basically says

what the President recalled."

PRESIDENT: That's right. Now, with regard to the . . .

HALDEMAN: Which it does. It's—your recollection of that was almost, almost verbatim, (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Not very, not completely. The question is whether or not—did I at that time, order Dean to pay off Hunt, "Go to work, Dean . . ."

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: ". . . the money to pay him off."

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: Not at the point that (unintelligible). You're sure I didn't. Didn't I say, "Well, now what ought to be done is to put the cork in the bottle," or some damn silly thing. I don't know. I thought I . . .

HALDEMAN: Yeah, but if it was, that was rescinded and it was a, and it was a, it was a, "shouldn't we do this, we at least have to do that." You were drawing him out. You did not order him to.

PRESIDENT: With regard to clemency if the subject ever comes up, you could say it, uh . . . must have, quite (unintelligible) obviously, it, uh,—you can say it and, "The matter was discussed (unintelligible) the people." And the way it came up, is that, I there talk about uh, doing it before Christmas, you know, doing it at Christmas. And I said, "Well, you couldn't even consider it until after 1974. We do it without the elections." You understand?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: I mean couldn't even consider it, I mean that's the point, because, because that puts it more in of the crime, see what I mean?

HALDEMAN: Yep.

PRESIDENT: I don't know, do you?

Haldeман I don't . . .

PRESIDENT: What troubles me is whether Dean, Dean has made a memorandum of this. Well, the fact that he had memoranda is irrelevant with what (unintelligible) . . .

Haldeман: Well, let's, let's look at this point though.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: That area is totally privileged until you come to an impeachment proceeding. There's no way that that can be brought out because it—there's no way that, that the Presidential, there's no forum for going into Presidential, uh, guilt, except an impeachment.

PRESIDENT: I know.

HALDEMAN: And they have got to impeach you first before the proceeding starts and they aren't going to impeach you.

PRESIDENT: No, I, I slept a little on that and it's good for John to look

at it that way. My God, what the hell have we done to be impeached?

HALDEMAN: But John doesn't believe you have either and John doesn't believe you can be impeached.

PRESIDENT: No.

HALDEMAN: Or, or will be. What he believes is . . .

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: . . . That's, that's the game Dean is trying to play.

PRESIDENT: That's right. That's what he's talking.

HALDEMAN: Does not believe it's, uh, it's a game of any potential.

PRESIDENT: Uh. (Pause) I made a call, that's the thing you have to remember, sometime about what the hell we going to do about—what's been done about Hunt, money he's asked for. You know what I mean?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: That's a possibility, Bob. Now how would you, how would we talk about that policy. (Unintelligible) trying to find out what . . .

HALDEMAN: What he was up to . . .

PRESIDENT: What, what this thing, how deep this thing ran. I had to find out. All right now, the big question: when I learned, this on the 21st—why didn't I go running right over to the Attorney General and say, "Look, I found out that Hunt is, Bittman's asking for, for money." It is a question of how long it took me to, to reach the, the conclusion that we reached, you know, that Dean (unintelligible) 14th, you know, Ehrlichman went over to give his report. (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Hmm, you didn't know what the facts were.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: You didn't (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Uh, you didn't know where, where they stood on it, they were still . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: . . . talking to Hunt and all that and it wasn't, there wasn't a timely problem there anyway. I mean it wasn't a matter of something, that whatever Hunt knows or doesn't know, he's gonna go on knowing, or not knowing.

PRESIDENT: No, no. The question is whether or not that, that Hunt, (unintelligible) didn't know, but the fact that an overture had been made by Hunt's attorney for, for payments.

HALDEMAN: But you didn't know what the nature of this payment business was? you didn't know what they were talking about in terms of payments. 'Cause you were trying to smoke it out.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: That's right. Then you trying to smoke out whether that involved other payments and you know, was this the first time and then Dean

in this conversation logged in a, it'll take a million dollars over some, over the next year.

PRESIDENT: I, I remember that I logged that in . . .

HALDEMAN: Okay.

PRESIDENT: . . . I can recall . . .

HALDEMAN: Okay. Right. Was that a million dollars to Hunt or to all of the defendants and then it, it, it comes to your attention that somebody has been working something out with the other defendants. You logged that in. Well, you said, what about the Cuban Committee? And, uh, . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah, I said, uh, I said, "How will you do this?"

HALDEMAN: You didn't, you didn't know, . . .

PRESIDENT: . . . Cuban Committee . . .

HALDEMAN: . . . you didn't . . .

PRESIDENT: I had read about the Cuban Committee in the paper that's true.

HALDEMAN: That's right. Well, then you didn't know then and I submit that you don't know now.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Who did it. Well, I didn't know then . . .

