

"Id He Going to Blow the White House?"

The foregoing selections were made to show guilt and intent. In a special perspective, nothing is more important than the bribing of Hunt. These selections are proof of Nixon's guilt of what he knew were criminal offenses.

But what is never addressed in the tapes and was never addressed in public discussion, official or private, is the reason for bribing Hunt, the reason for the recognized need.

Whether or not Nixon was a criminal prior to the June 17, 1972 arrests, he became one immediately thereafter, as his own transcripts of his own tapes prove.

Through all of the Watergate agony there lingered a hardcore of unseeing, those unwilling to see and understand the obvious. One reason for using these fuller quotations is an effort to satisfy some of them. Most can't be satisfied because to them Nixon is a special kind of god. Others may continue to wonder if the selection is truly faithful. For them there is this list of other references to ~~Hunt~~ Hunt:

1A here, numbers serially on, in paragraph.

Hunt's first lawyer, Bittman, was an unindicted co-conspirator. He was Nixon's blackmail agent. There are these other references to him: 1B here, serially, paragraph.

The lack of comprehension reflected in The New York Times' editing and annotation of the Bantam edition is exemplified in its "Who's Who" (pp.805-812). There is no mention of Robert Bennett, of Robert Mullen or of the Mullen agency. While this does also represent the avoidance of mention by Nixon and his henchmen, it does not mean that there was no mention and no reason for inclusion in a Who's Who. Bennett is identified on page 293 as the son of the Senator who was Nixon's friend and as Hunt's employer.

1C This is merely another way of saying that all the use possible was not made of these transcripts.

In part this can be attributed to their sheer bulk.

This can also be true of the preceding chapter, which is largely direct quotation of parts. Excerpting them further, condensing them more, can help understanding and can illustrate the predominance in Nixon's mind of neutralizing the acute problem Hunt presented. Graf here. The first excerpt begins:

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Compare these omissions, for example, with the first listing, "Acree, Vernon D. (Mike) - Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs," who is not important; or the second, "Adams, Sherman - a top assistant to President Eisenhower who resigned in a gift-taking scandal," who is hardly relevant compared to the Bennett-Mullen operation.

...a direct threat against Ehrlichman... 'I will bring John Ehrlichman  
...knees and put him in jail...seamy things for him...' and this not  
about Ellsberg. (pp. 144-5)

Nixon knew ~~that~~ "He was trying to get something there because ITT was giving  
us a bad time." ~~and~~ "he" was Hunt. (p. 152)

"I think Hunt knows a hell of a lot more," Nixon told Dean. <sup>(p. 165)</sup> If Nixon was playing  
devil's advocate, Dean told him it was so and Nixon knew either way. Haldeman was  
"afraid you are right." (p. 165) ~~Nixon~~ was explicit.

Nixon added, "He knows what he's got." (p. 165)

Nixon: "...is Hunt prepared to talk about other activities that he engaged in...  
to blow the White House...?" (p. 292)

Nixon: "...we have these weaknesses - in terms of blackmail." (p. 157)

Nixon: "... the whole (expective deleted) is so full of problems with potential  
criminal liabilities... I don't want any criminal liabilities." (p. 164)

When Dean told Nixon "cutting it at Liddy...requires a continuing perjury" Nixon  
was not being devil's advocate when he said that "requires total commitment and  
control over all the defendants," with worry about if <sup>u</sup> they are let down." By  
Strachan,  
name Nixon then said "this means keeping it off" Kalmbach, Haldeman, Dean and Chapin. (p. 164)

If these or others are called to testify <sup>Noxon said</sup> they "can take the 5th Amendment", and  
<sup>the</sup> as Nixon advised perjury not easy to prove, "You can say I don't remember. You can  
say I can't recall." <sup>(p. 170)</sup> (In addition, "we would insist on Executive ~~Priv~~ Privilege before  
the Committee" or say that can't talk because "It is a matter before the Grand Jury." (p. 171)

When Nixon asked Dean if it "is not really a viable option" <sup>if</sup> we "Hunker down  
and fight," Dean warned him "It is a high risk. A very high risk." (p. 177) <sup>told</sup>

...they discuss taking executive privilege - and Haldeman <sup>told</sup>  
Nixon that Colson "thinks you're nuts" if you don't," Nixon at first <sup>said</sup> says they have  
to wait until Haldeman says, and that takes you up to June 17th. What would you do  
after June 17th? Without hesitation Nixon replied, "Use the Executive Privilege  
on that." (pp. 261-2)

When Nixon tells Ziegler what to say of ~~what~~ of what "is totally true" that it is "totally untrue", that their "position is to withhold information and to cover up." Ziegler understood and repeated his orders:

- "Z. Cover up and withhold information. dashes in transcript rather than periods after initials
- "P. Cover up and withhold information.
- Z. And then bang into it."

