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Scanlan's Monthly

Volume One Number Eight

January 1971

New York, October 7, AP

Scanlan's, a monthly magazine, said Tuesday in U.S. District Court that employees of its printer have refused to work on the November issue.

Scanlan's sought to have Barnes Press, Inc. and its employees, members of Local 1 of the Amalgamated Lithographers of America, ordered to print the issue.

The November issue is entitled "Guerrilla Warfare in the United States." The employees of Barnes declined to work on it because the material was "detrimental to the interest of the United States."

NOTICE TO READERS:

Three consecutive printers refused to print this issue of Scanlan's.

We are suing them all.

We finally were forced to print this issue on newsprint and in another country to get it out.

The delays, totalling nine weeks, forced us to drop an originally scheduled October 1970 cover dating, then November, then December.

This issue, Volume I, No. 8 is now January, 1971, and will appear on newsstands in early December. Our last issue, Volume I, No. 7, was dated September and was on newsstands during September.

All subscribers will receive twelve full issues during the term of their subscription.

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Guerrilla War in The United States


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
SPECIAL GUERRILLA WA

Philadelphia, Pa. August 31, 1970. Police raid Panther headquarters and force people to strip for weapons search. (UPI)



BY THE EDITORS OF SC

ISSUE: WAR IN THE USA.



SCANLAN'S MONTHLY

[AN EDITORIAL PREFACE]

The next 90 pages of this magazine document the dismaying reality of guerrilla war inside the United States today.

This special has been seven months in the making — with an unexpected appendage of seven more weeks delay during which iniquitous and pernicious attempts were made by ruffian trade unionists and censorious printers to prohibit the publication of this magazine as it was written.

If the printers' reaction is typical of anything but latent Comstockery there will be people in this country who won't like what they read in this issue. Our reaction to that is a shrug—it's a little like refusing to hear that the Japanese were going to bomb Pearl Harbor. At any rate we hope we don't sound too accusatorially right wing by pointing out that the now quite visible wave of bombings is not the work of some isolated terrorist nuts, but part of an overall guerrilla war which has been waged in hot pursuit of American institutions for at least the last three years without anyone, most of all Attorney General John Mitchell, declaring or recognizing it as such.

It is quite the job of the press to tell the people what is going on—especially when the government won't or can't. If the necessarily relentless documentation of the machinery of terror loose in this country scares the hell out of some people, we don't apologize. If the shock of recognition is to bounce off something or someone, it should be the administration and the President, who are responsible for the perverse maintenance of imbalances in society without which there would be no popular base or support for guerrilla acts.

In the long haul of preparing this issue, Scanlan's reporters and researchers had to investigate and analyze every definable instance of left-wing terrorism and sabotage in America since such acts began in 1965. The government's research in this area is appallingly insufficient, although we suspect the administration knows more than it allows, since to admit what is to follow here would be to admit its inability to cope with it.

The resulting extraordinary documentation of guerrilla warfare is printed in agate type in the center pages of this issue. It provides a compelling footnote-in-depth to the accompanying journalistic revelations of the rudimentary stages—but on a scale that is truly astonishing—of urban guerrilla war in the most advanced industrial nation in the world.

The meaning of this phenomenon is explored as thoroughly as our contacts would allow. The editors managed to interview American radicals and revolutionaries who were representative of the new wave of urban guerrillas carrying out the increasingly violent acts which they categorize as "armed propaganda." We report their developing yet incomplete ideology, and their disparate motivations yet similar techniques. We describe their bases of operation and support within the United States, their common culture and internationalist world view, their lifestyles and reading materials, their sources of armaments and blueprints of destruction.

The current left-wing terrorism in the United

States is modeled on strategies developed during guerrilla struggles in other nations. This historical perspective is basic to the revolutionary view and tactics of most American guerrillas. Thus we have considered the history and characteristics of 20th century guerrilla warfare, its successes and failures, and traced the development of an American guerrilla consciousness during the last five years to a point where it is at least possible to make a tentative assessment of where the American guerrilla movement is at—and what might be expected to come of it.

This all makes for unusual journalism. But the editors feel that the undeclared and unanalyzed state of guerrilla war in this country presents a crisis of such magnitude and complexity that traditional magazine slickness and brevity seem unsuitable. It is critical to realize the very political difference between guerrilla violence and the more common and random acts of violence in America. That distinction is thoroughly explored in the following pages.

Guerrilla war is a radically different political reality from anything the United States has experienced. It would be a tragedy for it to be misunderstood—either by those who would wish to crush it, or by those who would attempt reasonably to cope with it—as old-fashioned terrorism or simplistic hooliganism. The primary journalistic purpose of this special issue is to allow the reader to comprehend the nature of guerrilla war in the United States with a sophistication at least similar to that of its practitioners.

To understand guerrilla war is not to endorse it; not to understand it is to make it inevitable.

[GUERRILLA RADIO SILENCE]

It is not unusual for a government to deny any success, much less any reality, to a guerrilla movement opposing it. Batista, for instance, let out continual rumors that Castro was smashed to smithereens when he wasn't, and the reports of Che Guevara's death in Bolivia were greatly exaggerated at least a dozen times before the CIA could deliver a corpse to match the story.

The pattern of obfuscation in the United States is different. It allows for screaming and hollering about the terrible violence that is coming down on this country, and then degenerates into a blubbery debate about whether violence, in general, is cherry, lemon or lime or even American at all. Since the Administration raising the issue of violence is itself the largest practitioner of that trade both at home and abroad, that would seem to give the boot to the question. But there is a talented vice president on the prowl whose opprobrious rhetoric keeps the confusion alive by speeches to Rotarians and other Bedouins and know-nothings across the Gaza strips of the midwest and southwest.

Despite all the official and unofficial outrage at H. Rap Brown's assertion that violence was as American as cherry pie, the National Commission on The Causes and Prevention of Violence took some 350,000 words last year to say that, in fact, was the case, and that nonviolence was not exactly in the mainstream of how Americans got things done. The only thing

new is guerrilla violence, which has never occurred in the United States before, but that revelation is apparently being saved for another commission.

Thus the central reality of violence in society has become the new American cliché. But most people don't bother to differentiate among the kinds of violence—right wing, left wing, government, criminal, and just plain demented—instead they lump all violence into one burdensome rock for this age where Armageddon takes place on prime time.

This tendency, promoted by the government, has delayed any declamatory awareness of the massive development in the United States of the specifically calculated violence of modern guerrilla warfare. But if the bombings continue this fall at the current hurricane pace, it is only going to take someone to say it is so and guerrilla warfare will become a catchword of the 1970's along with women's liberation and the mini skirt. Whether it will be as easily popularized and assimilated is entirely another question.

While the government's semantic holding action against guerrilla war is already slipping, it does remain true that certain realities, especially unpleasant ones, take a long time to penetrate the American consciousness—a phenomenon social critic John Jay Chapman referred to as the "habitual mental distraction" of Americans. It is now getting to the point, however, where it won't require the services of a computer to project a war out of the rapidly multiplying attacks of guerrilla terrorism and sabotage. March of 1970, for example, was a typical month without any major civil unrest or campus or ghetto riots. During March there were 62 left wing guerrilla actions against targets in 17 states, among them:

Selective Service Headquarters in Urbana, Illinois, Colorado Springs and Boulder, Colorado were fire-bombed. The Minnesota Selective Service Headquarters in St. Paul was heavily damaged when sprayed with black paint in a freak sneak attack.

Time bombs were discovered at Army installations in Oakland, Brooklyn, and Portland.

A Post Office was dynamited in Seattle, the Federal Building was firebombed in Champaign, Illinois, and a courthouse blown up in Cambridge, Maryland.

Firebombings and arson attacks caused light-to-extensive damage at eight colleges, and physical attacks on buildings and security guards took place at the University of Puerto Rico and Loop City College in Chicago. During the same period, six high schools were bombed and two damaged by arson.

Guerrilla attacks against police took place in Richmond, Calif., Chicago, Billings, Mont., Detroit, Boulder, Colo., and Cleveland. Dynamite, firebombs and sniper fire were employed in the actions.

In Manhattan, the IBM, General Telephone and Mobil Oil buildings were bombed, and incendiary devices were set off in Bloomingdale's and Alexander's department stores. During the month there were 17 bombing attacks against corporations and banks in eight states.

The geometric progression of such actions tells the story: the 62 guerrilla actions in March, 1970 were roughly double those of March of the previous year when 39 attacks took place against schools, federal

installations, police and corporations. In March of 1968 there were only 14 attacks; in 1967 there were four; and two such instances occurred in March of 1966 and 1965.

It is surmisable that the administration does not require this magazine to tell it that guerrilla warfare is going on in the country. It should not strain even the competency of the FBI to uncover such shocking statistics. But just who is going to tell the people is something else. The government doubtless has its own reasons for maintaining radio silence about the guerrilla war, but its semantics at times become strained. President Nixon, deploring violence in September in a major address at landlocked, conservative Kansas State University, went to awkward extremes to avoid the use of even the adjective "guerrilla" (except to refer to the "Palestinian guerrillas," which was all right, apparently, because that was out of town.) In describing American bombers and snipers, the President instead variously employed the descriptive labels "disrupters," "a small minority," "destructive activists," "small bands of destructionists," "acts of viciousness," "blackmail and terror," and "assaults which terrorize."

One reason for the Administration's compulsive evasion of the term is that it just sounds so bad. Guerrilla war psychologically is in the "It-can't-happen-here" category for America. And the admission of the existence of guerrilla warfare would prompt a host of embarrassing questions, not the least of which is why can't the government stop it?

The fact is that every branch of the federal government with as much as a pinky in law enforcement is actively but furtively attempting to catch itself some guerrillas. The FBI, the Secret Service, the Treasury Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and even the Bureau of Mines are all in on the chase. With all the resources at their disposal to monitor and supervise reputed revolutionaries, it must be a matter of considerable professional and political embarrassment that the combined law enforcement, military, security and spy establishment of the United States has been unable to catch even a literal handful of the thousands of underground revolutionaries who, now as a matter of daily benediction, harass the government with sniper fire or bombs.