HALDEMAN: Where's the line drawn between a legitimate effort to

provide legal fees and an illegitimate effort to buy off defendants.

PRESIDENT: Then the question comes, "Mr. President, did you know the effort was even being made to buy—pay legal fees?" And the answer is, I didn't. I did not know that, I didn't know . . .

HALDEMAN: Not till this point.

PRESIDENT: I didn't know about the 350.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: I didn't know about the launching of Kalmbach.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: You remember.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: I, I did not know, uh, I had read I had read stories to that effect but I didn't frankly look into them. But basically, I frankly had this—I said, "Well, it must be a bunch of Cubans" or something like that, and I thought of (unintelligible). (Both talk at once)

PRESIDENT: I didn't know about La Costa. My point is, and I'm not trying to be selfish, but I, the point is, the story is very true that I didn't know a thing. Now there's only one weakness in that, that, the Pappas thing, the Pappas thing where he said, "Yes, I know about Pappas." But . . .

HALDEMAN: Oh, but that was right in that same time frame.

PRESIDENT: I know, I know. But

he said, "I understand—" Did I say, "I understand that Pappas is helping," or, he said, "Pappas was helping?"

HALDEMAN: He said, "Mitchell has talked to Pappas." You just quickly logged it in, . . . know.

PRESIDENT: Yes, yes, I know. Well, the point was what I was referring to only was not that Mitchell had talked to Pappas, but that Pappas never mentioned that here in this office. Never mentioned that, I know. All he said is that, "I'm helping, uh, helping, uh, uh, John's special projects," and I said, "Well, thank you very much. I appreciate it very much." He didn't tell me that it was about.

HALDEMAN: Okay.

PRESIDENT: So after that conversation . . .

HALDEMAN: Okay. Now that—See . . .

PRESIDENT: You see what I mean. (Unintelligible) . . .

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) all this stuff.

HALDEMAN: Yeah. But it's, again, you're a long ways from having to make this case. You need to know what John has; but, uh, that was, that, that Pappas thing was so, you know, just, just—your "I know" was almost lost in the thing, he, he was going on, you injected, "I know." He had to be damn alert to have remembered that and put it down.

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: And you gotta assume that maybe he was, but, but the odds are very much against it.

PRESIDENT: Well, that's what they were.

HALDEMAN: Unless he's got a tape or something else. But I just don't—tape. I do not accept that as even a remote possibility.

PRESIDENT: I just can't believe that anybody, that even John Dean, would come into this office with a tape recorder.

HALDEMAN: And I think if he did, that's one more discrediting thing on him. I mean you just make the point that that's inconceivable, that a man . . .

PRESIDENT: . . . tape recorder, puts that out in the press.

HALDEMAN: But then that indicates he was coming in to try to trap the President. So what was his motive, what were your motives, what were the Justice Department's motives and prosecutors' motives at that point? They didn't know there was, that—you look at the things in the context of the times. There was no—at that point, there wasn't any real feeling that there was a cover-up thing, that's come out. That's just (unintelligible) out of Dean's thing, Dean report.

PRESIDENT: Well, I think there had been hush money talk John, Bob.

HALDEMAN: It was a story, there

was a hush money story and James McCord . . .

PRESIDENT: McCord, McCord, remember, said, "Hush money," didn't he . . . ?

HALDEMAN: I'm not sure when. Somewhere in there he did . . .

PRESIDENT: Before March. But, uh, there was a hush money story.

HALDEMAN: I don't know.

PRESIDENT: Oh, yeah, sure. Well anyway it doesn't make any differ . . . that's, uh, that's what it is. But, uh, he

was practically saying that Hunt's, uh, —he said, "Look, Hunt needs money here. Bittman has said that. Hutn's got to get money here or he'll blow all the seamy help—the seamy side." Wasn't that the story, this is (unintelligible) . . .

PRESIDENT: Well, you've got to do some (intelligible). I don't remember. I don't, God damn it, until this day remember what hap—, I don't really remember, do you? Whether you were told after that, well look for Christ sakes get this money.

HALDEMAN: No, I don't think so.

PRESIDENT: You don't think so?

HALDEMAN: No.

PRESIDENT: 'Cause (unintelligible) remembered that much, Bob.

HALDEMAN: And if I were, I said that we can't.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: And I know we didn't.

PRESIDENT: But I would say we'll do what you can do to help Mitchell but — I might of said to him get this, this to Mitchell.

HALDEMAN: Nope.

PRESIDENT: Get this message to Mitchell.

