In complete

The Analysts' Desk

Scant and skimpy as they were, it is certain that the first reports of this political exotica, Republicans caught inside Democratic headquarters triggered instantaneous reaction in every intelligency agency in the world, without doubt, even those of the United States. The extent of reaction would vary from nation to nation, depending on such factors as/its relations with the United States (and here the changed character of US relations with the USSR and China were a factor), its size and the extent of paranoia in each agency. Spooks tend to be paranoid, from the nature of the beast as well as that of the work.

In each agency, without the orders that soon would issue, whoever sat on the United States desk would immediately interest himself is this story. If the United States desk, in a large intelligence agency, was broken down into sections, like economic, political and military, each section, at least at the beginning and until policy was set, would follow the story as best he could, no matter how meager the initial information.

This, too, is the character of the ahalyst's job. Often major developments are signalled by the slightest clues, and he must anticipate major developments. An extreme example is an atomic bomb. Once the thinb explodes, it is know that it exists. However, knowing before the explosion that a country is developing atomic capability is a necessary intelligence function. The indications may be almost invisible. And they may be public and not noticed.

From my own experience, I recall a minor illustration, of an event that was less than world-shaking.

For a short while, despite lack of fluency in Spanish, I sat on a Paraguay desk. Paraguay is a place of beauty that escaped being a paradise by the quality of its its political life and the primitive max economic development, complicated by a senseless was against a number of its neighbors, all larger and more powerful. Most af able-bodied Paraguayan men will killed in pointless personal and national bravery. Thereafter it was without a stable government or any semblance of political freedom. When there was stability there was dictatorship. Revolutions were not uncommon. Minor as Paraguay was in any

minor scale of makine international values, it was necessary for the United States government to be aware of all developments, especially revolutions. Also unusual in those days was the fact that the rank and file of the Army was a major force for democracy within the country.

During one of these revolutions, when things were not going well for the dictatorship, the same one than lingers about four decades, with different dictators only and few of them, I noticed an obscure item in an Asuncion newspaper. Communication was nothing like what it is today in that era. The newspapers were flown up to Washington, in time-taking stages, the longest of which was getting the papers out of that landlocked country with limited internal and international communications.

That little news report set me to thinking. I turned in an analysis that had not been asked of me tje conclusion of which was hat there would be a change in commond of the army loyal to the dictatorship and who the new military chief would be.

Within a short interval, it happened.

(As a side note on the CIA, then just established, its knowledge of Paraguay was so primitive its analysts couldn't identify the two major political parties. I recount this unimportant hustory for an important point: while it is sometimes necessary for an analyst to jumpt to conclusions, he must have a basis for them and if his judgement is less than it should bee he can easily be quite wrong. In the midst of this revolution the CIA distributed a sport on it and the two major parties, known as Colorado and Blanco, red and white. It identified hhe Colorado party, apparently based on no more than its color symbol, as the liberal one. It was, in fact, the party behind the military dictatorship, a native fascist party.)

So, the intelligence analyst is faced with instantaneous needs and inadequate information at the outset of almost any crisis. From less than complete data he must evolve a dependable analysis. It may change with the acquisition of additional data. Generally, it is updated, as need dictates.

As the essence of intelligence is analysis, not clandestine dirty tricks, so is the essence of analysis the extraction of meaning.

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The process within the www.analyst's mind can be roughly compared with that of the newspaper reporter whose story must tell who, what where, when, why and how and whose instrumently summarizes this information.

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In order to extract the meaning of the event or development that takes his attention, In doing this he / the abalyst seeks the answers to all possible questions and then asks himself questions. It is by this simple process that in practise can be enormously complicated that the analyst evolves and analysis.

When each learned mithat the Republicanshad been caught with their hands in Remocratic pockets, so to speak, the end product of an instantaneous thought process was the question, "What does it mean?". The end product of the analysis would be the analyst's statement of the meaning he attributed to this act.

foreign inteligence analyst specializing in the United States In virtually every ase, because every/markyat can be assumed to be better informed than almost anyone in the United States, it can also be assumed that with incredulousness he inmediately asked hinself "why?", then Knowing the political situation within the United States, each analyst, unless blinded by his own prejudices, knew that Nixon was the odds-on favorite. Each therefore also knew that in normal terms, in normal politics and situations, there was no need for such a crime. A superior analyst may well have been baffled by an utterly needless crime that could have had such seriously counterproductive consequences.

"Why" is always an important question. In this case, because the event seemed so completely senseless, it is more than usually important.