Guerrillas interviewed in the course of preparing this issue found it a matter of exultant amusement that the government's intelligence system has turned out to be such a basket case. The Pentagon Counter Intelligence Analysis Division has a subversive data bank with 1.5 million names and even circulates a little red book entitled "Organizations and Cities of Interest and Individuals of Interest." The Secret Service has indices of 100,000 radical names and extensive dossiers on 50,000 revolutionaries presumed to be dangerous. If those figures have any rational or scientific base, that is quite some draft pool for guerrilla soldiers. The FBI has 194 million fingerprints in its files and quick access to 264 million police records, 323 million medical histories, and 279 million psychiatric dossiers. It also claims to have an infiltrator in a top position in every revolutionary group in America. Yet the nearest the FBI has gotten

to the Weatherman is to hang their pictures in post-office galleries.

To be fair to the FBI, authorities in other countries faced with indigenous guerrilla war of the type we are experiencing in the United States have fared little better in capturing insurgents. In Brazil, even the extensive repression of a relatively up front police state has failed to derail measurably the half dozen guerrilla groups following the teachings of Brazilian guerrilla theorist Carlos Marighella. (Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, from which selections are reprinted on Pg. 67 is prized as a crime-doer's textbook by American guerrillas.) Uruguay's military is also at a loss to stop the operations of the notorious Tupamaros, whose bank robbing and kidnapping tactics may represent the next stage of emulation by American guerrillas.

["ARMED PROPAGANDA"]

The patron saint of constant flux and change is Heraclitus, a grouchy pre-Socratic philosopher who pointed out to the surprise of practically everyone in the fifth century before Christ that you can't step into the same river twice. His didactic analogy is quite contemporary with the Marxist-Leninist heresies of modern guerrilla theorists. They hold that each country's revolution is necessarily different from previous ones — successful or unsuccessful — and that the means a guerrilla movement adopts will eventually define its ends, if the guerrilla minds his Mao and keeps his politics close to the inclinations and concerns of the people.

The revolutionary ideology that Mao defined in his treatises on guerrilla war is regarded in most instances as absolute, major exceptions being his political structure and the encrusted bureaucracy of vertical communism. Contemporary guerrilla war is an ever-changing revolutionary dialectic with common tactics which must of necessity develop differently in differing national circumstances.

Now that may sound unassuming and even reasonable, but the free-wheeling political and tactical positions that American guerrillas espouse along this line are sufficient to give heartburn and heart attacks to the traditional Marxists for whom the history of orthodox communism is perhaps half the struggle to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and the other half the ensuing struggle over who is going to dictate to the dictatorship. It was a game in which just about anyone was eligible to play except the proletariat.

The hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla war have changed little since the days when the Maccabees were hotfooting the Syrians. But that formerly pure tactical set of military assumptions has developed into a distinct revolutionary ideology in the 20th century, particularly under Mao. More recently, in Latin America it has undergone another metamorphosis into a burgeoning revolutionary theory all its own that threatens to disinter established Marxist-Leninism.

The primary theoretician of the "new guerrilla" is Régis Debray, a young French philosopher-journalist

and close friend of Fidel Castro. Debray has been under house arrest or worse in Bolivia since 1967, when he was accused by the right wing government of having travelled to the hills to break bread with Che Guevara. His imprisonment has been an international intellectual cause célèbre, even prompting a group of French journalists to petition the Bolivian authorities for his release on the unique grounds that "one must admit the legal existence of *guerrilla correspondents* (their italics), who must obviously be granted the same status as war correspondents." A left wing government came to power in Bolivia several months ago but as of this writing it has not sprung Debray, a fact which may attest to his controversial status within the communist world.

Debray's slim volume *Revolution in the Revolution?* fulfills the quip that the road to war is paved with good books. His revisionist analysis of the Cuban revolution leads Debray to argue that the classic Marxist patterns of revolution and guerrilla warfare must be scrapped for more up-to-date and egalitarian methods. The old Chinese and Soviet models will not do, indeed no models are necessary. The successful guerrilla war will be entirely home-grown, without the interference of what could only be termed "outside agitators," otherwise known as orthodox Communists.

In his scorn for the ossification of Communist Party machinery and the conservative and dictatorial methods of Marxist-Leninist institutions, Debray led the field in anticipating two of the most consequential political sensibilities of the 1970's: the New Left affection for "participatory democracy," and the worldwide radical student movement's struggle to free men equally from the institutional controls of Western capitalism and Eastern bureaucracy.

Accepting Mao's concept of the guerrillas being one with the people as the *sine qua non* of a successful guerrilla movement, Debray rejected Mao's principle that "politics directs the gun." Rather, it is the gun, in the form of successful guerrilla actions against definable manifestations of imperialism and oppression of the people, which defines and develops successful revolutionary politics.

This shattering revision of traditional Marxism offs the Communist Party from its traditional and cherished role as the political vanguard which sets the correct "line" for the people. The guerrillas, through terrorist and military actions geared to gain propaganda successes, gradually politicize and assemble the exploited classes on their side. Communist bureaucrats are left out in the cold.

What drives most professional observers of the new American revolutionaries to such fits of distraction and disgust is their lack of discernible "goals," of "something to replace what they want to tear down," their emphasis on the primacy of revolutionary tactics over political structure. Yet this reality, so defiant of traditional politics, is the carefully thought out ideological cornerstone of contemporary guerrilla theory as it is being practiced in Latin America and experimented with under the unique conditions that the United States has to offer any pioneers. The traditional left, and particularly

the older left — from social democrats on the right to leftover descendants of the Luddites on the left — takes about as much joy in guerrilla politics as Spiro Agnew.

Like Heraclitus' river, guerrilla theory is ever changing. The Cuban "model" rejected the traditional communist theory of creating a mass party and then proceeding to win allies for a united front for which guerrilla forces would act only as an "iron fist" when so instructed by the party. Instead, Castro's small band of 81 dedicated men themselves became the vanguard by instituting guerrilla actions that were not initially aimed at military victories but as an ideological organizing tool to recruit more guerrillas. Other guerrilla struggles that followed this pattern also began with small numbers — the Irish Republican Army had around 200 men, the Stern Gang and Irgun in Israel began with even less, the Algerians with around 500.

American guerrilla groups passed through this initial period several years ago, and now are in a second stage of "armed propaganda" which involves attacks geared to both undermining governmental authority and inspiring a revolutionary state of mind in others in the populace who share the guerrillas' developing political line. Even the most braggadocio of the guerrillas interviewed for this issue did not predict the attainment of the next level of guerrilla war — larger and more regular forces carrying out more traditional military operations — in the near future unless their patient timetable was changed through large scale repression by the government.

Castro's revolution was primarily rural-based — he once called the large city "a cemetery for revolutionaries" — but the I.R.A., the Irgun and the Algerians successfully carried on urban guerrilla terrorist tactics. The current guerrilla struggles in Canada, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay are largely urban-centered. While holding to Debray's theory of the vanguard in the people, not a party, American guerrillas have largely adapted the methods of urban guerrilla war, which are uniquely suited to the high strung, interlocking gears of a mammoth industrial society.

Future scriptwriters for Efreim Zimbalist Jr. may note that at this point in history the FBI was up against alien and unconventional tactics of sabotage, terrorism and hit-as-hit-can military and psychological warfare to which the modern industrial society is acutely vulnerable. Tactics successfully employed by insurgent forces in Ireland, China, Israel, Algeria, Cuba and currently in Latin American and African nations are being experimentally adapted to American surroundings by black urban guerrillas and the burgeoning middle and upper-middle class white revolutionaries who operate with relative impunity from college oriented communities which have become cultural and political "enclaves" in America.

Not that the tactic of blowing up things for principle is foreign to America, nor even politically parochial. The McNamara Brothers and others did it from the left when they gave a dynamiter's what ho to the L.A. Times Building in 1910, and many of today's generation of bombers were old enough to

go to the movies in 1949 and watch Gary Cooper as Howard Roark, the architect as man-of-steel in Ayn Rand's *The Fountainhead*, blow up buildings from the right.

But the indicia of the contemporary guerrilla is not so much the use of infernal machines but the political and cultural acceptance of that violent tactic in the community to which he belongs. Thus large sections of this land—its new youth communities, its older black, brown and Chinese communities—have developed a new importance as bases of support for domestic insurgency. It is in these communities that the traditional authority of the state has deteriorated most, and where the old system of values—capitalism, organized religion, the necessity of wedlock and the social unit of the family—is least appreciated by the young blood.

Berkeley, Seattle, Madison, Wis., and New York City are the largest of such political enclaves. They provide both the sources of guns and butter and the shared quality of life which has always been a necessary condition for the maintenance of a guerrilla struggle.

The golden rule of guerrilla war is to do unto the enemy no more than the people will support you in doing. This moral imperative hinges not so much on Mao's homey analogy about guerrillas being fish in the sea, but on its practical corollary: no sea, no fish. The big flops in guerrilla war this century came about when the guerrillas lost their common touch with the masses, as in post-1945 Greece and the guerrilla wars in the Philippines; or when they never had a base within the population to begin with, as in Che Guevara's disastrous attempt to organize a whistle stop guerrilla war in Bolivia.

American revolutionaries take their world guerrilla history seriously and thus there is constant discussion among guerrillas as to just what "action" is tactically best at the moment for the political effect of the act to outweigh its violent means. There is always the problem of a "guerrilla backlash" which could alienate or scare off their active base of support among their less revolutionary peers.

At this early stage of an urban guerrilla movement, the tactics are largely geared to what Marighella calls "armed propaganda"—bombings which serve a political and psychological purpose in singling out "enemies" and at the same time embarrassing the government by its inability to catch the mad bombers.

