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in the assassination and criticism of the Report. As Roffman also noted, the one of these four bullets in this "classified" photograph that was least deformed appears to be the only one of those ten wrist test fired bullets that was entered into the Commission's record. It appears to be Commission Exhibit 856.

From what Dolce told Selby, it was obvious that if Specter had intended honesty he would have introduced those pictures into evidence during Light's testimony—handed them to him and asked him to describe them and what they showed. But that would have aborted his beloved bastard, so Specter did not ask the obvious and required questions.

They danced a stately minute around it, never once getting into the nitty-gritty.

Nor did he ask them of the Olivier, whose testimony preceded Light (5H74-90).

Then there is the testimony of Ronald Simmons. It, too, utterly destroys the fraudulent official "solution" that also served to protect any military conspiracy.

Chief of the Infantry Weapons Evaluation Branch of the Ballistics Research Laboratory at Aberdeen proving grounds, Simmons testified to the results of other and irrelevant shooting tests that in part established the impossibility of Oswald's having fired those three shots in a fraction of more than five seconds, the absolute essentiality of the official "solution." His testimony as published, naturally for this Commission, is separated from that of the others like Light and Olivier. It was published two volumes earlier, in Volume 3, pages 443-51.

Oswald was officially rated by the Marines in its Warren Commission testimony as a duffer, "a rather poor shot." To determine whether he could have performed the superhuman assassination feat attributed to him, the Army used three riflemen all "rated as Master by the National Rifle Association," the most expert of all expert riflemen (3H445). Toward the end of Simmons's testimony, Commission member McCloy, who was also present at the conference at which Dolce had spelled out how completely impossible the Commission's "solution" was, asked Simmons what the "master" rating was. He asked, "Is that a higher grade than sharpshooter in the Army?" Simmons told him that the master rating was the very high-

est, so high "there is really no comparison between the rating of master in the NRA and the rating of sharpshooter in the Army." Rather than being a sharpshooter, Oswald scored only the minimum required of all in the military. His Marine mates indicated to the Commission that his shooting was so bad even this minimum score was their gift to him.

What Simmons testified to was only the beginning of the Army's stacking of the evidentiary deck.

With the official solution having the shots come from more than sixty feet in the air, from that sixth-floor TSBD window, the Army built a platform at Aberdeen that was only thirty feet high. With Oswald allegedly shooting at a moving target, the Army had fixed targets planted in the ground at the distances the Commission said the limousine was from that window.

While this reduced the serious shooting problems of that steep angle and a moving target, the Army, in its test with "master" riflemen, still encountered a serious problem when the riflemen moved the rifle from one *still* target to the next. This caused misses.

The Mannlicher-Carcano rifle when compared to our rifles is a piece of junk. It was in poor condition when it reached the FBI in Washington. The FBI overhauled it and put it in its best possible condition. But even then the Aberdeen tests required additional improvement. As Simmons testified, his shooters "could not sight the weapon in using the telescopic sight" in some tests. So, "we did adjust the telescopic sight by the addition of two shims," one to adjust it vertically, the other side to side [3H443].

Even then, to begin with, "for the first four attempts the firers [i.e., the best shots in the country] missed the second target" [3H446]. In part this was because they had to reorient the rifle, and at that a *still target they'd had time to adjust to*, not at a moving target without time to make any adjustment. In part these misses were because "of the amount of effort required to open the bolt" to remove the empty shell after a bullet was fired and close the bolt to chamber another time to be fired and because of "the trigger pull . . . a two-stage operation where the first—in the first stage the trigger is relatively free, and it suddenly required a greater pull to actually fire the weapon" [3H447]. This would "obviously require considerable ex-

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... bolt" [3H449].

... How serious a problem was this for the country's very best ri-
... flemen under the vastly improved and easier conditions?

... "In our experiments," Simmons testified, "the pressure to open
... the bolt was so great we tended to move the rifle off target" [3H449].

... With all that shooting expertise, the very greatest in the country,
... with all that improvement in the rifle and its sight and the shooting
... conditions, at a distance of 270 feet, the estimated distance of the
... rifle from the President's head when blown apart by the fatal shot,
... the country's very best riflemen could not duplicate the shooting
... attributed to Oswald. Simmons was asked by Melvin Eisenberg, the
... Commission counsel who questioned him, about an answer he had
... expressed in a tiny decimal, an evaluation of 0.4, Does 0.4 mean
... you have four chances in 10 of hitting?" Simmon said merely,
... "Yes" [3H449]. This means that unlike the poor shot Oswald, these
... "masters" missed—under vastly improved conditions—six times out
... of ten!