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than he did in college. His concerns will include the influence and the sources to which he can attribute what popular and widely-distributed write. A man like Jack Anderson would probably be a major study for a United States specialist, less because of the wide readership he has than because of the nature of his column and the inevitable truth that his sources are largely/ if clandestinely official. But above all, the analyst will be expert in the political parties, concentrating more on the one in power.

And he will make a cirtual career of knowing all there is to know about the leader of each country and the party in power.

All this knowledge will be in the mind of the analyst when any news about his country of specialty reaches him. This news will be like the input of a programmed computer when it reaches him.

Prior to the arrests of that early morning of June 17, 1972, the United States analyst will have learned that the ^Republican Party and the presidency had both changed radically under Richard Nixon. ^He will also know that the institution of the presidency had changed radically beginning with Franklin ^Delano Roosevelt. largely attributable to the fantastic growth of the country in all dimensions and the dramatically altered world situation.

As an example of the kind of factor that will figure in the analysis of a foreign analyst in assessing this fixe orime as first report there is what is generally not in the minds of most Americans, that it is virtually automatic that an incumbent president is re-elected. Especially because none of the INKNINK Democratic candidates for president had any mass base plus wide appeal will any dangerous act by or on behalf of Nixon capture the analyst's attention. It is foolhardy to jeopardize a sure thing.

United States

In and of itself, this one factor would have startled every/intelligence analyst in ever country. That any Republicans much were caught in Democratic hand national headquarters would titillate his antennae. That they were its a "epublican security chief, an unusual factor, plus four anti-Castro Cubans, another unusual factor, and that this is a truly strange combination, still another and aven more unusual factor, would electrify those antennae and I am sure it did.

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By and large Castro-haters are "emocrat haters. An immediate question would be had the Republicans mobilized this internal, dissident forces? A team of <u>four</u> anti-Castroites led, as would be presumed, whether or not accurately, by a Republican official?

Upon thought become the enalyst would immediately wonder if, despite the capture of the official, this was some kind of unofficial excess. ¹t is the improbability of this crime having any official auspices that was first siezed upon by all Republican spokesmen as their excuse. These men, the proclaimed, were "self-starters." For a long time this excuse had some credibility within the United States, witness the election results. It did not last long in foreign intelligence circles, for within a matter of days evidence of almost positive disproof was incontrovertible, evidence provided by the stupidity, arrogence and carelessness of the ⁴ubans th and their mentor, indeed, their \oint od, Hunt.

Hunt, in my view, is a much more significant figure in the arise and that of which a catalogue of crimess not duplicated in our two centuries of national life. it was a minor part,/As analysts could have undertaken to do as soon as his name suffaced, particularly because of how it surfaced, we shall examine him separately and at length.

But primarily and early in Mix analysis, the past and the character of Richard. Nixon would be recalled and reassessed. Had he gone crazy? Had the party and its control fallen into insane hands? If this crime was connected with the party leadership or with Nixon, what in the world could they be up to? What could they possibly expect to find of value in "emocipat files, what could they possible hope to overhear that could begin to justify the great risks involved in what was at first called a "caper" like this really farout one?

The answer, obviously, is nothing in the context of the political realities, that Nixon was a probable shoo-in.

And here what connects the orime to the White House also focuses attention even more on Nixon. In any close following of factual developments, the immediate lies about what connected the crime to the White House, even in the absence of other proofs that

were available soon enough, tended to bind the crime and the White House even closer. Why should it lie? Why should it continue to lie, to evade, never to stop either dishonesty?

6

What was permitted to be known in the first few days after the capture was controlled by the police. In every capital city, the police have special political problems. They learn to live with and to survive these problems, to cope with the special situations. What can be kept secret in a country supposedly open is astounding. From my youth I have never forgotten the exposure of sums an investigative reporter of that day, William Hard, that as a United States Senator the man who was later President Warren G. Harding was caught in a New York City whorehouse. His plea of Senatorial immunity was honored, he was let go, and there was no publicity. Otherwise there would never have been a Republican candidate Harding, a "epublican President Harding, and no Teapot Done scandal that, for the first time, put a member of a president's cabient in jail. (A second escaped conviction by the skin of his teeth. He was guilty as a common grafter in a case of bribery involving a valuable, nationally-owned oil deposit.)

Washington's police have a special, extra problem. There is no local self-governmont. The administration is appointed by the president, in this case, Mixon's appointees ran the city.

However, the press, particularly The Washington Post, was persistent. And the police and the city's administration have to live with the press, too. The press can make their lives miserable. Besides, by law, even though the law is bent and broken, some evidence of crimes is required to be available.