This is a delicate balancing act, and guerrillas occasionally blow it. But an integral part of guerrilla strategy is that civilians aren't supposed to get hurt, just scared. This doesn't necessarily make a Mr. Nice Guy out of a bomber; but true is true, and it simply is contrary to all guerrilla theory to go around blowing up people whom they expect, inevitably, some year, to side with the movement against the government.

All guerrilla tactics are adaptable to the situation: in Brazil, guerrilla forces don't usually engage in bombings because they fear the government could turn it around by planting a bomb in a crowded market place and use the atrocity to turn the people against the guerrillas.

At any rate, this political safety-first among Amer-

ican guerrilla terrorists is why so few casualties have been sustained—despite the horrendous noise of all those bombs going off in the United States the last few years. Most bombing attacks are on buildings or other inanimate objects and usually take place at night when the premises are safer on both sides to blast. A warning is routinely delivered before the blast in case of a night watchman or unknown laggards. The graduate student at the University of Wisconsin got it because somebody fouled up the warning call. Most deaths in bombing attempts have been those of careless guerrillas who blew themselves up.

Insurgents know that increased police repression helps to keep the community opinion scales weighted on their side. So as long as the enclaves don't sustain a guerrilla backlash, the current flabbergasting pace of "armed propaganda" could continue far over the horizon.

All American guerrilla groups have revolutionary tactics in common, but few share any common ideology. Few, indeed, have a definable ideology or post-revolutionary program. Most are feeling their way along the bombing trail, letting the tactics, as it were, quarterback the action in the manner suggested by Regis Debray.

[THE EXPLOSIONIST RASPBERRY]

American guerrilla tactics are as different from violence past in this nation as Scrooge was from Tiny Tim. The staccato of terrorism punctuating American history has always been associated with a single issue, or more exactly, a single hatred: that of the sheeted white Southerner for uppity blacks, or the exploited worker for his corporate overlord. The only group with a track record in bombing that could be said to have an overall political program was the high profile Anarchists of the 1880's and 1890's, and they made a point of principle out of having no program at all. The working class arsonists in the north and northwest, as well as the arsonists of the sheet in the South, shared a naive frontier-optimism that evil as they perceived it could be corrected, or destroyed, or at least sufficiently scared to death to make the existing society a better place for workers or racists, as their case might be. With the few exceptions of groups like the Wobblies, violence was practiced in America without benefit of any real political philosophy. Terrorists were moved to action by their own galling view of an outrageous flaw in the fabric of society — not from any rejection of the overall crazy quilt of society itself.

Not so today's guerrillas. They wish to trash the American Dream; not sleep with it. Their tactics are embodied in an internationalist political perspective that sees their own country as the empress-torturer of oppressed people both next door and overseas, and they have in common a political analysis of the problem which is so severe that they have elected to engage in some form of armed struggle against their country, right or wrong.

The indigenous guerrillas who share this nightmare version of the American dream are of two broadly

traceable ethnic, economic and social groups. To classify them as black and white would be an oversimplification, although not a heinous one. Their rise to guerrilla status, indeed their very choice of targets, grows partially out of their economic and social condition, which in America is more a question of skin than class.

Black and other non-white American guerrillas have their origins in that condition which sociologists and understanding liberals distantly and majestically refer to as culturally deprived, or oppressed, depending on the politics of the listening audience. They understand their own actions as guerrillas in the moral imperative of exploited third world peoples attacking their colonial master, and see the ghetto geography of America as a territorial map to the unique condition of a people living in colonies located within the mother country instead of over Kipling's waves.

The other catholic class of American guerrillas is the white and middle-to-upper-class citizens of college or dropout age who largely operate from those "enclave" communities fanning college campuses. They are generally distrustful of any Marxist eschatology, but generally accept a sophisticated and updated Marxist analysis of the American corporate state as an imperial presence in the underdeveloped world and cultural totalitarian presence in the overdeveloped world. They see America as a colossal computer running amuck in a post-industrial society which must be reprogrammed, if not destroyed.

Such tactical differences as exist between these two varieties of guerrilla are manifest in their choice of primary targets. The majority of sniper and bombing attacks on police are carried out by black guerrillas who view them (in the vernacular) as pigs who are the immediate and aggressive representatives of their colonial oppressor (this view of police is shared, in theory and practice, by white revolutionaries who see police as the shock troops of the enemy). Similarly, the judiciary and the entire machinery of justice are also targets for bombs which are aimed to clear the malfunctions in the machinery.

The first target for white guerrillas is the college, and increasingly, the high school. Next is the military, including and especially ROTC buildings on campus and Selective Service offices off campus. These two American institutions are the arch offenders both in disrupting the lives of white guerrillas and in the exploitation of the lives of others. "First America steals a country's leather to make shoes, then we sell the shoes to the people, then we wipe our feet on them," one guerrilla told me. This is neither a logical analogy nor sophisticated Marxism, but in its crudity it represents the feelings of many revolutionaries of middle class parentage. The schools are seen as the containers and suppliers of the human raw material of the corporate state, and the Army is viewed as its private police to protect resources abroad from those with proper prior claims. Another favored target of white guerrillas is partial to the same reasoning: the corporations which have their straw in the pineapple of underdeveloped nations' economies, and the banking houses attendant to those corporations.

If the guerrillas can be said to uniformly agree on any goals of American guerrilla warfare in addition to fighting the hated war in Southeast Asia, it would be to support national liberation movements throughout the world and, of course, the black liberation struggle in the United States.

A more limited if intriguing goal of the incendiary is to bring the war trashing home by bombing, looting and burning the country to perfect distraction, thereby undermining the faith of the populace in the order and stability so essential to the workaday conduct of commerce.

The highest profile among the practitioners of this art of the explosionist raspberry are the Weatherman, who make it a point of principle each time they blow up something to drive the FBI quite crazy by popping up somewhere in the country and telling how they got away with it. It is all a little in the manner of a terrorist's April Fool, but the joke appears always to be on the FBI.

[DAMAGE REPORTS]

The Bureau linked the Weatherman to the Chicago bomb factory it mothballed in March. And it required no ace police work to associate Weatherman with the accidental explosion that crumbled the Greenwich Village townhouse next to the loft of Dustin Hoffman, leaving three Weatherman members dead. Federal authorities have occasioned the indictments of just about as many of the Weatherman as they have names for. Twelve were indicted shortly after the Greenwich Village blowup, and this summer another 13 alleged members of Weatherman were indicted in a bill of particulars which read like a *Magna Carta* for American revolution. It charged the guerrilla organization with "agreeing to organize a central committee to direct bombing operations with members assigned to Chicago, New York, Detroit and Berkeley" and also establishing "clandestine and underground locals consisting of three or four persons who would be under the command of the 'Central Committee' and would carry out the actual bombing of police stations and other buildings."

So far, the only effect of the indictment has been for Weatherman to do just about what they were charged with planning, but without being caught. The FBI to date has been able to lock up only three accused Weathermen, one of whom turned herself in, and this slim catch required kamakazi missions on the part of the police underground that crashed the Bureau's painfully planted infiltrators. All this while Weatherman was taunting and humiliating the pursuers, sending them fingerprints of the Weatherman leaders, openly forecasting major attacks and then pulling them off, as hasty journalists write, under the cops' noses (in the case of the bombing of Manhattan police headquarters it was literally under their feet).

Unlike organized crime, which by definition has to be at least organized, or even J. Edgar Hoover's ideal communist cell, which by now should have acquired Smithsonian rank, modern guerrillas require

no layered structures of authority or communication. They would be betraying the studied exemplars of successful guerrilla experimentation if they did. Successful guerrilla actions minimally require a revolutionary consciousness and a can of gasoline, a weapon that is about as traceable as the common bobby pin.

There are, however, guerrilla lend-lease arsenals stockpiled throughout the country, and occasionally law enforcement finds one. In March, for instance, police and FBI agents in a joint discovery found a bomb factory in a Chicago North Side apartment stocked with enough explosives to level a city block: bombs, blasting caps, explosive liquids, plastics, hydrochloric and sulphuric acid and a variety of guns and ammunition. That haul was not even a firecracker in the tonnage of dynamite and other explosives regularly stolen from private sources in this country and lifted in truckload quantities from the military (see Pg. 52).

More indicative of the everyday manner of sabotage by guerrillas was an arrest in March in Rochester, New York — police found three young men carrying 18 readymade firebombs onto the campus of New York State University. The majority of guerrilla attacks are more products of Yankee ingenuity than private arsenals. There is no storehouse needed for the arsonists' gasoline soaked rag, the simple petrol bomb or the pipe bomb stuffed with gun powder. The ingredients are all available for the going price plus sales tax at local hardware or sporting goods stores. As far as that goes, dynamite may still be purchased without a permit in many states, or it can just as easily be stolen.

Citizens are now alarmed because the care and exploding of homemade bombs is becoming a discipline too widely studied, but the alarm should have gone off about three years ago. Blueprints and pamphlets on guerrilla weapons are so readily available that one need only sift through the rubbish after a large demonstration on almost any campus to find throwaway instruction sheets in the art of guerrilla weaponry and tactics. Much of this formerly difficult-to-get material was available to all takers, postpaid, through a right wing publishing house in Colorado which used to be called Panther Publications but now has changed its name to something a little less political: Paladin Press.

The laissez-faire publishing of the military right, and some left wing imports, combined with the ready availability of inexpensive photographic duplicating equipment, has made the literature of destruction as available as first aid pamphlets. One reality of guerrilla war that can be taken as an absolute is that the guerrillas (and all potential guerrillas) have the bombs if they want to use them.

Then there is the matter of the Library of Congress, which has available in excess of 1,000 reported books and pamphlets on the tricky art of destruction. The fledgling guerrilla can find in its card catalogue some 300 titles on blasting or incendiary bombs and 850 titles on "explosives." Xerox copies cost a dime a throw. For that matter, the Army only recently began thinking about applying some restrictions on

the warfare manuals it hands out for the asking, and some unusual people have asked. Father Daniel Berrigan, the guerrilla priest, said that he and others of the Baltimore "Catonsville Nine" made the napalm they used to burn draft files. The instructions were found in the Green Beret Handbook which was read to them over the long distance telephone by a housewife in Southern California who kept the handbook up on the kitchen shelf with her other recipe books.