HALDEMAN: No, I don't even think that. I'll—you might be right, 'cause you've been right on the rest of it and pretty accurately, but I sure don't remember that.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) I remember as much as had thought about (unintelligible) I, I, we've got to keep the cork in the bottle and so forth. Well, even looking at all of that, looking at it, at its worst and, let's face it the—it was not something that he just came in and said first reaction (unintelligible) of the White House (unintelligible) there's a cancer and he says well, it's growing daily and so forth and is on. He says there is the lem, for example, of the pay-offs (unintelligible) recount the payments and I'd say why is that. He says well, for an example, uh,—he's got Kalmbach in this memorandum, hasn't he. The call was made to Kalmbach and then Kalmbach raised the money. Got a little on Pappas but that's almost coincidental, isn't it? It's almost incidentally. It's . . .

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: Mitchell—Pappas is

helping Mitchell, didn't he say?

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: I don't think we can . . .

PRESIDENT: I said, I don't want that. Now wait—go ahead (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: Well, I was gonna say I don't think that we can pretend that, that we didn't know there was, was an interest on Mitchell's part in raising money for the defendants.

PRESIDENT: 'S right. Well, I . . .

HALDEMAN: But I sure as hell don't know what it was for.

PRESIDENT: I, I,—wait a minute. Start . . .

HALDEMAN: I mean, you didn't know about it, I gave you (unintelligible) . . .

PRESIDENT: I know that. (Unintelligible) went through this. I really didn't.

HALDEMAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: I didn't know, you know, I mean I didn't. I deliberately got the staff protected me from it for their credit and I just wasn't getting involved.

HALDEMAN: It wasn't even a matter of protection. It was, it was not something that was necessary to, to get you.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: It didn't involve you.

PRESIDENT: That's right. That's right.

HALDEMAN: It wasn't (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Then, then he did (unintelligible) Bittman is talking to O'Brien and so forth and so on. I said, well, my God, there's about \$1,000 sitting beside a road and so forth. Do we go into what the seamy side was at all? The conversation didn't go on too much?

HALDEMAN: No, not really.

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Excerpts of transcript of a recording of a meeting among the President, H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, on April (Nixon and Haldeman are discussing the March 21, 1973 meeting attended by 26, 1973, from 3:59 to 9:03 p.m.: Dean: Haldeman has just finished listening to the tape of that meeting.)


HALDEMAN: . . . I don't know, I don't know, I think that he wanted to set up this meeting with, uh, he wanted Dean to meet with Mitchell and Ehrlichman and Bob, you know. He went through it. Then Dean said, "You were, you know, faced now with the fact that the U. S. Attorney's gona pull all the defendants back and immunize them, and, uh, send them back to the Grand, Grand Jury." And, uh, he said, "That won't do any good 'cause they'll stonewall. Except for Hunt and that's not proper handling." And the Pres, you said, "That's why the, the immediate

“The thing that worries me is that, is the possibility of somebody charging an obstruction of justice problem—in other words that the subsequent actions would worry me more than anything and it, that’s where John (Dean) has, you know, he’s done all the things that have to be done but, that, makes him a little more of a participant than you would like”

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“I thought of trying to get a special counsel in to you . . . that you could appoint . . . Just to handle the Goddamn thing on the ground that you don’t want the Justice Department handling it . . . a guy who frankly can deal with anybody he has to deal with.”

—Charles Colson to President Nixon April 26, 1973



CHARLES W. COLSON

thing you've got no choice (unintelligible). But that you deal with the one point, is that right?" Dean said, "That's right." You said, "if, if," you said, "Would you agree that if that will buy time we'd better well, better damn well get that done." Dean said, "I think he ought to be given some signal anyway." You said, "For Christ sake give him a way down. Turn it off." You said, "Who's gonna talk to him? I guess Colson. He's the one." Dean said, "Well Colson doesn't have any money, that's the thing. One of the real problems is they haven't been able to raise money. A million dollars in cash is a very difficult problem, as we discussed before." He said, "Mitchell has talked to Pappas. I called him last night. John asked me to call him last night after our discussion and after you'd met with John to see where that was."

PRESIDENT: John Ehrlichman?

HALDEMAN: I guess. And I said, "Have you talked with Pappas?" This was all in code because Martha Mitchell picked up the phone. And, uh, so I said, "Did you talk to the Greek." He said, "Yes I have." And I said, "Is the Greek bearing gifts." And he said, "Well, I'm gonna call you tomorrow on that."

PRESIDENT: Who's this?

HALDEMAN: Dean to Mitchell.

See TRANSCRIPT, A15, Col. 1

TRANSCRIPT, From A14

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: Dean says, "Did you talk to the Greek." Mitchell said, "Yes I have." Dean says, "Is the Greek bearing gifts." Mitchell said, "Well, I'm gonna call you tomorrow on that."

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: You said then, "Well look, what is it you need on that?" Dean said, "It sounds easy, but that's where our breakdown is, that it's easy to do." You said, "Well if you had it out would you get it to somebody." Dean said, "Well LaRue leaves it in mail boxes, and then someone phones Hunt.