It is interesting to note that in these except excerpts fear ~~even mention of~~ <sup>4</sup> that disappears after he was paid off. Nixon worries about Mitchell "popping off." (p-282)  
 If "they get Mitchell" they'll soon have the others, including "Colson and the rest." (p-305)

Recognizing that "the cover -up" is "a second crime," Nixon worries, "Do you think they could keep going on the cover up even if Mitchell went in?" [to testify] (p-309-10)  
 (That was April 14, of which Nixon said "I have to bite the Dean bullet today.") 300  
 Even though he admitted "that Dean only tried to do what he could to pick up the pieces" to save him.) 328

They had ~~never~~ admitted reason to worry about Mitchell or anyone else "popping off" because, as Ehrlichman confessed, "There were 8 or 20 people around here who... knew it was going on. Bob [Haldeman] knew, I knew, all kinds of people knew." Confession 328  
 being the bulletObiting day's mood, Nixon confessed promptly, "Well, I knew it. I knew it."

Nixon adds he knew Dean was paying out money. Ehrlichman got to the bulletbiting by telling Nixon that "if the wrongdoing which justifies Dean's dismissal is his knowledge that that operation was going on, then you can't stop with ~~Dean~~ him [Dean]. You've got to go through a [sic] whole place wholesale." Nixon understood. His immediate rejoinder was, "Fire the whole staff." 328

He returned to this, after saying "Mitchell's case is a killer" to acknowledge "half he the staff is guilty." 333

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They were certain Strachan would perjure himself. They evaluated as "awfully remote" what Nixon described as "Dean rumbling around here and asking you [Ehrlichman] and ~~Robert F. Kennedy~~ Haldeman how about getting us some money for the Watergate defendants." 376  
 Nixon knew Kalmbach had been approached on Ehrlichman's agreement "to raise some money. For the purpose of paying ~~the~~ the defendants. For the purpose of keeping the 'on the reservation'," not compassion. He said this tied his top two

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men "on a conspiracy to obstruct justice." (399)

Nonetheless Nixon ordered that "these guys that participated in raising money, etc., have got to stick to their line - that they did not raise money to obstruct justice." However, as they spent the day rambling, Nixon did also say that "the obstruction of justice thing...is our main problem because it involves other people." He then ticked off a long list before he got to "The people you've got with obstruction are Hunt and Glodblatt and Bittman." (He meant Henry Rothblatt, lawyer for the Cubans.) Knowing that Bittman handled the Hunt payoff, Nixon described him as "a bag man" of whom Ehrlichman said "he's worked himself out a haven in all of this." (4345)

They didn't have to discuss how Hunt was obstructing justice. Nixon said it was the case and they let it rest at that. Now how could these three, the two lawyers and Hunt be obstructing justice with money? Only by bribing the other defendants into silence. Nixon ~~understood it to mean~~ understood it to mean "they wanted the defendants to shut up in court" and was assured by Ehrlichman this was the reason. 436

Not knowing that Nixon knew the whole story, Dean said it all out to him two days later, that in return for being silent "about the scary things I did at the White House" Hunt had demanded "\$72,000 for my personal expenses, \$50,000 for my legal fees," and that when Dean asked Mitchell "is that problem with Hunt straightened out?" Mitchell said, "I think that problem is solved." 570

Nixon then admitted that he, Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman are among those who "had knowledge" of this bribe. 570

It Nixon also knew the reason for this rushed payment to Hunt. Haldeman's explanation was, "I will tell you the reason for the hurry up in the timing was that we learned that Hunt was going to testify on Monday afternoon." 528

Much as they strained and struggled, they found no certain way around this bribery. Nixon knew they were all "aware of it." He worried about what Strachan and Kalmbach would say about "the 350 thing," meaning that \$350,000. He told Ehrlichman "you can't go in and say I didn't know what in the hell he wanted the \$250[000] for." 625

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Despite what he was later to say, he also worried that "Dean...talked to me...about the need for \$120,000 for clemencies," an interesting slip because he denied there had been any clemency conversation about Hunt and the \$21 \$120,000 was for Hunt. He was still admitting he had told Dean, "I guess you could get that." 623

Nixon's own versions of his tapes for March 21 say more. Dean was talking about money. Nixon asked, "How much do you need?" The "million dollars" was "not easy," Nixon said, but "I know where it could be gotten." But he cautioned, "there shouldn't be a lot of people running around getting money." 147

This can't reasonably be twisted into devil's advocacy even in what has to be assumed to be less than a completely honest transcription.

It also shows Nixon's certain knowledge about <sup>148</sup> Hunt, that "Your major guy to keep under control/ his <sup>Hunt</sup>" but no question why. As a matter of fact, nobody ever asked why Nixon was worried about Hunt more than all others, even more than all those so close to him all of whom he knew were guilty of obstructing justice.

Nor was any attention paid to what Dean next warned Nixon, "He [Hunt] could sink Chuck Colson." All focus was on the allegation that Hunt could ruin Ehrlichman. While only a single connection between Hunt and Ehrlichman, the Ellsberg break-in, was ever mentioned in public, there was no inquiry into what other "seamy things" allegedly attributed to Ehrlichman by Hunt ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ were or could have been. The ignored key is here. It is not that Hunt could "sink" Ehrlichman. It was Colson.

Nixon had no questions. He was the world's least curious man. Or its least uninformed.

