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MEMOR

8 July 1964

Deputy Director for Plans

Discussion with Mr. Dulles Re the NOSENKO Information on OSWALD

Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today, recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the commis-sion who were concerned lest they suppress the NOSENKO information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission report. I told Mr. Dulles that this concern was understandable but that we still felt the best converse by foundable but that we still felt the best course by far would be to omit any reference to the NOSENKO information in the final report. While it is conceivable that NOSENKO might someday be in a position to claim that he provided information on the KENNEDY assassination, I said that the difference between NOSENKO's situation and that of other bona fide defectors was such that it would be less likely that NOSENKO would be allowed to surface in this I noted that if the NOSENKO information were inway. cluded as is in the final Commission report and then later the facts of NOSENKO's agent mission became public knowledge, this could have perhaps an even greater negative affect on the standing of the Commission's report. The only way for the Commission to avoid this and still use the information would be for them to indicate that doubt existed regarding the source of the information. We would be opposed to this because it would signal to NOSENKO's principals something of how we viewed this case and could also bring about renewed press and public interest in NO SENKO

Mr. Dulles and I then exchanged views on the possibility of finding language which would allude to the existence of other, unverified information of the OSWALD case. This language would permit the commission to say if challenged in the future on this issue that it had taken the NOSENKO information into consideration in





the Final report but at the same time it would not be presented in a manner which would be at variance with the important operational considerations we have raised.

3. It was agreed that an effort might be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the NOSENKO information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know precisely in what context the Commission intended to make use of the NOSENKO information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the information he needs from Mr. Rankin.

4. I have briefed Pete Bagley on these latest developments and since he and Lee Wigren in my shop are fully cognizant of all the problems involved, they can work out language for your approval which hopefully will be satisfactory. Mr. Bagley knows Mr. Dulles and would be the most suitable person to work with him directly if this is indicated.

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