

The Case of the Doctored Transcripts

"I don't give a shit what happens. I want you all to stone-wall it, let them plead the Fifth Amendment, cover up or anything else if it'll save it—save the plan. That's the whole point... We're going to protect our people, if we can."

Thus spoke Richard Nixon to some of his top aides on March 22, 1973, as he urged them not to cooperate with the many investigations of the Watergate scandal that were getting hotter. His words were tape-recorded, of course, like most conversations in the Oval Office. But this particular call for a continued cover-up was somehow omitted from a transcript of the March 22 meeting that the White House finally released—under duress—last April.

The President's instructions to his lieutenants* emerged now because the House Judiciary Committee made its own transcripts of eight White House tapes that were turned over to the committee by Federal Judge John Sirica. When the committee published this material last week, observers quickly discovered scores of discrepancies between the White House transcripts and the committee's versions.

*Present at the meeting were: the President, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, John Dean and John Mitchell.

RODINO COMMITTEE WITNESS JOHN DEAN




BLACK—BLACK STAR

FREDERICK LARUE

JOHN MITCHELL



ROBERT MCNEELY



Some stenographic errors were inevitable in so large a mass of material, but curiously, in practically every instance, the mistakes in the White House transcripts put the President in a better light than did the committee's corrected documents. To Nixon's critics on Capitol Hill, the many omissions and apparent misstatements in the White House version seemed nothing less than a clumsy effort to doctor the evidence, to cover up the original cover-up. These revelations damaged the President and added impetus to the impeachment drive.

In addition to the release of the transcripts last week, the Judiciary Committee also published an extraordinary body of evidence concerning the Watergate case—eight volumes in all of more than 4,000 pages (see following story).

Unhelpful Witnesses. In the meantime, the committee moved ahead toward an impeachment vote, now expected by the end of the month. For a time last week it appeared that the vote might be delayed until mid-August, and a curious exchange of notes took place between House leaders sitting at, of all places, the President's table. While listening to a White House briefing from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, House Speaker Carl Albert slipped a piece of paper to Democratic House Leader Thomas ("Tip") O'Neill on which he observed that the Rodino committee was now running a month behind schedule. O'Neill quickly scribbled a reply: he had talked to Chairman Peter Rodino, and the committee would damned well vote soon.

The first four witnesses who testified before the committee in closed session last week had all been requested by the President's special counsel, James St. Clair. His aim has been to narrow the grounds for impeachment by maintaining to the committee that it must establish a direct link between Nixon and a criminal offense: in this case, the payment of hush money to Convicted Watergate Conspirator E. Howard Hunt on March 21, 1973. Accordingly, he wanted the witnesses to declare that Nixon had not specifically ordered the payment of the \$75,000 to Hunt. But no witness remembered the timing of the payment in such a way as to absolve Nixon of involvement in the incident.

The week's first witness was Frederick LaRue, onetime assistant to John Mitchell at the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, who said that he could not remember exactly when John Dean had telephoned him about paying Hunt. Another witness, William O. Bittman, former attorney for Hunt, was equally unilluminating.

Nailing Water. The third witness, former Attorney General John Mitchell, betrayed a failing memory of almost dismaying proportions. But he remembered precisely that H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, then the White House chief of staff, had not mentioned the payment of hush money when he telephoned Mitchell in Manhattan on March 21, 1973. It was for this reason that St. Clair had wanted Mitchell as a witness: to demonstrate that Haldeman had not passed on instructions from Nixon to see that Hunt was paid off.

Instead, said Mitchell, he had discussed the proposed payment with LaRue, who had asked Mitchell whether he thought the money should be paid. Mitchell said he replied that if the money was to be used for legal fees, he would advise LaRue to pay it.

Neither Democrats nor Republicans seemed impressed by Mitchell's testimony. "He has what I call a convenient memory, it's selective," declared Congressman George Danielson, a California Democrat. Trying to get information from Mitchell, he added, was "like trying to nail a drop of water to the wall." Republican M. Caldwell Butler of Virginia allowed that as a result of Mitchell's appearance, "the sum total of human knowledge is not changed a bit." Added Republican Tom Railsback of Illinois: "Mitchell personifies the stonewall."

Then came John Dean, the star of last summer's Watergate committee hearings. St. Clair had hoped to discredit Dean as a witness, since it was the former White House coun-

THE NATION

sel's sharp memory that had formed the original scope of the case against the President. But not even the toughest cross-examination by St. Clair would shake Dean in his basic charges that Nixon knew of and participated in the cover-up before March 21. In fact, Dean also furnished some hitherto unknown details about life in the Oval Office. The President, said Dean, once vowed to remove one of his most respected Cabinet members, Treasury Secretary George Shultz, if Shultz did not cooperate with the White House plan to "punish" the 500 "enemies" on its list. "If George Shultz thinks he's some sort of candy-ass over this [the crackdown on 'enemies']," the President told Dean, "tell me and I'll get him out."

The last witness of the week was Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, who was in charge of the original Watergate investigation. Petersen testified that he had "never received any information which involved the President in any cover-up." He described how he had passed on to the President some confidential information concerning the progress of the investigation. But Petersen professed to feel that the President had acted "within his rights" when he broke his word to Petersen and repeated the confidential information to several White House aides who were under investigation.

Another subject that fascinated the committee was the latest, 19-minute tape gap, mentioned last week by a Watergate prosecutor in Judge Sirica's court. The White House explained that, during a conversation between Nixon and John Ehrlichman in the Oval Office on March 20, 1973, the recording machine had run out of tape. Skeptics noted that March 20 had been a Tuesday—a workday when the machines were ordinarily carefully monitored by the Secret Service.

This week, as the hearings end, the committee will begin publishing massive additional evidence on the non-Watergate charges against the President: testimony concerning the milk industry contributions, the ITT antitrust settlement, the Ellsberg break-in and other matters. But nothing in this material is likely to be as potentially damaging to the President's cause as the transcripts released last week.

Too Late for the Hang-Out. The differences between the White House and Judiciary Committee transcripts were fascinating, and at times crucial. In the March 22, 1973, conversation, for instance, the White House version quoted Nixon as saying Mitchell favored a flexible strategy "in order to get off the cover-up line"; in the committee version, it was "in order to get on with the cover-up plan."