The transcript then has him saying, "Just looking at the immediate problem, ~~damn~~ don't you think you have to handle Hunt's financial situation damn soon?" (p 148)

~~XXXXX~~ This, too, was later described as "devil's advocacy." The words as well as the context make that impossible. Dean immediately reported that "I talked with Mitchell about that last night and -" But Nixon interrupted him with an explanation of his reasoning, not a question, "It seems to me that we have to keep the cap on the bottle that much, or we don't have any options." Even if the transcript is honest and his next words were a question rather than a statement -- and the final punctuation

control - it is a statement, not devil's advocacy: "Either that or it blows off  
right now?" (148)

A few pages later, without any question mark, Nixon told Dean "It would seem to  
me that would be worthwhile," the "that" being "the million bucks" and "the proper  
way to handle it." 154

This day Hunt stayed on Nixon's mind. Another example is where, unfortunately,  
Dean interrupted him. If the interruption kept the exchange from being informative as  
it could have been, it is enough to pin guilty intent on Nixon, who has said, "But at  
the moment, don't you agree it is better to get the Hunt thing that's there that - "

"That's worth buying time on," Dean interjected. "Nixon's response can't be  
devil's advocacy. It is, "That is buying time, I agree." 156

The time bought was the time to get past Hunt's impending testimony.

Again Nixon returned to Hunt and again with no possibility of "devil's advocacy."  
He told Dean of  
~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ "stonewalling" and "taking the heat" when he warned "there are  
vulnerable points there; - the vulnerable points being, the first vulnerable points  
would be obvious. That would be one of the defendants either Hunt because he is  
most vulnerable in my opinion, might blow the whistle and his price is pretty high,  
but at least we can buy the time on that as I pointed out to John," [Ehrlichman] 160

There never was any curiosity about ~~xxxxxxxx~~ why Nixon considered Hunt "most  
vulnerable" or why he named Hunt alone as one who "might blow the whistle."

He followed this with another statement, after a few words intervened, not a  
question, "Here we have ~~that~~ the Hunt problem that ought to be handled now." 161  
Not  
compassion for Hunt over his wife's death or anything like that was on Nixon's mind.  
That Hunt "might blow the whistle was."

With Haldeman in the conversation a few pages later. Dean returned to Hunt's  
"threat." Haldeman said, "It's Hunt's opportunity." Not a question, a statement of fact.  
Although there was contrived interpretation of what is now quoted without mission, there  
is no reasonable doubt that in even Nixon's version he is giving orders:

P. That's why for your immediate things you have no choice but to come up with  
\$120,000, or whatever it is. Right?

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D.- That's right.

P- Would you agree that that's the prime thing that you damn well better get that done?

D- Obviously he ought to be given some signal anyway.

P - (Expletive deleted) get it.

Making allowances for Nixon's fracturing ~~the~~ of the language, the line about "the prime thing" can't be a faithful rendition of the tape. At the least punctuation has been changed from the sense of the spoken words.

Regardless, and regardless of the expletive that was deleted, and regardless of the obvious liberty taken in punctuation, "get it" followed by a period or what certainly it should have been, "get it!" is not a question, not devil's advocacy. It is a direct and unequivocal order.

Nixon told Dean to get the money and to bribe Hunt.

Some more than three weeks later, in full recognition that "Hunt will testify that it was so-called hush money", Nixon ~~is~~ <sup>295</sup> laid out a different line, a different way of explaining his part in the bribery to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Remember that Nixon knew he was taping every word, that he alone controlled the tapes, and that he alone could quote them as he wanted. His version then was that when Dean "told me about the problem of Hunt's lawyer," which is not at all what Dean told him, "I said I don't know where you can get it," <sup>322</sup> which is exactly opposite what he had said. He told the others "you remember?"

Haldeman knew he was being bugged and taped. Ehrlichman did not. Ehrlichman admitted that Dean "talked to me about it," and that "I saw Mitchell later in the day." Here Nixon asked the question to which he knew the answer. There could be but a single purpose, to nail Ehrlichman to the wall: "What happened?" Not k Not knowing he was being taped Ehrlichman responded, "And he just said, It's taken care of." <sup>322</sup>

This is an admission that Ehrlichman knew of the bribery, of the crimes it meant, that he was guilty of keeping silence in the face of a crime or crimes.

Covering himself on faked tapes persisted in Nixon's mind and intentions. Three days later he had himself taped in a slightly different version of what he told Dean, "I don't know where we could get it, I don't know." <sup>644</sup> He followed this with a claim to



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having rebuffed Dean's suggestion, "I just shook my head," meaning no. 647

Maldeman played the same game with a fabrication that ended with Nixon's having said "that we ought not be in this --" with the anxious Nixon interrupting to exclaim, "That's right. That's right." He even has Ehrlichman saying, "(expletive removed) if you're going to get into blackmail, to hell with it." 647

Nixon was elated with what they had made up on this tape he could later produce. He did not then anticipate the entire taping system would become known:

"Good, (unintelligible). Thank ~~you~~ God you were in there when it happened." 647

Nixon then fed new lines for new false answers falsifying the taped record even more, "I didn't tell him to get the money did I?"

"No," Maldeman answered. Then to cover Maldeman, Nixon fed him a line, "you didn't either, did you?"

The cunning Maldeman was not content to protect himself. He had to nail Mitchell:

"Absolutely not! I said you got to talk to Mitchell."