The link that was to be a lock to the White House, that arrogance and stupidity of the Cubans and Hunt, was known to the police, who kept it secret, from the moment of the arrest. The Cubans had room keys. All hotels are identified on the tabs to which the keys are attached. The persons and the rooms of the Cubans were overloaded with the most incriminating evidence.

Host did escape, if his escape was unmanly and undignified, not in the manner of an experienced spymaster but in the abject terror of the coward. But he was linked to the crime more positively than fingerprints and other evidence could have. If he, like those caught in the act, wore surgical gloves, he left no prints. Prints would have meant further investigation only. The captured evidence eliminated all the early stages of investigation. They placed Hunt right smack in the White House.

In that whole motley crew that is known - there are others still unknown - ^McCord is the one thoroughly professional operative. That he was captured is because he was too authoritarian minded, to accustomed to the unquestioning discipline of the chain of command. In all of this he is guilty of but a single departure from sound intelligence practise, an error his FBI training and experience and his longer and successful career in the CIA should have warned him against.

He was the electronics expert, the tapper and the bugger. That should have been a separate operation. "e should never have permitted himself to be part of a virtual invasion Army, lest of all of such undependable types as recanchist Cubans.

^McCord, the solid, unflambouyant pro, did take the necessary precautions. He divested himself of all identifications, leaving all personal property and all that could identify him with ^Baldwin. It is the accident of recognition by a policeman that knew him that led to his immediate identification. In the end, because this was a case that couldn't be fixed, it made no difference, but his procedure were professional.

It is a little-known reality of intelligence that the flambouyant and attentiongetting aspects of intelligence are rarely the productive ones. Hunt is the selfconceived dashing type. His successes of the oast were disasters., The bux foundation of successful intelligence servise is the stolid types like McCord, those who do things with care and by the book.

false and artificial The Hunts are the storybook types. ^He, in fact, lived **xi** a special/James Bondery of his own in four scores of spy thrillers he wrote during his two decades of spooking. These fictions made him the herow in his own mind, in his secret inner life that did not exist.

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Hunt

insert near ref to \$114,000

(This fairly large sum is exclusive of about \$1,700,000 that was contributed to the Committee to Re-elect the President in cash prior to the April 7,1973 date on which a new election law became effective. More than a third of the approximately \$559000,000 collected for Nixon's re-election or about \$19,000,000 was in hand by April 7 in an effort to frustrate the public-disclosure provisions of both law, the old and the new, the Nixon scheme to keep the sources of his war-chest secret. On July 24,1973 the United States Distroct Court for the District of Columbia, which is Washington, held that full disclosure had to be made, that the secrecy was outside the law. As will become apparent, these larges sums in cash as well as what remained from Nixon's 1968 campaign, in itself a King's ransom, were available for and were used for illicit purposes.)

GOAI

What is called "cut-offs" is standard operating procedure in intelligence operations. The Republicans sought to cut themselves off, to isolate themselves, from this tainted \$114,000. While it is a large sum, it is peanuts compared to the total of \$50,000,000 in Republican campaign gunding a rather large percentage of which was tainted. Of them this \$114,000, \$89,000 had been passed through a Mexican bank, another cut-off that was called "laundering." When this had already been done, it many is beyond belief that this nd an additional \$25,000, all in checks, was then passed through Barker's account. The patriots, as they called themselves, were not above skinning. For this passage of funds may they took \$2,500, and nobody asked any questions.

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PPatriotism", too, has its price.

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The Gubans were Hunt's men, his contribution to the operation, still another in his long career of disasters.

Where McCord had taken precautions, these machos did not, save against leaving fingerprints. Their carelessness, never excusesble and less excusable given their long training and experience in dirty-tricks operations and Hunt's leadership, made finger-

In any rational operation they would have done as ^M-COrd did, leave all identifications is a safe place. Even labels would have been removed from clothing if labels could have the car they had rented on arriving at Washington flational kirport the preceding afternoon.)For these characters only an expensive and eye-catching Chrysler would do.) The trunk of that carwas a fairly safe place, with the keys inidden outside the rooms, not on their persons, smother simple matter. If sumit caught, confederates not caught could have removed the car at the evidence. Three were available for this stark, fimt, liddy and Bal dwin.

But no, not for Macho, the Cuban leader, Bernard L. Barker, whose real-life nickname he wears proudly. It translates from the Spantsh as he-man. This concept of manhood comes from the Hitler era. Swashbuckling, arrogance and dependence upon raw

power are not authentic manhood.

secret telephone humber.