People in this country seem to think that you can quiet the drum beat of left wing bombings by somehow curtailing the knowledge of explosives. This is a dangerous and foolish opinion. It is dangerous because it regards bombings as an aberration or temptation, completely misunderstanding the overall political nature of guerrilla war and the manifest abrasions in society that its successful waging implies. And it is foolish, not just because diagrams don't make people make bombs, but because the widest possible dissemination of the strategical and technical literature of modern guerrilla warfare has already been accomplished in the United States. It would be as fruitful to worry about kids having guns if Weatherman had turned Peter Pan and handed out automatic rifles to every American under voting age. The question is not whether guerrillas should have such weapons. They have them. And they can manufacture more. The question is what more they intend to do with them, and why.

Given the government's reluctance to let the cat out of the bag, some picture of the real extent of the damage being wrought in the nation from guerrilla actions must be put together piecemeal.

The Los Angeles Times reported in 1969 that damages to Los Angeles schools totaled over \$1 million from arson attributed to terrorist students, few of whom had been caught or charged. California's Chief Deputy Attorney General Charles O'Brien put that statistic in more colorful if menacing language. "There have been more fires in Los Angeles than there were in Saigon during the Tet Offensive."

The General Services Administration reported a \$2.2 million taxpayer's loss in man hours during the first six months of 1970 due to 130 evacuations of personnel from government buildings because of bomb threats. Such threats had increased nine-fold—from 46 during 1969 to 383 in just the first half of this year. The GSA did not estimate real property damage from the actual bombings of government buildings and installations. However, Scanlan's researchers found newspaper reports of 59 left wing attacks on government installations during the same period of the first six months of 1970. Actual damage reported to federal buildings and property, state buildings housing federal services, and Armed Services recruiting offices and bases from dynamiting, time bombs, arson, firebombs, pipe bombs and sabotage totaled \$2,061,305. However, damage figures in dollars were reported in only 18 of the 59 incidents; in many cases where an estimate was not given, the damage was described as "heavy," "extensive" or simply "destroyed." During the same six-month period, eight bombs were discovered on government property and

disarmed before they could explode, and five time bombs were sent through the mails to the Selective Service offices in Washington and to the White House. These figures do not include attacks on more "neutral" property—for example, on April 24 and 27 bridges were dynamited in Maryland and Arizona.

Property damages sustained by colleges and government installations on campuses during the wave of arson and bombing attacks in American schools following the Cambodian invasion and the Kent State and Jackson State killings in May have yet to be estimated in any accurate fashion, but were of course massive. But there are solid figures indicating the quite staggering extent of merely routing guerrilla actions on American campuses. The American Insurance Association reported property damage directly resulting from campus actions during the eight months from January 1 to August 31 of 1969 totaled \$8,946,972. The insurance industry's figures were taken from holy sources—the Riot Reinsurance Data Bank, Fraud and Arson Bureau memoranda, and insurance adjusters' confidential loss reports. The nearly \$9 million damage figure represented property damage by students in elementary schools, high schools and colleges in 79 cities. Most of the destruction took place on campus; off-campus actions done by students were included only when action was directly related to a campus incident.

That \$9 million report card for students takes on added significance as an indicator of the magnitude of what has been happening on campus since the halcyon days of panty raids. The insurance people pointed out that their total damage bill for *all* riots, civil disorders and guerrilla acts in the United States during the same eight-month period amounted to some \$15 million, which means that campus violence accounted for approximately 60 per cent of the wreck and ruin in the insured regions of this nation.

(The insurance carriers do not believe in guerrilla war as an act of God. Beginning in 1967, when arson and firebombing became common in high schools and colleges, the insurance companies who had to pay off began raising their deductible amounts. The first move in Los Angeles, where school fires increased 130 per cent in one year, was to raise the deductible for school fire insurance to \$25,000 from \$1000. Similar raises, some higher, went into effect for schools in most urban areas and certain high schools which have become favored targets of young guerrillas are rapidly becoming uninsurable.)

The campus is one of the two bases of operations for American guerrillas. The other is the urban ghetto, where small bands of black urban guerrillas are carrying on a running war with the police. The New York Times reported in September that 16 policemen had been assassinated this year and some 750 others injured in guerrilla sniper attacks and bombings. These casualties did not occur during riots or other disorders but represented individual sneak attacks on policemen by guerrillas. "There is more sniping and shooting in the streets of large American cities than in the streets of Saigon," Adlai Stevenson III said. At the time Stevenson was locked in a battle for a U.S. Senate seat with a more-repressive-than-

thou-Republican. Stevenson, who scampered to the right in order to emerge a winner in Illinois, may therefore be surprised to read that he has given comfort to the guerrillas by declaring one of their chief aims, that of bringing the war home to America, as achieved. Anyway, he said it, we didn't.

In addition to the war on police, urban centers have been rocked by the spate of bombings and other terrorist attacks against corporate headquarters, banks and large department stores. Guerrilla actions against such institutions appear likely to double this year from last. Scanlan's researchers documented 86 attacks on corporations in 1969, but by the late summer of this year 110 such incidents had already been reported. Defensive measures are metamorphosing many company headquarters into virtual corporate fortresses. Locked lavatories are an increasingly common sign of the times. The J.C. Penney Company is installing specially coded door openers on its 14 administrative floors in Manhattan. Duh and Bradstreet now requires employees to carry and show identity cards.

The federal government is fashioning its own Maginot Line against the guerrilla hailstorm. It is now as troublesome to enter many federal buildings during office hours as it is to get on an airliner during hijack season: guards open parcels, inspect briefcases, and require identification from those with a patina of the disenfranchised. The paranoia level in the Pentagon has risen with the decibel purr of special pentagon police patrolmen steering electric powered golf carts along the labyrinthian hallways in search of interlopers. When President Nixon signed the vaunted anti-crime bill, FBI and Secret Service agents equipped with walkie talkies guarded the Justice Department as if the ceremony were taking place at the plenary session of an SDS convention. The President has asked for 1,000 new FBI agents, and the Secret Service is getting several hundred more men to beef up a new Home Guard to protect foreign diplomats from what they assume will be kidnap attempts by U.S. guerrillas in emulation of the recent happenings in Canada and Latin America.

Such belt tightening came on the rebound from Weatherman's self-proclaimed "fall offensive" in early October, during which many bombs went off from Santa Barbara to Rochester.

The fall onslaught of sabotage occasioned the first break in the government's radio silence about guerrilla warfare. The right wing, which knows a good conspiracy when it sees one, came right on with the word. In early October, John McClellan of Arkansas, the Senate's chief crime buster, described a "war against the police" as part and parcel of "a wave of guerrilla warfare" sloshing the nation. William C. Sullivan, an assistant to J. Edgar Hoover, repeated the word a few days later in a speech to a gathering of newspaper publishers in Virginia in which he talked about "commando type units" in the Weatherman underground organized to carry out "urban guerrilla warfare."

It should be noted that although this constituted the first official use of the forbidden word, it was employed in most contexts as an adjective, a synonym

for terrorism. It was not given the stature of a noun, nor did anyone allow that "guerrilla" activities were anything but a very new thing in the United States.

Then those handmaidens of the leaked largesse of federal information, the newsweeklies, came up with their own versions of the new trouble. Noting that "It was hardly the administration's official line," *Newsweek* quoted an anonymous but "veteran Justice Department official" as making this "stark" but suitably melodramatic admission: "Face it, we're in what amounts to a guerrilla war with the kids. And so far, the kids are winning." *Time* found urban guerrilla warfare to be a problem suitable for framing on a global scale, and found guerrilla activities to be "relatively tame" in the United States compared with the situations in other countries. While allowing that guerrilla attacks had become "daily" occurrences in the U.S.A., *Time* adopted the developing administration line by blaming much of the trouble here on secret guerrilla training camps in Cuba. Its stringers also scrounged up several psychiatrists to attest to the fact that the guerrilla phenomenon was based on people suffering from childhood damage to the psyche due to overly strict or overly weak fathers, or an "Icarus complex" that leads to sensational derring-do.

After five quite incredible years of unreported guerrilla warfare, the American reading public is being eased upward in its political sophistication by reportorial analysis of this distinction.

[WHAT MCCLELLAN MISSED]

As awesome and portentous as these facts may appear, they remain only pieces of the whole. One problem in developing an overall picture of guerrilla operation is that the few primary sources of information include property damages and casualties stemming from riots and mass insurgency which belong to the studies of mass violence rather than planned guerrilla action. The other fault in available statistics is that right wing, criminal and other violence is lumped together with left guerrilla violence.

The high priest of Senate investigators, Senator John McClellan (Dem-Ark.), has put his permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to the task. Sometime in November it will make public yet another study of violence in America, covering roughly a 15-month period to June, 1970. This magazine has obtained an advance copy of the report.

Senator McClellan's staff study cites 4,330 instances of bombings in the United States during the roughly fifteen months from January, 1969 to early April, 1970. That sounds like something, but the report follows the usual government methodology. By the time our researchers had separated the left-wing wheat from the chaff, we discovered the Senate's investigation of violence to be surprisingly deficient in the singular area of guerrilla activities.

About the only thing the committee had right was the list of most bombing and sniper attacks on policemen, or police stations during the period studied. (Law enforcement is rather good at supplying governmental agencies with details of all such attacks, and

our investigators were able to establish independent corroboration for all incidents reported by McClellan.)

However, the Senate Committee simply missed about half of the left-wing guerrilla attacks which occurred during its study. There were over 1000 additional revolutionary acts of sabotage and terrorism against non-police targets such as corporations, high schools, military installations, federal buildings and colleges which you wouldn't know much about if you read McClellan. Documentation for these attacks were uncovered by Scanlan's researchers during a four month independent research project into the scope of guerrilla warfare in the United States. The study confirmed our beginning suspicions that there was an astonishing amount more guerrilla terrorism and sabotage going on in America than the government was admitting to.