Nixon was happy: "We've got a pretty good record on that one." (p 648)

True enough - the very best record he could make. Maldeman wanted to improve it. He took his cue from Nixon's "But then we got into blackmail." The tape for posterity and for later retrieval - in Nixon's personal version as transcribed, has Maldeman E explaining, "You said, 'Once you start down that path with blackmail it's constant escalation.'" He swore to this same deliberate falsehood under conditions that made it material hence perjury in his Watergate committee testimony. However, its major interest was in the tube, not the crime. It did not ask that Maldeman be charged with this perjury that was so important in keeping Nixon undispatched.

Nixon did not fail to play to Maldeman's cue: "P-Yes, that's my only conversation with regard to that." 649 There is no single part of Nixon's response that was not to his knowledge false. But he did get it onto tape.

This particular bribery was a monkey Nixon never got off his back. April 27 7746 he returned to it in a lengthy conversation in which he deliberately deceived the man in direct overall charge of the prosecution, the sanctimonious Assistant Attorney General Henry Pettersen. In its one lengthy Nixon explanation concludes, "as far as I'm

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concerned - as far as I'm concerned turned it off totally."

In another he told Petersen, "nothing was done" and "fortunately" he had witnesses. 787  
This and Dean's guilty were "the whole thing" Petersen was ~~it~~ told, with an order,  
"You've got the whole thing. <sup>Now...</sup> [kick him [Dean] straight ~~to~~." (788)

The monkey clawed and Nixon babbled on to his chief prosecutor who actually  
presided over the prosecutorial coverup, "I said, 'It can't be done. We can't do it.' " (791)

His own version of his own instructions to Dean are shorter: "Get it!"

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These are some of his omissions when he was rehearsing lies, lies so raw Ehrlichman had to caution against them, as when on April 16 he was rehearsing a "scenario" in which he would actually claim credit for the exposure of all he had suppressed. He was going to say that he had hauled all the miscreants before him after Ehrlichman told him what had been going on. "...as soon as you saw the dimensions <sup>in</sup> of this thing," id the line Ehrlichman, egged on by Aldeman, fed him, "You began to move." Fumbling as he so often did in private, Nixon asked, "Shall I say that we brought them all in?" It had not happened and it would have been proven that it had not, so Ehrlichman told him, "I don't think you can. I don't think you can." Aldeman followed with another warning, because Nixon had not done it but had done the opposite, "I wouldn't mention them by name. Just say I brought a group of people in." (p.527)

Unwelcome as American should still find it that their President and his staff are corrupt and dishonest men, it is the fact. The longer quotations from Nixon's unabashed release of his own version of his own words are intended as a fair selection to enable reader evaluation of intent and character while also giving a fair notion of the criminality involved and the special concern over Hunt, whose connections and operations were never really exposed.

There is much more in even this bobtailed version of Nixon's tapes, which are really thousands and thousands ~~an~~ of hours long. Nixon and company worried much more about Hunt and that of which he and those with whom he was associated were capable than was ever fully comprehended by the media or ever reported. What follows is an added sampling of shortened quotations where it appears not to be necessary to provide the longer quotations from which they have been taken, it being my belief that the fidelity of quotation is established by these longer quotations ~~in~~ that have been condensed for focus.

(One of the very real problems of the ~~writer~~ ~~investigator~~ writer/~~invest~~ investigator dealing with the most visceral political questions, like the political assassinations and the real inside on The Watergate is a compulsive unwillingness to believe not on the part of the

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people but by those who control what the people are allowed to learn. False standards never applied on other subjects with these are the norm.)

That Hunt monkey kept clawing at Nixon's back. Nixon could never get Hunt out of his mind. On February 28, when he started a meeting with Dean at 9:12 in the morning, Nixon was rambling on about "a fascinating book I read last night. What made it so fascinating to Nixon is that it was not his "crises" but JFK's alleged "Thirteen Mistakes." To Nixon these were "the great mistakes." And The Bay of Pigs, of course, was one. The only one Nixon mentioned. What made it this great mistake in Nixon's mind and words?

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"And what happened, had there was Chester Bowles had learned about it, and he deliberately leaked it. Deliberately, because he wanted the operation to fail! And he admitted it! Admitted it!"

This is the inside picture of the great mind of an informed President. His account, which was not without purpose, for all its emphasis is total falsehood. There was nothing to leak, except if the American people were to cease being the only people in the world unaware of what impended. Stories had appeared throughout the world and the Cuban Foreign Minister had been purpling the pages of the transcripts of the United Nations debates with detail after detail all before it happened. The Bay of Pigs was never a secret operation.

However, as Nixon was careful not to tell Dean, it was Nixon's own concept and it had failed miserably. Thus the Nixon mind needed another to blame and an explanation that would not have Nixon, in his self-concept, father of an abortion. Hating Chester Bowles was enough to lie and have the failure his fault because, falsely, Nixon said "he deliberately leaked it. Deliberately because he wanted the operation to fail."

This is one side of the sick, twisted Nixon mind. The other, on the same page (86) is the boast so soon his own Gethsemane. "You can follow these characters to their Gethsemane," he pontificated to Dean. With the typical Nixon boast to the

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worst of possible hearers, the man he had already set up to be his patsy, Dean.