Those \$5,300/with which Macho's pockets were stuffed were more than enough to Link the crime and the Republican hierarchy. To make it inevible, this animated stupidity and his stupid bosses had passed \$114,000 in secret Republican campaign funds through Barker's bank account in Miani's

The tracing, a simple and unavoidable police chore, wants notwhaw takes long. $A \lesssim f(M)$ of all minimum takes included the cubene and incomplete the cubene and into $A \lesssim f(M)$ of all the contract and incriminating identifications the cubene of the c

the hands of the police, all but one can be ignored. This one is addressbooks in the possession of two. Both had Hunt's name, his locate at the White House, even his

One was enough.

Under the XMX Hs there are <u>four</u> listing fors Hunt, three properly identified, The functhfirst, "Howard Hunt" says after it "W - House" (sic) and after that, beginning with the area code, 202, the White House number.

Under the "W - House" is "HOME", and the Maryland area code and Hunt's home phone in suburban Potomac(a home he calls "Wirch's Island.").

Next is "1700 Cenn Ave Suite 770, followed by the special Hunt phone in that suite in the offices that shall occupy our attention later.

Indented under this is "GEORGE", which turned out to be the name by which Liddy was known. He is George Gordon Liddy, but he prefers to be known as Gordon. His personal number in the CREEP offices, 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, accross from "unt's 1700 business office.

It took several months before another Hunt phone was detected, not necessary in connecting him and the spy apparatus to the White House. However, because of the unusual nature of the precautions against detection and the futility of it, what he did is worth noting.

Beginning August 1971

We arranged for the only one in the entire complex of White House offices for which there was private, clandestine billing. Yet he did that in a way that led to him. and Liudy's

He had the phone billed to the home of his/secretary, Kathleen Chenow. Long-distance calls to that number, 202/347-0355 led to Miss Chenow.She had no reluctance in talking. That phone in the secret basement suite in the Executive Office Building, on the third corner of the same intersection, "was ^hr. Hunt's phone. It was out in for me to answer and take messages for him...an average of three times a week" from a caller identifying himself as Bernard Barker." Porr security, that!

She

She remembers Hunt using that phone to call "Barker and his wife - nobodt else." She did not pay the bills herself. She forwarded them to "John Campbell of the Domestic Council....so the White House would pay them."

Carl Bernstein and Vob Woodward devoted more than two full columns to details of the use of this secret "unt-Liddy phone in the issue of December 8, 1972. In it they tied

many others in the White House to participation in and knowledge of the Hunt operation. Two of the more interesting are David XHXEX Young, of Henry Kissinerg's National Security staff, and Challes Colson, special counsel to the President, Hunt's long-time friend and the man who pressed him upon the White House.

12

extra space

Although what people readm need not indicate their beliefs, often what they do read can be taken as an accurate guide to their interests, On their safari, these four Gubans and others who may have eluded the police had min bits of reading matter that are reasonably subject to evaluation and interpretation.

For what reason they sarried newspaper clippings on an operation of this dolicate Room 214 nature can only be conjectured, but maxwfritherranew yielded a story headed, "The Russians May Be Spying"ma, from <u>National News</u>. Doesn't every country, including the United States? Hadn't and weren't these Gubans, at that very moment?

Or, an advance clue that on the subject of the USSR they were turned on, it not paranoid.

Lamia, titled in the French manuscript Le Reseau Topaz, was there, too.

The author is a real g bug on Russians. Aside from reasonable apprehensions, he sees them under beds and in clouds.

He is Phillippen Thraud de Vosjoli, a jazzed-up version of the name to which he was born designed to give him aristocratic class, according to mutual friends in Washington's French colony.I had met him casually and accidentally in his semi-secret office building near Dupont Circle, in Washington, toward the end of the 1950s when I was there to see others in French intelligence. I did not know him. I do know his book, witten arlier and published in 1970. It was not a current book at the time of The Watergate break-in, having been "remaindered" or closed out long before then.

De Vosjoli spent a life-time as a French speok, antikzhazman assignadztazbianhingten, asxibiantzaterena itzzztationzahief beginning in World War II in what finaly grew into the <u>Service de Ducumentation Extérioure et de Contre-Espionage</u>. Like its United States counterpart, CIA, it is known by its initials, SDECE, pronounced s-dick-ih. After he was assigned to Washington as United States station chief, which made him chief of

for 12 years.

