

On 15 - New Green Miami
outfit - Martiney

Had Hunt not taken steps to solidify his position so he could drive a hard bargain the situation ~~wame~~ close to permitting it. He had too much on too many. Colson also saw it this way. In his ~~Bast~~ conversations he said of Hunt that "He had everybody under his thumb by the time he was through." (New Times 7/26/74)

The Ties that Bound - the Enduring and the New

Hunt blackmailed Nixon, as even Nixon acknowledged when it served his purpose. Dean spelled it out in this blunt language. Colson, who was involved, tried to describe it as something else. But Nixon's own editing of his own transcripts of his own tapes, especially those of the period of Hunt's going into the stock-market, leave no doubt about this.

More reason that we have seen, going back to their common past in their common project for which Nixon claimed credit, the Bay of Pigs, is not needed. Nixon and Hunt could not have been strangers beginning a decade before Nixon became President and while he while Vice President and Eisenhower's "action officer" ~~on the Hunt~~ which roughly matches Hunt's role for the CIA. Cashman, who had known Hunt and shared an office in CIA, was an added common bond between Hunt and Nixon in those days as he was later, when Hunt went to work in Nixon's White House and for Nixon's own projects. Cashman never admitted this in his many trips to Congressional witness stands and hide it with such care before the Watergate committee his deception cannot have been accidental. This gave him still another claim on Nixon, who made him Commandant of the Marines.

Both were involved in Hunt's dirty-works for Nixon only some of which that was suppressed in the official investigations we have heretofore uncovered. The burglaries of official Chilean installations is one example. Another is the ripoff of the NAACP New York City office. Fiorini's dark Hints are not without substantiation.

Hunt knew he was ^{paid} apaid by executive-agency appropriations to do political work for Nixon, if his anti-democratic operations can be ~~ax~~ characterized as no more than "political" in its most disgusting sense. He was paid by HEW to do a campaign promotion for Nixon involving Julie, Nixon's daughter. He was paid by Mullen, which got its money for this from that non-competitive HEW contract, for all the "full-time" work he did for Nixon on those countless other projects, like framing the assassinated JFK with a responsibility he did not have for the Diem-Nhu assassination, the faking of cables; for the Ellsberg-fielding break-in; for the attack on Ellsberg and others at the Hoover funefal (in both of these anti-democratic Nixon projects the Cubans also were paid by White House funds);

Meanwhile, he had the CIA-Mullen connection going far back, to before Nixon's election; Bennett, himself CIA as was the Mullen agency, had been behind some of the dirtier of these dirty doing and involved in others. And Bennett was the son of a Senator who was also a Nixon friend/ and supporter. Mullen and Bennett and their and Hunt's CIA connections complicated this and Nixon's situation very much, as did Hunt's personal knowledge of the White House demanding and getting, through Hunt, special political services from the CIA that are in open violation of the law. Hunt knew that the demands had been from the White House and that the demands were illegal. At the very beginning, before any of this was known- and all of it never came out - Nixon was very vulnerable to exposure. ^{its} It gave him another pressure point.

the anti-Teddy Kennedy Chappaquiddick efforts, ranging from research in the White House to the DeMotte effort to get smear stuff and paralleling Ehrlichman's attempts with Ulaseqicz through Caulfield, also paid for with public funds and successful in that Tony, pretending to be a reporter, planted all the dirty, prejudicial questions; The burglary of the Greenspun safe; the planning of the CREEP spy and smear operations, in which he worked with the Nixon alumnus Liddy; the planning of the actual June 17, 1972 break-in and that before it; the recruiting of goons and thugs to bedevil McGovern's convention and to build sympathy for Nixon at the later one in which his re-nomination was as certain as the sun-moon cycle; his directorship of the Segretti vile fakes that successfully split the Democratic contenders and blackened them all; the penetration of the Muskie and ~~Humphrey~~ McGovern headquarters with spies who stole political materials of value to Nixon; the plot to bug McGovern and the recruiting of Tom Gregory, planted inside two Democratic camps for these intrusions into political life that subverts the whole election process; the Dita Beard job, in which, ridiculously decked out in CIA disguise or not he did get her to falsely deny her truthful and accurate memo that said ITT had bought its way into the Nixon future with that \$400,000 promise (with the still unresolved perjuries over this before the Senate Judiciary committee), an uncharged obstruction of justice; those other bag jobs never officially investigated and so consistent with these and other Nixon lusts and operations, including Democratic Chairman Straus's home and the Shriver-Harris law offices; the plot to frame Democratic Chairman O'Brien with a bum Hughes rap-smear in which Haldeman personally was also involved; the recruiting of the Cuban burglars and propagandists; and so many more, so many of a propaganda nature, like the promoting of the Nixon Haiphong speech in which he tried to justify the bestial attacks on North Vietnam.

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With these for openers and all of the period where Hunt was working full-time for Nixon with full-time pay from Mullen which got the money from HEW, is there need to complete the catalogue of Hunt-Nixon crimes and connections which Hunt alone of all Nixon's dirty-workers could use to blackmail Nixon?

Only his most trusted and closest, Haldeman, Colson and Ehrlichman, his most devoted, were in a better position to blackmail Nixon. There are indications that, with more

Being privvy to all the CIA's illegalities for Nixon and being part of the Nixon plot to frame the CIA with blame for his Watergate burglary and other jobs, which the so-called Baker report tried to carry forward, gave Hunt first-hand knowledge, the most admissable testimony for any use, in hearings or in court. It gave him something else to keep silent about in return for pay and other favors, still another way of blackmailing Nixon into bribing him for which Nixon had the most urgent need. Had this whole story been dumped on the country to begin with, before it gradually grew shock-proof as revelation followed numbing revelation, the strength of the reaction would have compelled immediate action with rapid impeachment a probability.

subtlety and without detection, Ehrlichman did.