... And even this is not all. Could they do it in the *time* Oswald had
... in the official solution? No pun intended, this is the killer! Eisenberg
... was careful not to ask Simmons for the results on all their shooting,
... which in this test was of forty-seven bullets (3H449). One series was
... of twenty-one shots [3H445]. The only test that fairly can be com-
... pared to the assassination, in which with the rifle that Oswald was
... never known to have fired, he allegedly fired the three very accurate
... shots of the official account, three and no more. No dry runs for
... him. No practice shots. No shots to set the sight—which according
... to the FBI would not hold a setting in any event and which Aberdeen
... had to shim to use at all—the first three and that was it for him, and
... that was that.

... Simmons testified of the three "masters" shooting that "on the
... first four attempts [all] the firers missed the second target" [3H446].

... Of a master rifleman whose name is given only as "Mr. Hendrix"
... in Simmons's testimony, his "time for the first exercise was 8.25
... seconds; the time for the second exercise was 7.0 seconds." The
... second master rifleman whose name Simmons gave only as "Mr.
... Staley" did "6 3/4 seconds" on his first try and 6.45 for the second

(3H446). This is 15 percent more time, regardless of his misses, than Oswald had.

The third master rifleman did not use the telescopic sight so that did not count for Simmons (3H446).

Remember that missing of the fatal shot six times out of ten? Here the first four shots at the second target also missed.

And these "masters" could not even approach the extremely rapid shooting attributed to as poor a shot as ever disgraced the Marines, Lee Harvey Oswald, the Commission's and Specter's William Tell.

Conspicuously Commissioner McCloy, the wily, worldly international lawyer, did not ask for a tabulation of the time required by each master for each series of shots. Eisenberg did not even ask if such a tabulation had been prepared or could be prepared.

For all the hemming and hawing, all the discussion of the arcane and irrelevant that could be impressive to the uninformed, the record that between them McCloy and Eisenberg made is that the very best riflemen in the land could not begin to duplicate the shooting performance officially attributed to Oswald.

Shooting is a mechanical skill. Good shooting requires regular practice. Oswald is known to have fired a rifle, a different and a much better weapon, only twice, years earlier, when he was in the Marines. Save for hunting squirrels with his brother, Robert, one time with a boy's .22 caliber rifle—and then he could not hit the side of a barn—Oswald is not known to have ever fired *any* rifle at any other time in his entire life. This includes that Mannlicher-Carcano he supposedly fired in the assassination. There is no evidence that he ever fired it and no reason to believe that he did.

The Army knew its tests proved the official "solution" was impossible. Neither Simmons nor any other witnesses testified to this shocking truth, that they knew the official concoction was an absolute impossibility. They all were careful in their testimony to steer clear of that.

This means that whatever its reason the Army knew there was a conspiracy, and it protected the conspirators. If it did not know earlier, it knew there had to have been a conspiracy because at Aberdeen, it proved exactly that.

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I include this, the only Dolce interview of which I know, in our consideration of whether or not there had been a military conspiracy for two reasons in particular. One is that the very first thing this retired Army full colonel, a rather high rank for a World War II battlefield surgeon, indicated was that there had been a military conspiracy. He twice said that the military took the autopsy over and then that the Army's own rules were violated in not calling him in immediately: "Right after the assassination the Army and Navy doctors appeared to take over everything," he said first. "The Army and Navy took over." This is what the evidence already showed without any question at all. Dolce's authoritative confirmation of it was suppressed.

Between them, Dolce's and the Simmons's testimonies, correctly understood, twice administer a "double whammy"—to the Commission and to the Army.

There is no apparent definitive answer to the questions I posed earlier: Why should the military have intervened at all and what purpose other than that of protecting the conspiracy could have been served by its gross improprieties?

There also is no answer in any of the evidence to the question: Why in the autopsy under military control were the prescribed rules for autopsies by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology not followed in the autopsy on the President?

To this Dolce added that it was in the Army's rules that "in the event of injury to any VIP . . . I was to be called in to go over the case: I was not called." yet he was the Army's number one expert in the field.

How many explanations can there be other than that the military wanted to control what the autopsy could disclose and what its report would state about the shooting in the assassination?

Why should it want to control what could be known about the shooting other than to hide the fact that there had been a conspiracy to kill the President?

A second assassin meant there certainly had been a conspiracy.

The shooting was impossible for a single assassin.

Absent any other explanation for the military immediately "taking over" control of the autopsy that was supposed to have been completely independent and uncontrolled in any way and its refusal to