An Offer That Can't Be Refused

will stand with them regardless of how unreasonable they are." Almost 20 years later, that actions over the past have led them to think we

message has finally been delivered.

But Bush is the first American president to go public with his frustration—at a press conference in which he employed for Israel a tone once reserved for Saddam Hussein. He demanded that Congress postpone action on Israel's request for \$10 billion in loan guarantees (not aid, mind you) and promised a veto if Congress went ahead anyway. Bush said nothing short of Middle East peace was at stake.

intransigence of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (not to mention the Manifest Destiny mentality of Housing Minister Ariel Sharon) have all sounded Nonsense. What's at stake here is the president's nose. It's been out of joint ever since Secretary of State James Baker III was three ishment of more West Bank settlements. The erection of those settlements, the bellicosity and times greeted in Israel by the cacophonous estab-

them go up.

almost no beliefs while Shamir would kill for his. Israel anyway. Over at Walker's Point, Shamir must be considered downright weird. Bush has Israelis. It's also an expression of contempt for a president who's not all that favorably disposed to Sharon intimidates Shamir or has the prime minister's consent. What matters is that every lem-will irrevocably remain a part of Israel. To such a way that it-and especially East Jerusa-Lobbyists for Israel who are now wringing their hands over Bush's latest threat seem to forget that Shamir and Sharon (or is it Sharon and settlement is more than a place to live for an American president, it hardly matters whether Shamir?) seem intent on settling the West Bank in

vexing was not also pressing. It could have waited until the Middle East peace conference was convened. In the first place, no Arab state has wise or sensitive. The settlement issue while But being right is not the same as being either

In 1973, Richard Nixon responded to a memo to Bush like a personal challenge—not to mention publicly raised the settlements issue as a preconfrom Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser, by writing, "The time has come to stop government. During the day, it talks reasonably second, if Israel is ever to renounce further actions over the near have led them to think use from the Arab states—not mere loan guarantees from Washington. That was the Camp David formula. Israel gave up the Sinai in exchange for peace with Egypt. For peace, a majority of Israelis might be thrilled to kiss even the settlements goodbye. do so only in exchange for something momentous

Whatever division exists in the American Jew-ish community or within Israel over settlements is not present, though, when it comes to helping Russian Jews emigrate to Israel. That has been a longtime goal of American foreign policy (the passionate crusade for American Jews—especially those with ancestral recollections of Russian antisemitism. It seemed to all concerned that this was a worthy humanitarian effort, distinct from settlements or any other issue—an effort that Bush administration was supposed to do its part. Instead, one delay has been followed by another. the tune of \$900 million in loan guarantees. The had strapped the American Jewish community to Jackson-Vanik amendment, for instance) and a

> over what most Americans would see as an aid matter. Jerusalem should accept it. It simply cannot win a fight with an American president what some might call an American-offered compublic relations loss. It should not be attempted. ing something else on its own terms. Even if the Israel lobby could win this fight in Congress, the package. Israel cannot play the role of the ingrate, spurning one offer of charity and demandpromise. Actually, it's nothing of the sort. No legislative victory would amount to a stunning The Israeli government is right now mulling

Jimmy Carter) can now be implemented by a president who is all too anxious to do so. Bush one American kid already knows: Beggars can't seems intent on teaching Shamir a lesson everygic value to the United States, nothing has changed in Washington. Much has, With the Cold nism's rigor mortis and Israel's diminished strate-They cannot persist in thinking that with commupoliticians have to understand the new realities. War over, the sentiments of Richard Nixon (or Above all, though, Shamir and other Israeli