They're a bunch of amateur in that business." And I say, "That was the thing we thought Mitchell ought to be able to do is to find some way to do that sort of thing. None of us know how to."

PRESIDENT: That's really first time I really ever knew who handled money or what, or anything. I had read, I shouldn't act dumb, I had read that Mrs. Hunt, that these Cubans got money in bags in (unintelligible). I also read, however, that there was a Cuban Committee, that's how that thing came in there. And, uh, the Pappas thing, the Pappas thing

was there but on that—my conversation on Pappas is pretty—I think, uh, . . .

HALDEMAN: Well, and Pappas was the number one of a number of major contributors that we met with. That's right.

PRESIDENT: No, no that's right. And I say, "Yes, I know about Pappas (unintelligible) Pappas and I didn't discuss this, believe me."

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) just knew that Pappas was (unintelligible) and helping with the campaigning.

PRESIDENT: That's right. Well, but Pappas was, said he was helping on, uh, . . .

HALDEMAN: Helping Mitchell?

PRESIDENT: Helping Mitchell on certain things and I said, "Well, that's fine, thank you." But I, he didn't tell me what it was.

HALDEMAN: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: I think it's a matter of fact though that somebody said be sure to talk to Pappas because he's being very helpful on the, uh, Watergate thing. Uh, (unintelligible).

HALDEMAN: I don't think I said Watergate thing. I said, I said Mitchell wants you to be sure and talk to Pappas. He's very helpful.

PRESIDENT: Very helpful.

HALDEMAN: Well, I may have said helpful in raising money for the pris—, for the defense. You see I, I . . .

PRESIDENT: Did you go over that point with your lawyer today, that point that the defendants . . .

HALDEMAN: Yeah, some. They're, they're . . .

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible), huh.

HALDEMAN: . . . still organizing.

HALDEMAN: That's something, incidental, but it's still a mystery to me. I don't—why we care if the Cubans talk. Unless it's about the National Security stuff about the other jobs we did.

PRESIDENT: That's right.

HALDEMAN: Because . . .

PRESIDENT: Well, that's what, quite a dif—, conversation differs, because it is foul. It was about the operation.

HALDEMAN: (Unintelligible) . . .

PRESIDENT: Things that we did and that's why we discussed it awhile.

HALDEMAN: . . . had to do with what we did at—not—had to do with what he did at the White House though, not what he did in, in, in . . .

PRESIDENT: Right.

HALDEMAN: . . . in, in this case.

PRESIDENT: That's right, not obstruction of justice.

HALDEMAN: No 'cause if it was obstruction of justice, it was obstruction of justice on a charge not yet filed, which is not obstruction of justice. The charge that he had bur-

glarized the Ellsberg.

PRESIDENT: But even then, we didn't (unintelligible). Dean says, "Well, I called Pappas and I told him about your other trump card." He naturally (unintelligible) lawyers all this obviously. Called, uh, Pappas.

HALDEMAN: Well, the other thing is that your dealing with the facts here. You're looking at . . .

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

HALDEMAN: . . . actual things that were said. Dean will be dealing with how he wants to construe those facts and that may not come out exactly the same way. And Dean may be telling his lawyers and may be thinking in his own mind a lot worse than what really happened. What do you think the President instructed him to do in this sort of thing (unintelligible). He said we have to (unintelligible) out, all this sort of thing which is (unintelligible), he didn't. We've just explored segments and we get to the thing somewhere.

PRESIDENT: Where, where he pledged this to you?

HALDEMAN: Where he puts it to us. I think then we may have to pull out this tape recording, and let 'em hear it. Somebody like the Chief Justice or somebody, you know. Just, uh, . . .

PRESIDENT: It's better if you can give your recollection now, that's the important part. And then afterward, afterwards Ehrlichman said "We will not, there's no dice (unintelligible)." Right, on that?

HALDEMAN: Yeah, I guess.

Transcript of a June 20, 1972, meeting between then-President Nixon and his special counsel, Charles W. Colson:

COLSON: Sir.

PRESIDENT: Hi. Now I hope everybody is not going to get in a tizzy about the, uh, Democratic Committee.

COLSON: A little, uh, it's a little frustrating, disheartening, I guess, is the right word.

PRESIDENT: Well.

COLSON: Pick up that God damn Washington Post and see that guilt by association.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. (Unintelligible) you?

COLSON: Yeah. I, this is the (un-

intelligible) in three months. Been off our payroll for three months.

PRESIDENT: No, don't worry about your personal expense and pension problems.

COLSON: No, I've learned a lesson from you in that regard. I must say that . . .

PRESIDENT: Can't rule out the fact, it happened. Oh, well—

COLSON: (Unintelligible) family—

they knew us (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Really?

