to resist. If it succeeded, he could move in a more important place—in West Berlin or with new pressure on our overseas bases—with missiles staring down our throats from Cuba. A Lentir adage, said Bohlen in one of our first meetings, compared national expansion to a bayonet drive; if you strike steel, pull back, it you strike much keep going. Khrushchev, having intested considerable money and effort in nuclear hardware he hoped never to use in battle, at least wanted one more try at using it for blackmail purposes.

Theory a Diverting Trap. If the United States did respond, presumably by a sacking "little" Cuba the Allies would be divided, the UN horrified. The Latin Americans more unti-American than ever, and our forces and energies diverted while Khrushchev moved swiftly in on Berlin. (Some Speculated that Khrushchev also calculated that any strong U.S. reservior would help him prove to the Stalinists and Chinese

that the West was no "paper tiger.")

Tukony .) Luban Defense: A Soviet satellite in the Western Hemisphere was so valuable to Kurushchev-in both his drive for expansion and his content with Red China-that he could not allow it to fall; and thus lachis view, an invasion from the United States or hostile Latin smerican states, which seemed inevitable if Cuba collapsed internally, had to be prevented at all costs. The Castro brothers, requesting military and could cite the Bay of Pigs and the constant invasion talk in Congress and the Cuban refugee community. Although they reportedly had expected no more than a firm Soviet pledge, the presence of Soviet missiles looked to them like an even tighter guarantee of their security. He should be noted that the Soviet Union stuck throughout to this position. Mikovan elifimed in a conversation with the President weeks after it was all over that the weapons were purely defensive, that they had been adapted by threats of invasion voiced by Richard Nixon and Penugua generals, and that the Soviers intended to inform the United Stans of seese weapons incrediately after the elections to prevent the maner from offerfing the American political campaign.)

Theory a Bargaraina Barier, Well aware of Cuba's sensitive interior domestic American politics. Ehrische Contended to use these bases in a summit of UN confrontition with konnects as effective barraining powers to tailed them en for his kind of Barian sentence of for a withdrawal of American overseas bases.

The ora 5. At sale Tonerso The Servicts could no longer here it drom the fiction that the muscle gar was in their favor. To close it with LIBMs (burn online mix) bullister on sales and submarine based missiles one of course Providing Cuban bases for their existing MRBMs and HIBMs (medicus and integral dimerance ballistic missiles) gave them a swift and comparatively inexpensive means of adding sharply

Sorensen, Throdore (. "Konnely"

Pick up and add Mickey on an mixon & Cuba. Back to A - Where It All Begain?

Nixon and Hunt both wrote separately about whri their common past. With Nixon, besides in speeches and interviews, he wrote about this in <u>Six Crises</u> and in Readers' <u>Digest</u> for November, 19764. Hunt wrote his <u>Give Us This Day</u>, according to its Foreword dated January 1973, after Watergate, in 1967, when he was still in CIA, when it was improper if not illegal for him to do it.

while he the writing of neither is dependable, it shows more than this common and the same beliefs, the same hangups, the same hates and the same, intense desire for self-justification in their common, misbegotten disaster which each in his own way blames on the man each victimized, John F. Kennedy.

Their common past is the Bay of Pigs.

in Six Crises Nixon practically claims the project as his own.

Their intense, consuming bitterness they shared with thousands, countless dozens of whom figure in undisclosed Watergate projects, about a dozen, by name in those detected, four inside the Democratic headquarters.

In it he wrote more than a personal addount. He wrote what any lawyer in the future could use to impeach his word on the witness stand, to show him to be an undependable witness, a man who will say what suits him when he knows it not to be true.

In April 1959, when Castro was in the United States, Nixon met with him. (page 351). "After that conference, I wrote a confidential memorandum for distribution to the CIA, State Department and White House. ... strong recommendations ... shared by J. Edgar Hoover..." (pages 351-2.)

"Early in 1960, the position I had been advocating for nine months finally prevailed and the CIA was given instructions to provide arms, ammunition and training for Cubans ...in exile. This program had been in operation for six months before the 1960 campaign got under way [but] I could not say one word. The operation was covert. ... (page 352)

His

The version in Readers' Digest for November 1964, which is expanded, opens much the (pp.283-30) same way, but has more detail, including matter as a remaining process of the process of the same way, but has more detail, including matter as a remaining process of the process o

briefing of JFK to make it appear that he had not lied. And to that he added, "However, after the first publication of the first edition of this book [sic], the WHite House issued a statement on March 20 denying that the [sic] two and one-fourth hours briefing covered any United States operations [sic] relating to Cuba."