"I have got to say one thing," Nixon boasted. There has never been a leak out of my office. There never will be a leak out of my office. I wouldn't begin to know how to leak and I don't want to learn how to leak." (p.86.)

Yet these transcripts abound in Nixon's mastery of and planning for the dirtiest and filiest of leaks. No administration ever mastered and practised the ~~messy~~ mastery of dishonest, angled leaks as his had.

The insight intended is not/into the corruption of the Nixon mind, his unabashed lying when he had to know his audience knew he was lying, important as that is in understanding both The Watergate and these transcripts. <sup>alone</sup> It is also into the sickness in that mind, the mind of the man who could never admit error, who had no real accomplishment in his long career and who had, forever and ever, to assure himself that he was indeed something.

All of this was blended with Hunt. The quotation on the alleged JFK Gethsemane is followed immediately, in the same short paragraph, with an abrupt switch to "I feel for those poor guys in jail, particularly for Hunt with his wife dead."

"Well, there is every indication they are hanging tough right now," Dean responded, assuringly. Nixon was not that easily assured. His next blast discloses that he knew well in advance of the popularly-accepted time that he was being blackmailed:

"What the hell do they expect though? What would you advise on that?"

Do they expect clemency in a reasonable time?...You couldn't do it, say, in six months?"

(pp.86-7)

Too political, Dean agreed.

This early - in the second of the transcripts Nixon released - there is his uninspired concern for Murby by name and in springing those who committed crimes for him and were caught in the act. (Hunt alone was then out on bond, as Dean reported on the preceding page.)

*next page, 1/ March 13,*  
Later in the same conversation (p.113) Nixon asked of Sirica, "When the hell

is he going to sentence?" Dean's answer is an early indication that the White House had a ~~plans~~ pipeline to Sirica:

"Hunt he will probably be very fair with." "Why?" Nixon asked. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
~~of~~ Dean's explanation ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ should be read with care:

"He likes Hunt - he thought Hunt was being open with him and being candid, and Hunt gave a statement in open court that he didn't know of any higher-ups involved and Hunt didn't put him through the rigors of trial. ...did not try to cause a lot of problems. Bittman was cooperative..."(p.114)

For Dean to know these beliefs and facts was improper. They could come from the judge only.

They amount to a statement that in return for making no problems for Sirica and for lying and telling less than the truth to make no problems for others Sirica liked Hunt and would be "very fair with him."

The man in charge - the man who was a direct link to Nixon and the White House - this is the one the "hanging" judge "likes" and is going to treat lightly?

Tapes of March 21 hold much conversation about Hunt. It was the time of his finally known payoff. In the morning session ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Nixon told Dean other than the public pretenses say, that "there was ~~some~~ discussion with somebody about Hunt's problem on account of his wife, and I said of course commutation could be considered on the basis of his wife's death..."(p/ 146)

This continuing Nixon worry about taking care of Hunt followed a hint by Dean about the late Mrs. Hunt, that she had known the ~~murder~~ entire sordid story:

Mrs. Hunt was the savviest woman in the world. She had put the whole picture together."

After more talk about how much bribery would cost, this million dollars, Nixon came back to Hunt still another time. The Nixon version shows the question mark on what even if put as a question is a statement: "Your major guy to keep under control is Hunt/" Dean Agreed. Nixon then said, "I think." This is not a question. What follows

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is, but there is no reason ~~throughout~~ Nixon intended more than ascertaining the extent of Dean's knowledge. He has Dean's feet on the skids already: "Does he know a lot?"

There was no comfort in Dean's answer:

"He knows so much. (The period is the Nixon version, hardly possible. What ~~Dean~~ Dean said required an exclamation point, particularly with what followed.) He could sink Chuck Colson." (p.148)

This, not the Whrlichman diversion, is what Nixon required and it is this that he followed up on with the first of his direct orders to pay Hunt off, already cited.

With Waldeman also present this came up again (p.163) because it was absolutely impossible for Hunt not to be in the front of his mind:

"What is the answer on this? How you keep it out, I don't know. You can't keep it out of Hunt talks." After some childish claims to be able to invoke "national security" Waldeman could not drop Hunt, either: "But we don't know about Hunt." (p. 164), to which Nixon's immediate rejoinder was "I think Hunt knows a hell of a lot more." (p.165) Nix chipped in, "I do, too." (p. 165)

This sampling - it is still far from all - leave unquestionable the dominance of fear of Hunt in all the deliberations and plotting about the Watergate and what it could do to Nixon and others and how to defend against all the perils without precedent in history.

They all agree that both Hunt and his wife knew all there was to know. They all say he knew "more," but not more than whom, more about what.

At no point does anyone give the slightest indication of what Hunt knows and can talk about. Nor does anyone ask. Now these are not highschool freshmen playing games. These are the President of the United States and his closest advisers supposedly worrying about his imminent ruin. Yet none has any interest in what can ruin him? It can't be from lack of interest or curiosity. But it can be because all knew more than he needed to know and each assumed the same about each of the others.