French intelligence in the United States/ His career is that of a double-agent, working for the CIA also. He claims to be the hero who uncovered Russian missles in Cuba, a claim disproved by the official United States account but enough to make the hook and movie Topaz, which made him rich when he got half the royalties from its author, Leon Uris. De Vosjoli, a far-right in his views, was strongly anti-Castro, perhaps enough to interest violently anti-Castro ^Cubans in it if not enough to account for carrying it so long after its appearance and on such a mission, when the work was night work, leaving little or no time for reading.

Aside from the anti-Castro content, for which the book is best known, and its accounts of Russian spying in Franco, real or fancied or both, also extensive and emphatic, it has much on the inner workings and personality and political conflicts within SDECE, to which he made major contributions. One of these inner workings may have been relevant to the Cuban's interest as it may also be to the overall story of The Watergate. SDECE's patriots, not above side-deals for their own benefit, also engaged in snuggling to help finance espionage activities, Especially did they snugglent from Southeast Asia, whose "Golden Triangle" is the source of about 75% of the heroin shot by United States addicts.

Between the time of the writing of the book and the finding of the Cuban's copy in The Watergate, at least one such smuggling operation, involving a French intelligence may, was intercepted in New York, resulting in one of the larger captures of heroin. In turn, that led to chaos among users, for the supply was suddenly diminished.

Meanwhile, soon after the United States accepted all the anti-Wastros who wantit Meanwhile left Cuba, these anti-Wastro Cubans moved into the east coast heroin business. Today they are a major factor in it, no secret.

The inference that these Cubans were part of The Watergate anias later became incontrovertible, other domestic-intelligence operations, all involving criminality, On May 24, 1873, inside the United States, for ulterior purposes, is the actuality./Bernard Barker, their leader, swore it was for "Cuban freedom." During the trial that, belatedly, followed capture, the United States Attorney for Washington alleged what was irrelevant to his

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and in context a gross and deliberate deception, a calculated misrepresentation on motive, that they had been engaged in blackmail.

The attempt to cover up covered everything and never ended. It involved everybody, includinif Nixon, who also never ceased his efforts. One of the first and most successful was the pretense that Hunt was not a White House employee at the time of this caught criminal activity. It was mornesseen so successful that more than a year later the press and some of the members of a special Senate investigation were still referring to Hunt as an agent of the re-election consistee, something he <u>never</u> was. He was working for the White House in two capacities and had been for several years.

No competent analyst would have been deceived by the thin cover, as I had not been. There is a good law that I have used often in efforts to obtain suppressed information from the government. It is known as the MFreedom of Information Law," in the law books 5 U.S.C. 552. From use and from acting as my own attorney in one case, I knew the procedents. When the White House had taken the step necessary for me to invoke this law, I made formal request for the records of Hunt employment.

John MANN W. Dean III, then Counsel to the President and later a sensational witness

beginning on May 25,1973 a sensational witness in marathon testimony before this same Senate committee, in refusing me this information, actually confirmed that Hunt was on the White staff and in its pay. $E \times h \times M M$

Use and attempted use of this law had given me extensive contact with and personal insight into the minds and characters of a number of official principals in The two Watergate affair, including two former Attroneys General and WM acting headsof the FBI. It has also left no minist that mendacity is the official way of life, that contempt for the law is official policy and that these are men who do not and cannot feel shame. Hix **Extension and official** arrogance is so insensitive that in one of my freddom of information suits, where I sought what the law describes as public information and letting me have it would prove the dishonesty of the FBI, Dejartment of Justice lawyers maneuvered themselves into the position where they had to certify to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that the then Attorney General was a liar and a repetitive Liar.

This seemed to embarrass nobody. The press ignored it for it then also had an official position, that this law, encated for its benefit, primirily, by the Congress, was too cumbersome.

These four top Nixon law-enforcement officials all committed or tolerated and condoned perjury and the subornation of perjury in these suits alone, matters of official record in the federal courts. All were participants ad defendants or as counsel to the defendant. The names of all are signed to official papers also part of the court records. Three The were forced into unintended retirement by The Watergate. These are Attorneys General John Newton Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst, the officially-certified liar; and Acting Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation L. Patrick Gray. The fourth, Nixon's "Mr. Clean and house "liberal" William Ruckleshaus, acting chief of the <u>mattemisticate</u>. "law and order" Nixon Administration from the time Gray's own oriminal activity forced abandonment of the effort to have him confirmed into permanent appointment/ until a new Clarence M. Kelley, permanent head/could meet with the approval of the Senate, as the law requires.

What forced Gray's abandonment by Nixon is his personal destruction of incriminating

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This case, which will be precedent under the new law, is on its way to the Supreme Court.)