In a March 13 conversation, according to both versions, Nixon asked Dean whether it was still possible to make full disclosure of the facts: "Is it too late to, to, frankly, go the hang-out road?" In the committee version—and only that version—the President quickly answered his own question: "Yes, it is." Then he added, in the committee version: "The hang-out road's going to have to be rejected. I, some, I understand it was rejected." This exchange took place eight days before the famous date of March 21, on which Nixon has steadfastly maintained he first learned of the Watergate cover-up. Yet by March 13, according to the new evidence, the President had come to believe that he no longer had the option of simply telling the truth.

On the same day, according to both versions, Dean told Nixon that Gordon Strachan, an aide to Haldeman, had already lied twice to federal investigators. In the White House version, Dean told Nixon: "He can go in and stonewall and say, 'I don't know anything about what you are talking about.' He has already done it twice, you know, in interviews." The Judiciary version is only slightly but subtly different. Dean says, "He'll go in and stonewall it...he has already done it twice, as you know..." Then, in the Judiciary version, when Dean remarks to Nixon that he does not believe that John Mitchell knew about the Watergate bugging, Nixon replies incredulously, "You kidding?" (That rejoinder was omitted from the White House version.)

On March 21, Nixon and Dean discussed Hunt's demands for \$120,000. In the White House version, Nixon asks Dean, "Your major guy to keep under control is Hunt?" In the Judiciary version, this is a flat statement: "Your major guy to keep under control is Hunt." And when, in the same version,

MARCH 21, 1973, A.M.

House Judiciary Committee
Transcript, p. 121

White House Transcript, pp. 236-37

PRESIDENT: that's why your,	P That's why
for your immediate thing you've	for your immediate things you have
got no choice with Hunt but the	no choice but to come up with
hundred and twenty or whatever	the \$120,000, or whatever
it is. Right?	it is. Right?
DEAN: That's right.	D That's right.
PRESIDENT: Would you agree	P Would you agree
that that's a buy time thing,	that that's the prime thing
you better damn well get that	that you damn well better get that
done, but fast?	done?
DEAN: I think he ought to be	D Obviously he ought to be
given some signal, anyway, to,	given some signal anyway.
to --	
PRESIDENT: Yes.	
DEAN: Yeah - you know.	
PRESIDENT: Well for Christ's	P (Expletive deleted),
sakes get it in a, in a way that,	get it. In a way
uh -- who's, who's going to talk	that -- who is going to talk
to him? Colson? He's the one	to him? Colson? He is the one
who's supposed to know him.	who is supposed to know him?

JUDICIARY & WHITE HOUSE VERSIONS OF MARCH 21 CONVERSATION

Dean reflects, "He knows so much," the President adds ominously, "about a lot of other things." (This, again, is omitted from the White House version.)

Then, as the already well publicized discussion of the payment to Hunt continued, Nixon, according to the White House text, asked: "Would you agree that that's the prime thing, that you damn well better get that done." In the committee version, the President says: "Would you agree then that that's a buy-time thing, you better damn well get that done, but fast?"

In the White House version, Nixon said of Hunt: "His price is pretty high, but at least we can buy time on that." In the Judiciary version, it becomes: "His price is pretty high, but at least, uh, we should, we should buy the time on that, uh, as I pointed out to John." When Presidential Assistant John Ehrlichman mentioned that Hunt also wanted to get a pardon, Nixon, in the Judiciary version, replies: "I know ... I mean he's got to get that by Christmas time." The White House version also included this remark, but attributed it to John Dean rather than to the President.

The same day, as he reflected on the amount of money that Dean estimated might be required by the original Watergate defendants, Nixon, according to the White House version, observed: "It sounds like a lot of money, a million dollars. Let my *[sic]* say, that I think we could get that. I know money is hard to raise." But in the Judiciary version his words are sharper: "Let me say that I think you could get that in cash, and I know money is hard, but there are ways."

One of the more eye-opening passages in the Judiciary Committee's version is a 15-minute conversation that does not appear at all in the White House transcripts. It was omitted, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler explained with a straight face last week, because "in our judgment it was of dubious relevance." This incredible assertion was echoed by St. Clair. It contains this comment by the President on March 22, 1973: "John Dean ... put the fires out, almost got the damn thing nailed down till past the election and so forth. We all know what it

is. Embarrassing goddamn thing the way it went, and so forth.” The excised passage also contains the President’s instruction to his staff that they strive to block the investigation by stonewalling or by invoking the Fifth Amendment, if necessary. The line is reminiscent of a suggestion that the President offered on March 21, 1973, when his aides were discussing the possibility of appearing before a federal grand jury: “But you can say, ‘I don’t remember.’” (In the Judiciary Committee version: “Just be damned sure you say, ‘I don’t . . . remember.’”)

Did the White House really believe that by quietly altering

—or just not hearing—the taped evidence, it could delude the army of investigators now poring over every detail of the Watergate case? That is hard to believe. But the responsibility for the petty cover-up is less ambiguous. Last week Ron Ziegler reaffirmed that it was Richard Nixon himself who had made the final decision on what material would be released. As the President declared on April 29, when he finally surrendered the transcripts (rather than the tapes) to the Judiciary Committee, “I have spent many hours of my own time personally reviewing these materials and personally deciding questions of relevancy.”

The Evidence: Fitting the Pieces Together

Never in the 25-month history of the Watergate scandal had so much of the evidence been brought together in one place. The eight volumes of material released last week by the House Judiciary Committee assembled all the available bits and pieces of the Watergate mosaic: previously secret grand jury testimony furnished to the committee by Judge John Sirica, memos written by President Nixon and some of his high aides, Senate Watergate Committee testimony, tape recordings from the Oval Office, a presidential Dictabelt, and notes scrawled on legal-size pads in the President’s irregular hand. The Judiciary Committee formed no conclusions and drew no verdicts. In a serious effort to be fair and impartial, it simply presented all the materials it had acquired.

The overwhelming weight of the evidence is against Nixon, though there is no single piece of new information that could conclusively decide the case. There is much ambiguity about specific words and actions of the President. But the broad pattern

demonstrates that the President recognizes that any blackmail and cover-up activities then in progress could not continue.”

