The Analysts' Desk

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Scant and skimpy as they were, it is certain that the first reports of this political exotica, Kepublicans aaught inside Democratic headquarters, triggered instantaneous reaction in every intelligency agency in the world, without doubt, even those of the United States. The extent of reaction would vary from nation to nation, depending on such factors as/its relations with the United States (and here the changed character of US relations with the USSR and China were a factor), its size and the extent of paranoia in each agency. Spooks tend to be paranoid, from the nature of the beast as well as that of the work.

In each agency, without the orders that soon would issue, whoever sat on the United States desk would immediately interest himself is this story. If the United States deak, in a large intelligence agency, was broken down into sections, like economic, political and military, each section, at least at the beginning and until policy was set, would follow the story as best is could, no matter how meager the initial information.

This, too, is the character of the abalyst's job. Often major developments are signalled by the slightest clues, and he must anticipate major developments. An extreme example is an atomic bomb. Once the thing explodes, it is known that it exists. However, knowing before the explosion that a country is developing atomic capability is a necessary intelligence function. The indications may be almost invisible. And they may be public and not noticed.

From my own experience, I recall a minor illustration, of an event that was less than world-shaking.

For a short while, despite lack of fluency in Spanish, I sat on a Paraguay desk. Paraguay is a place of beauty that escaped being a paradise by the quality of its its political life and the primitive max economic development, complicated by a senseless was against a number of the neighbors, and larger and more powerful. Most of able-bodied fris Paraguayan men will killed in pointless personal and national bravery. Thereafter it was without a stable government or any semblance of political freedom. When there was stability there was dictatorship, Revolutions were not uncommon. Minor as P raguay was in any

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government to be aware of all developments, especially revolutions. Also unusual in those days was the fact that the rank and file of the Army was a major force for democracy within the country.

During one of these revolutions, when things were not going well for the dictatorship, the same one that lingers about four decades, with different dictators only and few of them, I noticed an obscure item in an Asuncion newspaper. Communication was nothing like what it is today in that era. The newspapers were flown up to Washington, in time-taking stages, the longest of which was getting the papers out of that landlocked country with limited internal and international communications.

That little news report set me to thinking. $\frac{1}{4}$ turned in an analysis that had not been asked of me, the conclusion of which was that there would be a change in commond of the army loyal to the dictatorship and who the new military chief would be.

Within a short interval, it happened.

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(As a side note on the CIA, then just established, its knowledge of Paraguay was so primitive its analysts couldn't identify the two major political parties. I recount this unimportant history for an important point: while it is sometimes necessary for an analyst to jump! to conclusions, he must have a basis for them and if his judgement is less than it should be! he can easily be quite wrong. In the midst of this revolution the CIA distributed a moort on it and the two major parties, known as Colorado and Blanco, red and white. It identified the Colorado party, apparently based on no more than its color symbol, as the liberal one. It was, in fact, the party behind the military dictatorship, a native fascist party.)

So, the intelligence analyst is faced with instantaneous needs and inadequate information at the outset of almost any crisis. From less than complete data he must evolve a dependable analysis. It may change with the acquisition of additional data. Generally, it is updated, as need dictates.

As the essence of intelligence is analysis, not clandestine dirty tricks, so is the essence of analysis the extraction of meaning.

The process within the **xx** analyst's mind can be roughly compared with that of the newspaper reporter whose story must tell who, what, where, when, why and how and whose **kmadxwarmakkyxsummarizes** "lead", or story opening, usually summarizes this information.

In order to extract the meaning of the event or development that takes his attention, *in doing this he* the abalyst seeks the answers to all possible questions and then asks himself questions. This By this simple process that in practise can be enormously complicated that the analyst evolves and analysis.

When each learned if that the "epublicanshed been caught with their hands in Memocratic pockets, so to speak, the end product of an instantaneous thought process was the question, "What does it mean?". The end product of the analysis would be the bigarre analyst's statement of the meaning he attributed to this, act.

foreign inteligence analyst specializing in the United States In virtually every case, because every/markyst can be assumed to be better informed than almost anyone in the United States, it can also be assumed that with incredulousness he immediately asked himself "why?", then Knowing the political situation within the United States, each analyst, unless blinded by his own prejudices, knew that Nixon was the odds-on favorite. Each therefore also knew that in normal terms, in normal politics and situations, there was no need for such a coince. A superior analyst may well have been baffled by an utterly needless crime that could have had such seriously counterproductive consequences.

Why" is always an important question. In this case, because the event seemed so Allon myly in this to be under sford, which is not easy. completely senseless, it is more than usually important.

The Massie Links and Assuming he is adequately prepared for his job, a country analyst has studied the country. He knows its history, customs, culture, predominating attitudes, national trends in thought; in an academic sense, knows the political parties better than most of that country's reporters; has a good grasp of its economy and the state of the economy, its military strength and the attitudes and conflicts within the military command. Because he will draw much of his information from the press, he will know its ownership, the political orientation of the ownership and how accurate und dispoionare its reporting has been. About the press it is likely that he will learn more on the job

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than he did in college. His concerns will include the influence and the sources to which he can attribute what popular and widely-distributed write. A man like Jack Anderson would probably be a major study for a United States specialist, less because of the wide readership he has than because of the nature of his column and the inevitable term that his sources are largely, if clandestinely, official. BarAbove all, the analyst will be expert in the political parties, concentrating more on the one in power.