COLSON: Sickening, you know. They say, "Were you involved in this thing?"

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

(Unintelligible.)

COLSON: Do they think I'm that dumb?

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible.)

COLSON: (Unintelligible) quite that way.

PRESIDENT: Well, don't worry about that.

COLSON: Well, I don't think it's—it's even less than IT&T. It's the kind of thing that no one in the country...

PRESIDENT: Yeah, well now (unintelligible)...

COLSON: (Unintelligible.)

PRESIDENT: A lot of people think you oughta wiretap.

COLSON: Well, they, I'm, I'm sure most people...

PRESIDENT: Knew why the hell we're doing it, and they probably figure they're doing it to us, which they are.

COLSON: Most people figure that, uh, political parties spy on each other and that's part of the problem. (Unintelligible) spying. I...

PRESIDENT: That's why, uh, that's why, uh, they hired this guy in the first place to sweep the rooms, didn't they?

COLSON: Yes sir. Frankly, sir, I haven't got into the, uh, ultimate details that we want to on this. But I assume he was hired to protect their own offices.

PRESIDENT: Well, they better, better have somebody you know, the, uh, uh, Bob gave them 340 on the chopper. (Unintelligible). The chopper had some guy with McGovern, aides that they have are—they hope the committee bugged—I just had Bob pick it up.

COLSON: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) good story.

COLSON: (Unintelligible) they've, they've known most of our leads (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Was he the guy that bugged the U.S. — (Unintelligible). You've got a God damn person over there that's ratting on us. What do you think?

COLSON: I think it's undoubtedly O'Brien's group.

PRESIDENT: Do you?

COLSON: You never know.

PRESIDENT: You say who... I don't know who the hell it would be. Some disgruntled (unintelligible) or somebody planted it.

COLSON: Or it could be his secretary.

PRESIDENT: Well, secretaries do it, not that you pay them any (unin-

telligible).

COLSON: Sure. There, there's no way you can guard against this kind of thing. The only thing you can do is be...

PRESIDENT: Be sure the White House has told, you know...

COLSON: Well, I think—oh, sure, I mean, that's the kind of thing (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: At least the ones we're going to investigate are. (Unintelligible).

COLSON: Oh yeah (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I mean like, ah, the ones we have over there according to (unintelligible) and uh, the Yates) girl, Buz Yates, Yates (unintelligible) both worked for Johnson. That's sort of a key that, us—oh, hell, uh...

COLSON: Those, those kind of people; I think you can tell a person from the way...

PRESIDENT: I, I think so. They don't look that—well...

COLSON: Yeah. I don't quite know if—might be able to do it long enough to (unintelligible). (Tape noise) that's the kind of thing you can never be sure of.

PRESIDENT: On this thing here, I, uh, I've got to, well, it's a dangerous job.

COLSON: Well, Bob is pulling it all together—thus far, I think we've done this, I think, I think we've done the right things to date.

PRESIDENT: I think the real question is whether, uh, we want to (unintelligible) the charge—(tape noise) (unintelligible) to hold up. Basically, they all pretty hard line guys.

COLSON: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT: If we are going to have this funny guy take credit for that—

COLSON: You mean the one with the—Hunt?

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

COLSON: Course I, I can't believe he's involved. I think (unintelligible) he's, he's, he's too smart to do it this way, he's just too damned shrewd (unintelligible) too much sophisticated techniques. You don't have to get into (unintelligible with tape noise) heavy equipment like that, put it in the ceiling, hell of a lot easier way.

PRESIDENT: It doesn't sound like a, a skillful job. (Unintelligible). If we didn't know better, would have thought it was deliberately butched.

COLSON: Yeah, uh, I thought of that this weekend. And, uh, then I, then I figured, uh, maybe it's the Cubans that did it. Organizing it on their own, because you know they had, uh (unintelligible). (Coughs)

PRESIDENT: I just, feel very strongly.

COLSON: Oh, Jesus. I just talked to Clawson. He said you know we should (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I saw a paper when I

was in there—it says, Kennedy, un, public enemy number one for Cubans (unintelligible).

COLSON: Oh, they're violent. Well you know, Mr. President, most of them keep (unintelligible)...

PRESIDENT: I'm anxious to get that, why don't you get that paper of, ah, Rebozo had it on his, uh, desk. It's the last published, the last issue,

I think to the paper. Published, had to be published (unintelligible) public enemy number one.

COLSON: They hate him, of course they hate McGovern because they're not used to Kennedy (unintelligible). You know, if we were to recognize Castro and he was the man who returned the Cuban nationals. A lot of these guys who were, who were, would be considered fugitives from Cuba—they don't know where to get political asylum.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

COLSON: That's right.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) these days... Jesus Christ.

