

What makes this all the more provocative is what followed.

After Szulc wrote ~~and~~ this article ~~was first published~~ but before it appeared, precisely this newsworthy part about Hunt the would-be assassin originated in United Press International's Washington bureau. The story, written by Donald Lambro, made afternoon papers of May 29 and morning papers of May 30. It received a heavy, international play. Lambro ^{gives} credits the galley proofs. as his source. In content it is pro-CIA while blaming everyone else for the failure of the Bay of Pigs because those quotes from Hunt are selected. The first of many examples is, "...Kennedy tried to 'whitewash the New Frontier' after the fiasco by 'heaping guilt on the CIA.'" Another blames the Pentagon for the military aspects, "Assault planning was almost directly in the hands of the Pentagon." And it concludes with a prejudiced account of why there was no second advance air strike, blaming it on the Kennedy administration and four in particular are liberals to Hunt. Neither the story nor Hunt nor Szulc describe the miserable botch the CIA made of the first air strike and how it blew all cover" on it, well reported contemporaneously.

Timed to promote Szulc's book, he had "Cuba On Our Mind" in Esquire of February, 1974, of January 10
The New York Times story/on it is headed, "61 Pressure To Kill Castro Reported." Not this 1960 Hunt scheme. Kennedy had told Szulc after the Bay of Pigs that "he was ybde under great pressure in the Intelligence (sic, Ld1) (whom he did not name) to have Castro killed," but that "for moral reasons" JFK "violently opposed" any United States involvement in political assassinations.

While continuing to emphasize that this was a 1961 scheme and thus not the Hunt one, which he handles in an entirely different way, Szulc reports being "vaguely aware" of a (pp. 96ff) an alleged much later plot, of 1964 and 1965, in Compulsive Spy/attributed the the Johnson administration with an ~~ifaxxxxx~~ alleged Hunt leadership role from Madrid. If this later plot, code-named "Second Naval Guerrilla", ever existed, it came to nothing and was in open violation of United States pledges and agreements with the USSR at the end of the Cuba Missile Crisis. It would have been enough to launch World War III, with the only alternative the end of the USSR as a major power whose pledge meant anything.

Here is the only Esquire reference to the Hunt plot, which, of course, meant the Hunt plot when Nixon was in charge for the White House:

"In fact, the Eisenhower Administration turned down in 1960 the recommendation of a CIA operative to kill Castro."

No mention of Hunt by name. Still no quotation from Hunt. And the evidence that the Eisenhower-Nixon administration rejected the Hunt plan is missing. Szulc cites no authority for the statement.

This is directly followed by the account of "Second Naval Guerrilla," as both a plot to kill Castro and a planned invasion of Cuba "presumably acting with President Lyndon Johnson's authority."

Shortly afterward, preceeded by generally unflattering reviews, Compulsive Spy appeared.

Not until the last chapter in the book allegedly on Hunt but still again a defense of the CIA and an element in it - both - does Szulc, who covered the Bay of Pigs from Miami, mention in an offhand way that he knew Hunt as E "Eduardo" beginning "during the preparations for the Bay of Pigs." Szulc calls this

[~~Hunt's~~ code name]

that "Eduardo/~~was~~ the man I had known casually in Miami, in 1961, during the preparations for the Bay of Pigs." (p.156) His memory was re "refreshed" by a call from an unidentified "friend from my Cuban days" who also "told me" that "It is Eduardo who is behind this whole business."

Here Sculc goes into a fascinating rascal-dazzle that apparently succeeded in distracting everyone from not only his failure ever to report this in his New York Times writing - where he said what he here proves he knew was false -but what is even more significant, when he learned it. (How-from whomever might have had the motive Sculc serves, is a remaining mystery.)

It was "Early on Sunday afternoon," or the day of his first story, the day after the breakin and the arrests.

All the other elements the skilled Sculc here throws in also make the reader forget to ask himself why this "friend from my Cuban days" has to be anonymous. All of Sculc's writing is studded with name dropping. All reporters tend to be ~~be~~ specific and to give names not only as a matter of journalistic practice and responsibility but for credibility. The five traditional "W UG W's of the "lead" of a story begin with "Who?"

Whatever the reason may be, it is atypical and unprofessional and strongly suggests CIA. And in CIA most likely the faction not ~~Hunt's~~, the liberals.

How "casually" Sculc knew Hunt follows (pp. 156-7). Sculc assumed Hunt would recognize him ~~xxxxxxxx~~ after more than a decade and says so:

"Then, because I did not want my own name to surface pre-maturely in the handling of the story, I asked one of my colleagues at the office to dial Hunt and to say that "Macho Barker says he knows you." Bernard L. Barker was Hunt's Bay of Pigs assistant and the man in charge of Hunt's Plumbers' Unit Cubans in their White House jobs. Predictably Hunt hung up promptly.