Nixon makes it even dirtier in the paperback reprint where on page 381 he expands this to assert that he based his statement, analystic researched the facts relating to it" and that his sources included "conversations with responsibile individuals who had knowledge of the facts." This is not enough for him. In the conext that makes it appear to address this issue Nixon add, a generality he got from Eisenhower, "President Eisenhower has authorized me to state" that JFK had been briefed and "was to be as fully briefed on our foreign problems as I was."

Now briefing on "our foreign problems" is not the same as telling him Ike planned an illegal invasion of another country. And Nixon didn't have to be briefed on his own plans, those for this invasion for which he takes full credit.

After JFK was assassinated and after he had lost the California election, Nixon included the parentethical explanation "(Several months after the election Allen Dulles was to state that his briefing of JFK had included Cuba but not the training program for Cuban exiles.)")p.288)

"Several months after the election" was long before Nixon wrote his book; months longer before he added the first false footnote and many months more than that before he added more defamatory further falsehood to the paperback.

At this same point in the magazine article after JFK was dead Nixon, unconcerned about having been caught in a lie and not admitting it here, either, adds emphasis and self-characterization to what follows in all versions, his attack on JFK for this alleged dirty trick that cost Nixon the presidency: "I was one of the only three members of the President's cabinet who had been fully brieffed fr briefed on it [the invasion training], and the irony was that I had been the strongest and most persistent advocate for setting up and supporting such a program."

Nixon's version is not only that it was all his idea but that the secrecy was so great Ike didn't even trust most of his own cabien cabinet with it.

"his soft-line advisers" and "His liberal advisers from the State Departmenty and and "his personal staff" for the failure of the invasion that was actually designed to fail, as Hunt says in a different way, Here he recounts this meeting with Dulles "several months after the election." It was actually during the invasion, in Beril April, 1961. He wish says what proved he lied all over again, that "Dulles now filled me in on the details. After (manhanian and all over again, before (emphasis added) President Kennedy took office in January, Dulles had briefed him completely on the training program."

This vintage Nixon refers to what began with an October after 20, 1959 afternoon headline, "Kennedy Advocates U.S. INTERVENTION IN CUBA CALLS FOR AID TO REBEL FORCES IN CUBA.

In <u>Six Crises</u>, again typically, he present his "What could I do situation" falsely.

(pp.354-5). He begins by taking credit for the Bay of Pigs again ("had been adopted as a result of my direct support"); follows with another attack on JFK personally ("that Kennedy was endangering the security of the whole operation" by his public statements"); and cast himself in the role of the self-sacrificing hero. Because "The covert operation had to be protected at all costs...I must go to the other extreme. I must attack the to provide such aid Kennedy proposal/as wrong and irresponsible because mf it would violate our treaty commitments."

This shocking - or at least before The Watergate shocking - self-disclosure of no concern for truth when confronted with a personal need is worth remembering separately as a means of the dependability of Nixon's word given about The Watergate and his involvement in it.

It is not a truthful pre representation of Nixon's problem. That was simple: JFK had stolen his thunder. Nixon could not say only "me, too."

What he actually said makes his own description an understatement. What he does not say is the reason for his desparation and lying, aside from having been outsmarted. This was the day before the last of their debates. It was held the next night, @staterx21 broadcast from ABC-TV's Manhattan stadios. Skipping the timing and its meaning he instead attacks JFK and writes:

"This then was the background for the fourth debate. Predictably, the Suba issue was raised almost at once... This is what I said:

I think that Senator Kennedy's policies and recommendations for the handling of the "astro regime are probably the most dangerously irresponsible recommendations that he made during the course of the campaign.

"But I could not say why. Instead I took this tack:

"... if we were to follow that recommendation...we would loose all our friends in Latin America, we would probably be condemned in the United Nations, and we would not accomplish our objectives... It would be an open invitation to Mr. Khruschev ... to come into Latin America and to engage us in what would be a civil, war and possibly even worse than that. (Omissions in Six Crises)"

Nixon goes on to claim this "hurt" him and made it appear to the average voter that Kennedy was "stronger and tougher than I against Castro and Communism" and that Kennedy had gained more from the debates than I."