COLSON: Well.

PRESIDENT: We pay a price. McGovern would do it in a minute.

COLSON: You, he, put yourself in their shoes, when you think that, uh, that they're sitting here thinking—God, that's not what (unintelligible). He may be taken back to a firing squad in Havana. (Unintelligible) resort to some further (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Or The Post, obviously, would be in a hell of a fight on that, and it will rub off on some others. I cannot believe that the press is as vicious as it is. Be able to make this an issue, that's uh—Stay relaxed, you know what I mean (unintelligible).

COLSON: The Post story is the front page in Boston this morning, in the Boston Globe. They've got some (unintelligible) large pictures so I called a few people up here this morning, and nobody's seen it. And those who had seen it said, "Look, (unintelligible)." I, I don't think people pay attention.

PRESIDENT: I read the story. (Unintelligible). But, uh, of course I (unintelligible). What the hell does it prove? That he had—somebody had your number in a book, so that's, what the hell does that prove? But... (unintelligible). Probably had mine.

COLSON: They had Howard Hunt's number, not mine. (Unintelligible) telephone...

PRESIDENT: That's right, but Hunt was, uh...

COLSON: But you read that story in the paper and you think they had mine. Now, that was a brilliantly

written piece of, uh, political knavery because the first time you read it you think they had my number and then you read it again and it's Howard Hunt's.

PRESIDENT: Know about Howard Hunt's, but how did we get in there?

COLSON: Well, Howard Hunt was here as a consultant and I wrote an (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Oh yeah. Well, I said to him I don't suppose any lawyer from (unintelligible) the guy will get a Pulitzer prize for this . . .

COLSON: Probably.

PRESIDENT: (Laughs). No, no, no, you know what I mean, the guy that broke in . . .

COLSON: Oh, oh.

PRESIDENT: . . . for Christ sakes, they gave the Times the Pulitzer prize.

COLSON: They gave Anderson a Pulitzer prize. In other words, stealing documents (unintelligible) for (intelligible).

PRESIDENT: Belonging to the Government, top secret, shit, uh, who, did,

did any of these people squeal about that then%

COLSON: Yeah, isn't that true.

PRESIDENT: That's my point. Did McGovern, did The Times, did The Post squeal about that then? Now here was an attempted theft that failed, against a political party, not against the government of the United States. They give Pulitzer prizes for publishing stolen documents. Now let's get at a, I think a hell of a tough speech. (Unintelligible). An article, I mean, let a, a . . .

COLSON: . . . that's right, if, if you steal classified government documents and print them in a newspaper you get a Pulitzer prize.

PRESIDENT: Right. And don't . . .

COLSON: (Unintelligible) political party headquarters, uh, you get pilloried.

PRESIDENT: That's great, great. Well, and then, too of course, we are just going to leave this where it is, with the Cubans. I hired a detective as being, happens to be the most (unintelligible). Now—

COLSON: I think that's (unintelligible) when he was younger. (Unintelligible) the picture said he's good. The fact that they had Hunt's name was the most logical thing in the world because he ran and trained the chief of brigade that went to the Bay of Pigs. He's the fellow that came up and, and cried at John Kennedy's office to win such and such a waiver.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible).

COLSON: Bill Buckley is his children's godfather. He's a very hard, right hard running guy.

PRESIDENT: Buckley's the kind to



H. R. HALDEMAN

"Where's the line drawn between a legitimate effort to provide legal fees and an illegitimate effort to buy off defendants . . ."

"I don't think that we can pretend that, that we didn't know there was, was an interest on John Mitchell's part in raising money for the defendants."

"That was the thing we thought Mitchell ought to be able to do is to find some way to do that sort of thing. None of us know how to."

—H. R. Haldeman to President Nixon on April 26

write the story.

COLSON: Buckley's the guy who just (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I hope to Christ that he's got (unintelligible) they get Hunt for trying? (Unintelligible) double standard (tape noise). (Unintelligible) I'm not gonna worry about it. I've (unintelligible) sh—, the hell with it. Well, let me say it flatly—we're not going to reach to it that way. We're gonna, we've worked hard on that (unintelligible). What else could we overlook?

COLSON: They'll feel sure (unintelligible). No basis for that. O'Brien—, O'Brien has sued for invasion of privacy. That's that's, that's libel in my book. That's libel. That isn't—

PRESIDENT: When will that get up?

COLSON: Well, they, they brought the suit today, it was announced they were bringing the suit today that the attorneys. I don't think that . . . be dismissed for lack of a (unintelligible) But the, the, uh, you know, it's a great Washington story, because Washington just thrives on intrigue, and spies and suspense.