Bribery is a crime controlled by intent on either part. All the attention, when so belatedly there was any attention, was to that March 21 payoff after Hunt laid it on Colson and Bittman followed through O'Brien. But Hunt's leaning on Nixon did not begin at that late date. ^{It} began immediately the five were arrested. This is another aspect only partly reported and never put together in either the reporting or in any of the investigations. Putting the arm on Nixon is the first thing Hunt did. They he ~~was~~ "disappeared," not to return until he had been provided with counsel he could not begin to pay - one of Washington largest and most prestigious firms. The size of the known payments and the allegation that of this most expensive legal talent 15 lawyers out in 2,600 hours for Hunt are ample proof that there was no way ^Hunt could undertake any relationship with the likes of Hogan & ^Hartson without known underwriting or that the firm would consider investing ~~the~~ 2,600 hours of lawyers time without assurances that it would be paid. With his retirement pay and no job there was no prospect Hunt could pay them.

3A
only
These are/the more visible manifestations of an immediate Nixon-Hunt deal, as the foregoing catalogue is only part of the pressure ^Hunt could apply on Nixon. Once he and his wife started handling Nixon's bribery of the others they could really lean on him. ^{If} If Hunt opened his mouth Nixon was done. Hunt's closed mouth alone is enough to account for Nixon's two years of unimpeachment. And for Nixon's "compassion" for him alone - for a man then wealthy but not for the agent whose wife had to hock her jewels or for the other not wealthy Cubans all of ~~whom~~ had problems ever so much more acute than Hunt's.

Of the many other proofs of this blackmail and the fact that it had the intent to bribe into silence and accomplished that purpose, several interrelated crimes plus Nixon's own representations are relevant. There are other proofs, but these make the point of showing what Hunt did that was suppressed in the investigations and account for Nixon's once-secret remarks, reactions and orders.

What ^Hunt did, which correlates with what ^Pat Gray did after pressure by Ehrlichman and Dean, has never been explained. Spme has been reported without being given meaning.

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Hunt was not a clever operator, despite his vaunting self-concept and the self-glorification of all those cheap novels in which he is the unhidden hero. He got away with all the things he didn't mess up - like ending the slight chance of success the Day of Pigs operation had by intruding outdated, authoritarian political demands - only because the odds are with sneaks and crooks and because he had real power behind him. His operations for Nixon were misbegotten and failures when they succeeded. In the closest approximation of a "success," getting Dita Beard to lie for Nixon, Kleindienst, good old ITT at al, he accomplished only slight delay and was soon exposed personally.

There was one flash of brilliance, one strategem that was so fast it has to have been impulsive, not the result of deliberate thinking. And it worked. With it he hooked Nixon and all those closest to him before they had begun to get control over themselves after the stunning news of the arrest of their gang the early morning of June 17, 1973.

Before adding to what we have seen of these first Hunt moves, let us prepare by recaptulating them.

~~After his first nervous reaction~~

Perhaps it was because Hunt had no time to think, because he acted out all those years of spook training, all that thinking of cheap spy novels, without his farout beliefs having time to take over, that he could ~~pull~~ conceive and pull off what he did. It ~~is~~ genuinely daring. It was the stuff of the real James Bonds. Wheter or not so,

After his first nervous reaction - and there is nothing to be ashamed of in his flight to Baldwin's toilet because he knew he had messed up an operatoon that could for the first time kic an American President out and perhaps into jail - he was a real pro. He started planting evidence against Nixon and involving Nixon, simultaneously exercising control over ~~ixxxx~~ his bomb while the fuse he lit was burning inexorably to that great blast.

We know that he went to his Mullen and White House offices, that he got Caddy, that ge took enough money from his White House safe so that, with what he had on him, he was not broke after he gave Caddy \$8,500. He had enough for all that travelling we have reconstructed. And he liked to and did live well in his travels. We know that he

alerted the White House by 4 a.m., a secret though all the investigations and his public appearances. Mrs. Barker was set to going on the silly cover story for Caddy that collapsed of its own weight, not a brilliant ploy. We know that aside from any other warnings, tips or advice Szulc told him the inevitable had ^{already} happened, that he and the Cubans had their past links connected. We know that is his initial panic he left all sorts of incriminating evidence to be found on the first search, like his own check in Barker's room and all the crazy identifications and addressbooks of the Cubans.

We do not know what if anything he took from his White House office. This is the wrong thinking that made covering up possible. The key is not what he took but what he left and what he planted there. What he planted tied the White House to the break-in and the bugging. He took ^{and planted} an attache case of McCord's electronic gear there and left it while sending McCord's truck and all the gear Baldwin had out to Mrs. McCord with Baldwin as the driver. Of the countless proofs he was careful to leave, three that are known tied him and the White House together and ~~him~~ bound Nixon to all his dirty-works for Nixon. These are his pay and expense records, which include proofs of when he travelled where; that whole files of secret Vietnam cables, including all the steps in his faking a case against JFK; and those notebooks Dean belatedly admitted destroying, which Hunt said would provide an investigative lead to everything he did, every contact he had.

Without doubt ^{bt} there was more. But these four alone impaled Nixon so securely no more was needed.

What we have also seen is that Hunt went back to his White House office the first regular working day, before he scammed until the July 4 weekend. There is no evidence that he then removed anything. But he did leave the message for Colson, whose secretary had the combination of Hunt's safe - which also hooked Colson - that the safe was loaded and had best be emptied. This meant disaster if it wasn't done and greater disaster if it was and was detected, for that would be an extra and more dangerous obstruction of justice.

Colson and his secretary kept it secret that they had the safe combination. Instead they protected themselves and hid the closeness of the Hunt connection. This meant that the safe had to be cracked. In turn that involved others, GSA experts. This made records and witnesses. Trouble, for Nixon, Colson and others.

The real - the lingering - question is did Gray ever tell the truth in any of the contradictory versions to which he swore.

These others are those who had to become involved, including Ehrlichman, Pat Gray, Dean and his assistant, Fred Fielding.

Ehrlichman denies Dean's story that he told Dean to "deep six" Hunt's remaining records but there seems little doubt of the order and its refusal. Dean and Gray tell consistent stories, if anything Gray ever said can be believed. His last admission of repetitious lying was when he was before the Watergate committee, where he admitted lying to the Judiciary committee and lying when he said he was telling the truth after stopping lying, and lying to his friend and supporter, the trusting Senator Weicher.

EA
Gray's last story is that he destroyed whatever he destroyed when he burned his Christmas refuse at his Connecticut home after the 1972 holiday. His earlier admission is that he put it in his FBI desk's burn basket.