Nixon did not stop here. Writing about the CIA and the Cuba fiasco in The Invisible

Government (Bantam edition, pp. 366-7) David Whise and Thomas B. Ross reported:

"The Nixon camp was elated. All the next day, as the republican candidate barnstromed through eastern Pennsylvania, members of the Nixon staff let it be known that
they felt Kennedy had finally made a serious error. That night, October 22, in the
crowded gymnasium at Muhlenberg College in Allentown Nixon attacked:

"He [Kennedy] called for - and get this - the U.S.Government to support a revolation in Cuba, and I say this is the most shockingly reckless proposal ever made in our history by a presidential candidate during a campaign and I'll tell you why... he comes up, as I pointed up, with a fantastic recommendation...

M'You know what this would mean? We would violate right off the bat five treaties with the American states, including the Treaty of Bogota. of 1948. We would also violate our solemn commitments to the United Nations...'"

There is more- and I think worse - in Nixon's own Readers' Digest account (pp.290-2).

April 20 JFK asked him to the White House and manyhkkhiskaskissas "put the key question to me bluntly and directly:'What would you do now in Cuba?' "Ixwas

"I would find and proper and legal cover and I would go in," I answered. I suggested

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three possible legal [sic] justifications ... "

Those who recall Nixon's breast-beating about how he had inherated the terrible

war in Southeast Asia and had had nothing to do with it and had in fact epposed it
section of this

will find particular point in Nixon's consicu conclusion to this/article that reaches

the country's largest audience. "Our conversation then turned to Laos... I thought that in both MANN Laos and Cuba the important thing was to take affirmative action...

He said, "I just don't think ixees we ought to get involved in Laos... I don't see how we

can make any move in Laos, which is 5,000 miles away, if we don't make a move in Cuba,

which is only 90 miles away."

Nixon offered him all the support possible, inclusing the use of his personal influence, "if either the "uban or the Far East Crises involves an American armed forces commitment..."

"prophetic"

He then quotes Kennedy as/saying that "with all the problems we have, if I do the right thing kind of job, I don't know whether and I am going to be here four years from now."

These "problems" were left to JFK by the administration in which Nixon was Vice Bresident. The EXECUTED Bay of Pigs part Nixon claims as his own idea.

The description of Richard Nixon the man, the politician and the national leader by Richard Nixon the writer requeires no explanations. Nor is this to suggest that by fathering the Bay of Pigs he is responsible for the assassination that alone made him President. It is to suggest - and it falls short - the extent of Nixon's personal and political involvement with anti-Castro activities and anti-Castro Cubans, four of whom, acting for him, were caught in The Watergate. Many others did and were not caught. Three waterwarks burglarized the office of Daniel Ellsberg's doctor for him.

under whom in The Watergate and elsewhere all Nixon's Cubans labored This same E. Howard Hunt/fills in the gaps. In his Give Us this Day he tells what

in his own writing Nixon did not, Nixon'd actual role in the Bay of Pigs past elementing actual role in the Bay of Pigs past elementing past elementing actual role in the Bay of Pigs past elementing past elementing actual role in the Bay of Pigs past elementing past ele

Hunt's life's work was as a clandestine operator for the CIA, his rank ranging upward to Station Chief. After the Bay of Pigs he reportedly worked for Akken Dulles personally when Dulles was Director, Central Intelligence. Hunt also wrote some 40 hero trivial novels mostly fantasies of spooking in which he is the poorly-hidden, if hidden at all. In them he is great lover and irrestible; great spook; great brain and political thinker. His also unhidden enemies in his fictions are the Kennedys, particularly in The Coven, part of a trilogy written under one of many pen names, that of his two sons combined, David St. John. Hunt was a political potboiler while he spooked around the world.

In 1956 he was part of the CIA's overthrow of the democratically-elected Guatemalan of Jacobo Arbenz, government/considered "Communist" by the administration of which Richard Nixon was Vice President.

As Hunt tells the story - and he is the name-dropper, having known many important people mamm more of whom we shall meet - "In March 1960 I was having coffee with the newly elected president of the country to which I was assigned" when he was informed of "an urgent cable" awaiting him. Long before this book appeared it was public that the country was Uruguay, Hunt was static CIA Station Chief and he was in trouble with headquarters over allegedly shady deals.