St. Clair’s relatively slender volume of defense is overshadowed by the seven books of evidence (ranging from 271 to 687 pages). Part 1 of the Judiciary Committee document details the formation of the “sophisticated intelligence-gathering system” that eventually led to the Watergate break-in and bugging. A second volume deals with the initial attempt to limit the case to the seven original burglars and their accomplices, while keeping the scandal away from the White House. A third section of two volumes focuses on the hush-money payments to Hunt and the continued cover-up efforts. The three-volume fourth section contains material on activities after March 22, 1973, emphasizing the role of President Nixon—whether he launched an investigation or participated in the cover-up himself.

Herewith the major elements of the evidence:

The Immediate Cover-Up

One of the more startling disclosures is that Nixon foresaw a need to conceal information about the Watergate affair just 13 days after the June 17 break-in. At a meeting with Haldeman and Mitchell, which was called to discuss Mitchell’s resignation as Nixon’s campaign director, this dialogue took place:

HALDEMAN: Well, there maybe is another facet. The longer you wait, the more risk each hour brings. You run the risk of more stuff, valid or invalid, surfacing on the Watergate caper—type of thing—

MITCHELL: You couldn’t possibly do it if you got into a—


HALDEMAN:—the potential problem and then you are stuck—

PRESIDENT: Yes, that’s the other thing, if something does come out, but we won’t—we hope nothing will. It may not. But there is always the risk.

HALDEMAN: As of now there is no problem there. As of any moment in the future there is at least a potential problem.

PRESIDENT: Well, I’d cut the loss fast. I’d cut it fast. If we’re going to do it I’d cut it fast.

It is possible that by “cut the loss” Nixon meant that Mitchell would have to resign. But in expressing his fear that some information might “come out,” the President seemed already concerned that an open policy of complete disclosure would be




The President’s notes from an April 15, 1973 meeting with Richard Kleindienst at which there was discussion of transfer of \$350,000 in campaign funds to Frederick LaRue.

of motives and strategies suggested by the mass of material leaves little doubt about the major aim of the President: to protect himself and his aides from the flood of disclosures that began immediately after the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972.

New evidence assembled by the committee confirms, and in many instances sharpens, the impressions given by already published material. The President and his men often judged possible actions for their publicity value, rarely for their potential in getting out the complete truth or bringing individuals to justice. Though the White House insists that the impeachment inquiry should be limited to the Watergate break-in and cover-up alone, the committee, beginning this week, will produce ten more volumes of information on other allegations against Nixon.

The President’s defense on Watergate is contained in a separate 242-page volume, which the committee released together with last week’s seven books of evidence. Prepared by Presidential Lawyer James St. Clair, it is the only portion of the massive document that attempts to draw specific conclusions. St. Clair cites Senate Watergate testimony by H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and John Mitchell that the President had no knowledge of the burglary or the cover-up. The defense counsel’s main focus, however, is on the crucial \$75,000 payment to E. Howard Hunt, one of the convicted Watergate conspirators. St. Clair argues that the transcript of the meeting that Nixon held with White House Counsel John Dean on March 21, 1973, “clearly



A portion of John Dean’s incomplete report on Watergate, written at Camp David between March 23 and 28, 1973.

be sure E.O. office is thorough checked re tapes at all times - etc.

*what is our counter-attack?
PR offensive to top the —
hit the opposition w/ their activities
pt. cut libertarians have created public letters —
do they justify this less than
sticking Pentagon papers, Anderson for it?*

we shall be on the attack - for diversion -

Haldeman's notes on a June 20, 1972 Watergate strategy session with Nixon, indicating some topics raised in the taped conversation that turned up with an 18½-minute gap.

fraught with danger—fully nine months before he claims he first became aware of the Watergate cover-up.

Less than three weeks after the arrest of the Watergate wiretappers, the possibility of granting them Executive clemency was discussed by the President and Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman later recalled before a Watergate grand jury that he held a "very long, rambling conversation" with the President on or about July 4, 1972. Testified Ehrlichman: "We talked about the Watergate defendants, and I raised the point with the President that presidential pardons or something of that kind inevitably would be a question that he would have to confront." Ehrlichman added in his testimony that Nixon expressed the "firm view [that] he would never be in a position to grant a pardon or any form of clemency in this case." Despite Ehrlichman's report that Nixon rejected clemency, the conversation raises a sticky question for the White House: Why did Ehrlichman feel that the question of Executive clemency would "inevitably" come up over what was then being described by Nixon's spokesmen as a "third-rate burglary"?

That question indeed occurred to an assistant special Watergate prosecutor, Richard Ben-Veniste. Logically, one Watergate defendant that the White House should have been worried about was G. Gordon Liddy, then a fairly high official of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. Ehrlichman testified that he knew by June 20 that Liddy had headed the Watergate break-in team. Yet Ehrlichman told Ben-Veniste that he did not inform the President of Liddy's role.

Q. Now when was the first time that you were aware that the President was aware that Liddy had an involvement?

A. I don't know.

Q. Was the President aware of that by the Fourth of July [1972]?

A. I haven't any idea.

Q. Was he aware of it before the 10th of July, based on your long and very complete discussions with him on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of July?

A. I don't know.

Then, moments later, Ben-Veniste asked incredulously:

Q. And are you testifying that you were aware of that and you

*McCord - psychotic
nervous
arrogance
religion - soul - Garing*

Comments about James McCord, a convicted Watergate burglar, jotted down by Ehrlichman at April 5, 1973 meeting with Paul O'Brien, a re-election committee lawyer.

had conversations with the President about the possibilities of Executive clemency for these people, and you just omitted to tell the President that the general counsel for the finance committee [Liddy] had admitted to Dean that it was his operation?

Nixon's Involvement Deepens

The most damaging material concerns the events of March 1973. President Nixon has repeatedly stated that it was only on March 21 that he first learned, from Dean, of the Watergate cover-up. There are strong indications in the new evidence that the President discussed the cover-up at least eight days before March 21. More incriminating still is material showing that President Nixon perpetuated the cover-up rather than launching a complete investigation, as he has frequently claimed he did.

The Judiciary Committee's version of a March 13 conver-

1. oval	3/12/73	= 1	1:45 PM April 25, 73 out
2. oval	3/12/73	= 2	5:28 PM " id
3. oval	3/13/73	-	11:07 AM April 26, 73 out
4. oval	3/14/73		5:05 PM May 2, 73 id
5. oval	3/15/73		to Steve Bull only
6. oval	3/16/73		
7. oval	3/17/73		
8. oval	3/19/73		
9. oval	3/20/73	= 1	

Grand jury exhibit showing a Secret Service log of presidential tapes and some temporary withdrawals by White House Aide Steve Bull.

sation between Nixon and Dean shows clearly, as do the transcripts issued by the White House, that the President was then aware of perjury by Gordon Strachan, Haldeman's top aide. The President on that day also explicitly rejected the "hang-out road"—meaning a complete disclosure.