16A

Long before deciding to write this book, because I had knowledge of some of the principals, I provided information to reporters and to political figures whose responsibilities at various stages required them to have knowledge of the case. One of these correspondents, when Gray's nomination ran into serious trouble in the Senate, phoned to credit the copies I provided with the ultimate Gray exposure, his confession on the witness stand that he had destroyed evidence in Nixon's interest. If this evidence mu might have helped the Senators in other way, it was not responsible for the end of the career of L. Patrick Gray as head of the FEI.

in full, John What actually happened is that on April 15, Gray had confessed/to mixon and,Ehrlichman, his demestic-affairs adviser. Neither did anything, preferring, in Ehrlichman's brutal metaphor, to let Gray "turn slowly, slowly, slowly into the wind." Gray had wanted his nomination withdrawn. If he did it himself, it would be an affront to the President. punishment Mixon would not do it. He preferred that "ray take the Maxt for him and to seem to be separated from the terrible thing Gray had done for him. So, for ten more days he kept and painfully Gray dangling from the yardarm, turning painfully and slowly/in the winds of obloguy, an embarrasment to him and his family and friends, as it was an agony.

So, Gray phoned his friend, the junion Senator from his home state, Connecticut, Lowell Weicher. Weicher was a Republican member of the Senate Select Committee to Investigate the Election of 1972. When Gray confessed all to him, Weicher was confronted with a conflict of interest, between his feelings for his friend Gray and his duty as a Senator, a citizen and a member of this committee. Weicher would not follow Nixon's course of silence and covering-up, however. It took him about 36 hours to resolve the conflict and end Gray's troture. "ray confessed ho him on April 25. Two days later it all came out, when Gray was a witness before the Judiciary committee, under questioning by "emocratic Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the assistant "emocratic leader in the Senate. Gray's candidacy ended officially the next day.

This was deliberate on Nixon's part, as became known because Ehrlichman was in the self-bugging business, tapping his own phone. He tapped a conversation he had with ean the end of the first week of March, 1973. In it he reported how Gray was doing a job for Nixon, by suppressing, in his testimony at the confirmation hearing. This is Dean's description:

"yea, maxim he's really hanging tough. You ought to read the transcript." e makes me gag,"

Ehrlichman, Really?

Jean. Oh. it's awful, John.

Dean concluded this report by telling Ehrlichman he had discussed this with Nixons

"... I was in with the boss this morning and that is exactly where he was coming out. He said, "I'm not sure Gray is smart enough to run the Bureau the way he is handling himself."

"The way he is handling himself" was doing his loyal best for Nixon, taking the heat for him. The servile Gray had held the FBI in check, prevented investigations, delayed them, leaked them to the White House so they could be countered. There was nothing to dangerous to his confirmation, no risk to his personal reputation he would not run for Nixon, for whom he had been covering. Gray could not be confirmed.

Long before this Nixon knew there was no chance for confirmation. He did nothing terreplace Gray nothing to relieve the pain Gray was bearing for him and for him alone. The replacement, Ruckelshaus, was at hand. t was not that there was need to decide upon and check a replacement out.

Gray's performance as Watergate chief investigator and as self-sacrificing Senate witness inevitably suggests he was made FBI director so Ehrlichman, who dominated him, would become Nixon's secret national chief of police, with the national police bcoming more a secret political police.

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Watergate evidence, incriminating to the White House. The true nature of some of what Gray destroyed and that of which it was part will here be discussed for the first time as the story develops. If it is irrue, as it is true, that Gray's precesses as FBI chief, J. Edgar Hoover, was responsible for the destruction of evidence - and my investigations into he assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy proves this he did not, personally, destroy that evidence. (It was destroyed because had it not been and had it been made available, the purposes of one of my suits, it would have destroyed the official solution that that erime, properly called "the crime of the century.") In a system of law-enforcement and of justice that through the years has often enough been tainted by official corruption, financial as well as political, Gray's crime is without precedent. Richard Hixon was its beneficiary.

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Gray's sole qualification for this important post, one through which the country can be largely controlled because it is the equivalent of police chief for the nation, Nixon's is that he was completely imm lackey, aff a man without question or doubts, capable of served anything he was toldby anything thread the President's personal interest, even whin/ of the moment. He was without law-enforcement experience of any kind, had been a professional military man, and had established himself as a loyal sycophant in Nixon's political service and in the post that was his reward, ^beputy Attorney General, the position he held when he was signatory to some of the papers in my suits.