What is by no means certain is what he took from Dean to destroy and what he did destroy.

In his Watergate committee testimony (9H3473ff) Gray testified to burning two Hunt files. "Because of the instructions I had received from Messrs. Dean and Ehrlichman when the two files were given to me, and my absolute conviction ~~since~~ that, tinged with political and national security implications had nothing whatsoever to do with Watergate" and "because my brief look at the file of State Department cables had confirmed for me what I thought were overwhelming considerations of national security." (9H3470) Nixon's person choice to head the FBI seems never to have thought of returning these cables to the State Department or to have asked himself or anyone else why xeroxes of original had to be burned. His answer to everything was "the thought never entered my mind," swell credentials for heading the FBI.

Not until Ehrlichman leaned on him several times April 15, 1973 and Petersen told him the next day that Dean had told the prosecutors of giving Gray these hunt files to destroy (9H3470) did the "thought" enter Gray's mind that he should do something. He sought to see Weicher. (9H3471) but "failed to tell Senator Weicher all the facts."

Gray claims the file he did glance at "implicated officials of the Kennedy Administration in the assassination of President Diem. ^{9H} (9H33526)

footnote to first mention Dean's sentencing

(On August 2,
(Judge Sirica, also known as "Maximum John", after being argued with stringly by
both the Special Prosecutor and Dean's counsel, gave Dean a sentence of not less than
one and up to four years. The maximum sentence of five years, which he apparently intended
to mete out, would be the same as that of John Ehrlichman on a series of charges in the
Ellsberg break-in. Unlike Ehrlichman, who stonewalled, deceived and lied, Dean was the
most cooperative of witnesses, the man who had told more to more bodies than any other,
the man responsible for most disclosures. In wruing for a lighter sentence, the special
prosecutor emphasized the help Dean had been but to slight avail. What Sirica did is to
guarantee that Dean, who had some justification in having been counsel to the White
House, might serve a longer sentence than Ehrlichman and would serve a longer period than
a number of others, like Krogh and Magruder. It was hardly a sentence to encourage others
to come forward and confess what they could. Nor was it a sentence to encourage witnesses
to cooperate with the Senate impeachment trial then in prospect.)

The first of the four numbered subjects of this message to Nixon is the relevant one, although the others have significance, too: "I hope you understand that my actions are motivated by total loyalty to you & to the Presidency. If that is not clear now, I believe it will become clear."

(The last was very good advice the significance of which was ignored by the investigations but it is advice that Nixon took: "You should take your counsel from Henry Petersen who I assure you doesn't want the Presidency hurt." (3H1313)

Plug-puller or not, this is the real John Dean. He said what he had to and no more. It hurt Nixon but it did not expose all Dean could have, about Nixon or about himself. Witness his not testifying to his destruction of the Hunt notebooks or to the break-in at the Chilean offices.

In this forgotten testimony that was never followed up about what Gray had and what he destroyed there is intertwined information on the ~~skunksmelling~~ bribery and about Colson and his hidden relations with Hunt. Dean laid it all out in his initial sworn statement. (3H911ff)

It is Colson who was really worried about the contents of Hunt's safe. Colson was more closely connected with Hunt and his work than ever indicated or than Colson admitted. And Colson is the only one in the White House Hunt really trusted. When Hunt was not working directly for Colson he supplied him with copious memos on what he was doing and his opinions of others with whom he worked.

Dean "had seen Hunt on many occasions in Colson's office." (3H921) ^hhe does not testify to having seen him elsewhere. Unless Hunt was there only when Dean was, Hunt was there more than "on many occasions."

As soon as he started his checking around Colson denied all knowledge or connection but admitted that ~~over the weekend~~ ^{with} Ehrlichman had spoken to him earlier regarding Mr. Hunt, earlier during the weekend, and Colson said that we should get together with Ehrlichman as soon as possible." (3H932) When he asked (Colson if Hunt still worked for him" Colson "became very defensive" [Dean also said "he protested too much"] denied it, and asked Dean to learn if Hunt were still on the payroll. (3H933) And what gets back to the disinterest of the official investigators, Hunt's having notified the White

When Gray testified to destroying this file, regardless of the variants in his
cunning story and his explanations of his shifts, it was believed. ¹It was a shocking
thing: the head of the FBI personally destroying evidence and obstructing justice-
and confessing?

^This, too, is without ^{known}precedent.

But there is reason to believe that he did not destroy the file of cables and the
fake ¹unt made.

This takes us back to John Dean's testimony that, aside from its general thrust,
is largely forgotten. It is as jammed with subtleties as it is with facts. It also
withstood the most vigorous examination and an enormous Nixonian campaign against him
and it. It is tested testimony.

John Dean was never really understood. It is know^N/and accepted that he was Nixon's
loyal field commander in the cover-up campaign and that when he had no alternative he
went to the prosecutors and made the best possible deal for himself. This required that
he testify and he did thereafter testify, in private, in public¹ and before the Watergate
committee. What is not understood is that after Dean went to the prosecutors and while
he was testifying he remained a Nixon loyalist, as best he could while preserving himself,
and working to earn the shortest possible sentence. 7A
~~when he testified and~~

One of the more comprehensible clues to ^{Dean's}his intent to help Nixon all he could
while looking out for himself, is one of his memos, not something he created for
use in testimony. When The Watergate showed signs of bursting in early 1973, Dean,
who had been to the prosecutors, phoned Larry Higby, Haldeman's assistant, ~~Nixon's~~
~~xxxxxxx~~
~~xxxxxxx~~
~~xxxxxxx~~
~~xxxxxxx~~
~~xxxxxxx~~
xxxxxxx phoned xxxxxx Nixon through xxxxxx with a message for Nixon. Higby was also to
inform Ehrlichman because part related to him. (34 B13)

Shortly after that 8:15 call of April 15, 1973, a Sunday night, Dean was asked to
go see Nixon in his Executive Office Building office. That, naturally, is one of the
"missing" tapes. Nixon took it seriously, though he was then about to fire ^Dean.