The evidence shows that Nixon again discussed the Watergate cover-up with Dean on March 17. A committee subpoena for the tape of that conversation was rejected by the White House. But during a later talk between Nixon and Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, a tape of which was obtained by the Judiciary Committee, Nixon recounted that on March 17 he ordered Dean to "cut off any disclosures that might implicate him in Watergate." The Judiciary Committee states: "The President said that [the former deputy campaign director] Jeb Magruder 'put the heat on, and [the former treasurer of Nixon's finance committee, Hugh] Sloan starts pissing on Haldeman.'" As the committee report summarizes the conversation: "The President said that 'we've got to cut that off. We can't have that go to Haldeman.' The President said that looking to the future there were problems and that Magruder could bring it right to Haldeman, and that could bring it to the White House, to the President. The President said that 'We've got to cut that back. That ought to be cut out.'"

The evidence also amplifies the record of the events of the fateful March 21. A statement made by the President on his Dictabelt machine just after his meeting with Dean and transcribed by the Judiciary Committee shows that he admired those of his aides who lied to investigating groups and had contempt for those who told the truth. He praised Gordon Strachan—who at the time was stonewalling FBI investigators and Government prosecutors with denials that led later to his indictment for perjury. In Nixon's words, Strachan was "a real . . . courageous fellow through all this." By contrast, Nixon talked of Magruder, who was cooperating with prosecutors, as "a rather weak man, who had all the appearance of character, but who really lacks it when the, uh, chips are down."

Strangely, Nixon began the Dictabelt by saying that March 21

THE NATION

was "relatively uneventful." But he went on to recount his long conversation with Dean and made a possible damaging statement about one of the most crucial parts of the Watergate case, E. Howard Hunt's demand for money. Lawyer St. Clair has argued that, in his March 21 discussion of a payment to Hunt from campaign funds, Nixon meant only legal-support payments. But the President's Dictabelt indicates that this was not so. "Hunt," said the President, "needed a hundred and—thousand [sic] dollars or so to pay his lawyer and handle other things or he was going to have some things to say that would be very detrimental to Colson and Ehrlichman, et al. This is, uh, Dean recognizes as pure blackmail."

On the Dictabelt, Nixon placed much of the blame for the whole Watergate imbroglio on Charles Colson, who had recently resigned as White House special counsel. "Apparently what happened is that Colson, with Liddy and Hunt in his office, called Magruder and told him in February to get off his ass and start doing something about, uh, setting up some kind of an operation . . . Colson was always pushing terribly hard for action, and in this instance, uh, pushed so hard that, uh, Liddy et al following their natural inclinations, uh, went, uh, the extra step which got them into serious trouble."

The evidence confirms that Colson did urge Magruder to speak with Hunt and Liddy, who at the time were promoting the Watergate break-in plan. But if the President was aware of Colson's involvement, he seemed anxious to keep others from finding out. A week after Nixon made the Dictabelt, according to evidence revealed in the Judiciary Committee's volumes, Nixon instructed Ehrlichman to inform Richard Kleindienst, then the Attorney General, that "neither Dean nor Haldeman nor Colson nor I nor anybody in the White House had any prior knowledge of this burglary." On March 30, nine days after the President recorded his suspicions of Colson, Ziegler told reporters: "As we have said before, no one in the White House had any involvement or prior knowledge of the Watergate event, and I repeat that statement again today."

Ziegler was asked about that pronouncement by a Watergate grand jury last Feb. 12. His testimony included:

Q. Did the President tell you to make that statement in March?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. So the President didn't tell you what he had learned on March 21st [from John Dean] prior to your making the March 30th statement?

A. No, he didn't.

Cover-Up of the Cover-Up

After the March 21 meeting with Dean, the President and his top aides spent weeks huddled in strategy sessions, looking for ways to limit damaging disclosures about Watergate while trying to give the appearance of exhaustively examining the case. A 15-minute portion of a March 22 meeting of Nixon, Mitchell and Dean was entirely left out of the White House transcripts. The Judiciary Committee transcript of that portion of the meeting depicts the President in a cover-up frame of mind.

*This is not acceptable —
Colson is acting under express
instructions. Tell Magruder
to talk to me if he has
a problem — H*

G-2000
2/16

Haldeman's reply to Feb. 16, 1972 memo from Strachan describing a disagreement between Colson and Magruder over the former's attacks on Senator Edmund Muskie.

*They prob. re John Dean bid.
P of call that re ride lead on Baker...
(called during the mtg.)*

*Rec: write exec. pres.
of Nelson Dean report*

Haldeman's notes of a March 22, 1973 meeting with Nixon, Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Dean at which Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray's statement that Dean "probably lied" in saying he did not know if E. Howard Hunt had a White House office was discussed.

PRESIDENT: . . . I was going to say, uh, uh, John Dean is, uh, (unintelligible) got—put the fires out, almost got the damn thing nailed down till past the election and so forth. We all know what it is. Embarrassing God damn thing the way it went, and so forth. But, in my view, uh, some of it will come out; we will survive it. That's the way it is. That's the way you've got to look at it.

Significantly, when John Dean claimed before the Ervin committee that Nixon praised his efforts to contain the Watergate affair, the White House denied that Nixon had done so. The transcript, however, clearly shows the President complimenting Dean on his work. In the March 22 conversation, the President seems still to be looking for a way to "put the fires out" without making a full disclosure:

DEAN: We were within a few miles months ago, but, uh, we're—

PRESIDENT: The point is, get the God damn thing over with.

DEAN: That's right.

PRESIDENT: That's the thing to do. That's the other thing I like about this. I'd like to get—But you really would draw the line on

*got 400,000 before election —
at end of 3.28.71 —*

*✓ Brief H & E every int. f. way —
obtain info is as broad as
imagination of man —
① Causing by circumstances —*

Notes made by the President on April 15 meeting at which Dean said that he had gone to the prosecutors.

—But, I know, we can't make a complete cave and have the people go up there and testify. You would agree on that?