"...I was wanted at Headquarters the following day to discuss a priority assignment, and it was signed jointly by Richard Bissell, Chief of Clandestine Services, and his first assistant. Tracy Barnes." (p.22)

Barnes had been honcho on the CIA's, Nixon's and Eisenhower's view of deomcracy, everthrowing elected governments. (p. 23)

"My job, Tracy told me, would be essentially the same... Chief of Political Action" in themplanned overthrows of Castro.

This meant "form and guide the Cuban government-in-exile, accompany itsm members to a liberated Havana and stay on until after the first post-Castro elections." (pp. 39-40)

Unless one has read Hunt's writing, the inevitable result of making him the political his novel

chief of the Bay of Pigs can't be credited. He is so far to the right that in/Berlin casts

Ending he has Willy Brandt, the anti-Communist West German political leader, as the Kremlin's chief agent in western Europe!

Putting him in as political chief of the Nixon operation meant that he would alienate all Cubans to the left of the John Birch society and would turn it over to Batistianas.

Hunt's own version in EXEXXECK give Us This Day is that he quit when he could not keep out of it at the very last moment those Cubans who were only mildly liberal. His and support may selection of and association with Batista's followers is not disguised.

His hape was for a Batista government without Batista.

He and his beliefs, which are sincerely held, carry him so far to the right that his greatest heros are those around the ultra-conservative Havana paper, Diario de la Marina, which I expans helped expose as Nazi-oriented and Nazi-associating back before the United States was attacked in World War II.

Nixon had a representative present when Hunt got his orders as political chief of Nixon's Vice-Presidential operation, "Brigadier General Robert Cushman, USMC. A few years earlier as a colonel detailed to CIA Cushman had shared an office with me. ...Bob was now Military aide to Vice President Nixon."

"Bob", later prominent on TV during the Senate Watergate hearings because of his illegal Help to Hunt when Hunt was Nixon's chief White House spock, told Hunt that Nixon "was the projects action officer within the White House, and that Nixon wanted nothing to go wrong. ...He gave me his private telephone numbers and asked that I call him night or day whenever his services might be needed." Meaning Nixon's, whose aide on this and on all military matters Cushman was. (p.40).

But when Hunt wanted to make the Bay of Pigs a far-right only operation, "Unfortunately, when I later needed them, Nixon and Cushman warm had been supplanted by a new administration."

(p. 40)

And Hunt's political favorites had access to Nixon. (p. 43)

Nixon had many connections with the anti-Castroites, political connections.

However, Nixon is not remowned for his modesty. He was anything but modest in his own representation of his responsibility for the concept of the Bay of Pigs. He was he was uncharactefistically modest, in writing about it after its inevitable failure, in never ever saying what Hunt reports.

This can be easily explained. His scheme was one of the most spectacular and most costly disasters in all of United States history. It was almost impossible to do more to ruin international respect for the United States or to impair our foreign relations.

Nixon'd characterization of its immorality and illegality when he sought to piny a bum rap on his opponent, JFK, is accurate and in point. It is an astounding self-description.

Naturally, Nixon was not about to assume responsibility for the unprecedented fiasco. By seeming to detach himself from everything other than the plan itself he could - and he didblame his hated opponent, JFK, for the failure that was Nixon's own design and the execution of the administration of which he was part a heartbeat from the top, where he was the President's "action officer," as Hunt describes it.

And had his own military aide in close supervision.

It is inevitable that not later than 1960 Nixon and Hunt were not strangers. If they had been earlier.

This can and I believe does explain much of Nixon's fears and acts after the "unt/Nixon gang was caught inside The Watergate.

The first thing the White House did after those arrests was misrepresent to the point of lying about Hunt's connect with it. Speaking for the Nixon, his spokesman, Ken Clawson, immediately led the press to believe that Nixon unt was long since gone from the White House - since March 29, 1972. The truth is that Hunt was Nixon's consultant at the time of and for several days of these break-in, as he was when he planned it. He the overall spying operation did swear that he did plan it when he testified to the Senate Watergate committee. (H____) — Thus he was Nixon's agent in the crime, if nothing more. And thus the need for all the official lying that ensued. And more to which we shall come.

As "ixon is an intense hater, so also can he and does he reward those he believes served him well or can and who are loyal to him. The personal loyalty is one of the most predominating themse themes in the confession before the Senate Watergate committee, beginning with its first witness on its first day of hearings.