PRESIDENT: Well, as you know,

COLSON: . . . the political (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Where in the hell (unintelligible), where the hell are all these leaks from our side coming from? Now let's put that aside for (unintelligible) Jesus Christ we've got our place replace. You know damn well, there, you're, you're either bugged or disloyal or thievery are common par for the course. You don't have to deal in proving a bugging count.

COLSON: (Cough) I think they'll have to guard against, Mr. President, is the idea of (unintelligible) on ITT mistake. Now, we were riding so damned high and I guess we couldn't do much about it but they dragged us into it, but—the press, the media and the Democrats are so God damn desperate that any issue that they can lay their hands on—that it's something which normally wouldn't amount, to that much. They're just going to blow their cool out because they haven't got any other place they can lay a glove on us. And that was the case with ITT, which came after China, the economy was picking up, wage-price controls were working, they had nothing so they went into ITT viciously.

PRESIDENT: Sure: (Unintelligible).

COLSON: I think they'll try to. You can't make a case out of this the way you could out of ITT. The weakness in ITT was that it fed the public suspicion that the Republicans are dedicated to big business.

PRESIDENT: Yeah. I know. it's

\$400,000 and all that and so forth. But here it is, they're just trying, let the committee try to find out what the others are doing (unintelligible).

COLSON: I think people expect it. I really do. I think they expect it. The trouble is . . .

PRESIDENT: Mistake would be what? (Unintelligible).

COLSON: Mistake would be to get all of them zeroed in on it.

PRESIDENT: Oh.

COLSON: Make a big case out of it.

PRESIDENT: Oh shit. (Unintelligible) I couldn't agree more.

COLSON: Go after it day in and day out.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

COLSON: Follow the every—uh, I'd say the hell with it, believe me.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, gotta—, and keep your people all away from it. (Unintelligible) like this and I cop out. (Unintelligible).

COLSON: This is good. This is a (unintelligible). This gets into the media in a way that they would have accepted . . .

PRESIDENT: That's right. It couldn't be very hard.

COLSON: Sure these fellas are just in there trying to win the Pulitzer prize. He's going at this pretty well—it's going to be a darned effective speech. Apparently was on a TV program out in California, statewide program. And, uh, (tape noise) Ellsberg, he didn't know he was having it on Ellsberg, and they asked him to comment on Ellsberg today on Ellsberg today and come here today prepared to discuss the wholesale price of (unintelligible) (laughs and coughs). And I gave a very good speech and said, "Look, I, that the President is monitoring it himself (unintelligible). Actually, Mr. President, in this area we've been making, I think, some pretty good progress with the media. It's (unintelligible with tape noise). Now, well it has taken hold really. And the interesting thing is that the press office, every week, come around asking questions about who's money we are (unintelligible) the media this week.

PRESIDENT: Yeah.

COLSON: It shows they're ner-, I'd say it shows they are nervous about it. They're, they're . . .

PRESIDENT: Here we have meetings and so forth and so on. So they'll know better next time.

COLSON: We, we too, but . . . (Laughs)

PRESIDENT: That's right. (Unintelligible). I'm not saying about it.

COLSON: You know, I, I picked up

just earlier this,—I guess it was yesterday—run down of oral (unintelligible) and published them around the country as a result of Ken Clawson's attack on the New York Times. And it's really, ah, it's ah, fascinating, uh study, the Dallas Editorial . . .

PRESIDENT: Great.

COLSON: . . . the Detroit News, the, it's run all over the country, little syndicates picked it up, uh, media critics picked it up, Newsday featured it. He caught them on that one. He really—and this, really hurt them. They're still stinging over that Anthony Lewis story on Vietnam.

PRESIDENT: They're still writing that same lousy line, but they're stinging about the story. You're right.

COLSON: And they're also stinging now about that impeachment ad in The New York Times.

PRESIDENT: Are they?

COLSON: I don't know whether you've noticed it but, but that Common Cause (unintelligible) up against, uh, against The New York Times and the sponsors of the impeachment ad.

PRESIDENT: On what grounds? Common Cause.

COLSON: Yes sir.

PRESIDENT: Why?

COLSON: Because they, this is their chance to prove that they're (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Fair?

COLSON: Fair.

PRESIDENT: On what a, what ground?

COLSON: Well, The Times violated the new, the new campaign spending (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: How did it violate it?

COLSON: Because they didn't, they didn't require the political disclaimer which, uh, says that this ad is, was paid for or not paid for on behalf of . . .

PRESIDENT: My guess is The Times would be pretty—

COLSON: No, no, they'd have, they'd have to, to charge them for it.

PRESIDENT: What look, well, you know what I mean.

COLSON: Oh yeah, yeah.

PRESIDENT: That's what they believe.

COLSON: If that comes out, uh, we'll, we'll have a case against The New York Times on that quick. The GAO is now investigating The Times on that . . . Would be a lovely twist . . .