► The President stated in August 1973 that he ordered Ehrlichman to investigate the Watergate case after he learned that Dean was unable or unwilling to carry out his inquiry. Ehrlichman testified before the Senate Watergate committee that the orders came at a noon meeting on March 30. But a White House transcript for that meeting shows that, in the words of the committee report, "the only subject discussed was a statement to be issued by Ziegler at a press briefing." The President, Ehrlichman and Ziegler did discuss the possibility of going up before the grand jury but only as a public relations device.

► One of the President's handwritten notes shows that he fretted over the \$350,000 shelled out by Frederick LaRue, a former re-election committee aide, to the Watergate conspirators. "What will LaRue say he got the 350 for?" wrote the President on April 15, 1973—the day when Nixon was told by Prosecutor Henry Petersen that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were guilty of cover-up activities. The exact meaning of Nixon's note is un-

clear. But apparently he was not thinking that telling the simple truth would be the best course for LaRue.

Previously undisclosed evidence reveals a seamy, desperate attempt to pin the blame for the break-in on a couple of vulnerable faithful servants of the President. The White House tried to use Mitchell and Magruder to protect the President and his top aides. The method: secretly tape separate conversations with Mitchell and Magruder and then turn their words against them.

On April 13, 1973, while Magruder was cooperating with the prosecutors, he was called by Lawrence Higby, an aide to Haldeman. According to a transcript of the tape, Higby charged Magruder with leaking information to two reporters. Magruder retorted that that was "just ridiculous," but he went on to implicate both himself and Mitchell: "I've committed perjury so many times now that I'm, uh, you know, I'm, uh, I've got probably a hundred years on perjury alone." Then he talked about his decision to "make a clean breast of things." He added: "Of course, he [Mitchell] will be upset with me because I obviously will implicate John Mitchell." Finally Higby extracted from Magruder exactly whom his testimony would implicate: Dean, Strachan and Mitchell—but not Haldeman and not the President.

This was just what Higby and Haldeman wanted. The next evening, Ehrlichman told the President: "He [Higby] tape recorded this thing. Higby handled it so well that Magruder has closed all his doors now with this tape."

PRESIDENT: What good will that do, John?

EHRlichman: Sir, it beats the socks off him if he ever gets off the reservation.

"Can you use the tape?" the President wanted to know. After some discussion, Haldeman said that, according to Washington, D.C., law, they could.

Also on April 14 Ehrlichman, at Nixon's request, taped a conversation with Mitchell. The apparent purpose: to get Mitchell to admit that he had approved the Watergate break-in and engineered the original cover-up, and thus take the heat off the White House. Mitchell took a commercial flight to Washington that afternoon. Ehrlichman quickly ushered him into his office without giving him a chance to see the President. Also, Ehrlichman pulled a chair close to his desk so that Mitchell would be close to the hidden microphone.

Nixon, Ehrlichman said, would get the credit if Mitchell would only confess his guilt to the U.S. Attorney. But Mitchell proved to be too shrewd to say anything that would incriminate himself. According to a transcript of his conversation, he denied his own guilt and accused the White House of responsibility. "Well let me tell you where I stand," he told Ehrlichman. "Uh, there is no way that I'm going to do anything except staying where I am because I'm too far, uh, far out. Uh, the fact of the matter is that, uh, I got euchred into this thing, when I say, by not paying attention to what those bastards were doing, and uh, well, you know how far back this goes ... this ... whole genesis of this thing was over here—as you're perfectly aware."

That put Ehrlichman, who knew the meeting was being recorded, on the immediate defensive. "No, I didn't know that," he replied.

Some Light on the Origins

The Judiciary Committee evidence shed a bit of light on the origins of Watergate by recounting some of the practices, power relationships and internal rivalries in the Nixon political camp during the months before the break-in and cover-up. What is clear is that the White House kept the tightest control over even the smallest details of President Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign.

The control was exercised by Haldeman. He gave his orders to Strachan, his liaison at the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, who is currently under indictment for covering up the Watergate burglary. A lot of ordinary and extraordinary campaign decisions were made through a long series of "Political Matter" memos that Haldeman got from Strachan; Haldeman indicated a preferred course of action in spe-

cific situations by placing the initial H next to an alternative.

In the memo dated Dec. 2, 1971, with which the evidence begins, Strachan mentioned that "the Attorney General [Mitchell] discussed with John Dean the need to develop a political intelligence capability. Sandwedge [a previously considered plan] has been scrapped." In a memo four days later, Haldeman approved a pay raise, from \$26,000 to \$30,000, for Liddy, who had just shifted over from his job as an Ehrlichman aide to handle political intelligence and legal matters for the re-election committee. In these and later memos, Haldeman approved such trivia as the idea of starting a tabloid for the campaign to get news to the organization, and the request by Maurice Stans, the re-election committee's finance chief, for permission to eat in the White House mess. Haldeman accepted without comment the news that Political Adviser Harry Dent had counseled that President Nixon could break "without undue political flak" an unwritten promise to National Urban League Chief Whitney Young that the Veterans Administration would create \$9 million worth of jobs for blacks. Dent had recommended, Strachan reported, that the funds be used instead for recruiting blacks "who can deliver for the President on Nov. 7, 1972."

Several memos deal with a sensitive topic—money. Both Hal-

5.1 GORDON STRACHAN MEMORANDUM, FEBRUARY 1, 1972

Copy 1 of 2 copies

February 1, 1972

b) In light of the campaign spending legislation, Stans, Kalmbach, and Dean recommend that the 690 in accounts be spread back into legal committees and kept under Finance Chairman Stans' control. The 230 green would be put in a Riggs box with access by any combination of two of the following people: Tom Evans, New York France Raine, Jr. (who Kalmbach wants to use generally in the finance area) -- and Kalmbach. If this recommendation is not accepted Kalmbach is willing to retain personal control of the 900 and run the very high risk of violating the criminal provisions of the campaign spending legislation. Stans is opposed to paying for any polls other than through a correct committee; the risk from using green is just too high. OK

Recommendation:

That the advice of Stans, Kalmbach, and Dean be followed in that the 690 would be put in legal committees; that only the 230 green would be held under Kalmbach's personal control; and that any polling would be paid for by regular Nixon Finance Committees.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Comment _____

Make it 350 green + hold for us

Copy of memo from Strachan to Haldeman.

deman and Strachan used the same slang as the underworld when discussing finances. Zeroes were dropped from large sums; cash is called "green." Wrote Strachan: "Of the 1.2 fund Kalmbach has a balance of 900 [meaning \$900,000]—plus under his personal control." Strachan presented to Haldeman the recommendation of Stans, Dean and Herbert Kalmbach, the President's private lawyer and a major fund raiser, that "690" be put in legal committees and that "only the 230 green would be held under Kalmbach's personal control." Haldeman approved with his "H," and in a handwritten note at the bottom of the page told Strachan to "make it 350 green and hold for us."