Since all official sources of information were relatively useless, we had to compile original research the hard way: our researchers methodically plugged through all daily and Sunday editions of seventeen major daily newspapers during the last five years. They read the Seattle Post Intelligencer, San Francisco Chronicle, Milwaukee Journal, St. Louis Press Dispatch, Boston Globe, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Baltimore Sun, Atlanta Constitution, Denver Post, Los Angeles Times, Houston Post, Miami Herald, Washington Post, New York Times, Chicago Daily News, Detroit Free Press and the Kansas City Star. Where possible, they utilized the newspaper's own library and index; otherwise, they got their fingers dirty reading every final edition of the newspaper over the last five years.

Our researchers also studied the underground press, and private sources such as the Lemburg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University. When we found an incident from any source that was not also reported in a daily newspaper, we dug up independent verification of the attack or else forgot it.

Our object was to document planned guerrilla actions that clearly employed the techniques of urban guerrilla warfare as practiced in Latin America. We therefore eliminated the plethora of individual incidents related to major urban riots, although riots that were sustained by heavy guerrilla actions—such as Watts—are mentioned. We, of course, ignored any arson, bombing or other terrorist act that had its origins in the beserk, criminal or right wings—for instance, the bombing of a synagogue is not guerrilla business.

Only actions that were clearly left wing and utilized guerrilla tactics were included in the final tabulation. When the political motivation for an incident could not be ascertained, we left it out. For instance, a high school arson immediately preceded by a school controversy over an issue such as the expulsion of a political student or the censorship of an underground newspaper was included; if no political motivation was evident, we left it out.

The study begins in 1965 as that year is the definable starting point for a new pattern of violence emerging in American society. Armed attacks, rang-

[GUERRILLA ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM IN THE U.S. 1965-1970]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Total
Government	2	3	1	11	21	47	85
Corporations	4	5	15	28	86	110	248
Homes	3	3	4	9	22	21	62
High Schools	4	16	19	21	90	42	192
Colleges	0	2	6	26	85	161	280
Police	3	4	11	124	168	113	423
Military	0	1	0	17	31	52	101
TOTAL	16	34	56	236	503	546	1391

ing from minor street trashings to more complicated forms of sabotage, began to develop in a fledgling guerrilla phenomena where the actions appeared to grow more out of spontaneous uprisings than clearly planned targets.

The guerrilla movement began to define itself during 1966 and 1967 with a concentration of attacks against colleges, high schools and police which reflected a growing radicalization of a sense of impotency and bottled frustration with the war and with racism.

These early stirrings of guerrilla activity were all close to home. Convenient targets such as the cop on the corner and the unguarded ROTC building allowed revolutionary tactics to develop without the danger and discipline associated with planned guerrilla assaults.

But as guerrilla politics developed in its campus and ghetto incubators, guerrillas began to strike at political targets outside their immediate environment. Since 1968 bombing and arson attacks on army installations, federal buildings, corporate and banking headquarters and department stores have escalated into the commonplace. This growth pattern is apparent in the statistical compilation of guerrilla attacks by year and target which is printed below.


As journalists we find statistical reporting rather offensive. Nor did we feel any compunction to engage in a body count competition. We therefore condensed whenever possible a number of incidents under one guerrilla attack. Thus many single entries in the study include two, three or more bombing or arson attacks if the attacks occurred in a pattern against the same or a related target.

This distilled research, printed in the center pages of this issue, represents the first definitive picture of the development of guerrilla war in the United States. We thought it important to print it in its entirety because the sum of statistical research is never as believable as the substance, and the awesome reality of guerrilla war is such that reasonable men should not have to differ on its existence.

—by Warren Hinckle

DECEMBER, 1969: WEATHERMAN GOES UNDERGROUND

Flint, Michigan, Dec. 1969. Bernadine Dohrn addresses Weatherman Conference. Last known photo before she went underground. ©1970 Scanlan's Literary House.



For the first time in memory, since even the years when *desparados* sought to keep dries wet, the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted" list has ballooned to sixteen. Over half of that number are guerrillas, and the majority of that revolutionary lot are admitted or suspected members of Weatherman.

The American guerrilla organization took its name from one of the lyrics of Bob Dylan ("you don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"), emerged amoeba-like and split from the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The Weatherman grew out of a battle in the 1968 SDS national convention over which ideological theory could hold the shattered student left together.

The fight to control SDS was between a group of revolutionary-minded students who later came to call themselves Weatherman and the Progressive Labor Party, a Maoist group.

Weatherman, who had dreams of white radicals joining blacks in a guerrilla war against racism (Weatherman Mark Rudd called for "two, three, many John Browns"), had a rude political awakening some months later at a Black Panther conference in Oakland when the Panthers rejected the Weatherman call for urban guerrilla war and opted instead for one alliance with white groups and a traditional united front on the left.

Weatherman, after practising with trash in Chicago during their heralded "Days of Rage" in the fall of 1968, elected at an historic Weatherman conference in Flint, Michigan in December, 1969 to become an underground organization and carry out urban guerrilla war by themselves.

They have done just that, and successfully, to date under the Weatherman theory that their "white skin privilege" made it easy for them to "bring the war home" by attacking the "beast in his own belly." Except for their obsessively rhetorical revolutionary proclamations before or after major attacks, Weatherman has remained totally underground. The following interview is between a Weatherman and a Weatherwoman who has since left the organization. It is significant because it is the first time that any Weatherman has made public any of their underground history.

What was it that first attracted you to Weatherman?

For a long time I had been searching for an alternative. I knew that America was fucked up and I knew that I was fucked up. I had been into freak culture, the whole hippie trip, but it was only a beginning, not a real change.

I got into the movement and realized that there had to be a revolution. From the beginning I agreed with a lot of Weatherman philosophy, but I was afraid to commit myself. I was scared.

Then it struck me, at a meeting I went to, that they were a family. A big, very tight family. I wanted to be a part of that. People were touching each other. Women together, men together. They were beautifully free. I felt that they were experiencing a whole new life-style that I really hadn't begun to understand. They were so full of life and energy and determination and love.

Can we talk a little bit about the War Council at Flint in December?

Flint was unique. People were drawn by the publicity of the national action in Chicago—by the charisma, the aura, that surrounded Weatherman

after the action. Everyone was looking to Weatherman to lead the way. There were Weather factions in every radical organization.

The Council lasted four days. Revolution was really in the air. Enormous hand-painted murals of Fidel, Ho Chi Minh, Bobby Seale and our other heroes hung from the ceiling. On one wall posters of Fred Hampton spelled out "Seize The Time." The spirit of the raps by Bernadine (Dohrn), Mark (Rudd), J.J., Linda (Evans) were of such intensity that there was just nothing left to say. It had been said. Do it. It was after Flint that I became a Weatherman.

Yeah. It seemed to me that the overriding element was to charge people up after a very heavy winter. This was after Fred was murdered, which certainly contributed. I also felt that for a lot of the people there who were not Weather people, well, there was no place for them.

No, it wasn't as cohesive as it could have been. And it's true because of the murder of Fred Hampton that people felt extremely impotent. The national action had built them up, had given them reason to begin to respect themselves. Not just for what they were saying, but more importantly for what they were doing. And yet that wasn't a lasting thing. Perpetual activity is the lifeblood of a revolutionary organization. They fell short of that by being unresponsive to Fred's murder.

But even though there were shortcomings, the War Council was a new beginning. A leap. A new era had begun. People were determined to destroy the State. The things that were talked about were things that people would be doing in the very near future—higher levels of struggle. Although we weren't given the new form of what was later to become the underground organization, we were given the content.

What would you say characterized the beginning of the formation of underground cells?

Well, people were coming into Weatherman, people were leaving, many were being transferred from one city to another. So none of the people in any one collective knew any of the other people that were in that city after a short period of time, except for a few leadership people who went from collective to collective to insure some kind of unity, to bring things together in terms of how the city as a whole was operating.

Earlier we talked about the content being there after Flint, but the form hadn't been supplied yet. Was this the beginning?

Yes, I'd say so. Evidently what people thought would come out of this was exactly an underground organization. What reason is there for not being in contact with each other except for security purposes? *In other words then this was very similar in terms of structure to the Tupamaros?*

Yes, I think so.

You joined a collective. How big was it?

When I first arrived there were two large groups of people, maybe 15 in each house. Shortly thereafter we split into smaller cells of five or six.

Was there any grace period—any period of adjustment?

No. The same was expected from everyone, from

the very first moment you arrived. You were expected to adjust immediately to what was going on, which was constantly changing. Everyone had to be a leader. There was no initiation, no getting to know people. You immediately became involved in political and personal discussions with everyone. On maybe your third day there there'd be a full-scale criticism of you. Maybe you'd only be there three days altogether. The standards were very high. There was no passivity allowed, no monogamous tendencies. You had to be as much a communist as a person can be. You had to push yourself and other people as hard as you could, try to be the best you could be.

What were some of the key internal tensions going on?

About 70 per cent of the people in Weatherman at this time—March of 1970—were women. A lot of the heaviest criticism was directed at the men for their male chauvinism. Weatherman understood that the most potentially explosive conflict brewing in white America is between men and women. We had to kick out these jams in ourselves in order to move the nation forward in miniature. Men and women who couldn't change their patterns of thinking and reacting were asked to leave. I had to overcome the limitations I had set on myself and on my sisters. For the first time I made love with a woman. It was a uniquely beautiful experience, because we built off of each other's strengths rather than playing off of each other's weaknesses.

Wasn't this period of time used to instill the kind of consciousness that would be necessary to reach the highest level—the level of armed struggle?

Yes. People were being pushed to their limits. Some were being weeded out. It was a test to see who was best.

How did Weatherman deal with the problem of infiltration?