House before dawn the morning of the arrests, after Bittman became Hunt's lawyer Bittman told Dean "that Hunt and Colson spoke on the weekend of June 17-18, and that Hunt had told Colson to get the materials out of his safe - Hunt's - office safe." (3H933)

Hunt was true to Colson and did not testify to this. He testified to telling Colson's secretary only. Colson never admitted this conversation with Hunt. It conforms to what Hunt did not say until his second Buckley show, that of May 12, 1974 - almost two years after the fact.- that he had warned the White House immediately.

This also means that before Hunt spoke to Joan Hall he had told Colson that his safe was loaded with "dynamite."

Dean's testimony was about ^{the morning of} June 19, the first working day after the weekend. Before Hunt was back to warn Colson through his secretary. He then testified to an afternoon meeting prior to which Ehrlichman called Mr. Bruce Kehrli and requested that he bring Hunt's personnel records up to Ehrlichman's office." (3H934) (Dean believed that cover story Colson concocted "required some alteration of the records, he said on the next page.)

Colson was hung up on the contents of Hunt's safe but he was also determined not to do what he alone could do, unknown to the others - just go in and empty it: "Before Kehrli arrived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson, without getting specific, said it was imperative that someone get the contents of Hunt's safe." Dean was designated. (3H934) With Colson silent they decided ~~to~~ ^{they} they would have to have GSA open the safe. Colson said it would have to be done immediately." (3H935)

What Colson was so anxious about was done that day, the contents were "secured in Kehrli'd office overnight," and the middle of the next morning, Tuesday, June 20 "the GSA men brought several cartons to my office," the Hunt safe's contents. (3H937) In addition to these cartons of materials there was a handgun that had been loaded and "a large briefcase containing electronic equipment." (3H937)

Dean then gave a description of the documents: "...classified cables from the State Department relating to the early years of the ^{war in} Vietnam. ~~was~~ These were separated from the rest of the papers. The other papers I assumed related to Hunt's work at the White House. Also there were personal papers. ...First among the personal papers were copies of his submissions for per diem as a consultant, a few travel vouchers, and an envelope

containing materials of a personal nature relating to his wife. Among the papers that I assumed related to his work at the White House were numerous memorandums to Chuck Colson regarding Hunt's assessment of the plumbers unit operations and criticism of Mr. Krogh's handling of a matter; a number of materials relating to Mr. Ellsberg...; a bogus cable - that is, other cables spliced together into one cable [the anti-Kennedy fake]; a memorandum regarding some discussion about the bogus cable with Colson and "T. William Lambert;...an investigation Hunt had conducted for Colson at Chappaquiddick..." / (3H938-9)

After examining this scatology "Fielding and I discussed our concern about the public impact some of these documents might have if they became public, particularly in an election year. I requested that Fielding remove the politically sensitive documents from the others, which he did. The classified State Department cables were too bulky for my own safe, so I called David Young [to] store them for me in his office. [Young was of Kissinger's national security staff and of the Plumbers.] The large briefcase was stored in a locked closet in my office suite and the politically sensitive documents and Hunt's personal papers were placed in a safe in my office." (3h938)

This makes clear and certain what everyone ignored, blinded by the dazzling insight into the Nixon White House that fakes cables to defame a martyred President who had been Nixon's always-successful ~~opponent~~ opponent, the JFK so diametrically opposite Nixon in every way. Going over the exact words establishes that the State papers, fakes and authenticals, were ~~first~~ quite bulky, too bulky for Dean safe, and are separate from - not the same as - "the politically sensitive documents and Hunt's personal papers." These, not the State papers, are what "were placed in a safe in my [Dean's] office."

The distinction is beyond ^{ing} questions. It is not the fakes that are "politically sensitive." And the documents from and about State are too voluminous for a safe so certainly they can't squeeze into an attache case.

What is not as certain is whether Hunt's memos to Colson are among these "politically sensitive" ~~papers~~ papers that could be so dangerous "in an election year." It seems probable that they are because they deal with what Hunt described as his "seamy" work which is what he could use as a blackmail threat and did and because what has become

known about them would have cost Nixon the election. By the second anniversary of the caught break-in ~~in~~ polls showed that 75% of the people did not express approval of Nixon.

In explanation of these otherwise undescribed papers and their contents, a digression is necessary. First a question: what in the world was Hunt doing using his White House safe rather than his secure facilities at his Mullen office or his home for these "materials of a personal nature relating to his wife?" (3H937) Prying into the personal is inappropriate and perhaps irrelevant. However, this seems to be an exceptional situation, that Hunt used a safe so secure and in so secure an area for whatever personal material about his wife he had that he did not want either at home or in his Mullen office or in his safe-deposit box. And what is also important, Hunt kept Colson informed on all his operations and his opinions of the others in the Plumbers unit. He was "critical" of them. But Colson, despite all his protestations of non-involvement, was deeply involved. From Dean's testimony alone - and he was not questioned about this information, which he volunteered - the only place he ever saw Hunt was on the "numerous" occasions in Colson's office and he reported to Colson, not to Ehrlichman or anyone else.

This casts Colson in his true role, not the one he succeeded in pretending he did not have. Hunt's reports were to him. The Hunt work for Ehrlichman seems to have been limited to what he did on the Pentagon Papers, ~~wholly~~ centered around Ellsberg. So, when Hunt threatened Colson and referred to the "seamy" work he had done for Ehrlichman, Colson read him loud and clear: unless Colson did his bit, Hunt would talk about all the rest of his dirty work, for Colson.

It is that that accounts for Colson's panic about the contents of Hunt's safe and his campaign to detach himself from Hunt. It is that that accounts for Hunt's warning Colson and not Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Dean, Krogh or Young about the "dynamite" in his safe, some just planted there to ~~explode~~ ^{burning} explode if the/fuze were not quenched. It was never out of Colson's mind and never out of Dean's description. Another representation follows what has been quoted, where Colson, "on June 20 or 21," told Dean about Hunt's return to his office and walked past when Colson assistant Douglas Hallett was talking to a reporter, the time Hunt left word with Joan Hall to empty his safe. Colson gave Dean the "impression that this incident had occurred on June 17 or 19" and "Colson was

COLSON INSERT
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Not only Colson- everyone tried to disassociate him and the Watergate committee was content for this to happen. Here is an example of Senator Edward Gurney tough grilling of Bruce Kehrli, "Special Assistant to the President," actually Haldeman's youthful assistant. Kehrli was the second witness on the first day of Hearings, May 17, 1973 (1H75ff) Kehrli had testified that Hunt was assigned to Colson's staff, that his office was room 338 Executive Office Building:

Senator Gurney. What happened to his office after he was removed from the federal payroll?