No theme emerged from the evidence with more regularity than that of hear no evil. When Sloan, the treasurer of the re-election campaign, asked Stans about Liddy's request for \$83,000, Stans replied: "I do not know what's going on in this campaign and I don't think you ought to try to know." And when Liddy, depressed because his plan for the burglary seemed to be getting nowhere, approached Dean early in 1972, Dean gave him a moral stiff-arm: "Well, Gordon, you recall that we're not going to talk about that."

The Crack in Ehrlichman's Stonewall

For John Ehrlichman, it was a hang-tough defense all the way. On trial in federal court in Washington for authorizing the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office in September 1971 and then lying about his participation, Ehrlichman conceded nothing. Not only did he deny approving the break-in but he claimed that he did not even know about it until after it happened. Yet the weight of evidence—many memos and recalled conversations—counted against him. Last week, after a little more than three hours' deliberation, the jury found him guilty of conspiracy and three counts of perjury. The other, lesser defendants—G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio Martinez—were also convicted of conspiracy.

Euphemistic Exchange. Ehrlichman is the highest official of the Nixon Administration to be convicted so far of Watergate-related crimes. Due to be sentenced on July 31 by Gerhard A. Gesell, the U.S. district judge who conducted the trial, he could receive a prison term of up to 25 years; each of the co-defendants could be given a maximum of ten years. Ehrlichman announced that he would appeal the decision, repeating his earlier contention that he could not get a fair trial in Washington, a city that is heavily Democratic and preponderantly black. (His jury was composed of nine blacks and three whites.) He also complained that a "great deal of the substance and background of this case has been excluded by rulings of the court," a reference to Judge Gesell's rejection of national security as a defense.

Unable to fall back on national security, Ehrlichman based his defense on

the claim that he had never specifically ordered a break-in but only a "covert" operation that would give the White House "plumbers" access to Ellsberg's psychiatric files. The two former White House aides in charge of the plumbers—David Young and Egil Krogh—testified that they had discussed the operation only in general terms with Ehrlichman, their immediate boss. In a delicate exchange of euphemisms, they were careful never to utter such words as "entry" or "burglary." Nevertheless, said Krogh, "it was clear to me, at any rate, that an entry operation would be necessary to examine the files."

Other witnesses brought Ehrlichman closer to the commission of the crime. Charles Colson testified that only a few days before the break-in, Ehrlichman had asked him to raise \$5,000 immediately for a plumbers' operation. Ehrlichman told Colson of a project to get derogatory information about Ellsberg. Colson would then have to devise a game plan to spread the dirt. After the burglary, said Colson, Ehrlichman admitted to him: "The boys tried to get Ellsberg's psychiatric papers. They failed."

General Robert E. Cushman Jr., commandant of the Marine Corps, told the court how Ehrlichman had phoned him several times about a White House operation. Ehrlichman first asked Cushman, who was then serving as deputy director of the CIA, to give some assistance to E. Howard Hunt, one of the White House plumbers who was a field manager of the burglary. Later, when Cushman was instructed by the CIA to write a report on his contacts with Hunt, Ehr-

lichman phoned him with another request: Keep White House names out of his memo. Cushman obliged.

Ehrlichman's defense received some help from high places. In response to written interrogatories, President Nixon stated that he had urged the plumbers' operations to be kept secret. He thus implied that Ehrlichman was acting on presidential orders when he tried to conceal the break-in and was not just maneuvering to camouflage his own role.

Three Noes. The most dramatic defense witness was Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. On the day of his testimony, people queued up as early as 4 a.m. to try to get a seat in the courtroom. Those few who succeeded were disappointed. Kissinger was on the stand for less than two minutes as he answered three questions. No, he had not authorized David Young to request a psychological profile of Ellsberg from the CIA. No, he had not known that one was being assembled. No, he had not been aware of a plan to obtain information from Ellsberg's psychiatrist. That succinct testimony by the Secretary of State ran counter to Young's assertion that both Kissinger and Ehrlichman had asked for the profile.

With his wife Jeanne and their five children observing in court, Ehrlichman took the stand in his own defense. He emphasized that he had nothing illegal in mind when he approved the covert operation. "My mind didn't dwell on the various possibilities. I didn't run over possible means or methods."

In his summation to the jury, Assistant Special Prosecutor William Merrill said that it was not necessary to prove that Ehrlichman had ordered a break-in. It was sufficient to show that he had approved a covert operation to

JOHN EHRLICHMAN ARRIVING AT FEDERAL COURT IN WASHINGTON WITH WIFE JEANNE & THEIR FIVE CHILDREN




get the information. William S. Frates, Ehrlichman's chief defense counsel, indignantly objected. "They're trying to make you the jury believe that the word covert is an illegal operation. It doesn't mean illegal."

In his charge to the jury, Judge Gesell emphatically supported the prosecution's argument. To conduct an illegal search, he said, a "physical break-in is not essential." All that had to be proved was an "intrusion or exploration by governmental agents of an area which one would normally expect to be private." One of Ehrlichman's attorneys, Andrew C. Hall, protested that the judge's charge was too favorable to the prosecution. Beyond that, said Hall, Gesell's "facial expressions and demeanor" during the trial had been harmful to the defense. But the tart-tongued jurist replied that there had not been much of a defense. It had been mainly a matter of "dodging around various issues of the case." Given Gesell's charge, the jury had little choice but to find Ehrlichman guilty of conspiracy.

"Selective Memory." The case against Ehrlichman for lying was, if anything, even more solidly supported. In testimony to a Watergate grand jury and to the FBI he had denied any involvement in various stages of the Ellsberg operation. But several memos indicated that he had not told the truth. Throughout the trial, he demonstrated what Prosecutor Merrill called a "selective memory": he had no trouble recalling episodes that might help his defense, but forgot incidents that might damage him.