At first it was difficult, due to the open nature of the collectives. We were trying to bring people in off the street, off the campus. And there were a handful of people outside of Weatherman—people with revolutionary potential—who ran on actions, even lived in collectives, knew almost everything we knew, but who weren't under strict collective discipline. A couple of them turned out to be pigs. There was one guy, William Frappoley, who was suspected of being a police agent. When confronted, he admitted that he had been in a police academy for a year and that he had been a pig; but he said he wanted to change, and we wanted to believe that people could change. It was decided to trust him a little, which turned out to be a mistake. Frappoley ran on actions, then implicated people and got them busted. He loaned Bernadine his car and then got her picked up on a stolen car rap. He finally blew his cover as a government witness at the Chicago Seven trial.

More recently we had Larry Grathwohl. He got Linda Evans and Dionne Donghi picked off and sent up. He is an example of what any revolution has to confront. He looked like one of us—he even passed an acid test.

Infiltrators are not fools. They'll do whatever they have to do to get people to trust them. They grow their hair, smoke weed, sell us guns, even help us blow a pig station.

How did Weatherman see the revolution happening? What was their strategy?

We tried to figure out a strategy for each area in which a collective was working, a strategy for the particular city we were in—an overall strategy for the nation. We calculated scientifically, militarily, historically.

Was this among black people, or in white areas?

We concentrated most on racially mixed areas, because there racial contradictions are at their highest, most explosive level. Not that there is any such thing as an integrated community in America. On the fringes and borders, that's where things were coming down. Especially in high schools that were newly integrated or desegregated—so that's where we were.

What exactly was your role in all this?

Generally we all worked together doing more or less the same things. However, because I look rather young, I was chosen to go into some of the high schools, so I dressed up and became a student. I spent some time walking around the halls talking to kids—black kids, white kids—trying to get a better idea about what kinds of tensions existed there. Being in the halls I could pretty much determine who ran the school, and believe me, it wasn't the teachers. We discovered that when there were close to equal numbers of black and white kids in a school, the white kids usually would follow black leadership, which was mostly out of sight. It was mainly in schools that were disproportionately black or white that the shit really came down.

Why did Weatherman start moving from large, open collectives doing mass organizing work into small very security-tight cells?

There was a need for heavier security measures. And there was a real need for radical militant leadership for young white kids. Weatherman had been organizing for quite some time, which led to more organizing but not to revolution. Enough people now knew what Weatherman stood for. What was missing was the armed vanguard.


Why did you leave?

I think that because of the fear people were experiencing at being so close to armed struggle, the cadre wasn't critical enough of what the leadership said or did. We were into accepting lines and tasks almost without question, almost blindly. We felt unsure of our own ability to make decisions, unsure of the validity of our arguments. And, the leadership was not very responsive to what dissent there was. It was a breakdown of our democratic centralism. I had political disagreements and I felt I had no power to change what I thought needed to be changed—so I had to split.


What do you think of Weatherman now?

Weatherman has done what it set out to do. They have succeeded in publicizing to millions of kids that there is a revolution in the making in America—in the world. And that white kids have a stake in it and a responsibility to make sure that it happens. It has started to happen all over this country. If you don't believe it, just pick up a newspaper or try to talk to your kid.

A BOMBER'S TACTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACK ON A MILITARY POLICE INSTALLATION



On July 28, 1970, the Armed Forces Police headquarters in San Francisco was bombed by three civilians, two men and a woman. The following is an interview with one of them.



Why have you decided to give us this description of the bombing of the military police station in the North Beach area?

We realized we were making a mistake. Our actions were not being clearly defined. We weren't able to provide people with an understanding of what we are trying to do... we weren't explaining the importance of violence in bringing the war to America... we hadn't explained to people why we picked this obscure station and did what we did.

Could you give us the chronology of events that led up to your action?

Well, we had come together as a group to begin to engage in various acts of violence. We decided that we would participate in the new kind of struggle—that of armed struggle—but not necessarily withdraw from other political activity. We planned to develop a new life-style for dealing with problems.

Of course we had discussions about what target we would attack. The corporations and the pigs and the various targets that now occupy the consciousness of all young American radicals ran through our minds. We thought about the new Bank of America Building, but that's too big and sloppy and

wouldn't be very effective. And we thought about the new police station—but the increasing security in police stations would make it difficult to strike. Our actions are always designed to maximize significance and minimize getting caught. Because right now we realize that we can't destroy the police mechanism or the corporate mechanism. We realize we're at a very elementary stage—the stage of the theatrical.

Once you realize the absolute historical necessity of armed struggle, you can't organize a demonstration anymore. You might be able to attend one, but you can't invest your political efforts in trying to make peaceful political changes. All the people in our group had realized that and that was the basic unity of the group. We didn't have any major unity or strategy or tactics. We weren't prepared at that time to engage in direct personal violence unless absolutely necessary in terms of self-defense. We felt it would be possibly alienating to engage in the same kind of personal violence that the governing structure gave us every day. We thought we would try and begin in another range and experiment in another possibility of physical property damage because we felt that was paramount in the consciousness of America.

Let's go from here to this action that happened.

Well, we found that the most important institution in America is the military. It's the military that the Vietnamese people face every day. They don't face Bank of America directly, they don't face our universities directly, they don't face the city government or the tactical pigs. The thing they really face is the U.S. military, the foot soldiers. Now, basically we were saying that we were declaring war in unity with the Vietnamese against the military operations.

We realized, of course, that the military itself was also stratified just like American society, that there were all classes, all kinds of people in the military—people that had been forced into it by the very nature of American capitalism. They were slaves to the military. So, with that realization and with the realization that these men were trained military experts who could also become involved with the struggle against imperialism and racism, we felt that we would have to be very discriminating in our attacks on the military.

Now, until the time when we did our action, we followed other actions. That's one of the main things you get into as a group. You wait every morning to read the newspaper, you listen every day to the news. You're always getting in touch with the other members and discussing what actions have been created, so you are abreast of what's going on. And that becomes your life—armed struggle is your life.

We thought about who the greatest oppressors of the GI's were and we knew the main oppressor was the commander or the lifer. The actual mechanical apparatus of the lifer is oppression of the foot soldier—the average guy. We were aware that before every GI in the country goes to Vietnam, he comes to North Beach. Then, of course, there are the GI pigs—the people who pick up the deserters, the resisters, the trouble-makers. We'd seen several occasions in which GI's had been busted. So, we realized that to these

guys, the real instrument of oppression was that military policeman. And we went on to investigate that. In other words, because of the role of the military policeman in the North Beach vicinity, we began to understand that it was necessary to attack that symbol. *What particular target did you pick?*

The military police station, the Armed Forces Police Station, which is in San Francisco. It's located on Clay Street. It's rather obscured, even most of the people in the area don't know about it. This was one of the key reasons it was picked as a target—to emphasize its very presence, the fact that such a police station could exist and no one even know about it. The police station itself was in a civilian community (which was an interesting contradiction in that they were military police and they didn't get on very well with the civilians in the area), so we didn't feel that we would be alienating any of the people in the area. They'd wake up in the morning and it would be: "Oh well, the military station has been bombed." The main reason it wouldn't be important in their lives is because in no way does that military station serve anyone's interest in the area. It doesn't protect, it doesn't defend, it doesn't procure—all it does is oppress.

After the picking of the target what was done? Was there reconnaissance planning, were there charts made?

We planned in depth. A number of us sat around and we discussed what would be the way, militarily, to execute this action. We decided to do something with that station. So we went and used some of the simple tools of reconnaissance.

We worked with a real map, a very detailed map of the area, because there are other police stations in the area—we knew where they were and watched their patrols and had a basic understanding about how the area was kept under surveillance by the local pigs. The civilian pigs and military pigs are very close.

We decided this was a fairly easy action. There were one-way streets going both ways—main streets. Late in the evening there's very little chance of congestion and usually the pigs don't patrol that area because it's downtown and very visible and light.

Previous to the incident, we began to live a social existence in that area. We'd go there for our meals—we'd eat in Chinatown or North Beach. We'd walk around that area. We'd get entertained there. We'd get high there. When we had free time, we'd spend it there in bookstores. The key thing always is to understand the area—to know where to go. We began to live there and to feel settled about the issue and then we picked a time when we were going to strike—and then the main thing of course was to plant the bomb. See, we knew it was absolutely simple to plant any device.

We certainly didn't want to harm any civilians. Definite precautions were taken not to. We took great precautions not to interrupt any civilian activity in the area or any GI activity. See, we consider the GI, the non-com, the foot soldier, to be a civilian. Whereas we consider the lifers and the military structure and the police structure of the military to be a more permanent structure—a structure which is evolving to a more Gestapo-type existence. Of course

we wanted to isolate our acts of terror from any other elements of the population.

So the two main problems were planting and escape. That area happens to be particularly good for escape because it's filled with traffic. Because it's constantly congested and there are people around, you are never out of place. So we felt that escape was not much of a problem. Part of our discussion was about how to develop an untraceable escape. And that was also fairly easy.

How did you go about doing the actual action?

First we prepared the weapon. There was substantial discussion about what kind of weapon to use. Should we shotgun the place or whatever? What kind of attack? We finally decided on a fairly simple kind of pipe-bomb. The ingredients that were used in this pipe-bomb are not super easy to procure but it's fairly easy to create. The device we used was approximately . . . Okay, let me tell you this . . . all the things that we used were totally untraceable in that they all were stolen. Stolen from someone's home, stolen from a store, a hardware store . . . we stole some pipe from a construction sight. The whole point of the pipe-bomb is that it is a people's weapon. Just about anyone can make one of these. So we stole what we needed and then we made up a dynamite-type base which would be fairly effective. My own particular task was to detonate the device, and to arrange a timing mechanism for it, since I had volunteered to plant it.

Let's talk about the actual planting of the device. How was that carried out?

There's an alley that runs behind the pig station. The back door of the station—which faces on the alley—is made of wood. This is the weakest spot in the whole building and the point we chose to attack.