Mr. Kehrli. It was left within the Colson operation. I do not know who is sitting in that now, Senator.

Senator Gurney. Is that part of the block of offices of Colson's?

Mr. Kehrli. He had people with various responsibilities within the Executive Office Building. (1H88)

With this non-answer Gurney was satisfied, par for him in particular. On the same page when he learned he could get an answer about Hunt he just let his questioning drop dead, which was a benefit to Nixon, Colson, Hunt and their collective interest: Gurney has asked if people who left the payroll still had access to their offices, skirting around what we soon come to, and if they had the use of the phones: Kehrli said he did not know. Then:

Senator Gurney. What happened to their file cabinets?

Mr. Kehrli. I know what happened to Mr. Hunt's file cabinets.

Senator Gurney. That is all, Mrs. Chairman. (1H88)

It is non-investigation like this that enable the Colson deceptions and the Nixon-Hunt deals. With any real investigation in those early days it would all have been over and the country would have been saved the agony and the enormous cost.

very concerned about his relationship with Hunt." (3H939)

MA Colson has been getting away with murder. Nobody with any responsibility dared tell anyone that Colson was lying and misrepresenting and that he was really the man over Hunt except where he loaned Hunt out, that Hunt reported to him, that his office alone had the combination to Hunt's safe. To do this would be to do Nixon in and none of his loyalists would do that nor would they run the danger to themselves in doing it. To expose Colson was to expose Nixon and to expose themselves. Colson was as daring as he was dirty, but he got away with it because the situation left nobody any options.

This is the same Colson who played the Baker game in trying to blame the CIA for Nixon's dirty-works which it is now clear were also Colson's own dirty-works.

Here Dean's testimony includes on this another fascinating aside that nobody every followed up on. It follows immediately in Dean's opening statement but because it was ignored and has no confirmation in other testimony or documents simply because it was not investigated, it is included here merely as a footnote. Under the heading "First Dealings With the CIA" (3H945ff) Dean describes Kitchell as "very knowledgeable" about the suspicion that "the CIA might be involved. ~~In Watergate~~ So, "Mitchell suggested I explore with Ehrlichman and Haldeman having the White House contact the CIA for assistance." Because these "former CIA operatives might compromise the CIA in some manner" the "CIA should be interested in assisting." (3H946)

If this is the origin of Nixon's effort to frame the CIA, and it may not have been, it would expose his dishonesty more. But in the absence of the official investigation that should have been made and wasn't we just don't know.

The one thing we can always know is that these Nixonians were cutting each other's throats to protect their own and Nixon's and that they are sociopathic liars. Gray was more than their equal because most were subtle enough to try to avoid lying by using semantics and evasions. Gay just lied straight out, as on his destruction of what he was given by the White House to destroy.

In Dean narrative he describes his subsequent meeting "with Ehrlichman to inform him of the contents of Hunt's safe. Here (3H938) he continues to make the same distinction

"the bogus cable, the materials relating to Ellsberg" and the "politically sensitive documents." (3H938) Dean recognized Ehrlichman's order to destroy everything, the documents by shredding and the electronic gear by throwing it in the river, as "incredible" because it was "to destroy potential evidence-- criminal." (3H938) He "decided that I would not engage in any such activity myself."

Making same same distinction ~~between~~ "with regard to the sensitive documents" he says he "suggested tha they be given directly to Gray." The "politically sensitive documents," not the cables and Ellsberg file, that "bulky" one. His reason, "I told Ehrlichman, is that "if ever asked under oath, I had to be able to testify that to the best of my knowledge everything found in the safe had been turned over to the FBI." (3H948) To Gray directly, that is, or to agents.

When the agents "came to my office" Dean "gave them one box, ~~and~~ which had been packed, and told them that as soon as the other materials was packed I would get it to them." Dean then "got tied up in a meeting," so he phoned his assistant, Fielding, "and asked him to pack up the remainder of the materials, which I believe was the State Department cables and the briefcase. He did so, and turned over the remainder of the materials, with the exception of the two envelopes which contained the politically sensitive materials I described earlier." (emphasis added.) He then told Ehrlichman that "the material had been sent to the FBI with the exception of the politically sensitive documents." (Emphasis added) He told me he was meeting later that day with Gray and I should bring them over at that time." (3H948)

This Dean did, placing the politically-sensitive materials on Ehrlichman's coffee table. Later Gray came and Ehrlichman told him that we had some material for him that had come from Hunt's safe. Ehrlichman described it as politically sensitive but not related to the Watergate. This means only not to the break-in itself, not to that collection of crimes known as The Watergate. (3H948) Dean added that "should they leak out they would be political dynamite in an election year." Further proof that this was not those "bulky" box of State cables and Hunt's fake that would not fit inside Dean's safe is that "Gray placed the ^{two} envelopes in his briefcase." ~~Dean was never present when or~~

(3H949)

When Dean, Fielding and Kehrli "were being interviewed by the prosecutors regarding the handling of the materials in Hunt's safe...shortly before the criminal Watergate trial in January [1973]" Dean asked Henry Petersen "if I could speak to him privately. ...felt I had to tell Petersen that not all the materials had gone directly to the agents, rather than two envelopes of material...had been given directly to Gray... Mr. Petersen suggested that the interview be terminated, which it was, and that they would get back to me.... I was not called again..." (3H949)

The subject remained closed until long after the first trial, until the month after sentencing, when it was again discussed with Dean, but nothing happened (3H949)

There is no doubt that Gray always perjured himself about this, when he was head of the FBI and afterward. He never told the truth and he never admitted that he had destroyed. It could not have been what he said, those State cables.

What Gray destroyed is the remaining proofs of all the uncountable dirty political jobs Hunt had done for Nixon through Colson, not Ehrlichman. The Ehrlichman files did go to the FBI, which is one of the more effective means of total suppression. The really hot stuff Gray burned, the very most effective means of suppression.