When they got close to it they skated away from the thin ice, as when Dean

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reported on what he with complete candor described as the "CONTINUING BLACKMILL operation. He ...No doubt about it..." Nixon, gingerly, asked "Was he talking about Ellsberg?" of this Hunt demand for another \$120,000. (pp. 143-4) Dean's reply says he does know more but does not say what: "Ellsberg and apparently some other things. I do not know the full extent of it."

"Instead of asking Dean what he does know Nixon played to the tape, "I don't know about anything else." (p.145)

How uncurious can a President fighting impeachment be when he is this incurious?

Dean made a gesture at exciting Nixon's interest and curiosity but he had to worry about saying what it would mean misprison, a felony, for Nixon to know if he didn't. Following a generalization of "a couple of things around here that I guess have gotten wind of" he specified "a second story job on the Brookings Institute," that Colson firebomb plot "Dean personally had aborted. (p/145)

Nixon didn't explode. When Dean rattled off the names of lawyers with knowledge, Nixon's only concern was, "But they know?" (p.15 146) Dean assured him they all did.

The wonder is not that this immediately preceded Nixon's direct order to Dean to see to it that the blackmail was paid but that Nixon felt no need to know what could make him the most disgraced President in history.

Aside from insanity, what else can account for his never wanting to know what could be attributed to him? Only one thing: he had no need to be told. He knew.

And thus only can his singular lack of curiosity about what was known be explained, as can his also singular interest in but a single aspect, and "they," wherever they might be, "now?" If they knew anything Nixon had no need to know more.

There was never any doubt of this or that it had to be the case. As we began, it was as inevitable as it was essential that Nixon know all the details from the first minute of the arrests and reports poured in from Hunt in the wee hours and from all the federal agencies all of which were promptly informed. Nixon was told in Key Biscayne. They, what was universally ignored despite the fact that it was published verbatim, before Nixon and Haldeman returned from Florida, Pat Gray stated the series of personal



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memos spilling his guts about what the FBI had learned to Waldeman for Nixon.

What Nixon knew is what was within his personal knowledge, going back to before the Bay of Pigs and what the FBI knew that "Ray kept pouring out and all his confidential aides kept telling him. Where it was crucial that there be no taped record, the tapes suffered what Haig described as "sinister forces" and were erased, they were alleged to have expired, the supply of tape just happening to end at crucial points, or Nixon held his conversations in places and on phones that were not hooked into the bugging system. Where he forgot himself, his own dictabelts dictabelts fell victim to the same "sinister forces" and were erased.

Even the details of the payoffs were known to Nixon before he raised the question with Dean, as he did early on March 21, with Waldeman present and sitting for the most part in silence, listening, the witness whom he could and later did deny.

Dean opened it with the confession, "I was present in discussions where these guys had to be taken care of." (p.142) Nixon came right back, without being fed any leads at all, "They put that under the cover of a Cuban Committee, I suppose?" (p.143). The question is rhetorical. It reflects knowledge, not invention.

Dean laid it all out, in full, conspiratorial, obstruction-of-justice-bribery-impersonation-of-a-felony- accessory after the fact detail:

"Well, they had a Cuban committee and had - some of it was given to Hunt's lawyer who in turn passed it out. You know, when Hunt's wife was flying to Chicago with \$10,000 she was actually, as I understand after the fact now, was going to pass out that money to one of the Cubans - to meet him in Chicago and pass it on to somebody there." (Odd how after this was published no reporter remembered that Mrs. Hunt had a cousin there, that he was awaiting her at the airport, and that she had Howard had had their reunion after his non-mysterious disappearance.)

Nixon's response begins with "(Unintelligible)" but what was not chained to be beyond recapture hooks him personally into these crises, "but I would certainly keep that cover for whatever it is worth." (p.143)

As with Hunt, Nixon not only knew about this "uban Committee" he kept it in mind, too. Once where his punctuation failed, important as punctuation is in understading his version of his tape trasdripts. Dean was talking about this need to raise large sums for bribing, Nixon understood this to mean "you need amillion" and when Dean said that is right" Nixon, understanding "you need it in cash" said he was "thinking out loud" and "Would you put that through the Cuban Committees?"

Not all, Dean said. So Nixon asked "Is the Cuban Committee an obstruction of justice?" to which t e closest thing Dean gave in asnwer is "Well, they have priests in it." Nixon visualized "a little bit of vover" in this. Dean saw it for this front committee and "possibly Hunt." (p. 147)

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Before putting together more that escaped official and unofficial compilation and what was so loudly pretended not to have meaning by those who for different reasons atoutly pretended Nixon was innocent of any crime, let us once again and condensed ~~me~~ even more review Nixon's person knowledge or and participation in crimes. Each of the <sup>hunt</sup> quotations that follows, all relating to Hunt, is Nixon's own words:

"Hunt knows a hell of a lot more." (p. 165)

Hunt "knows what he's got" (P.165)

"other activities...blow the White House." (P.292)

"We have these weaknesses - in terms of blackmail." (p. 157)

"criminal liabilities." (P. 164)

"requires control over all the defendants." (pp. 164-5)

"I knew it. I knew it." (p.328)

"raising money" was "obstructing justice" ~~in~~ (p. 434) to get "the defendants to shut up in court."(p.436)