Anyway, this alley was lined with trash cans. The military police station put their trash out there, too. So we figured there would be no better place than a trash can to put the bomb. Our main concern was that the device be in a place where there would be no question as to what our target was. Secondly, the trash can would provide a good cover for our device. There were times when the wooden door was open, but we thought it would be difficult to get inside.

There had never been attacks on this station before. That's one of the reasons we picked it. It had remained obscured in that commercial community. That evening we went by there several times. First we had dinner in the area earlier in the evening. Then we walked around and got a feeling that was fairly comfortable.

Early in the day we hid the device in a park. This park was a key staging area because it allows perfect vision down both the alley and Clay. In the evening we came back, had dinner and went to the park. Then we walked around North Beach and the topless area just like any tourist does. We walked around very casually—we were dressed very conservatively. We looked just like anyone else on the street.

What did you do to execute this action?

Let me just describe very simply what was done. There were basically three people. One was a woman. She was stationed in the park and her job was to

monitor this area. She and I were in visual contact always. We had created various signals to communicate with one another. The first thing I did was proceed down the alleyway and at the time there was a building under construction across the way from the back of the station. . . .

Were you driving or parked?

We were already parked. We parked two vehicles a block away on a one-way street which was part of the get-away plan . . . we would be leaving by two one-way streets.

What were you doing at this time?

I would go down and plant the weapon in the general area. At that time the area was so congested I could just walk anywhere and lie the weapon down. Not for detonation, just lay it down. In other words, hide it . . . take it from the park and hide it again. Just temporarily hide it again . . . move it . . . to begin the motion of the action.

So I hid it at the construction site, not inside but in the debris. The plan was: I would walk down to the end of the alley and back up again—and then I would retrieve the weapon, plant it and proceed up the alley and institute the get-away.

As I passed the first time, I realized the wooden door was open to the rear garage of the military police station. Immediately inside the garage is an area in which vehicles park, both civilian and military. From there you can see a locker room which we thought was used to store the gear—the guns and weapons and whatever—of the pigs working in that station. So when I made my trip down the alley, I decided it would be the best place . . . because I noticed these trash bins standing inside the doorway. So I came by the second time (on my first trip I saw there was no one inside) and I picked up the weapon and treated the weapon and put it in the trash can. Now as I was coming up here with the weapon and getting closer and closer to the spot itself, this woman was in constant visual contact with me. If she signaled me that there was some foul-up or some police or some civilians in the area, the plan would be temporarily delayed. And delayed in such a way that it would be impossible to pin it on somebody. As I came up she gave me the clear signal. I was hurrying at that time, I was really moving, and I got to it, you know, and I put the device inside the door . . . inside the trash can.

The device we used wasn't particularly accurate, but we knew we had enough time. It's the kind of timing device which I'd prefer not to talk about. So the device was placed inside the trash bin and I began to run. Part of the plan was that I would exit the area on foot to the get-away car. The woman would go to one car, the nearest car, and she was to start the engine on that car and be ready to leave. The other man with us was to drive the second car, which was immediately in front of hers. Then we'd escape up the one-way street so if any civilians or military were to come behind us or follow us or in any way detect what was going on, she would be able to block that road, which would make it almost impossible for anyone to apprehend us at that point.

Now after the action, where did you all go?

The first thing we did was to leave the area. Then we parked the car that I escaped in and changed into the second car and we went back to one of our places, where we discussed it. The first thing we did was . . . we were all nervous and blown-out, it was our first major action . . . we got high. We turned on the radio and we sat back. Of course we were pretty anxious to hear about it, though we were pretty certain the device had detonated because we had practiced with it before and the person who was responsible for it said it was perfect.

Did you reach any conclusions while waiting to hear news of the action?

We were basically interested in how to use our violence, how to use our attacks to mobilize other people. See, we don't think that we alone can seize power or take over this country. We feel it's going to come through a large, massive movement. Our responsibility as people who realize this is to pick these targets and people to pull off these actions successfully . . . and to try and convince other people to follow our patterns . . . our style. We're experimenting—we're scientists. We're trying to develop a pattern, a style, to develop an understanding. We're willing to make certain sacrifices. We're willing to go out and do this. Now if we are to be criticized by the people, if our actions are inappropriate—then we deserve to desist, to disorganize ourselves. But until that point we feel that we have a certain role to go out and forge and create some new direction. *Is there a piece of information that you could relate to me that would in some way authenticate this interview? Something that did not come out in the press, or something that you remember about the action?*

One thing I remember that was very ironic was that in the process of surveillance and reconnaissance, I saw a hamburger stand in the area that's called Clown Alley. And as I went to the trash can to plant this thing I saw all this shit coming out from Clown Alley. All this, you know, cups and stuff and trash from Clown Alley . . . and there was a beer can, I know it was a Lucky Lager because I happen to drink a Lucky Lager myself sometimes. I'm sure that whoever was in charge of that investigation, if they investigated that trash in that barrel, which I'm sure they did, I'm sure they would find plenty of paraphernalia from Clown Alley and plenty of beer cans. Which is surprising—the pigs inside that station are drinking beer when they're on duty. I'd like to call for an investigation of those pigs.

I'd just like to know when you finally heard news of your action? Was it that night? What did it feel like?

That night the news wasn't going so well, it was late and the news didn't have it. We basically listened to FM stations and rock stations and they weren't carrying it. So we actually found out the next morning. It was in the paper. Which was also a great feeling, to read about your action in the paper. We definitely began to understand the thing about mad bombers and people that are into this. There is a kind of ecstasy in knowing that you destroyed something, that you were effective. Because all of your life you are told that you can't get away with it, you can't beat it, and we beat it.

THE STUDENT WHO BURNED DOWN THE BANK OF AMERICA



On the night of February 25, 1970, demonstrating students of the University of California at Santa Barbara started a fire which completely destroyed the Bank of America's Isla Vista branch. The demonstrations were the spontaneous result of the university's decision not to grant tenure to a popular, radical anthropology professor, Bill Allen.

Shortly after the bank burning, a member of the political underground arranged an interview between the student who was primarily responsible for the destruction and the editors of Scanlan's. Since that time, the State of California has indicted 12 people for the bank burning. The trial of 11 of the defendants is expected to conclude soon, and the twelfth, who was recently arrested in Oregon, will be brought to trial during the next month.

The details of the interview explain why those charged could not possibly be guilty.

What did this bank represent to you? This Bank of America branch?

Well, this Bank of America represented to me the same thing every Bank of America does. It's essentially the Bank of America which has its hand in everything all over the world. It's like the largest bank in the world, from what I understand. The people who sit on the board of directors of this bank, they're pigs! You know, it was more symbolic, because it's one bank and they've got so much fuckin' money. But we figured, you know, the Bank of America, let them feel the same fear they have to feel abroad. Like when guerrillas in Lebanon, the next day, shot mortars through their windows. Let them feel that at home. They're not safe anywhere, and they shouldn't be. It was also an ugly building. Aesthetically, it was ugly. As one of my friends remarked: "That fuckin' thing was so ugly, it had to go anyway."

Tell us about the events which led up to your burning down the Bank of America at Isla Vista.

An anthropology professor named Bill Allen was fired for being cool. The Regents gave the excuse that he was being fired for not having done enough research, but in fact he had done more research than anyone else in his department. He's a noted California archaeologist. They threw him out because he had long hair and a beard and smoked dope.

He was very well-liked. He was pretty radical. He taught a class in Latin-American revolution. He had this picture on his wall that we all dug. The mouth was filled with a collage of poor people all over the world and it said: "U.S. imperialism swallows the globe." We dug him, because he was not making it into a student-teacher relationship, like a dictator to a dummy. He made it, you know, we're all in this together. So, the students got very upset when the Regents fired him.

Santa Barbara first became radicalized by the blacks who took over the university computer center. Then when the Regents dismissed Bill Allen, the whites began getting radicalized. The students requested an open hearing for Bill Allen. It was refused. This really solidified the campus because people actu-

ally knew what was going on. Over 7,000 students, over half the enrollment, signed a petition to keep him on. It was ignored by the administration and the Regents. Prior to this, most people were not aware of their roles as students. But, then, when all of a sudden, they were put in the role of niggers—having one of their teachers taken away—they became aware. This was such a needed kick to all of us.

How many demonstrations were there before the first attacks by the police?

It's pretty hard to remember exactly. But I do remember that we were gassed and beaten a few times. But overall they were, you know, typical average riots. There was nothing special about them. It's not even worth going into detail. But it was enough to make people pissed off at the police.

Then one day, the pigs decided to arrest these four people. They were walking down the street and a pig car pulls up. "You're under arrest," one pig says. And their immediate reaction was: "Well, what are we under arrest for?" The pig says: "Get in the car." And they give out the constitutional rights trip: "What are we being arrested for?" And the pig just said: "Resisting arrest." Okay. "Resisting arrest to what charge?" "Get in the car." So they pulled these four people in and while they were doing that, they tried to pull each other out. You know, when the pig was puttin' one in, they kept tryin' to get out. And they were struggling with the pigs right on the street. People saw this and they couldn't believe what was going on. So, pretty fast there was a bunch of us out on the street. The police got uptight and said, "This is an illegal assembly," and the people started throwing rocks at the police. It was really an incredible scene. People running all over the streets throwing rocks at the police. The police called in reinforcements, and there was this street fight going on. All of a sudden, all you heard out windows of the houses right next door was The Rolling Stones' Street Fighting Man. And people are going crazy when this comes on. Like the minute they heard that, they start throwing rocks in the realty office.

Were you throwing rocks?

Well, yes. To be precise, I hit one pig in the stomach. The fucker.

All right, so groups are running around throwing rocks at the police. The police, I presume, were making arrests?

No. The pigs were retreating. They were forced to retreat. We had militarily defeated them. One pig car was bombed. It was Molotov'd. The pigs weren't in it at the time. They were away. They couldn't make arrests because there were so few of them. They couldn't get enough reinforcements. So now the area was more or less ours, and at that point you could hear Jefferson Airplane singing Got A Revolution. People were all putting on like all revolutionary songs on their record players. It was just unbelievable.