Robert Everton Cushman, Jr., was a colonel when he became Nixon's Vice Presidential military aide and personal watcher-over of the Hunt/Bay of Pigs operation. He rose to general in this post. And as soon as Nixon became President he appointed Cushman to be Deputy Director, Central Intelligence, the CIA's Number 2 man.

Had Nixon not been more than satisfied with 'ushman's services and his politics and his loyalty, he would never have made him the nation's second in command of intelligence. But one can examine Cushman's biography of himself in Who's Who without apprent seeing and record of any intelligence experience. In fact, Cushman also said almost nothing of his military experience, either.

It is one of the shortest Who's Who entries. The first third of this brevity is family data. He refers to but a single overseas assignment in what follows, as "comdr.

3d Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam until 1969." Cushman is so vague that he neglects including when he assumed this post from which Nixon promoted him to Number 2 Spook.

In a military lifetime then in its fourth decade - it began at the Naval Academy from straight which he graduated in 1935 - he lists only two other/assignments, "asst chief staff USMC, 1962-64; comdt. gen. USMC base Camp Pendleton, Cal., from 1976 1964." Until when he omits. Aside from this his military career is represented in toto by "advanced through the grades to maj. gen., 1968."

His description of his service to Nixon is "asst to v.p. for necessity nat. security affairs, 1957-61."

national security affairs to the Vice President of the United States, there is nothing in this biography to indicate any special qualification. Either Cushman is an exceptionally reticent man, especially for the military, who love to adorant their breasts with all the ribbons for foreign service and other military duties, or the absence of any specification

represent, his qualification - an intelligence gareer.

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Such a career would qualify him to be Deputy Director, Central Intelligence, and there is reason to believe it was his life's work in the Marines.

Comparing his Who's Who account of his own life with Hunt's when Hunt was still in CIA, it is entirely consistent. Hunt made no mention of CIA. He listed his assignments by his official covers, generally diplomatic. I know a reporter who believes he saw ushman on duty in the office of the Narral U.S.Naval Attache in China before World War II. All military attaches are official and officially-recognized spies. And then there are teo other ways in which Hunt helps show this, one because of a clandestine tape Cushman made of a conversation they had when Hunt was in the White House and Cushman was made of a conversation they had when Hunt was in the White House and Cushman was made of a conversation they had when Hunt was in the White House and Cushman was made something Hunt wrote that coincides with it.

From his 1935 graduation from Annapolis until become Nixon's military aide in 1957 there is no date in Cushman's biography.

In what we have quoted, Hunt wrote that "A few years earlier as a colonel detailed to CIA, Cushman had shared an office with me." (p.39) The vagueness has a point. What is "a few years" before 1960? And in writing of his meeting with Tracy Barnes on reaching Washington after that emergency cable, Hunt said, "We had a common OSS background and five years earlier I had worked for Tracy as a member of the CIA team that usted Jacobo Arbenz from Guatemala." Later on the same page (23), he describes his Cuban gang as a reunion, "aca a cadre of officers at I had worked with against Arbenz."

"Rivery earlier" that he and Cushman shared that CIA office and from Hunt's biography is is the only time they could have.

Or, it seems that Marine Corps Colonel Cushman was also part of the CIA's overthrowing of an elected government and the installation of a lingering military dictatorship, which served it as the main training base for the Bay of Pigs.

After this internation adventure in ending deomcracy in the name of democracy, Hunt was assigned to Uruguay and Cushman became Nixon's national-security assistant. And

a general.

If such adventures fell within Nixon's responsibilities as ke's Vice President, one wonders what his role may of been in this Guatemalan affair. And whom he may have met and been associated with.

After Cushman violated the law to help Nixon's Watergate crew when it was called "The Plumbers" and he was \$ second man at CIA, Nixon promoted him even higher, to be Commandant of the Marine Corps. In manuscring reporting the announcement November 30, 1971, the Associated Press said that before becoming DCI "on April 21, 1969, Cushman commander the III Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam for more than 18 months. Comparing this with Cushman's official biography would seem to leave another void.

This prestigeous assignment for Cushman surprised "some circles" at the Pentagon,

AP reported. The Pentagon expected another General of the same rank to be appointed.

They "felt Cushman's CIA assignment was of such importance that he would not be tapped for a purely military post."

Cushman became that important in two years at the CIA and no other intelligence experience?

The Washington Post's military writer, Michale Getler, added detail in his story of December 1, after the EMERSIN appointment was official. Two other general, had been favored in the Pentagon, Both were experienced combat commanders. One ranked Cushman, the other was considered a "defense intellectual."