If I am by no means certain it is the fact, one of the correspondents to whom, along with a number of Senators, I supplied coppes of my correspondence in the steps preliminary to going to court for the information the White House was suppressing believes it was instrumental in encouraging the Senate to persevere in close examination of Gray that resulted, ultimately, in his confession on the witness stand, before the Senate committee considering his nomination.

What is also surprising is the large number of an correspondents who did nothing when I supplied them with the leads that led to three other sensations in The Maz Watergate mess, each of which we shall consider. One became a major sensation in a story unequalled in its sensations. It deals with Nixon's personal gain from public moneys.

14

LGA

(Sadistic thoughts and their expression preceded practise by Nixon and in Nixon's savage, vindictive White House when they were never expected to become public knowledge.The/way of political life was not limited to Ehrlichman and Dean, either. Nor was Pat Gray its only bictime

(A. Ernest Fitzgerald is an honest man who had brought to the attention of another Senate fommittee the wholesale, multimillion dollar plunering of the public treasury by military contractors, presented and approved as "cost overruns." Neither the military nor Mixon liked this. Bother were seriously embarrassed by it, most of all because it was irrefutably true. It is to highly-paid jobs that the military shows with these corporations that the military's top brass retires. The militarists thus enjoy great wealth, first from the munificence of the tax-payers directly, from generous retirement pay and benefits, then from the tax-payers all over again as executives of the corpirations, generally dealing with those who had been their subordinates in the military. And these are the corporations from which come the most generous political contributions, again, the money initiating in the public till.

(If this kind of dishonesty embarrasses any administrations, and there is some of it in all. it reach a new high under Nixon and no administration had ever made the public protestions of probity he and his did.

(Before Alexander F. Butterfield distinguished himself in a separate Mixonian scandal, that of the secret tapes, he had been a Reputy Assistant to the President. From there he was one of many spidered into the operating branches of government to exercise more dictatorial control for Nixon, as Federal Aviation Administrator, another post of importance to large corporations, which are much influenced by the FAA's decisions, in which what the public pays and how safely it files is juxtaposed against corporate profits.

(On January 20, 1970, as Nixon's deputy assistant, Butterfield wrote the man who the was actually mn Assistant President, staff director H.R.Haldeman, about Fitzgerald. He began by paying tribute to Fitzgerald's professional competence, calling him a "top" man in his field, as indeed he was. But in the light of Fitzgerald's vain attempt to impede this plundering of the Treasury, as Butterfield put it, he must be given very low marks on loyality. And loyality is the name of the game [meaning in the White House and the executive branches and to Nixon]." So, "We should let him bleed a while at least."

(It happened, too. Fitzgerald's bleeding was very public and not for a little while only. Finally, the ax fell. Fitzgerald was one a series of dedicated public servants who were "bled" by Nixoh for exposing official corruption. INTEXEMENTED

(This case was one too, much for Glark Mollanhoff, another Special Assistant to the President. Mollanhoff, a lawyer by training and a deservedly honored reporter who had spent much of his career exposing graft and corruption, had been hired by Mixon with a great show and given the duty of the public's embudsman. In practice he was often a Mixon ax-man when it came to dufferning performance of his unanounced role as Nixon's embudsman, when Nixon's incredibly unsuited nominations for high office ran into opposition. Mollenhoff tried and tried to effectuate justice in the Fitzgerald case. Although "Special Counsel to the President", he was unable to get even a slip of paper to him. Haldoman et alk, keeper of the portal to the inner sanctum, cut them all off. In the end Mollenhoff out his stemach back where it be, ong and took himself back to where he belonged, quitting the White House in disgust and resuming his career as Washington correspondent

industriat for the "es Moines (Iowa) Register and Tribune and author of a syndicated co, unn.)

Perhaps part of the explanation lies in the growing American tred to regard the President, whoever he may be, as our own special kind of royalty. The American Revolution of two centuries earlier was an anti-monarchical, anti-authoritarian revolution, oen of wan's major forward steps in his ageles quest for personal freedom. It was the intent of that revolution, its leaders and those who established the republican form of government it made possible that this be an non-authoritarian society. The tendency to revere the EXMANNET much as the ast possible he were some special kind of royalty coincides with the growth of advertising into themajor industry it has become.

There is no country in that part of the world calling itself free other than the Ugited States in which the government could have survived the initial Watergate scandals, small a part as they are of the entire deep subersion known by this generic.

extra space.

The Freedom of Information law has specific exemptions to the democratic intent records of the that Max actions and an example of the government be accessible to the people. One of these, properly in my view, assures the right of personal privacy. However, if the government, for any reason, waives any of the nine exemptions, the citizen is then entitled to that otherwise exempt information. The decision of the federal court in a suit against the government, known as <u>American Mail Lines v. Gulick</u>, holds that any use waives the exemptions.