This was, as Dean himself evaluated it, "dynamite" in an election year. Had there not been this added and largely hidden crime Nixon's re-election would not have been possible and he could not have remained unimpeached.

But Gray was not in all this time charged with any crime. He is the most successful of all Nixon's obstructors of Justice, destroyers of evidence and the most nonstop perjurer who never once told the truth about what he burned.

What qualifications to head the FBI! What qualifications for Nixon appointment!

This is only part of what Hunt knew, what he could use for blackmailing Nixon and to extort bribes. It is one of the timed bombs he was careful to leave in the White House. Gray is a long-time Nixon hack whose one qualification was total servility. Nixon had made him Deputy Attorney General - the man who day-by-day runs the Department of Justice while the Attorney General politics - before putting him in charge of the FBI.

He did not have to know what happened to it. If it disappeared he could prove it had been destroyed assuming anyone would give him the chance. He could use it in his

own defense - for his survival. He started using this and other means of applying pressure immediately, an important point entirely ignored because investigators chose to ignore it and because everyone fell for Nixon's deceptions centering around his alleged first knowledge on March 21, 1973, the day of the known bribe payment. Again Dean spelled it out but nobody wanted it. Headed "Mr. Kalmbach and Silence Money (3H949ff) which Dean brackets with the Hunt safe matters by having it the next section, he ~~places~~ dates "a meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office" with LaRue and Mardian^W also present" on the afternoon of June 28." This was but ten days after the arrests and there had already been inquiry about the sources of money. (3H949-50) It was "a discussion of the need for support money in exchange for the silence of the men in jail and if the CIA would not do it they would have to find money somewhere else. (3H950)

Not only does this date the bribery but it leaves no doubt of criminal intent, "money in exchange for silence."

Dean returned to it again, involving the White House directly, after "Kalmbach's raising the money for the first pressures for support money for silence. These pressures were continuous and following the election there was increasing pressures from Hunt for money for himself and the other indicted defendants as a means of assuring their silence...it grew steadily...until the demands were being made directly to the White House..." (3H967)

This ~~seems to say~~ ^{says} what is the fact, that Hunt acted as Nixon's agent in bribing his co-defendants into silence, that Hunt wanted money not only for himself but "for the other indicted defendants as a means of assuring their silence" in addition to his own.

Coinciding with these pressures/immediately after the arrest, ^{particularly Hunt's for himself,} Dean "learned ~~of~~ that \$⁵350,000 of the surplus [sic!] money had been delivered to the ~~money~~ White House." (3H~~9~~ 968) This is that Hadleman "green." A small amount had been used. ^b because ⁿ Dean wanted in insult the paying of bribes from the White House he first arranged to have the sum restored to full size with "about \$22,000 that Stans made available" from that nother lode of the unaccounted (3H969) aftr which Strachan delivered it to LaRue (3H971).

I turned out ~~in~~ that even this added \$350,000, "this delivery, did not satisfy the demands

and they continued to be relayed by Mr. Bittman," Hunt's lawyer who took over Hunt's role in this blackmail to bribe for Nixon's unimpeachment and Hunt's enrichment from Nixon crime.

But this is more than an account of the untold part of the story of Byzantium in the White House. There are interrelated subplots throughout that may to those without investigativen analytical or legal experience appear to be digressions. They are not. For all their public crudity and the understanding of it that followed partial exposure, Nixon and Hunt were both also exquisitely subtle, as was Colson, who was inextricably implicated and avoided the consequences, even the embarrassment and the danger of public testimony before the Watergate committee. ^{Tracing} Following the leads in this complicated story is like following a long snake through close-growing weeds. One twists and turns. With this twisting and turning one does not trace the evidence.

Hunt wanted more of Nixon than ~~wealth~~ wealth. He wanted his freedom to enjoy that wealth. If it is not to say that he was not desolated by the death of his wife, who was also his effecient and trustworthy agent in his bribing for Nixon, it is clear that he tried to use this death to extort even more from Nixon, what endangered Nixon more than paying Hunt and the others off. He wanted executive clemency. Far from rejecting this, Nixon said Hunt - Hunt alone mind you- deserved cmpassion. Hunt - also alone- received it.

The fatal crash was a month after the election. The ~~ix~~ election carried Nixon over his first major hurdle, gave Nixon more time, and enbaled him to accede to demands that before the election would have been too dangerous. As soon as Mrs. Hunt was buried, Hunt's former ~~fix~~ CIA-man then CREEP lawyer, Paul O'Brien, started relaying these new demands. They began with Bittman's claim that Hunt had been so tirm up emotionally by this tragedy that "he was not capable of standing trial in his then psychological situation, and that he had been examined by a psychologist who had reached that conclusion." (3H972) Bittman actually "thought that the Government might be of some assistance in resolving Hunt's problems temporarily by finding a sympathetic psychiatrist to examine Hunt who would concurin the findings of the psychiatrist who had already examined and found him not fit to stand trial." (3H972) Raw as this was, corrupt and dishonest as it

was on the face, Mitchell liked the idea and "asked me [Dean] to discuss this with Petersen [awho] said that if there was anything that could be done it would be, but he did not think that anything could be done regarding this matter." (3H9722)

This chest-beating chief prosecutor, the man whose dedication was to Nixon, as Dean told Nixon April 15, 1973, did not roar in indignation at this crude demand for the corrupting of justice. He said he'd try but without expectation of success.

"The government psychiatrists determined that Hunt was capable of standing trial." (3H972) When he learned this, "Hunt was outraged that no one in the White House was doing anything to take care of him and, in fact, he thought the White House and his friends had turned against him..." (3H972) Hunt had spent a lifetime in the CIA, where these matters are fixed quietly and regularly.