Like Ehrlichman, the other three conspirators had been stripped of a plausible defense because they could not plead national security. In an eloquent final argument for Barker and Martinez, Attorney Daniel Schultz portrayed them as "little men" who had been victimized by their cynical and sophisticated superiors in Washington. They had been led to believe that they were acting on the highest patriotic principles. Countered Merrill: "People cannot be allowed to violate the law because they are told it is right. That's not patriotism. It's anarchy—the beginning of a police state."

Ehrlichman took the verdict without flinching, commenting: "I have for years had an abiding confidence in the American judicial system. Nothing that has happened today has shaken that confidence. I look forward to complete exoneration." But his options have been sharply limited. For all his surface composure he may soon be persuaded that he can no longer hang tough and stonewall. He still faces two more trials: one in California for perjury in connection with the Ellsberg case, one in Washington for his role in the Watergate cover-up. With the prospect of receiving stiff sentences from unsympathetic judges, he may choose to start telling more of what he knows about Watergate. If he does make a deal, he might topple some other top White House dominoes.



SENATOR ERVIN HOLDS UP THE 10-LB. "WARMED-OVER BALONEY" GIVEN HIM BY COLLEAGUES

The Ervin Committee's Last Hurrah

The Senate Watergate committee passed quietly into history last week—and with it an extraordinary episode in congressional annals. Having accomplished its primary objective—to inform the U.S. public about the facts and dimensions of the Watergate case—the committee bequeathed the continuing investigation to a host of other legislative and judicial bodies. But before it expired, it issued one last broadside: a 350-page staff report alleging, among other things, that leftover campaign funds had been used by President Nixon's good friend C.G. ("Bebe") Rebozo to pay for various major improvements to the Nixon properties at Key Biscayne and for a pair of platinum-set diamond earrings that the President gave to Pat in 1972 for her 60th birthday.

Then, finally, on a warm summer day, the committee assembled for a closing ceremony in the marbled Old Senate Caucus Room. At the long table sat the Senators and key staff members, like a senior class on graduation day. Only four of the committee's seven members were present: Chairman Sam Ervin, Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Joseph M. Montoya and Daniel K. Inouye. Vice Chairman Howard H. Baker Jr. was home in Tennessee; Herman E. Talmadge was busy elsewhere; and Edward J. Gurney was beset by troubles of his own (see story page 37).

Attention focused naturally on Sam Ervin, now serving the last of his 20 years in the Senate. Through some ten weeks of televised hearings last summer, he had become, at the end of his career,

a folk hero, a landmark of integrity. As TIME Correspondent Stanley Cloud observed last week: "Sam Ervin hadn't been discovered as a result of Watergate; he had simply been there waiting, as though his entire life had been a preparation for this final service."

After paying tribute to his colleagues and to the committee staff, Ervin was presented with a 10-lb. sausage by Committee Counsel Samuel Dash, in recognition of White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler's denunciation of the committee's special report on Rebozo as "warmed-over baloney." Then Sam Ervin delivered a short speech, quoting right and left from his favorite writings, and it was over.

Without Demagoguery. Whatever its weaknesses—excessive leaking and petty rivalries—the committee accomplished its basic task. After a year and a half of existence, it had spent about \$2 million of the public's money, produced 13 volumes and 5,858 pages of testimony and exhibits, and written a three-volume 2,217-page final report. Without engaging in demagoguery and without acting as prosecutor or persecutor, the committee had laid out the basic story of Watergate as clearly and fully as it could. Moreover, it had largely carried out this task in public, so that the American people would be able to make their own decisions about who was telling the truth and who was not.

The committee's special report on Bebe Rebozo's expenditures was not particularly important for the amounts of money involved. Compared with the

abuses of power already documented in the Watergate affair, for example, the allegation that Rebozo spent \$4,562.38 in leftover campaign funds for earrings for Pat Nixon would not ordinarily have been of much consequence. But it was perceived as a vivid symbol, calling immediately to mind a much younger Richard Nixon who bragged on television that his wife wore only a "respectable Republican cloth coat." Strategically, the allegation was also important to investigators because it helped them trace the means by which much of Nixon's campaign funds had apparently been "laundered."

The report alleges that the \$4,562.38 portion of the \$5,650 spent on the earrings was originally derived from campaign funds and that Bebe Rebozo attempted to disguise the money's source by transferring it in and out of four separate Florida bank accounts. The \$4,562.38, the report charges, was part of \$6,000 that Rebozo withdrew on April 15, 1969, from the Florida Nixon for President Committee account in the Key Biscayne Bank and Trust Company—which he heads—and immediately deposited in a trust account in the name of his lawyer, Thomas H. Wakefield.

Nice Discount. Then, on June 28, 1972, the report continues, Rebozo (or his lawyer) transferred \$4,562.38 to another Wakefield trust account in the Key Biscayne bank, immediately transferred \$5,000 from this account to still another Wakefield trust account in the First National Bank of Miami, and finally bought a \$5,000 cashier's check payable to New York Jeweler Harry Winston—all in the same day.

The rest of the cost of the \$5,650 earrings was covered by two personal checks—one from Richard Nixon (for \$560), the other from his personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods (for \$90). The sale was apparently made by Winston's man in Washington, the late Don Carnavale, who was a close friend of Miss Woods. The earrings, containing 20 diamonds, were delivered to a presidential aide, Lieut. Commander Alex Larzelere, and the bill was marked "Please send to Rose Mary Woods." The earrings were subsequently appraised by Carnavale at \$9,000—indicating that Winston gave Nixon a nice discount.

Rebozo admitted to the committee that the \$4,562.38 had originated from campaign funds, but maintained that it was a proper reimbursement to him of money he had spent on campaign costs. The Ervin committee saw the transaction differently. "This complex four-stage process of payment for this gift," declared its report, "concealed the fact that the funds originated from contributions to the 1968 campaign and were ultimately used by Rebozo on behalf of President Nixon."

The report also charges that Rebozo used various trust accounts (again in the name of Thomas Wakefield or his law firm) for the deposit and transfer of

at least \$20,000 in \$100 bills, and that these funds were subsequently used to pay for part of the \$45,621.15 in improvements to the Nixons' Key Biscayne properties. These improvements included a new swimming pool and accessories, a fireplace, a putting green and a billiard table.