Predictably eager to take credit, Sculc claims "I may have been the first person to alert Hunt to the knowledge that he had some involvement with the Watergate burglary" and that "The FBI, which entered the case on Monday, only established the connection with Hunt a few days later." Consistent in inaccuracy, he also claims it was from the

If the ~~many~~ major and minor errors that permeate this book did not attract New York Times attention - and they did not get reported there or elsewhere - they are glaring to one who knows the subjects of which Szule writes and they have to have been ~~it~~ closely read by foreign intelligence services. The conclusion is inevitable that if Szule was not in CIA pay the distinction is immaterial. This book serves, among others, CIA purposes. Ostensibly it is a book on Hunt. Actually, he is relatively minor in it.

There is, of course, criticism of the CIA. Here it is understated and comes from only part of what was well publicized, well known. A conspicuous example is what amounts to a justification of what he says is illegal domestic activity (p.40), the CIA's use of foundations, but in reporting this omits the greatest of them all, that which led to the exposure, the CIA's taking over of and financing of the National Students' Association.

Szule is almost a one-man protection team. On HUNT he says little of Hunt's career and nothing about his domestic activity whereas he has to have been onto it from what he does report. Of Hunt's work for and relations with the Robert R. Mullen public-relations agency he writes inadequately and inaccurately, as we shall see, raising serious questions about further covering of the CIA. Mullen's personal connections with spying may go back to the end of the 1940s. It certainly existed at the time of the "Day of Pigs", where it admittedly worked for CIA. It was doing CIA work at the time Szule wrote this book. He edited the Cushman tape to eliminate Hunt's own references to his domestic operations and takes at face value - in fact reports extensively about - other of Hunt's overs that are of a time Hunt told the Ervin committee in private that he was engaged in domestic operations (pp.96ff). So carefully does Szule edit this part of Hunt's career that he even eliminates a Hunt Washington address that Hunt listed in Who's Who for consistency. (pp.99-100)

Knowing it to be factually incorrect, he has Hunt working for the re-election committee rather than the White House at the time of the ~~xxxxx~~ caught crime (p.140,142) He revised his book to include the sworn testimony - by Hunt - on September 24 and 25, 1973 but omitted this, which is in that testimony and was known prior to it. While he hedges, he says there were only three known Hunt White House jobs (pp.134-5) but all Hunt's work was for the White House. He was never employed by the re-election committee.

On his handling of the whole spying and dirty-works campaign (pp. 136-50) Szulc's protection of Nixon and those closest to him extends to ~~eliminating the name of the man in overall charge, John Mitchell, Nixon's Attorney General and then campaign director.~~

Not even Douglas Caddy is unworthy of Szulc's covering up, which promotes wonder about Caddy and what is not known about him. That he shared ^{Mullen} office with Hunt, that they had other joint projects, that he had serious trouble with the grand jury for refusing to testify and a battery of lawyers in attendance including ^{the Hogan & Hartson} a firm that had a CIA history and for a time defended Hunt is not mentioned. Nor are many other things, like Caddy's politics (first director of the Young Americans for Freedom, ~~backed by~~ sponsored by Buckley). (pp. 154-5)

And, as we have seen, he has Hunt the man in charge when he was not (pp 156ff)

The prosecutors who covered up are shielded (p. 161) when they went into nothing except the burglary of all the White House crimes.

Even Hunt's then lawyer, William O. Bittman, Hogan & Hartson partner, who had been part of Hunt's blackmailing of Nixon and had a part in ~~laundering~~ an until-now unreported laundering of some of Nixon's \$100 bills, merely "withdrew as Hunt's attorney" when it was public knowledge, thanks to the New York Times, that the Special Prosecutor had asked him to resign over an allegation of conflict of interest.

Not even Buckley escapes the Szulc wing. (pp. 163-4). His set-up for Hunt's public relations becomes "tough questioning" and his editing of the transcript, which Szulc does say he read, is expunged.

It sure sounds like the CIA's old-boy network at its professional best!

In all this kindness to others, Szulc does not forget himself. He goes far out of his way to be kind to the CIA and to justify much of its activity that is not properly justified as the proper functioning of an essential intelligence activity. After ticking off a "list of the brilliant men who served" - and there is nothing wrong with serving a nation's proper intelligence activities - (p. 30ff.) he gets into and justifies with mild criticism some of CIA's domestic activities. There is this passage on page 40:

"At home the CIA slightly [sic] overstepping its statutory ~~authoritative~~ role, managed to subsidize a highly active publishing house in New York...." The CIA is known - publicly exposed as having - also subsidized other publishers, including leftist journals. There is a good reason for this limitation, hiding the other activities and even the name of this "active" publisher: he was Szulc's. The house is Frederick A. Praeger, the book Szulc's apologia for the CIA's Bay of Pigs fiasco, The Cuban Invasion.