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of each country and the party in power.

All this knowledge will be in the mind of the analyst when any news about his country of specialt freaches him. This news will be like the input of a programmed computer when it reaches him.

Prior to the arrests of that early morning of June 17, 1972, the United States analyst will have learned that the ^Hepublican Party and the presidency had both changed radically under Richard Nixon. ^He will also know that the institution of the presidency <u>Multitud Dipression and Wolf Win II</u>, followide by had changed radically beginning with Franklin Delano Roosevelt) largely attributable to *Multitud by Nutifield policy and* the fantastic growth of the country in all dimensions and the dramatically altered world situation.

a would an example of the kind of factor that will figure in the analysis of a foreign analyst in assessing this first crime as first report there is what is generally not in *Rese* press dent. Mot since FOR best Herbert Hover has it not happined. the minds of most Americans, that it is virtually automatic that an incumbent president is re-elected. Especially because none of the XAXAXAN Democratic candidates for president with

had any mass base plus wide appeal will any dangerous act by or on behalf of Nixon

capture the analyst's attention. It is foolhardy to jeopardize a sure thing. United States and diplomatic In and of itself, this one factor would have startled every/intelligence enalyst on wirg United States dest.

in everycountry. That any Republicans would were caught in Democratic hand national ubrete headquarters would titillate his antennae. That they were the a Republican security istraly Wichtimed, further capturing attention. were chief, an unusual factor, plus four anti-Castro Cubans, another unusual factor, and 'Wish myfor the topotal factor, plus four anti-Castro Cubans, another unusual factor, and that this is a truly strange combination, still another and even more unusual factor, Atuff of Musicul wonsely mit political heality.

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By and large Castro-haters are "emocrat-haters. An immediate question would be, had the Republicans mobilized this internal, dissident forces? A team of four anti-Castroites led, as would be presumed, whether or not accurately, by a Republican official? Or was

Upon thought harvante the analyst would immediately wonder if, despite the capture of the official, this was some kind of unofficial excess? It is the improbability *upploited monduately* of this crime having any official auspices that was first siezed upon by all Republican spokesmen as their excuse. These mon, the proclaimed, were "self-starters." For a long time this exempt had some credibility within the United States, witness the election results. It did not last long in foreign intelligence circles, for within a matter of days evidence of almost positive disproof was incontrovertible, evidence provided by the stupidity, arrogance and carelessness of the Cubans in and their mentor, indeed, their God, Hunt.

Hunt, in my view, is a much more significant figure in the crime and that of which a catalogue of crimesm not duplicated in our two centuries of national life. it was a minor part, As analysts would have undertaken to do as soon as his name suffaced, particularly because of how it surfeced, we shall examine him separately and at length. very But primarily and early in his analysis, the past and the character of Richard Nixon would be recalled and reassessed. Had he gone crazy? Had the party and its control fallen into insame hands? If this crime was connected with the party leadership or with Nixon, what in the world could they be up to? What could they possibly expect to find of value in "emocyat files," what could they possible hope to overhear that could begin to justify the great risks involved in what was at first called a "caper" like this really farout one? I have are no notional upplien ations in this of politica

The answer, obviously, is nothing in the context of the political realities, that Nixon was a probable shoo-in.

And Here what connects the crime to the White House also focuses attention even to disassociate more on Nixon. In any close following of factual developments, the immediate lies about from what connected the crime to the White House, even in the absance of other proofs that

unud utily below [is this undesirable reptition!]

were available soon enough, tended to bind the crime and the White House even closer. Why should it lie? Why should it continue to lie, to evade, never to stop either dishonesty?

first What was permitted to be known in the first few days after the capture was controlled by the police. In every capital city, the police have special political problems. They adapt to learn to live with and to survive these problems, to cope with the special situations. What can be kept secret in a surtry supposedly open is astounding. From my youth I have never forgotten the exposure of axrax an investigative reporter of that day, William Hard, that as a United States Senator the man who was later President Warren G. Harding was caught in a New York City whorehouse. His plea of Senatorial immunity was honored, he was let go, and there was no publicity. Otherwise there would never have been a Republican candidate Harding, a epublican President Harding, and no "eapot Dome scandal that, for the first time, put a member of a president's cabient in jail. (A second escaped conviction by the skin of his teeth. He was guilty as a common grafter in a case of bribery involving a valuable, nationally-owned oil deposit.) H Unlike other Cepital cuties, (Washington's police have a special, extra problem. There is no local self-governwashington's NIXIM

ment. We administration is appointed by the president, In this case, Nixon's appointees

However, the press, particularly <u>The Washington Post</u>, was persistent. And The police and the city's administration have to live with the press, too. The press can make their lives miserable. ^Besides, by law, even though the law is bent and broken, some evidence of crimes is required to be available.

Chain mat bound the purglars

The link that was to be a look to the White House, that arrogance and stupidity *immediately*. They of the Cubans and Hunt, was known to the police who kept it secret, from the moment of the arrost. The Cubans had room keys. All hotels are identified on the tabs to which the keys are attached. The persons and the rooms of the Cubans were overloaded with the most incriminating evidence.