Dean then told Colson that "Hunt was thinking about pleading guilty" and "wanted Colson to talk to his lawyers" because direct Hunt-Colson meeting was not safe. (3H972)

What Dean did not spell out and for Colson, the White House and the committee's Senators, all of whom are lawyers, is that in pleading guilty without helping the prosecution—spilling all the beans—Hunt would be inviting the maximum sentence on each of the charges of the indictment. Everybody knew he would not do that, not run any risk like this, without some quid pro quo. This was, as Dean's next subhead says, "Executive Clemency for Mr. Hunt and Others." (3H972-4)

The first new pressure on this was on "January 2 while [Dean] awaited] takeoff from California in the President's new Air Force One. [there was a] call from Paul O'Brien... some serious problems... Hunt was off the reservation..." Dean immediately told Alderman. (3H973)

Hunt's demand was for Nixon's clemency, promised before he entered a guilty plea, and to be delivered by Colson alone. The next morning O'Brien added a now or never warning. Hunt applied his own pressure directly on Colson in his December 31, 1972 letter (3H 1234) in which he concluded with his own warning, "there is a limit to the endurance of any man trapped in a hostile situation." Hunt placed his faith in God but his last words are that "His will, however, is often enacted through human hands, and human adversaries are arraigned against me."

The combination did it and panicked Colson all over again. Dean arranged a January 3 meeting in Ehrlichman's office. Dean recalls that Colson "was extremely shaken, which was unlike Colson. He was not specific in his arguments to Ehrlichman but he said that he felt it was imperative that Hunt be given some assurances of ~~some~~ Executive clemency." (3H973)

Ehrlichman and Colson detested each other. They also competed for ~~Nixon's~~ status with Nixon behind Haldeman. Colson could not be "specific" without arming Ehrlichman to ~~cut~~ chop Colson's head off.

Nonetheless, Ehrlichman knew enough. He "said that he would have to speak ^{with} the President. Ehrlichman told Colson that he should not talk with the President about this." Nixon had to be isolated from this added bribery as he also had to be separated from Colson's knowledge. The very next day, however, Dean learned from Ehrlichman that he had given Colson an affirmative regarding clemency for Hunt and that Colson had talked with Bittman again about the matter." On January 5 Colson again explained this and what he had told Bittman in a meeting in Ehrlichman's office. ~~that~~ He had given a general rather than a specific assurance, "that clemency generally came up around Christmas..." (3H974)

Dean interpreted this to mean that similar assurances would be given all the other defendants. Ehrlichman said it had this meaning. As they left the meeting Colson told Dean that although Ehrlichman had told him he "should not discuss this matter with the President, that he, in fact, thought it was so important that he had taken it up with the President himself [when] Hunt was not satisfied with Colson's assurances." (3H974) Twice thereafter Nixon personally discussed ^{with Dean} his having agreed to clemency ~~with~~ for Hunt to Colson. These Nixon admissions were on March 13 and April 15, 1973. (3H974)

When Hunt faced sentences of up to 35 years for what he had been charged with and what he had been charged with was only a minor portion of the indictments that could be paid on him it is obvious that he required some guarantees on which he could depend if he were to preserve silence. There seems little doubt that he was given these guarantees but in ways that made deniability possible for everyone except Dean. There were the denials but in practice Hunt received clemency in addition to his great wealth. After

a brief confinement mostly in the softer jails, often interrupted by periods in Washington for testimony, Hunt was released on appeal, which could last for years and, thanks to prosecutorial abuses, could be successful. He lived the life of a monied gentleman, first in his Potomac estate and then in Florida, where he moved after buying an expensive home there.

extra space

It is not possible to separate the various components of Dean's evidence without breaking it up too much, ^{and} destroying its context. ~~and~~ Those unwilling to credit the record against Nixon would wonder if quotation was faithful or distorted by short selections. The preceding passages may appear to be digressions but they are not because Dean correctly interrelated what was in fact interrelated, all the aspects of the Hunt-Nixon operation, all of those involved in it and its consequences, the unimpeachment of Richard Nixon through bribing Hunt who paid back but also laid a basis for blackmailing over and above the testimony he could give. The first Hunt scheme ^{to} ~~is~~ assure his success was ~~to~~ ^{to} planting and leaving ^e the most incriminating evidence in his safe and then letting Colson know that this safe was loaded with "dynamite." Immediately the whole White House knew. Colson knew before Joan Hall because Hunt told him over the weekend. Whether it is Colson Hunt phoned before dawn June 17 is not known, but he is the probable one. He and Hunt were friends, Hunt worked for him and when Hunt worked for Ehrlichman he reported to Colson. Also, Colson was involved in all of Hunt's nastier political projects so he had ^{personal} ~~his own~~ inspiration for effecting Hunt's silence.

One benefit of all these different aspects being intertwined in the testimony is that a case of obstructing justice is made against all those named and more from the Hunt bribery alone. Nixon, Ehrlichman, Colson, Dean, ~~LaRue~~ LaRue, Mitchell, Strachan, Kalmbach, Ulasewicz, both Hunts, Bittman, O'Brien and Caulfield (who conveyed the clemency officer to McCord and testified to it at the opening of the Watergate committee hearings) are only the beginning. So many are involved and so many were silent until they had no real choice it becomes an answer to those who were unwilling to confront the irrefutable evidence of fakery and dishonesty in the investigation of the JFK assassination and argued in the face of fact that large conspiracies cannot succeed in the United States.

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The second Hunt scheme was to remove most of the evidence. This also was done immediately, not discovered until later, and then of no interest in the Watergate investigations and did not figure in the indictments. It became known when a lawyer's integrity was needlessly challenged by the ~~presentation~~ original prosecutors, forcing him into a conflict between preserving his client's rights and doing what these prosecutors insisted on doing the wrong way.

The Peter Wolf story attracted little attention and was not understood.

It confronted the government with a case of perjury it did nothing about. Either Wolf, who could have no motive, or Silbert, who denied Wolf's charges before the Senate Judiciary committee's hearings on his confirmation as United States Attorney, was untruthful. The materiality of the disagreement is beyond question.)

The story is reminiscent of Silbert's attempt during the first Watergate trial to get into evidence the entirely unnecessary fruit of the bugging, which to his knowledge was defamatory. He was thus in the position of furthering the intent of the criminal conspiracy he was allegedly prosecuting.

(After Silbert's denial in April 1974, hearings on his nomination were suspended.)

On April 19, 1973 Wolf filed a "motion for a protective order" in federal district court in Washington. Here is his "background facts": Lil-first two pages, in full, typed only.

Wolf then informed the court of the problem Silbert created for him: Lil- marked parts 3,4, with dots for omissions.