So extensive was this covering of the CIA in this particular book that although Szulc now admits he knew Hunt then when Hunt was political chief, there is no mention of him by his right name, as Eduardo or even the role! A book on the Bay of Pigs invasion that has no reference to the man or the politics of the man or even the function of setting up an exile government and directing it and then writing its constitution! How much more could he have underplayed the ambition and intent of the CIA?

A careful reading of Szulc's Dominican Diary shows him to be consistent in whitewashing the CIA. He covered the United States invasion of the Dominican Republic when the United-States subsidized and educated Dominican military overthrew the first democratically-elected government for The New York Times. The book is well done. So is the hiding of the CIA's hidden role that was reported contemporaneously in the newspapers, including The New York Times.

It would seem that when CIA's duty is to be done, the left and right are really one.

A Buckley and a Szulc combining at suppressions of which a Nixon is beneficiary? Who would have thought it possible!

Extra space

The initial Nixonian need was the classic of intelligence activities - detachment from The Watergate. It successfully pulled off probably the greatest covering-up in political history for the crucial period. Gradually there were disclosures, but after two years, even with impeachment commenced, after not less than seven Congressional investigation partly or entirely devoted to it were completed and another in progress, the full story was far from told. There is no better measure of the success of the Nixon deception, misrepresentation, diversion and outright falsification of which Nixon, personally,

was in overall command, as his own transcripts leave without question.

Had it not been for The Washington Post, two young reporters, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, and the Metro editor, Barry Sussman, under whom they worked when the story first broke, all may well have been different and as much as did become known of Nixon/White House crime may not have.

It can, I believe, be fairly alleged that Szulc's reporting for The New York Times, the most influential paper, is of opposite character, and that until long after the Post had done the work that earned it the prestigious top journalistic honor, the Pulitzer prize - until the Times, much later, put an excellent investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh, on the staff if had on this story - the Times' reporting was so inferior and inadequate that it actually served the Nixon whitewashing of Nixon.

Here the importance of Szulc and his work can't be over-estimated. He was an authentic expert on Cubans and as close to an expert on Hunt as there was in the press.

(And here it also should be noted that the Post never used its own expert, Haynes Johnson, who as a reporter for the Washington evening paper, then the Star, now the Star-News, had also written ^{the supposedly} a definitive ~~book~~ The Bay of Pigs. The original printing was by W.W.Norton & Co., Inc., the reprint was Dell's. In Johnson's book there also is no Hunt, no one in his role, no Eduardo, and provocatively there is a Bernie, Barker's Bay of Pigs name, (pp. 60-1) Bernie, whose description is that of Barker whether or not he was, was one of the sub-commanders of the Guatemalan training camp. When some of the Cubans expressed political opposition to ^{this is what Johnson reports;} ~~the~~ authoritarianism, ~~he~~ "They were soldiers, he stormed, and had to obey orders whether they liked them or not." Thereafter, without trial, these men were confined in a virtual concentration camp "in the midst of the un u jungle, accessible only by helicopter." (p.61)

Bernard L. Barker is the lead of Szulc's first story, "The apparent leader of five men arrested yesterday for breaking into" "democrats' headquarters. Knowing better, Szulc given him Hunt's description in the second paragraph of the lead: "He is also said to have been one of the top planners of the Central Intelligence Agency's abortive invasion of Cuba in 1961."

This is what Szulc wrote after he had been told that Hunt was in charge, after he was reminded" that he knew Hunt as Eduardo, after he had Hunt phoned so Hunt would not recognize him.

This is also deliberate lying. Why he did it only Szulc can answer. But his own book (as we have already quoted, ~~proves that~~ it is a lie and it was deliberate.

The beneficiary was Nixon, to a lesser degree Hunt, and the victims were the editors of The New York Times, the people and truth.

Without this deliberate Szulc lie, Nixon could never have gotten away with his self-whitewashing.

The initial ploy was to say that Hunt was ~~affiliated with~~ not working for the White House. As late as Compulsive Spy, when he knew better, Szulc was repeating this lie, too.

Szulo's piece on Vietnam, by the way, appeared in a very full version in the Outlook section of the Post for June 2, in case you missed it. It's a cool and dispassionate account of how Hanoi actually ran out the negotiations, including the POW business, for maximum political effect; the mistakes and miscalculations involved, etc. This, you are correct, it appears to represent faithfully what the factors in the CIA would want said and in many places actually seems to use wording that could be attributed to them. If this is the case, it's a main reason for Hanoi's failure to salvage the war, and Hanoi's primary proclivity is not merely to cover their own backs with a court. There are other factors, but I think it's safe to say that Hanoi is the main reason for the war, who safe in their own hands. Hanoi's motives appear to be all.

Jim White
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