Getler described Cushman as "a close personal friend of the President" and noted that promotion to four-star rank went with the job, as did "a spot along with the heads of the other three services on the "oint Cjiefs of Staff- the nation's top military council."

Or, Nixon was packing the top military policy body with close personal friends and planted an experienced and his personal spook on it.

Nixon lost no control over CIA, which he was soon enough to bring under even greater control. He appointed another personal friend and associate of the past, his long-time translator and his Vice Presidential translator, General Vernon Walter, to take Cush-and his place at in CIA and in the gavors he extorted from CIA. Especially in The Watergate.

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It goes without saying that both Nixonian generals remained Nixon's friends after
The Watergate and after their testimony about their parts.

These are the like-minded through whom, as he placed them in authority throughout the government, Nixon gradually, Watergate or no Watergate, made it over as he wanted it made over, into a more authoritarian government - on all levels and in all branches.

A glimpse into the kinds of people they are is provided by that second bit of Funt evidence dealing with whether or not Cushman had a spook past. Cushman swore falsely about his reasons for it, but when his old friend and officemate Hunt came to visit him in Nixon's behalf and Ehrlichman's order already conveyed to Cushman, Gushman had his office bugged and taped their conversation. This was july 22, 1971.

The transcript somehow escaped the shredders. Some friends and fellow spooks when they bug each other in secret. (Hunt did it to others.)

What the White House wanted and Hunt specified it was both illegal and improper for the CIA to supply. It included the creation of false identities and the providing of technical equipment. These aspects will interest us in another context.

After the arrangements were completed they engage in small talk for several pages,

CIA

not counting what was omitted, not all of which is encompassed by the/transcriber's

note on the seventh page,""(The chatted here, but I skipped over it for the time being.)"

In their transcribed ramblings, Cushman asked to be remembered to Ehrlichman. "He's an old friend of mine from previous days." Not the Bixon Vice Presidency days.

Hunt asked to have delivery made where he was not so well known. He was well known at CIA headquarters. "I'm sure they have (safe) facilities downtown." (He meant what is known as a "safe house", a place for clandestine meetings. Cushman replied, "They sure as hell did on my last tour of duty here." After Hunt says his private office downtown "was practically an FE division. They had that many spooks, "Gushman reminisces about his clandestine meetings. "The place I used to meet people was an office building—wight near where the Press Glub is——it was the Washington Building....There used to be a night club on the second floor, and we used to meet people up there. I had a gal who just thought it was just lots of funk to be in this business. She used to have me meeting people out on damn park benches and all this stuff, and I'd give her hell, if

necessary. She just thought it was fun, playing a game ... "

It was the Madrillon, a fine Spanish restaurant which stayed open officially until 2 a.m. and unofficially for me and the fiends I also met there until our parties wore out. It had a band, there was dancing, and, of course, drinks.

Hunt didn't indicate recognition of the Washington Building. The spook in him cut off the chatter from him.

Extra space

In even Nixon's restrictive representation of The Watergate, as limited to that single one of his numerous crimes and to se committed for him and those involved, this is relevant to investigating The Watergate and to reporting it. Especially "investigative recording." But it was never put together for popular comprehension by the major media. If most of it was public domain and in my files and the rest - the single quoted CIA document - was as available to anyone as it was to me and was printed in full after the Senate Watergate Committee released it to the papers, then it represents no secrets.

Yet noweh nowhere have I seen it reported that all these Nixonian paths all connected with even this irrationally restrictive concept of The Watergate had corssed, that the central characters were not strangers before The Watergate, and that they all connected, directly with the Bay of Pigs and the revanchist Cubans who were part of The Watergate in "ixon's and in the true senses.

Nobody chose to remember that Nixon had claimed the ay of Pigs as his own and that he thus had previous connections with its characters.

Or that his personal friend and adviser on "national security" matters and his direct Bay of Pigs overseer and his chief spook in residence at the White House, Hunt, the architect of his personal spy operation that lead to the Watergate, were also old plans and office mates.

This brief encapsulation is but a small fragment of what for so long led to the unimpeachment of Richard Nixon, as it is also what made him shake in public and hide himself for so long.

And participate in other impeachable criminal offenses to which, in due time, we shall come.

Ourt thanks to Hunt, the spook who blabbed.

None of the many official investigations told us.

Nor did the media.