When Wolf was willing to testify if ordered to do so by a judge under conditions that would preserve his professional integrity/and when this is precisely what Silbert had done with Caddy, who was deliberately withholding information and was not punished for it, what motive could there be for not being consistent, for not doing what a judge compelled? There is but one answer: keeping it all secret. Wolf's appeal for judicial relief is all that broke this official secrecy. The proceedings of the grand jury are secret. What anyone tells a federal attorney that attorney can keep secret.

What purpose was served by keeping ^{it} secret that Hunt had removed eight cartons of his files "before the F.B.I. got there" and was so mysteriously given access to the White House enclave "on the Sunday after the Watergate break-in?" Obvious reasons are

to hide still another obstruction of justice and a conspiracy in it if not also the destruction of evidence.

The one White House official with whom Hunt is known to have had contact in this period is Colson.

Conspicuously, there is no mention of Liddy in this. He also had access to those offices. But because he was no longer a White House employee, it does not seem possible that he could have ^{issued} ~~substantiated~~ the clearances. Someone in official position had to have done this. After the arrests this was criminal.

Silbert charged nobody.

He did not use it in his own indictments, which were whitewashes, charging less than the minimum.

Subsequent news stories identified the client as ^(and also Roy) Lyndon/Sheppard. McCord confirmed that Hunt had "plans to 'bug' the Watergate." In his "newsletter" (The McCord Washington Newsletter, May-June 1974) he said that "in the late Spring of 1972 Hunt had shown" him "a typed 'bugging plan' which Hunt had typed on his typewriter, listing a step-by-step arrangement for bugging the Democratic National Headquarters. Hunt indicated...that he was going to show the plan to 'his superiors at the White House.' (Hunt's superior at the White House had been Charles Colson.)"

Because McCord was the bugger on the operation Hunt should have consulted him prior to getting approval of his plan.

And because Hunt was a Nixon employee this tied the White House not only to the crime itself but to advance knowledge of it, still another series of crimes.

The advantage to Hunt for blackmail in having this and the other files from his office is obvious. These eight cartons also were "dynamite."

Because the news stories were few and because there was no investigation - this became public before the first Watergate committee hearing - details in addition to those Wolf filed in court are not entirely consistent.

That there was no investigation is not because there was no knowledge. This is what is the closest thing to an investigation, the first day of the hearings, the second witness, Kehrli: (11/8/74)

21/1/75

SE: ... know a Mr. ...
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Senator INOYE. Have you ever met Mr. Shepard?
 Mr. KERR. No, sir.
 Senator INOYE. Were you aware that he visited one of the offices
 Mr. KERR. Not before his name came up.
 Senator INOYE. Thank you, sir.

With his "thank you" Inoye ended his questioning and turned the questioning over the Weicher.

Here Inoye, who had one of the better reputations as a questioner, ^{He} hardly elicited the background from Kehrli before he quit. Without knowledge of what Inoye was driving at, this wholesale removal of Hunt's incriminating evidence, neither the TV viewer nor the reader of the hearings can make any sense at all of this questioning. It does, however, confirm Wolf.

It does not explain the security laxity on a Sunday. Someone has to have given the right word to the right guard, as when Hunt cleaned out his Mullen office, even to the TV, when the keys had been changed.

With this reflection of the committee's interest, it goes without saying that it did not summon Shepherd as a witness. In an exact duplication of McCord, who was never served a search warrant and whose premises were never searched, Shepherd had unmolested possession of all this incriminating evidence at least until after the elections, when he first examined them and according to one version (UPI in SFChron 6/27/73) burned them. In another ~~Wax~~ (Jack Anderson in Parade 7/22/73) Hunt obtained the clearance for the removal of these eight cartoons, then arranged for Shepherd to pick them up and keep them in his basement until August, 1972, when Hunt retrieved them. This account describes Shepherd as a trusted associate of Hunt.

Because there was no ^{real} investigation and because nothing came of the grand jury non-investigation over which Silbert presided there remain unanswered questions and doubts. But there is no doubt that Hunt did get this great volume of his files out of his office a day at least after it should have been ~~secured~~ ^{securely guarded} and wasn't.

Of course, getting rid of all this incriminating evidence about so widespread a crime ring that Nixon operated out of the White House was in everyone's interest, from Nixon down. It enabled ~~him~~ him to remain unimpeached and protected all those who had been involved in his crimes.

But it also enabled Hunt to apply pressure and it ~~permitted~~ ^{gave deep concern to} those who knew what his files could prove and how ~~it~~ ^{his files} could support his testimony should he talk. Hunt's testimony and his files, had he really talked, could have sent many to jail and could have impeached Nixon. Many top White House staffers knew the extent of Hunt files and knew that what

was dumped on Dean after Hunt's safe was cracked was a small fraction of his papers.

Kehrli had testified to Hunt's having file cabinets in the plural when Gurney backed off so fast. (1H88)

extra space

In putting together this added case of basis for Nixon's yielding to Hunt's blackmail and bribing him and through him the ^G other defendants we have, perforce, seen more of the suppressed truth of Colson's role and involvement, of the nature of his cover-up operations, and seen his own motive for ~~facilitate~~ facilitating bribery and even involving Nixon in guilty knowledge of it, as Dean was able to testify only because both Nixon and Colson told the man they had in charge of covering up. Colson, too, was thus able to pressure others not to throw him to the wolves because he would be able to involve Nixon in bribery and obstruction of justice, with corroboration.

In all of this Nixon became the victim of his own fellow conspirators because so many could implicate him in criminal, not just impeachable acts. His choices also were by these maneuvers of his co-conspirators so limited that he could not come close to any admissions because any admission from him ~~me~~ jailed others who did not hanker for going to jail, for him or any other reason. There were his closest he might depend upon to make this great sacrifice. But Hunt clearly was not one. Hunt knew this, Nixon knew it, and Hunt was bribed into more than silence - into become Nixon's briber among his associates.

Except for McCord, they did remain silent. They accepted the bribe and upheld their ends.

Hunt's operation was in this for the first and only time brilliant.

It worked. He is rich and comfortable, with a new promising literary future and all the rewards our society holds for the perpetrators of out-of-the ordinary crime.