Whether specific laws were violated in the alleged use of campaign funds for private purposes is subject to varying legal interpretations. But certainly such funds would be taxable, and there is no record that the committee could find showing that the President paid any income tax on them. Nor, according to the committee, is there any record that Rebozo filed a required U.S. gift tax return for 1969, 1970, 1971 or 1972 on any improvements of more than \$3,000 that he may have made to Nixon properties from his own funds. The committee noted that the only record of a reimbursement to Rebozo by the President had been a check for \$13,642.52, issued in August 1973 at a time when Rebozo's affairs were being actively investigated by the Internal Revenue Service as well as by the Watergate committee itself.

Indeed, Rebozo seems to have conducted his business affairs with consistent vagueness. When asked by the Watergate committee earlier this year whether he had ever been reimbursed for bills that he paid for improvements to the Nixon properties, he replied: "Yes, I say, usually, I'm not going to nitpick with the President. If there's something I think he should have, I might just go ahead and do it without even him knowing about it. He just doesn't concern himself at all with financial problems; never has."


The committee failed in what had been a primary purpose of the Rebozo investigation: to establish a definite link between Rebozo's expenditures on the President's behalf and the \$100,000 campaign contribution from Billionaire Howard Hughes. The report alleges but does not prove that, contrary to Rebozo's sworn testimony, he did not leave the Hughes contribution intact in a safe-deposit box for three years before returning it to a Hughes representative in June 1973. As previously reported, the President's former lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach, told the committee that Rebozo had told him that he gave part of the \$100,000 to the President's brothers, Edward and F. Donald Nixon, to Miss Woods, and to "unnamed others."

Special Account. The report contains some fascinating details about Rebozo's role as a part-time political fund raiser. In February 1969, according to a White House memorandum, Nixon asked Rebozo to solicit Billionaire J. Paul Getty in London for "major" campaign contributions—only a few months after he had completed his victorious campaign for the presidency. Getty subsequently contributed \$125,000 to the 1972 Republican campaign. In early



ED STEINER

PRESIDENT'S WIFE WEARING BIRTHDAY GIFT



THE PRESIDENCY/HUGH SIDNEY

The Man with the Wry Eye

Up until now, Henry Kissinger may have had more fun than almost anybody else on this earth.

Hard work—sure. Moments of anger and frustration—certainly. But for the most part, as he has gone about his remarkable rounds he has produced a lot of peace, and injected quite a bit of good sense, all the while casting a wry eye over the singular doings of mankind.

A growing worry in Washington is that President Nixon, to ease his own crisis, is allowing his Secretary of State to drift into the Watergate mess, a situation that would bring Kissinger's resignation if it impaired his effectiveness. But even that problem has not yet dampened Kissinger's special style.

When it seemed that millions of people would give their left arms for tickets to the World Cup soccer match, Kissinger came up with some choice seats without any strain. He ordered his jet to take a detour for one game, and was lifted by Luft-waffe helicopter to the playing field. When he got to his hotel in Munich for the finals, there was a call waiting for him from Elizabeth Taylor. "She wanted to get a briefing on the European Security Conference," he said, the old Kissinger grin growing wide above his chins.

The other night Kissinger devoured roast goose in a Bavarian restaurant. The discreet Secretary surveyed the bosomy waitresses, and after some hasty calculation observed that if those particular girls had not served the dinner, the hosts would have had to increase the guest list by 30% just to fill the room.

A few days before, he had stood fascinated on the lush grounds of the Black Sea dacha of Leonid Brezhnev as the Soviet Communist chief demonstrated the collapsible glass wall around his Olympic-sized swimming pool, which Kissinger was repeatedly asked to swim in. Kissinger has listened to Brezhnev "order" him to Siberia for failing to yield enough in negotiations. His comeback: "I should be a member of the Politburo since I meet with you guys so much." Kissinger came away from a negotiating session with the Soviets and said, "I would do anything for caviar—and I may have."

Usually Kissinger travels in a 707 jet that is just as big and just as plush as Nixon's. The Secretary's bulletproof limousine precedes him by air, as does a crew of advance men. Almost any service can be obtained for the Secretary in almost any place, his fame preceding him with amazing results.

He called for a massage in Israel recently. "You can say anything you want to about Jewish intellectual attainments," he reported, "but that guy almost killed me." When he asked the masseur what he thought about disengagement with Syria, the man said he was for it. Then Kissinger asked him how many kilometers he thought Israel ought to give up, and the masseur hammered the Secretary a little harder and said, "Absolutely none."

Reporters discovered only recently that Kissinger is fascinated by soccer, and as a boy in Germany played goalie until he broke his hand. Then he shifted to forward. Somebody asked him if he had been fast. Kissinger thought a moment. "I wasn't so fast, but I was tricky."

Like Nixon, Kissinger has found that sports and politics have much in common. So a while back when East Germany was still in world soccer contention, he sidled up to a Soviet bigwig. "I'll bet I know one team that you don't want to win," said the smiling Kissinger. "East Germany, because if they win they will be more trouble than ever." The Russian roared and slapped Kissinger on the back for displaying such wisdom in the ways of this wacky world.



ED STEWART

BEBE REBOZO IN MIAMI
A proper reimbursement?

1969, Rebozo established a special account in his Key Biscayne bank to pay for what he described as "Administration-connected costs"; this was the account from which the "earring" funds were withdrawn on June 28, 1972.

The special report on Rebozo and his friends was but one part of the complete report that the Senate Watergate committee issued. Within this exhaustive document, based on the testimony and other evidence, are 35 suggestions for governmental reform.

Spending Ceiling. Among these would be the establishment of an office of "public attorney"—a sort of permanent version of the Special Watergate Prosecutor—who would prosecute criminal cases involving conflicts of interest within the Executive Branch. The committee favored setting up a nonpartisan elections commission to enforce statutes governing campaign contributions and expenditures. It proposed that cash contributions by an individual be limited to \$100; that total contributions by any person to a presidential candidate be limited to \$6,000; and that the overall spending in any presidential campaign be limited to an amount equal to 12¢ for every citizen of voting age. (This would hold the 1976 campaign funds to approximately \$17 million.)

At the closing ceremony last week, a reporter asked Sam Ervin why the committee had failed to state in its report any conclusions about the responsibility for the Watergate scandal. Ervin replied that it was possible to draw a picture of a horse in two ways. You could draw the picture of a horse, with a very good likeness. Or you could draw the picture and write under it, "This is a horse." Well, said Sam Ervin, "we just drew the picture."

GREETING WIFE NANCY ON RETURN LAST WEEK