PRESIDENT: The GAO is . . .

COLSON: . . . basically . . .

PRESIDENT: Because of this?

COLSON: . . . because of a violation of the campaign spending section.

Yeah, they're on, The Times is on very weak ground, I think . . .

PRESIDENT: What're they arguing? They just, they just—oversight . . . ?

COLSON: No, they're gonna argue that is wasn't a political ad, yet right in the body of the ad was a request for funds for candidates who would vote to impeach you as President. So, they, they don't have much of a defense. Then they'll have to disclose who paid for the ad. And if it turns out that that may be traced back to McGovern people, you, you can make this bugging incident look puny by comparison, because that ad was placed the day you left the Soviet Union. And here you are coming back from negotiating with a, one of the most important critically important meetings in modern history and they're placing an ad to impeach the President of the United States. If that can be traced back to McGovern, I think it would, make, uh eavesdropping at the Watergate Hotel look like child's play.

PRESIDENT: At times, uh, I just—stonewall it, they're not gonna . . .

COLSON: Well they haven't, they haven't yet been, uh . . .

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible)

COLSON: They've just been served now, with the, uh, the request for information so they will have to start answering. The Boston Globe, you know, refused to run that same ad. Oh, that shows you how far out The Times is, Jesus (tape noise). The Times and The Post (unintelligible) they're not supposed to do it. That's different.

PRESIDENT: Is anybody over at the committee—good intentions I'm sure. All that work, gets up on (unintelligible)—McGovern crowd I suppose.

COLSON: It's gonna be a lot of bitterness coming out of the McGovern crowd before it's over. I don't think we have to go looking for it. (unintelligible) (tape distortion) he, he really does, a lot of people (unintelligible) that are frightened to death that he could get elected.

PRESIDENT: I noticed in reading the news summary today, I, uh (unintelligible) some of these god-damned politics are gettin' a little worried.

COLSON: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I don't know. I, uh

much. (unintelligible).

COLSON: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: Sure. (Unintelligible).

COLSON: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) washes away (unintelligible). And you look at this damn thing now and its gonna be forgotten after awhile.

COLSON: This'll be forgotten and I hope a lot faster than ITT.

PRESIDENT: Oh sure, you know the hell is going to keep it alive. We're gonna have a court case and indeed, the difficulty we'll have ahead, we have got to have lawyers smart enough to have our people de-, delay (unintelligible) avoiding — depositions, of course, uh, are one possibility. We've got—I think it would be a quite the thing for the judge to call in Mitchell and have a deposition in the middle of the campaign, don't you?

COLSON: I do. I don't think he would. Of course, I'd love to have a deposition, I love to have a deposition taken around here. I'm not—, because nobody, everybody's completely out of it.

PRESIDENT: Yeah, I know.

COLSON: But—this is, this is once when you'd like for people to testify. (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: I don't think you should (unintelligible) . . .

COLSON: (Unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: . . . you're an inside man.

COLSON: I shouldn't. I'd love to, but . . .

PRESIDENT: I'd just stay out of it, uh, all there is to it.

COLSON: (Unintelligible). I want (unintelligible).

COLSON: Yeah.

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible) could kill him. But I just think, ya know, sometimes the uh, you may have your chance later on. (Unintelligible) how we (tape distortion). The press (unintelligible) they know goddamn well. (Unintelligible). Well, go right out and answer these questions for now (unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: "Well Ron, isn't this a terrible thing." Shit.

COLSON: You know, Mr. President (unintelligible)

PRESIDENT: I, I tell ya, I didn't have that much to (unintelligible).

COLSON: The greatest lesson, uh, those of us around you learn from you. I just, I, I wonder how in other presidencies (unintelligible) the guts to stay with it. Because it gets to your morale, personally. (Unintelligible) it does.

PRESIDENT: Ya.

COLSON: And after it does — I put up with it a dozen times in the last three years. Every time I do I stop and think "My God, look at what the President has gone through . . ."

PRESIDENT: Well . . .

COLSON: . . . over the years.

PRESIDENT: One thing I do . . .

(unintelligible)

COLSON: It's a, it's a . . .

PRESIDENT: I mean they're worried because they hate my guts so that so. That, that they're worried . . .

Second Excerpt

COLSON: Keep the (unintelligible) up on our troops, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT: Oh sure, and as I said, my goodness, . . .

COLSON: We won't let this one bug us, uh,

PRESIDENT: Dumbest thing. My God, there are going to be all sorts of things in the campaign. (15-second unintelligible). We can't let this (unintelligible) world's coming to an end.

COLSON: (Unintelligible).

PRESIDENT: (Unintelligible). This is a development. Nothing loses an election. Nothing changes it that