Bittman was "a bag man." (p.148)

"Your major guy to keep under control is Hunt. " (p.148)

"We have to keep the cap on the bottle ...or it blows right now."(p. 148)

Bribing Hunt is "buying time." (p. 156)

"Hunt...might blow the whistle." (p. 160)

His price is pretty high." (p. 160)

"You have no choice but to come up with ~~the~~ \$120,000. ...Get it."~~112~~ (p. 172)

No punctuation, no interpretation, no explanation can change these personal, original Nixon admissions. *These are his own words.*

When the Senate Watergate committee did not call Colson, master of sirty tricks, early in its investigation - certainly befor the grand jury could designate him a target and justify his invocation of the Fifth Saondment - it was a certain sign of intent to do and expose less than it could. I know the "mistake" of calling Jon John Mitchell before Ehrlichman, who was sure to ag garrot him, was deliberate. Whether or not this was the case with Colson I don't know. But anyone familiar with the method methods of serious investigation should have understood the need to get him on the record and under oath before the slick liar had a chance to know what was known about him. He could always be called back after that record was made, to confront the evidence gathered later. <sup>1</sup> This Colson was able to eescape giving public testimony, which was also essential to the unimpeachment of Richard Nixon. And he was able to cop a plea to a single count and disappear behind jail doors with relatively light punishment.

Colson was so <sup>dangerous and</sup> important a witness, knew so much, that even Nixon was afraid of him. So were the others close to Nixon.

Were there space, this would be an appropriate place for a separate chapter titled "Before Colson Found Christ in the White House."

For a man so much in the news, one of the few with direct access to Nixon, frequent access particularly at crucial Watergate moments, Colson escaped the attention he warranted and the investigation the absence of which alone is assurance that there was no real Watergate investigation - ever.

Nixon's apprehensions over Colson are implicit and explicit. In all three large volumes of transcripts he was forced to release, 877 pages in the small-type Dantam edition, there is no single conversation between him and Colson, his in-house chief of dirty tricks.

Without explanation and immediately after Dean had discussed in generalities this secret and very large Vesco cash contribution, Nixon, out of the blue, in a paragraph having to do with personnel forms, suddenly told Dean that Colson "has a lot of vulnerabilities." (p. 78) This was when Colson was making noises about filing his own civil suit. "Keep him out of it. Keep him out of it," Nixon ordered (p. 78)

A little while later, when Haldeman had joined in and they were discussing keeping secrets from Colson, Dean "wouldn't even tell Chuck." Haldeman asked, "There is no reason to tell 'huck, is there?" Nixon suggested "Tell him he is not to say anything." (P. 94)

In no interpretation is this expression of trust or confidence in Colson. It is expression of fear of what he could do, of what of which he is ~~not~~ capable.

Shortly later, in the same meeting, Nixon distinguished between what he knew and what interested "them," meaning the Senate Watergate committee. "They are after Haldeman," chiefly. (P. 116) But, "bob didn't know any of these people like the Unts and all that hunch. Colson did." (p. 116)

Immediately afterward (p. 117) Dean reporting having told Colson he had "indication" of Colson's involvement in a number of "seamy" matters. Colson, he said, denied it. This followed Nixon's initiative, "Where do you see Colson coming into it? ... He sure as hell knows Hunt. That we know. Was very close to him." (p. 117)

Nixon was deeply worried about Colson and his "vulnerabilities." He followed this quotation with words apparently hedged for Dean's special benefit but are explicit enough about Colson, "he could know quite a great deal about a lot of other things." (p.117)

Dean added new worries to Nixon's knowledge and about both Hunt and Colson, linking them: "He [Hunt] knows so much. He could sink <sup>h</sup>uck Colson." (p.148) To Nixon "sinking" Colson meant sinking Nixon. It is at this point he ordered Hunt's money demands be met. "Or it blows right now?"

The pressure was not relieved <sup>with</sup> Dean's report on "Colson's going away party," when he left Nixon's payroll. Hunt was at that party! Dean put it this way: "Chuck had <sup>mighty</sup> some/serious words with his friend Howard and has some mighty serious messages back." (pp.160-1)

Nixon had a chance to say only "Well" when Haldeman interrupted to make a sharp ~~pit~~ point, "That is where your dangers lie." (p. 161) He added "I don't think you want to give Chuck any more knowledge than he's already got." Nixon said "OK."

Discussion of Colson continued for several pages. Nixon could see he "may have been the triggerman" in the break-in bugging job. (p.162)

They got to the defendants and the ploy to cut the White House connection of <sup>f</sup> with Liddy, although Hunt was a Nixon employee when it all happened. Haldeman was uneasy. "But we don't know about Hunt. Maybe Hunt has that tied into Colson." (P.164) It is here that Nixon offered his belief, "I think Hunt knows a hell of a lot more." (p. 165) He then added, of Colson "playing hard ball" and Ehrlichman, "He knows what he's got." (p. 165) And this is an admission that Nixon also knew.