Were you near the bank while all this was going on?

We were floating around on Embarcadero. That's where the bank is. We were deciding if there were any good targets and we saw some people congregating by the bank. The bank windows had already been broken the night before and the windows were

boarded up. We'd beaten the pigs. We were all so happy we had finally beaten the pricks.

At this time I was wearing a green Army jacket. And the collar is big on it. So I pushed it up so you couldn't see my cheeks, or mouth. My hair was really long. So I'm pretty hard to tell in the midst of chaos and other friends of mine did typically the same thing with their coats. And we like pulled this trash can right in front of the boarded window of the bank. And what happened was people were talking in frenzied voices and saying beautiful, crazy things, like "I wish we would blow this fucking bank up." Just then some people started to rip down the boards from the window and, just out of inspiration, I threw a match in the trash can trying to start it, you know. *You had not planned anything prior to right then?*

No. I planned to start a fire in the trash can, not before but right then. The inspiration was like, "Light this fuckin' trash can".

The inspiration must have hit all of us at once 'cause we pulled the sleeves of our jackets over our hands so we wouldn't leave fingerprints on the trash can handles, and then—WHAM! Right through the fuckin' open window. The trash splattered out all over the bank. Papers caught on fire. People were going wild, yelling out, "They're burning the bank!" The people started throwing matches and shit. Pieces of paper on fire.

What did you do after you threw the trash can through the window?

I split. We went and checked to see if there were any pigs in the area, if we were being followed. We were pretty sure we'd gotten away with it. So we went home and smoked some more dope and relaxed and waited to see the outcome. Actually, it was rather tense after we smoked the dope. We were elated and then we settled down for our one paranoia stretch. We got the guns out of the closet and just loaded...

You had guns in your closet?

Yeah, I mean, fuck it. Like when you do this stuff, you should generally be prepared to die right then and there. My politics are I believe in armed self-defense. I believe in having guns in your house. 'Cause I believe there is so much repression that you never know who they're going to get. And, like, I was once formerly an SDS member, so my name is on lists. They know who the fuck I am. So, I'm not taking any chances. Any time repression can hit. It's not something you should laugh and play about. *Why did you split? Were there still other people left out on the street?*

There were people outside the bank when we left, chanting and yelling. But what we didn't want to do was be out there any longer than we had to. Because I'm not risking my life in a street situation any more than is necessary for that action. If I thought the action was crazy, suicidal to begin with, I wouldn't even go out there, even though I thought politically it was a groovy action. 'Cause riots are getting out of hand. They're shooting people down in the streets. I'm still gonna do shit, they're gonna still know I'm around. But I do not suggest people go out and riot. If they like violence, they should form their own cells

and go out and do something.

I still attend things, but shy away from some. Those last riots we had during the Cambodian incident were pretty bad. I was there, but I kind of stayed away afterwards. There was teargassing, beating heads, it was like martial law while all this stuff was going on. We didn't want to fuck with National Guardsmen. We figured we could talk to them, could radicalize them eventually. Because these people lived right in our community. I still think some of them can be saved and you want these people in the national guard not to shoot you but to put their arms around you and point their guns the other way. You be nice to them. A pig is a pig. But the National Guard is like guys do that to get out of the Army, so you know where some of their heads could be.

What would you like to see happen in America?

One of the things that I would like to do is some serious organizing among the labor people I've come in contact with. They are the most important. Say if people strike General Electric for political reasons—saying we don't want General Electric supporting the war—it can be incredible. You can stop the machine at home. Like I was reading Che, and he said, "You're right in the middle of the beast," and that is the most important struggle. If you can stop it here it can't go anywhere else and that means politicizing labor.

Basically I guess I'm some sort of communist. I would like to see some sort of socialist or communist type of revolution. I have definite anarchist leanings. But I must stress that I am not a Stalinist or anything. I don't think major universities will be open in five years. Black people are still going—really going—to get it in the head. All over. Students will possibly calm the riots and do some serious organizing among themselves and labor. This is what I would like to see and hopefully we'll know in a year if this will happen. I don't really expect this as I think a lot of people in the movement are jerks. They may think I'm a jerk for that, but I mean they don't see when the times are changing. All they want to do is organize hippies and stuff and keep the student revolution as the most important thing.

I used to have that egocentric view that we're the only people doing anything. But now I believe the whole population has to be moved. That of course doesn't mean everybody, but strategic militant segments of the population. The teamsters in Los Angeles for instance. When they went on strike everything stopped. About 200 of those cats didn't get their jobs back. I helped picket for them. They definitely were into militancy and into a rank and file wildcat strike.

This one cat I know in Santa Barbara is one of the teamsters who were really pissed off and militant. They had ripped off some mortars and set them up outside the building where they worked. They were very much contemplating shelling this fucking building, but they decided against it. They said they will wait until later.

What do you think is the value of the bombings?

Well, right now I'm not so sure. It's almost like a war was going on in this country and I guess there is. And I think the pace of the war will keep pace with

the rising militancy of the people against government repression. If they continue the bombing at this pace they will force so much repression that there will be no movement. If they are going to bomb things I think they should at least avoid killing people at all costs. But the pig station is different. That is always going to be strategically and tactically correct. Because once you put that uniform on you are a pig. That's your job—you follow orders.

What about somebody like Rockefeller?

Oh, I wouldn't mind ripping him off. Of course any of their flunkies, any of their strong arms. They have to go. Now I would advocate something with real balls like picking off a particular general in Washington. It's just general violence and bombing that I question.

You were speaking of special organizing in the working class. Do you see violence as a way of organizing? How does it help?

Most workers would be afraid of us if they thought we were these crazy bombing people. They wouldn't understand that I want ultimately to get students and workers together. Like Berkeley kids were pretty successful at the Richmond Oil Strike. There were some contacts made in Santa Barbara. So I figure that students all over the country should just invite workers up to their houses for dinner. Talk to them. Bring their families. You know, we're not bad people. You're getting all this bullshit in the media and like you should just come in and see what's going on. And don't rhetoric them to death. Just let them know that, like, there is piggery going on in the country, and they're being screwed by it because they are workers.

What will you do in the future?

I have some ideas about organizing a cooperative-type venture. Hopefully I will acquire a skill before school closes. I may want to do something medical. That would be my specialty. A friend of mine will be making films. And we wanna get someone in who is an auto mechanic.

We would give free medical or dental care to people. And free auto and mechanic repairs. Another thing I advocate for all students is to help workers repair their houses. Some workers never get a chance to paint their houses. So help them paint it . . . you actually show them that you're concerned with them. They will ask you questions, like, "Why do you fix up my house when you burn a building on campus?" You can like explain that the ROTC office was involved in killing Vietnamese. And you should have a little more—because you really do a lot of hard work out there so I can go to school. You bust your ass. You should have little more. I feel solidarity with you. I feel we should be together instead of being split apart. That's why we do stuff like this. We don't do it because we're sneaky fuckers. We do it because we actually feel this way.

Do you have a scenario for a political apocalypse?

I see more of a civil war than a revolutionary struggle in the United States. In a civil war I believe our propaganda will be better than the pigs', and that eventually we will sway enough workers over to our side. Militarily, urban guerrilla tactics will give us a tremendous advantage over the pigs. So the civil

war will be waged pretty much in guerrilla style. The whole country will become a kind of occupied territory, and there will be an underground and real guerrillas will walk down the streets looking just like the pig businessman. They will do their shit and go home and incredible things will happen at night.

There will be some armed insurrection in the cities. The Bay Area will liberate itself right off and I feel that a major part of New York will be liberated. New York is really heavy. I figure a lot of cities will be divided into liberated zones and pigs' zones. And when the pigs try and invade they will not get in so easily. And they are not going to shell them immediately because the liberals will still be screaming. And then there will be some repression for these screaming liberals and then—boom. Liberals are going to decide this is it. Hopefully, I figure that most people will get mobilized when their lives are truly affected. So far this government is not really into mass repression. They are just picking off leaders. And when repression picks up I figure they will pick off the liberal leaders first. Then the mass of liberals may actually do something. I hope. But even if they don't, most of the moderates will remain so passive, they could generally be swayed to our side.

And once resistance increases in the cities?

One of the most important things that I think will happen will be a breakdown in the national guard. In Chicago, for instance, a lot of the national guard just didn't want to be there. A similar, but not so broad, decomposition is taking place within the U.S. Army too. A lot of these cats are getting really militant. A lot of the black soldiers and the chicanos for sure, and a lot of white guys who are fucked over in the armed forces, can be counted on. There will be breakdowns and revolts in both the army and the national guard in cases of fighting guerrillas. They don't want to shoot their own people. I'm sure of that. Except maybe the sick ones, I figure a lot of them will come to our side.

Is there anyone in the movement you would like to see become President of the United States?

Well, none of the conspirators excite me. I don't really like Tom Hayden or Rennie Davis that much. I definitely like Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, and I guess I would like to see them in leadership of the country, but more I would like to see a balance of power between guys, if there was one group it could continue to create friction, like the blacks or any other took over.


Are you going to remain a student?

Yes, that's the way it looks. I want to build as many alliances in the university as I can. Maybe the universities will be able to stay open. And if we are really successful . . . but I don't really see that. That's like a dream, wow, like all this stuff is going to happen. I don't think like that. I think more on a hard line, that there is going to be more hard core things going on rather than big national movements.

What about money?

My parents are helping out while I'm going to school. And I've got a national student loan that I have no intention of paying back. I think it is very nice of them to send me here to school.

GUERRILLA ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1965-1970



LEGEND

TARGET



Government
Buildings



Corporations



Homes



High Schools
Elementary Schools



Colleges



Police



Military

METHOD



Sniping



Bomb or Dynamite



Time Bomb



Arson



Molotov Cocktail



Terrorism