Through one of its official spokesmen, Ken Clawson, earlier a reporter for The Washington Post, the White House lied about its employment of E. Howard Hunt. I knew this was a lie because I understood the traditional official semantics. Clawson, while falling just short of saying precisely this, deceived the press into believing that Huntwas not an employee of the White House at the time of the caught criminal st act. This is a distinction without a real meaning that the White House has consistently exploited.

The logic the situation was and I was certain that "unt was working for the White House at the time his men were caught in The Watergate. However, until the White House made reference to "unt's employment, the effort to get the pecords of

his employement was not legally promising. This moment came with Clawson's deception. what he did is simple. He equated the date of the last check issued to Hunt, who was employed as a consultant, on a per diem basis, at the rate of \$100 a day, with the May day of employment. 68

Aside from my own reasons for believing Hunt was an official white House servant at the time of The Matergate, I knew of two calls to the White House for him thereafter. In each mse, when there was no answer on his phone, the operators said they knew another place where he might be reached. In each case thecall was transferred to the office of Charles Colson, whose title was Special Counsel z to the President and whose role as dirty tricks. Colson had been Hunt's friend. Hewas responsible for bringing Hunt to the White House. Hantwas on his payroll. In neither case did Colson's secretary tell the caller Hunt was no longer at the White House and in both cases took messages to which, naturally enough, "unt never responded.

So, with Clauson's false announcement, I wrote him inredictely, invoking the Freedom of Information law, and as a first steps asked two things, one of which was the record of Hunt's uployment <u>after</u> the dateof the last check, ^Hurch 29, 1972, or more than ten weeks before the Matergate.

ANALYZY ANALYZY ANALYZY ANALYZY ANALYZY This was embarrassing to the White House. "esponse took some time. Finallyy under date of October 19, 1972, ¹ heard from a san then little know, later very much in the news, John Wesley Dean,III, Counsel to the President. Later, when he became convinced that the White House was making him its scapegont, Dean confessed in five days of marathen testimony before the Sonate Select Committee which had been charged with investigating the election of 1972. In preparation for this, really his pun defense and effort to escape judicial retribution, Dean had arred himself with copies of a series of official papers hard to believe real even with confirmation. However, when he wrote me, Dean, the President's official lawyer, was part of the massive covering up by the White House and all officialdom.

Deen ignored all I had asked except "certain information in regard to Mr. E. Howard Hunt's employment as a White House consultant." Bear in mind that I asked for

the record of <u>post</u>-March 29, 1972 employment <u>only</u>. Dean <u>confirmed</u> this post- arch employment in citing his reason for refusing to supply <u>copies</u> of the records:

The information which you seek has been turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is a part of its investigatory files."

Without so intending, ^Dean involved the Justice Department in the covering-up and seemed to say that either ^White House employment was a crime or that there was a case against the White House:

Since any of the material provided to the FNI could be used as evidence in the criminal prosecution of harges against Mr. Hunt, the Department of Justice has requested that none of it be publicly disclosed prior to completion of that prosecution."

L. Patrick Gray was doing his duty to Nixon. MunthaddhitezHausszamplaysumatztatesz The duration - even the fact - of Hunt's White House employment was ireelevant in the prosecution. Dutiful Richard Kleindienst and those subordinate to him. to a man, had seem to it that this was all omitted from the indictment of the previous month.

Thus the involvement of the White House in The Wisergate crimes, if in no other Hunt, way through the act of its agent,/was exculpated by the Mixon's henchmen who controlmthe processes of government who simply ignored it.

The ploy worked in other ways, too, for the lies, deceptions and misrepresentations that merely began with this and never ended, took hold. Another of the distinctions without meaning is the pretense that Hunt worked for the Committee to Re-elect the President, not the White House. That committee was the Presidenta's personal creature. He was created it and used it instead of the Republican National Committee. It meant that Hunt was Nixon's agent during his crimes anyway. But the pretense of White House separation from the orimes begun by Clawson (soon enough rewarded by pronotion) took hold so well that more than a year later, well-informed reporters and even Senators on the investigating committee were referring to Hunt as a Committee to Re-elect the President employee rather than Nixon's personal agent, part of his White House personal staff.

One of the few things appropriate in all of this is the acronym by which some of the employees of this Committee to Re-elect the President malled it, CREEP. In American slang, creep is an uncouth, undesireable, loathsome person.