Later when the "runaway" grand jury described by Ehrlichman as "mean" "meaning the Vesco Grand Jury," Nixon asked, "You think Colson knew about that?" (p.293)

Their worries were without limit or end and in so many they could not avoid the always absent Colson. They were worried about Magruder's perjury. Nixon raised the Colson worry, after "what do you think Mr. Colson is going to be doing? You're not going to tell him about this are you? I wouldn't think so." Ehrlichman told him, "Colson is undoubtedly sending all kinds of signals to Mr. Hunt." He was interrupted

When Nixon was really worried about the potential of the Senate Watergate investigation not yet started, he began an April 14, 1973 meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman at 8:55 a.m. Nixon expressed worry over whether Hunt or Liddy would involve Colson. He was assured that Colson had a solid alibi. This is the ~~critical~~ point at which, out of the blue, Nixon had said, "Question, for example, is Hunt prepared to talk about other activities that he engaged in? ...is he going to blow the White House?" (p.292)

Lumping Colson and Hunt and Hunt's ability to ~~blow the White House~~ "blow the White House" was not paranoid and was not without basis. Hunt could "blow the White House," which is the reason he was paid off. And despite the way it was put, that Hunt had threatened to expose this "seamy" things he had done for Ehrlichman, Hunt had done these jobs not for Ehrlichman, who was unable to say a word without admitting these other jobs. Hunt from the first to the end worked for Colson, who loaned him to Ehrlichman for one known job only, the Ellsberg break-in.

So it is not only Hunt who could "blow the White House." Colson could have, too. His knowledge and his known complete lack of scruple are the reasons for all others, including Nixon, fearing Colson.

Colson also was the link between the Bennett/Mullen/ Hunt-CIA jobs and the White House. Colson, ~~who~~ had known Bennett from their Senate days together and had worked with Bennett on his father's re-election campaign. They were friends. No sooner had Bennett taken over the Mullen agency than Colson, in an effort to build him up, tried to build him up more. One of the documents the Watergate committee avoided using in its so-called Hunt investigation and Baker avoided in his so-called CIA expose is a letter Colson wrote Agnew staffer Roy Goodearle. After it was typed Colson wrote "Confidential" in the upper right-hand corner and then underlined it.   
 And how to build Bennett's influence with Hughes for political benefit to the White House.

The letter abounds in quotation of Bennett about Howard Hughes. Here is how it begins:

"Bob Bennett, son of Senator Wallace Bennett of Utah, has just left the Department of Transportation to take over the Mullen Public Relations Agency firm here in Washington. Bob is trusted loyalist and a good friend. We intend to use him on a variety of outside projects."

There were all these "outside projects," <sup>- Watergate -</sup> throughout Colson, and Bennett and Hunt, who did them, all could "blow the White House." But not, of course, without "blowing" themselves.

In this connection, it should be remember that although Colson alone had the combination to Hunt's safe, when it was decided that Hunt's safe had to be emptied after Hunt's warning that it was loaded, Colson pretended he did not have the combination. Instead of opening the safe, which would have disclosed his closeness to Hunt and destroyed his pretense that they had no occupational connection, Colson let the GSA people crack the safe.



B by Haldeman's opinion, "And that Chuck is overkill..." (P. 404)

Still later in reporting a conversation with Petersen, Nixon disclosed that he had asked in connection with the possible indictment of White House people, "What about Colson?" Petersen mentioned "three areas" of possible indictment. (p.525)

Colson was figured as without scruple, that "if Colson gets hung up anywhere, he will go for Ehrlichman," as Haldeman, who felt safe from Colson, laid it out. (p.532)

Is it any wonder that when closeted with only his most trusted, His Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Ziegler and those faithful bugs, Nixon finally finally muttered what his transcript describes as "unintelligible" followed by "I got to get out of this- "  
(p. 643)

Or that he considered Colson "capable of anything?"

Anything?

Even finding Christ?

In the White House?

Bribery is a serious crime. It is one of the specific crimes the Constitution calls an unimpeachable offense.

Nixon did bribe Hunt and to a lesser degree, Hunt's subordinates, through Hunt.

Why Hunt?

Why was Nixon so deeply worried about Hunt and *Paying him alone off?*

Why did not and could not the others lean on Nixon for the fortune his crimes for Nixon yielded Hunt? *And why and how did Hunt dare blackmail a President?*

It is because more than Hunt's safe was loaded with dynamite that could "blow" Nixon. Hunt could talk about Nixon and his connections all the way back to the Bay of Pigs, in which they had been associated.

Colson also was privy. Colson is among those who tried to bring Hunt into that White House "public relations" job the end of 1969, one that he appears to have filled later through the Mullen connection.

Hunt was caught and jailed. Colson, Bennett Nixon and others were of higher status and free. Hunt could have ruined any one and through any one, without ever mentioning Nixon's name, could have ruined Nixon.

"Is he going to blow the White House?" was a legitimate Nixon worry.

There were countless White House employees who could have blackmailed, not just Hunt. He is the one known to have, regardless of the fancy words he used to give it a less repugnant name.

In a conversation that lasted from 8:58 until ~~9:14~~ 9:14 p.m. April 16, De

Dean warned Nixon "That building next door [the Executive Office Building] is full of people who knew that money was being raised for these people," meaning the payoffs to the original defendants. "Yes, sir, just full of them." (p.626)

Yet Hunt only blackmailed. Any one with knowledge could have.